solemn significancy and point no longer to an eternal, immutable and necessary distinction and opposition of things; that the orgin and existence of law, proclaiming itself to our intelligence as universally obligatory, are inexplicable, since, if it be not a necessary enactment of our reason, it must be a generalization, or induction from experience which can never attain such a stupendous height of knowledge as to say, "this must be the end for all moral beings;" that the very existence of moral destinctions is unaccountable, since if they are not the necessary products of reason carried forth into the world of experience, no act could be thought of as right or wrong, any more than a cause could be assumed for every event if the law of causality were not antecedently given in the reason; that moral government has no foundation to rest on, since its whole object and function is to secure the willing of absolute good, the wisest and best end, and by hypothesis no such end is known to finite agents or such as are to be governed; and that consequently religion is a dream, moral science a fable,man's moral nature an enigma and himself a fool.

The question may be asked here "why then are so many different theories of moral obligation recognized and defended by philosophers, if there can be but one ground of moral obligation?" A complete answer to this question would detain us too long, and draw us aside into a discussion which is not strictly connected with our present object and which we have détermined to avoid. It may be expedient however to suggest in passing that a multiplicity of philosophical theories where but one true one is possible is not new or wonderful. Look for example, at the theories relating to the freedom of the will. Here all believe the same thing by absolute necessity and yet one tells us that the will is nothing but a pair of scales for determining the relative weight of motives; and an other tells us that its action is wholly self-originated and when no motives are found "stat pro ratio volentas." That philosophers therefore hold different opinions on any point is no proof that there are difierent realities corresponding to those opinions, nay frequently their discussions prove that all their theories, save one, are false, for they turn upon the supposition that but one can be true and thus evince a spontaneous and necessary conviction of the human intelligence. And this is no less true of the different theories of moral obligation, than of such as relate to the determination of the will. We now invite the readers attention to a few consequences which seem to us to flow from the position just established.

1. Both the conception of the end which we are under obligation to choose and the law commanding this choice, though their development is occasioned by experience, are of purely a priori origin. They have all the characteristics of such ideas and conceptions. They are necessary; they are immutable; they are universal. Their origin is coeval with the dawn of reason: they are destined to share its immortality; they ask not our consent to appear upon the theatre of consciousness; and we may as soon expel or alter our ideas of space and time as induce them to depart or change a single feature. A necessary accompaniment of reason, all who participate that heavenly gift, possess them in equal clearness, and the only limits of their control are the boundaries of the moral world.

2. Hence the self-same object which the Deity wills, all his holy angels will, and all the fallen spirits know they ought to will; and in this respect neither the celestial nor the infernal world can boast any pre-eminence of knowledge over our feeble and fallen race. We know as absolutely as they what this end is and must be, (for in reason nothing short of absolute knowledge is possible,) and one of us knows it with as much certainty and absoluteness as another. Kant himself has no superiority here over the miserable unfortunate who stands upon the misty confines of idiocy. The infant in whom reason is just developed may in this respect think "it no robbery to be equal with God."

3. Hence in the self-same time that we choose this end, we do and must impliedly choose that all rational beings should will the same and use their utmost powers to secure its universal realization. Although, therefore, Kant may not have enunciated the moral law with entire correctness, it is nevertheless certain that whenever we choose this reason-given end, we are "acting from a maxim fit for law universal." We are choosing that end and the only end which the entire moral world must obligate themselves to choose. We shall therefore be allowed to use this enunciation as an axiom in our future discussions. An action is right whenever its end is such that all ought to choose it, or when its maxim is such that all ought to adopt it.

4. It is plain also that this end is a unity, not in the sense of a whole compounded of parts by addition, where the conception of parts precedes and makes up the conception of the whole-but either an absolute unity in which conception or distinction of parts is impossible, or a totum whose concep

tion precedes the conception of all parts and distinctions included in or falling under it, and such that no part can be withdrawn without the total destruction of the whole conception. Reason being an absolute unity, such must be the nature of all its conceptions. This will be another important axiom in our future discussions.

5. Before the first theory of moral obligation above mentioned can be fairly legitimated it must be shown that happiness or enjoyment is every where and necessarily recognized by the human intelligence as the only ultimate and absolute good; for till this necessity is demonstrated it can never be certain that right is not so regarded, or moral order, or all combined. The like may be said of the second and all the other theories we have mentioned. Has either of these theories been thus firmly established? Can either of them be? We shall not attempt to discuss these questions; nor shall we attempt to establish an independent theory of our own; for we think it unnecessary to our present purpose, having arrived at the knowledge of all the characteristics of this end which can at all affect our argument. We have found that it is given us in an idea or conception of the reason; that it is necessarily one and identical for all the universe; that it is an absolute and indissoluble unity; that all rational beings know it with equal certainty; and that whenever any one wills it he is acting from a maxim fit for law universal. Now if we should go on and prove that happiness or any thing else actually is this end, we cannot see that we would be in any better circumstances to establish the simplicity of moral actions than if we should represent it by A or any other arbitrary symbol. We shall therefore commend our remarks to the attention of these several theorists and recommit to them the question of the ground of moral obligation and proceed as if it were already known. And let it be remembered, if we shall at any time use language hereafter that seems to assume the truth of either of these theories, that such is not our purpose, and that we mean to rest the whole fate of our argument upon that which we have already proved.

In regard to the end which the law prohibits, few words will now be necessary. It is now almost universally agreed that it is nothing else than our own happiness dissevered from its connexion with, and proper subordination to the happiness of being in general. This position is professedly based upon experience, the teachings of inspiration, and a supposed impossibility of choosing any other end when we are law

less and disobedient. And hence it is asserted with confidence that where a right intention does not exist, whatever may be the apparent differences of their characters, all men are of necessity alike supremely devoted to their own gratification. The seeming liberality which distributes all its goods to feed the poor, kneels at the same shrine with the sordid avarice which recks not a famishing orphan's tears, and the heartless ambition which desolates a continent. The self-same object lulls the epicurian asleep upon the downy lap of sensual pleasure, and strengthens the suici dal arm to provide a way of escape from earthly sorrow, by the point of the dagger. All sin is selfishness. Kant maintains that it is the maxim of swerving occasionally from the law. And a few others contend that although self-gratification is doubtless the end of most wicked men, and perhaps of all, yet it is not necessarily so. For since the will is free, and therefore able to resist any array of motive how great soever it may be, and stem alike the current of conscience and passion, of duty and of interest, provided only it can find an object which neither the intelligence recommends, or the sensibility demands, it inevitably follows that we may will as an ultimate end not only our own supreme misery, but that of all the universe, since neither the reason commands nor the sensibility desires it.

Now whether it be possible to will universal misery or not, we shall not take the trouble to enquire. One thing must be certain to all, that the law prohibits the choice of every thing else as an ultimate end only that end which it requires to be thus chosen. Every thing else therefore that can be chosen as ultimate is the end or ends (we care not for the number) which the law forbids us to choose. Now whether our own gratification is alone that end, or whether misery also may be an end, it does not concern us at present to determine. Suffice it to say that these ends, whatever future investigation may find them to be, are perfect antagonisms and mutually exclusive of each other. They are moreover of universal extent; every possible object of choice that is not included in the first, must be included in the last. They are the true Ormusd and Ahriman of Eastern philosophy-the genuine angels of light and darkness; at their respective shrines, all rational beings in the universe offer their devout and whole-hearted adorations, and march to deadly and irreconcilable warfare under their respective banners..

An intention is right when it terminates upon the former end: it is wrong when it terminates upon the latter. Its character will in all cases correspond with its object or end. When it terminates upon the former object it complied with a maxim which the agent knows to be fit for law universal. When it termihates upon the latter, the agent knows that he has acted from a different maxim. To know on which of them it has terminated is all that we need to know to determine its character. Such are the conclusions to which this investigation has brought us.

Were there no different tests proposed or defended by the advocates of the doctrine of mixed moral action, we might now, without further remark, join issue with them upon the question of the possibility of such an action. But they have proposed others so very unlike this, that it is indispensable to disprove their validity before a nice issue on that great question is possible. Indeed, if some of them at least are not wholly chimerical, the doctrine of the necessary simplicity of moral actions is a dream which must vanish away as soon as revery shall give place to sober reflection. We have hence arrived at a cordon of forts and bulwarks which must be demolished and removed out of our way or the whole field is lost. It is however the last that can impede our progress, and is far from appearing impregnable. Let us try its strength.

A few quotations will serve to intoduce the first of these tests which we propose to examine.

Says President Edwards, when speaking of the possible character of converted men, while in this world:

"They may love God more than other things, and yet there may not be so much love as there is want of love; or in other words, they may love God more than the world, and therefore the love of God may be predominant, and yet may not love God near half so much as they ought to do. This need not be esteemed a paradox: a person may love a father, or some great friend or benefactor of a very excellent character, more than some other object a thousand times less worthy of this esteem and affection, and yet love him ten times less than he ought: and so be chargeable, all things considered, with a deficiency in respect to gratitude, that is very unbecoming and hateful. If love to God prevails above the love of other things, then virtue will prevail above evil affections, or positive principles of sin; by which principles it is that sin has a positive power and influence. For evil affections radically consist in inordinate love of other things besides God; and therefore virtue prevailing beyond these will have the governing influence. The predominance of the love of God in the heart of good men is more from the nature of the object loved and the nature of the principle of true love than the degree of the principle."

The reader will observe that, in this passage, the phenomena of the will are jumbled in blind confusion with those of