balanced the extreme hazard of their attempts, even if the French had in either case been successful.

The next cavalry engagement took place near Campo Mayor, about the end of March. Colonel Napier, after noticing the retreat from the town, of 1200 cavalry and 3 battalions of infantry, some horse artillery and 13 battering guns, the whole under Gen. Latour Maubourg, thus describes the action which took place during the pursuit of the Allied troops.

"Colonel Colborne was on the right, at a considerable distance from the enemy, but Colonel Head, with the 13th Light Dragoons, was on the left close to them, and supported by Colonel Otway, with two squadrons of the 7th Portuguese; the heavy cavalry was in reserve; and while in this state, the French hussars, suddenly charging with a loose rein from behind their infantry, fell, some on the Portuguese and some on the 13th Light Dragoons. So fiercely did these last on both sides come together, that many men were dismounted by the shock, and both parties pierced clean through to the opposite side, then re-formed, and passed again in the same fearful manner to their own ground; but Head's troopers rallied quicker than the French, and riding a third time closely in upon them, overthrew horse and man, receiving, at the same time, the fire of the infantry squares. Nevertheless, they galloped in upon the battering train, hewed down the gunners, and drawing up beyond the French line of march, barred their way, in the expectation that the heavy cavalry would also fall on; but Beresford would not suffer the latter to charge, and the French infantry returned to their guns, and resumed their march, but the 13th and the Portuguese continued the pursuit in a rash and disorderly manner, even to the bridge of Badajoz, and being repulsed by the guns of the fortress, were followed by Mortier in person, and lost some prisoners. Of the Allies 100 men were killed or hurt, and about 70 taken. Of the enemy about 300 suffered, one howitzer was taken, and the French Colonel Chamorin was slain in single combat by a trooper of the 13th."

After a few observations on Lord Beresford's conduct on the occasion, Colonel Napier adds

"The 13th were reprimanded, perhaps justly, for pursuing too rashly without orders, but the unsparing admiration of the whole army consoled them."

Three weeks had not elapsed after this affair before we again find Colonel Napier making honourable and deserved mention of this same gallant regiment.

"Two French regiments of cavalry advancing from Llerena to collect contributions, had reached Usagre, where meeting with the British cavalry, they were suddenly charged by the 13th Dragoons, and followed for six miles so vigorously, that 300 were killed or taken without the loss of a man on the part of the pursuers."

In an affair which took place on the 16th, Colonel Napier seems to attach some blame to the cavalry, for having failed in cutting off a body of infantry who were escorting a convoy into Ciudad Rodrigo. It would be absurd, no doubt, to defend a want of proper enterprise on the part of cavalry, because enterprise is almost the soul of the service, and without it cavalry would be nearly an useless appendage to an army in the field. Great objects cannot be gained without sacrifice, and in the case under consideration, the question seems to be merely how far the possible result of the attack, if successful, would have repaid the heavy loss which must always attend the charges of cavalry

upon a perfectly well-formed and steady body of infantry, such as the escort of this convoy appears to have been. Some officers have strongly contended that a determined resolution on the part of cavalry, will ensure their success against the squares of infantry. It has been said by a writer in the U. S. Journal, for instance, that upon that occasion when Colonel Talbot, of the 14th Light Dragoons, lost his life in charging a body of French infantry, the cavalry gave up their attack just at the moment of success, when their horses were close to the bayonets; but surely this writer forgets that much more depends on the horse than on his rider, at such a moment; and that when once thoroughly confused and terrified, the animal becomes quite unmanageable, and no efforts on the part of his rider can force him forward, or indeed prevent his turning short round, breaking the ranks, and flying from the danger which is before him. It should also be recollected, that the fire of the infantry will inevitably produce some degree of confusion in the ranks of the cavalry, before they can possibly reach the point of conflict, and the fall of a very few men and horses, in an advance of this desperate nature, is liable to produce a disorder, which neither courage nor discipline can prevent or remedy.

In his observations upon the battle of Albuera, Colonel Napier, speaking of the cavalry, says General Lumley handled the "Allied squadrons with skill and courage, and drew all the advantage possible from his situation;" a just tribute to the admirable judgment with which that excellent officer, commanding a force greatly inferior in number, not only held Latour Maubourg in check, but at the worst crisis of that tremendous battle, when Colonel Colborne's brigade, by being too hastily brought into action by Gen. W. Stewart, were overwhelmed by the French cavalry, "perceived the mischief," as Colonel Napier tells us, "and sending four squadrons out upon the lancers, cut many of them off."

Here then is an instance not of mere courage for attack, but of that cool forethought and deliberate resolution so necessary for the preservation of order and steadiness, and without which the efforts of cavalry must always depend upon the luck and chances of the moment.

But a week had elapsed after the bloody battle of Albuera, when we again find Colonel Napier bearing testimony to the good service of Gen. Lumley and his cavalry.

"From Llerena a detachment was sent to drive away a Spanish partisan corps, which had cut off his (Soult's) communications, and at the same time Latour Maubourg was directed to scour the country beyond Usagre; this led to an action; for that town, built upon a hill, and covered towards Los Santos by a river, with steep and rugged banks, had only one outlet by the bridge on that side, and when Latour Maubourg approached, Lumley retired across the river. The French light cavalry then marched along the right bank, with the intention of crossing lower down, and thus covering the passage of their heavy cavalry; but, before they could effect this object, Gen. Bron rashly passed the river with his two regiments of dragoons, and formed them in line just beyond the bridge. Lumley was lying close behind a rising ground, and when the French had advanced a sufficient distance, the British artillery under Lefebre opened upon them, and the 3rd dragoon guards and 4th dragoons charged them in front, while Madden's Portuguese fell upon their flank. They were overthrown at the first shock, and fled towards the bridge, but that being choked by the rest of their cavalry advancing to their support, the fugitives turned to the right and left, endeavouring to save themselves among the gardens along the river side; there they were pur

THE LATE ADMIRAL SIR JOHN KNIGHT, K.C.B. 363

sued and sabred, till the French, on the opposite side, seeing their distress. opened a fire of artillery and carbines, that obliged the British to discontinue the attack. Forty killed, above 100 wounded, and eighty prisoners, were the fruits of this brilliant action of Gen. Lumley's."

No comment is needed upon this affair; the rashness and disorder of the French cavalry and their leaders were as conspicuous as the cool and steady manner in which they were received and discomfited by Gen. Lumley and his cavalry. A remark was made at the time by those who were engaged, which it may be well to notice. Only about one third of the French who were struck down by the sabre, were killed outright; while, on the part of the English, the proportion of killed was much greater than that of the wounded, a circumstance from which it was reasonably inferred that the French sabre was a more destructive weapon than that of our cavalry. The swords of the latter were bad enough for cutting with the edge, but for giving point they were almost quite useless, while those of the French were admirably adapted for pointing, and altogether a far superior weapon. A much better pattern than the old one has been lately approved, it is said, for the British cavalry, and there can be little doubt that although the Englishman is more inclined to strike or cut than to point at his adversary, yet there are many occasions when the soldier, if properly instructed in the advantages of so doing, as well as in the method, would use the point with as destructive effect as the soldier of any other nation.

This affair at Usagre is the last which Colonel Napier has noticed in his third volume, and we now take leave of him as an evidence, having, as it is hoped, redeemed our pledge of proving, by his own statements, the injustice of his comparative condemnation of the British cavalry, in the sweeping sentence of which they have such reason to complain. We shall next proceed to detail from the most authentic sources within our reach, farther actions reflecting credit upon their conduct and courage in the field during the remainder of the war.

(To be continued.)

THE SERVICES OF THE LATE ADMIRAL

SIR JOHN KNIGHT, K.C.B.

MR. KNIGHT first commenced his career in the navy, on board the Tartar, frigate, under the command of his father, who was made a Captain, May 8th, 1756, and died a Rear-Admiral. On the 1st of June 1758, the Tartar left Portsmouth for the French coast, with an expedition under the orders of Commodore Howe, against Caucalle, Cherbourg, St. Maloes, &c. which destroyed several of the enemy's ships. Mr. Knight afterwards was in the squadron under the orders of Lord Anson, which convoyed Her Majesty Queen Charlotte to Harwich, in Sept. 1761. After the peace took place, Mr. Knight was employed in surveying the North American coast, and on the 25th of May 1770, was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant; and in 1775, was second of the Falcon sloop, Capt. John Linzee. The Falcon was one of the vessels that covered the attack on Bunker's Hill, after which Lieut. Knight was made prisoner of war in endeavouring to bring off an American vessel that had been driven on shore. An exchange of prisoners taking place the following year, Lieut. Knight joined Lord Howe, who, in February 1777, appointed him to command the Haer

lem of 12 guns, in which he captured several of the enemy's small vessels. In 1778 the Haerlem narrowly escaped capture by the French fleet, under the command of Count d'Estaing. Lieut. Knight was soon after removed into the Eagle, the flag-ship of Lord Howe, in which he returned home in October.

Lieut. Knight's next appointment was to the Barfleur, the flag-ship of Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, (afterwards Viscount Hood,) on the Leeward Island station, by whom he was on the 21st Sept. 1781, promoted to Post-Captain, and to command the Shrewsbury, in the room of Capt. Mark Robinson. Capt. Knight continued under Sir Samuel Hood's orders, by whom he was appointed to command his flag-ship the Barfleur; and after the defeat of Count de Grasse, presented the sword of that commander to Sir Samuel Hood. A few months previous to the peace of 1783, His Royal Highness Prince William Henry (his present Majesty) did duty as Midshipman on board the Barfleur.

The Barfieur being paid off in consequence of the peace, Capt. Knight remained upon half-pay until his appointment to the Victory, fitting for the flag of Lord Hood, in consequence of the expected war with Spain in 1790.

Soon after the commencement of the war with France, Lord Hood was appointed Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, and Capt. Knight was again appointed to the Victory, and was present at the several affairs of Toulon and at Corsica, and returned home in December 1794; when in May the following year, Lord Hood was ordered to strike his flag, which was the last time his Lordship held a command. Capt. Knight continued in the Victory, and in the action with the French fleet, 13th July 1795, Rear-Admiral Robert Mann had his flag on board. In December the same year, Admiral Sir John Jervis, (afterwards Earl St. Vincent,) hoisted his flag in the Victory, on which occasion Capt. Knight returned from the Mediterranean, and was soon after appointed to the Montague, attached to the North Sea fleet, under the orders of Admiral Duncan, which ship bore a conspicuous part in the disgraceful mutiny that subsequently took place. Happily for the country this mutiny was suppressed, and proper examples made of the ringleaders. The misguided men fully retrieved their character in the action which afterwards took place off Camperdown, 11th Oct. under the orders of Admiral Duncan, against the Dutch fleet under De Winter.

After this brilliant action, Capt. Knight had a command on the Irish coast; served in the Channel fleet, and in the Mediterranean ; and in August 1779, commanded the advanced squadron before Brest, during which time several successful captures were made by the Montague's boats of the enemy's small vessels.

A promotion of Captains taking place 1st Jan. 1801, Capt. Knight became Rear-Admiral of the Blue. In April 1805, Admiral Knight hoisted his flag on board the Lucca for the Mediterranean, and succeeded Admiral Sir Richard Bickerton, in the command at Gibraltar, where his flag was hoisted on board the Guerrier guard-ship, which was the last command he held.

In the promotion that took place 9th Nov. 1805, after the action off Trafalgar, Admiral Knight was promoted to Vice-Admiral; and on the 4th Dec. 1813, to that of Admiral.

THE LATE VICE-ADMIRAL VISCOUNT TORRINGTON. 365

For his services in the action off Camperdown, Admiral Knight was honoured with a gold medal, and on the 2nd Jan. 1815, was created a Knight Commander of the Bath.

On the 16th June last, Sir John Knight expired, after a very short illness, at Woodend, Hampshire, aged 83 years.

THE SERVICES OF THE LATE VICE-ADMIRAL

VISCOUNT TORRINGTON.

THIS nobleman was the eldest son of John, the fifth Viscount Torrington, brother to Admiral Byng who was shot in pursuance of the sentence of a Court-Martial, 14th March 1757, on board the Monarque, 74, at Portsmouth.

Mr. George Byng was born in London, 5th January 1768, and entered the Naval service when scarcely more than ten years of age, as Midshipman on board the Thunderer, 74, Capt. the Hon. B. Walsingham, and was in the action between Admiral Keppel and the Count D'Orvilliers on the 27th July 1778. Mr. Byng subsequently served in the Alarm, with Capt. Sir Richard Pearson; and in the Active, Capt. T. Mackenzie. In the latter ship, Mr. Byng sailed for the East Indies, where he joined the Superb, the flag-ship of Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, and was in the actions with M. Soufferin. After the Superb, Mr. Byng served in the Defence, with Commodore Andrew Mitchell; and on arriving at Portsmouth in the end of 1785, passed his examination for a Lieutenant. He next joined the Jupiter of 50 guns, Commodore W. Parker, at the Leeward Islands, from whom he subsequently received a commission as Acting Lieutenant; and afterwards served in the Trusty with Rear-Admiral Sir John Lafory, who had assumed the command on that station, in the room of Commodore Parker. In September 1790, a commission was sent out, promoting Mr. Byng to the rank of Lieutenant, and he returned home in the Shark sloop-of-war.

In 1791, Lieut. Byng was appointed to the Illustrious, Capt. C. M. Pole, and afterwards removed into the Druid frigate. He was afterwards appointed to the Impregnable, but from ill health, was not in the action of the 1st of June, under the orders of Lord Howe.

In October 1794, Lieut. Byng was promoted to Master and Commander, and to the Ferret sloop-of-war; and during the absence of Sir Edmund Nagle, acted as Captain of the Artois frigate; and in June 1795, was further promoted to Post-Captain, and to the Redoubt of 20 guns. His next appointment was to the Mercury frigate, under the orders of Vice-Admiral Sir James Walmer, at Newfoundland; and was there when the French Admiral Richery appeared before the settlement with seven sail-of-the-line, and three frigates, having 2000 troops on board, who from the resistance they experienced by a force considerably inferior, abandoned their project. In 1797, Capt. Byng was appointed to the Galatea frigate, in which he captured a French corvette of 14 guns, and several armed vessels. In May 1802, Capt. Byng resigned, through ill health, the command of the Galatea; and on the renewal of the war with France was appointed to the Texel, and became commanding officer of the block ships stationed on the Kentish coast.

In August 1804, Capt. Byng was appointed to the Malabar of 50