Services of the late Capt. Sir Murray Maxwell, Knt. and C.B. Plan of Illuminating the Semaphore Telegraph Remarks on Lieut. Raper's Method of Working a Day's Work Reviews and Critical Notices.-Life of Sir Thomas Lawrence-Brooke's Travels in Spain and Morocco-Life and Adventures of Nathaniel Pearce-Fletcher's History of Poland-Classical Library-Epi- tome of English Literature-Cabinet Cyclopædia and Library— Page 435, lines 19 and 20 from the bottom. There should not be a full stop or new paragraph, the sentence should run on from the quotation. In the Yeomanry Paper, page 500, line 12 from the bottom, for "pretty well” read “fitted well.” page 502, line 21 from the bottom, for "position" read "formation." page 505, line 10 from the bottom, for "first rank" read "front rank." page 505, lines 23 and 26 from the top, for "division" read "divisions." Page 6, line 34 from top, for "second battalion" read "two battalions." Page 9, line 25 from top, for "by mere pressure" read " by the mere pressure." Page 339, line 3 from bottom, for "29th of January” read “21st of January.” Page 364, line 7 from bottom, for "Lucca" read "Queen." Page 364, line 12 from bottom, for "1799" read "1797." Page 365, line 12 from bottom, for "Warmer" read "Wallace." Page 366, line 23 from bottom, for "Schweling" read "Scheveling." In our report of the Library and Museum Meeting, for "Capt. Blackhouse, R. N." read "Capt. THE UNITED SERVICE JOURNAL, AND NAVAL AND MILITARY MAGAZINE. TACTICS. WITH REFERENCE TO IMPENDING WAR. "C'était de tous les arts le plus funeste, mais Celui qu'il fallait le plus perfectionner."-VOLTAIRE. THE peace which had been purchased for liberated Europe by so much blood and treasure, is again drawing to a close. A factious press, conducted by ignorant and designing men, more frequently than misguided enthusiasts, has at last succeeded in calling forth the fierce and destroying spirit of Democracy, "Whose wild incessant cravings spur From crime to crime its worshipper," and has at the same time, as a necessary consequence, infused fresh vigour into that antiquated absolutism which was gradually giving way before the increasing light and wisdom of the age, but which is now roused to fury by the necessity of self-defence. Continental Europe.is thus divided between two hostile principles, that, like Milton's fiends, on the verge of battle, frown on each other As when two black clouds With Heaven's artillery fraught, come rattling on To join their dark encounter in mid air.” In such a state of affairs the sword alone can be leaned upon with safety; for though our own shores may not be immediately assailed, yet it will become our duty to protect Europe, and the cause of freedom and civilization, from the ruin that must follow any decisive victory gained by either of the contending parties. We must be alike prepared to say to autocrats or demagogues, "Thus far shall ye go, and no farther:" and this is what we can say by the aid of arms alone. But as we can do this with confidence, whenever our military policy and method of war shall do justice to the power and the energy of our people, it may not, under such circumstances, be amiss to institute some inquiry into the efficiency of the system of war on which such mighty interests will soon be staked. And as the only mode of conducting such an inquiry is to "begin at the beginning," we shall for the present leave military policy and organization entirely out of the question, and merely ask in the plain and soldier-like language, best befitting the subject, U. S. JOURN. No. 30. MAY 1831. B and without any attempt to gain by sophistry or evasion a victory of words, but with the honest view of arriving at just professional principles, what is the object of Tactics, and how far does the modern science of Tactics attain its object, and do justice to the character and energy of the people of these islands? That the object of tactics is to arm, train, and instruct the soldier in such a manner as to render him, when contending against the enemy, as formidable an engine of destruction as is compatible with poor human nature, will probably be allowed on all hands; so that we have at present only to inquire how far that object is attained. We shall first confine ourselves to the infantry, not only because it is the principal arm, and must always constitute the main strength of armies, but because cavalry tactics are in principle less faulty; so that the weakness of that force has been owing less to its constitution than to the manner in which it has been understood and used; whereas the strength of the infantry, such as it is, has resulted from causes over which tactics had no control, but which not being understood by tacticians, have led them into a belief of the wonder-working powers of their boasted science; and has thus tended to keep up a system of delusion that has cost the country millions of treasure and thousands of valuable lives. The modern science of tactics teaches the soldier his position under arms, his facings and marching; and it enables a commander to give to any number of men a uniform and simultaneous impulse and movement. But it contributes in nothing to develope or increase the personal strength, energy, and activity of the soldier, from whom, of all men, the most active of exertions are demanded; and not only may its exclusive use of the musket and bayonet be questioned, but it does not even instruct the soldier in the skilful use of those arms, and leaves him consequently destitute of that confidence in his mode of fighting which is always the surest forerunner of victory. Our present system of tactics is, in point of principle and with few variations in detail, exactly what Prince Leopold of Dessau introduced into the Prussian army about a century ago; it teaches men to act together, and is very well as far as that goes; but it is still far behind the Roman system, which not only taught men to act together, but to act boldly and energetically that system which led to the conquest of the known world, developed in men of rather small stature a degree of personal strength that enabled them to perform marches, and to construct works, that astonish us even at this day, and rendered them above all, so confident and skilful in the use of arms, that they never met their match in equal combat. And why do we remain so far behind the Romans? Is a musket an easier weapon to wield than a sword or a hasta? Are modern soldiers taken from a class of men more inured to athletic exercises than the ancients? Or are the toils and difficulties of modern war inferior to those the ancients had to contend with? Verily I should think not. The cause of our inferiority must, therefore, be sought for in the opinion entertained by tacticians of the excellence of their art ; for no mere acknowledgment of its difficulties could have kept it stationary for such a length of time. Let us try that boasted excellence therefore, and see what are the destructive powers possessed by an art whose object is destruction itself. They will probably be found less formidable than might at first be suspected. Supposing that 20,000 French were killed and wounded at Waterloo, and allowing 5000 of these to have fallen by the fire of the artillery and the sabres of the cavalry, it leaves 15,000 to the share of the infantry; and counting the latter at 30,000 only, though the number present was certainly greater, it required an entire day's hard fighting before the 30,000 had disabled 15,000 adversaries: that is, all the exertion of two men during an entire day only brought down one enemy!!! Let not the reader here think of two fencers who by equal skill and courage foil each other's exertions; there is no such thing as parrying a musket-ball when properly aimed, nor is there any defensive power in modern armies beyond what they derive from their offensive strength; for with modern arms all fighting is purely offensive. The above estimate of the efficiency of modern tactics may, indeed, be considered as highly overrated, because it applies only to the most sanguinary battles fought during the war, such as that of Marengo, Talavera, Borodino, and others, but by no means to actions of minor note: at Roliça only a few hundred French were put hors-de-combat, and at Vimiera 16,000 British only killed and wounded 2000 French, after what was called a smart action. Now, we are allowed on all hands to be more able-bodied men than the French, and illiberal as it may sound in these liberal days, we are also individually a far more active and resolute people. The army that fought at Vimiera was composed of as fine men as ever left England, so that we may take it for granted that they were, on an average, superior to the men of the French army. Let us suppose then for a moment, that both parties had, by mutual consent, divested themselves of their arms and tactics, and fairly fought it out with no other aid but their natural strength and courage, does it not follow, as a matter of course, that the 16,000 stronger must have so pounded the 14,000 weaker men, as to have rendered the latter totally incapable of impeding the progress of the former towards Lisbon. If so, tactics, instead of strengthening the strong in proportion to their strength, must be something that principally favours the weak; an exceeding good reason, one would think, why the strong should look twice at the system before they adopt and follow it with blind adoration. That it has made us victorious, proves in itself nothing until it is shown that the success was the most decisive, and attended with the least possible loss; but twenty-five years of dubious war, the convention of Cintra, and the lists of killed and wounded that were at times not much inferior to those of the vanquished enemy, form a sufficient quietus to all speculations upon those points. Achilles would have been formidable even with the arms of Thersites, but it was only in the Vulcanian arms suited to his strength and power, that the Goddess-born became invulnerable and invincible: it is even thus with British soldiers; they are as formidable as men can be with the present system of tactics, but it is only by a system capable of doing justice to their energy and resolution, that, like Pelides rising in his strength, their full power of action can be displayed. “Throw your plaids, Draw your blades, Every man to set; Pybroch of Donald Dhu Now for the onset."-SIR W. SCOTT. Having seen what is the destructive, or as political economists would say, productive power, possessed by modern infantry, when contending against those who are about their equals in point of science, let us next see what they can effect when opposed to men who have followed a more energetic mode of action, or when contending against those who, by accident or design, have evaded the only strong point of modern tactics, and struck at one of its ninety-nine weak sides. The result will not be very flattering to the " King making" science. At Prestonpans, 2000 highlanders, armed only with broad swords and targets, overthrew at the very first onset nearly 3000 British infantry, and completed their defeat in about a quarter of an hour: the same was the case at Falkirk: and even at Culloden every point of the line that the highlanders reached in their charge was completely overthrown. As we may be told that the infantry of 1745 was not equal to that of the present day, and as any person making such an objection could probably not point out the difference, we shall ourselves show in what it consisted. The infantry in 1745 could neither move nor form with the rapidity of modern infantry; they used wooden ramrods, that during a quick and protracted fire were liable to break; and they fought three deep as all continental armies do to this day; but in every other respect they were trained on the same principles, and fought exactly in the same manner that we do now; nor did the defeats above stated result from the wooden ramrods or from any tardiness of movement, for the King's troops were all drawn up and formed when assailed by the highlanders, and a charge could leave no time for more than one or two volleys. Though lowlanders, we are proud of having worn the tartan, and we love the mountaineers, but we cannot claim for them any superiority of personal courage over the English; for as yet no men of women born can make such a claim, nor are they in general considered equal to the Southerons in point of strength; and as generalship was entirely out of the question in these front to front onsets, their victories must be solely attributed to their superior and more energetic mode of fighting, and to the skilful use of a more efficient weapon. That the King's troops were ultimately victorious at Culloden, proves nothing in favour of their tactics; for not only were they vastly superior in number, but they were aided by a succession of faults on the part of the highlanders that sets all speculation utterly at defiance. The latter had made a long and fatiguing night-march towards Nairn and back again; they had been without food on the previous day, and were without provisions on the morning of the battle; they had neither cavalry nor artillery worth noticing; and though their retreat was perfectly open, though there were strong positions all around, and reinforcements on the march to join them, they yet drew up on the open heath of Culloden to fight an enemy nearly double their number, (95) and well provided with both cavalry and artillery. Where is the strategus, who, with the best drilled soldiers to back the pride of |