ARTICLE LIX.

Simplicity of Moral Action. No. 4.

BY THE LATE REV. WM. COCHRAN.

III. A PRELIMINARY remark is here demanded. The phases of the intensity theory hitherto examined, in so far as they are different from the one now introduced, had, in our opinion, either been virtually refuted, in our former numbers, or were scarcely deserving of refutation in an inquiry of this nature; and in so far as they are identical with this last phase, for obvious reasons, their examination was deferred till this time. Hence, we have passed them over slightly, and should have entirely omitted them, but for the hope that by a few suggestions and inquiries, we might render more apparent, than we had hitherto done, the intrinsic absurdity of attemptting to extend the sway of the moral law, beyond the acts of absolute freedom, into the chaos of necessary phenomena, where unity is impossible, and concord a mere accident; and also, that, by showing the impossibility of inferring, with any certainty, the character of the governing intention from the mere intensity of its outward manifestations, we might rebuke a practice of censorious judging which is alike sinful and injurious. But here we meet a view of a moral action, which, as it includes no elements of necessity, will allow of no skirmishing and random shots of picket-guards; but will compel a a death struggle of the opposing theories, and decide the fate of a long popular doctrine. We are therefore entering upon a question of vital interest, and no pains should be spared to secure a fair issue.

Our position, it will be remembered, is, that when our intention terminates upon what the law requires us to choose, (and, we add here, upon nothing else, for we have not yet proved the impossibility of choosing two ends at once,) it is whol

ly free from all blame; and generally, that the character of an ultimate intention varies as the object of its selection.

The opposite position alleges that an intention, although terminating upon the object required by the law, (and upon nothing else,) is not therefore wholly free from blame; but must, in addition, possess a certain degree of intensity; and generally, that the character of an ultimate intention varies as the object of its selection, and ALSO as its subjective force. In other words; the law, according to the former view, requires nothing but the choice of an object, and when an intention is objectively right it is wholly so: according to the latter, it requires both the choice of an object, and that a certain amount of vis volendi (not now determined) be communicated to this choice; so that an intention, objectively considered, may be perfectly right, and at the same time, subjectively consid ered, more or less blameworthy, on account of being more or less deficient in intensity.

Whether it be possible to yield any obedience at all to the objective requirements of the law, without perfectly obeying them, is a question which yet remains to be discussed; but its decision can have no bearing upon the present debate, for the supposition on which we are now reasoning, is that an intention, as a matter of fact, is objectively right.

It will be seen at a glance that the only possible basis of this intensity theory is the supposition that less than all the energy of the moral will may, at any time, be exerted in the choice; and that this deficiency is cognizable by the law, and morally reprehensible. To remove this foundation, it must be shown, either that the whole energy of the moral will of necessity passes into its intentions, or that, if the reverse is true, MORALITY can take no note of it. We hope this issue is now both comprehensible and satisfactory to all our readers; and that we shall be able to lead them, with little difficulty, through what would otherwise have been a dark and tangled labyrinth.

Our first proposition relates to sinful deficiences for which this theory contends. We allege that, by a law of absolute necessity, whatever of moral energy the will at any time possesses, passes into its ultimate intention.

1. To establish this proposition, we remark, in the first place, that when that object, which the law requires us to choose, is consciously present to the mind, the will cannot avoid choosing or refusing it. Total quiesence is impossible. We hold that it is just as much the nature of the Will to choose as of the

Intellect to think, or of the Sensibility to feel; and that it is just as impossible, when the conditions of its acting are supplied, that choice should not take place, as that, when the conditions of thinking and feeling are supplied, these phenomena should not exist. The only difference between them, worthy of notice here, is that the conditions of thought and feeling determine also their kind, while the conditions of choice leave its kind or quality wholly contingent. The existence of each is alike necessitated, and purely spontaneous. When their conditions are supplied, reflection never does or can intervene to decide whether they shall exist or not. Choice follows in all instances, upon the presentation of an object of choice, by the same necessity and immediateness, which marks the connection of the explosion of a magazine with the application of a match, or the roar of heaven's artillery with the ignition of the electric fluid.

In this view, the advocates of the doctrine of the necessary determination of the Will are obliged to concur. For holding that the Will has no self-determining power of its own, and that motives are the only and true causes of its choices, they must allow that whenever motives are present to the mind, choice, their appropriate effect, must inevitably follow. And no other person can hold a different opinion, if he implicitly confides in the spontaneous and necessary convictions of his own mind. Who believes that quiescence of will is possible in presence of an object of choice? Who does not find it impossible to preserve it? Who believes that his neighbor is, at any time, destitute of all present moral character? Who does not assume, and constantly act upon the supposition, that the presentation of an object of choice always begets choice, and that all rationals, at each moment of their conscious agency, are aiming at one or the other of those rival ends which divide the moral universe? Not only, therefore, are a large proportion of our opponents bound to grant us the truth of our proposition, or abandon their favorite theory of necessity; but all persons of every creed are behooved to admit it, or deny a primitive and necessary judgment of their own intelligence. We are therefore warranted in assuming its truth as a first principle of Reason. But being aware how frequently such principles are called in question, where their admission is likely to draw after it the overthrow of a long cherished doctrine, we will try to set the matter in a stronger light before leaving it.

Kant has discussed this question in his "Theory of Religion," and, in our judgment has shown incontestably that quiescence of the Moral Will, is, during consciousness, an impossibility. We will lay his argument before the reader. After quoting sundry opinions from the ancient poets and philosophers relating to the primitive, or natural moral character of mankind, he proceeds to say-Since however, nothing is more likely than that both poets and plilosophers are in the wrong, it would at once occur to any bystander, to inquire if no medium could be found betwixt the two extremes, and if there were not room to say, that mankind, as a race, are neither good nor bad; or, otherwise, that man is as much the one as the other, being in part good and in part evil. **** At the bottom of the two just stated hypotheses there lies a disjunctive proposition-"Man is by nature either morally good or morally evil" and it will immediately occur to every one to ask if this disjunction be correct. Some one might say, that there is room for maintaining that "man is by nature neither one nor other," and a third party might contend that "he is both at once." **** The answer to that disjunctive interrogatory, if it is to fall out agreeably to a rigorous method of deciding, bottoms itself on this remark, which is of the most vital moment in ethics; namely, that the freedom of the will is endowed with this peculiar property, that it never can be determined by any spring to any act except in so far as mankind hath himself adopted and taken up that spring into his maxims; that is, hath transformed it into a universal rule, according to which he wills to conduct himself. In no other manner can a spring, be it what it may, consist with the absolute spontaneity of a free choice. Again, the moral law is [ought to be] (our own reason being judge,) itself the only originary spring, and whoso makes it his maxim is morally good! But if, notwithstanding, the law does not determine a person's choice, then some contrary spring must influence the will; and since, by hypothesis, this can only happen by a man's adopting this spring, and along with it its necessary effect; namely, the swerving from the law, into his maxim, (in which latter case the man is evil,) it follows that his inward mindedness to observe or depart from the law is never in a state of equilibrious indifference, and that mankind never can be neither good nor evil.”

We take no notice now of his answer to the other member of this disjunction, inasmuch as it is not connected with the subject immediately before us.

To those who are sufficiently well acquainted with Kant's philosophy and peculiar technicality to comprehend this argument, it must have all the force of absolute demonstration. The reasoning is irrefragable; but, if we mistake not, it turns not wholly upon the peculiar view of the author, that the first act of freedom consists in choosing a maxim for its future conduct; but will apply equally well, though no intermediate were found between the will and some actually existing good. Its force is derived from the essential conditions of the will's activity, and from its relationship to the moral law.

The same, or at least a similar argument may be exhibited in a form comprehensible by the most ordinary capacity and scholarship: The moral law requires of us, during each moment of accountable agency, the choice of that object which our own intelligence shall prescribe as in its own nature worthy to be made an ultimate end; and, by consequence, it prohibits every choice or state of will, which in the mind's judgment, is inconsistent with, or antithetical to that former choice. But, in every moment of accountable agency, we know precisely what the law requires of us, and what it probibits; and we cannot but be aware, that the not-choosing of the legal object is inconsistent with the choosing of it, and is therefore a prohibited state of will. It is, besides, a conscious state; and therefore, since the will is endowed with that absolute freedom by which it can immediately pass out of this state, and is constrained by no cause ab extra to remain therein, it follows that it must be a voluntary state. Hence, choice is an unavoidable necessity during each moment of responsible agency. But every choice must have an object. It hence follows further, that, wherever the apprehended good of the universe is not chosen, the rival end is of necessity made ultimate. Throughout the entire domain of the moral law, there can be no such thing as a state of equilibrious indifference. "He that is not with me, is against me; and he that gathereth not with me, scattereth abroad." It being thus established that the will is necessitated to choose whenever the claims of the law and the objects of moral election are before it, the onus probandi is fairly thrown upon our opponents; and we are not obliged, by the rules of debate, to take any farther notice of their position, until they have clearly shown that some portion of the will's energy is exempted from this necessity. We will, however, waive our logical rights, (for our object is truth and not mastery,) and proceed to show that that position can never be established.