I desire to mention the following: First Sergeant Grachette, in his care in looking out for the details for the comfort, safety, and protection of the men and in his carrying out the instructions given him, showed the ability that he had gained by long service. Sergeants Gaughron, Harper, Cheatham, and Sullivan, who were in command of platoons averaging over 40 men, had perfect control of them. I desire to call particular attention to the efficient services rendered by Sergeant Fisher during the whole time I was in command of the battery. On August 3, from his knowledge of the Spanish language, I selected him to take charge of a small party to reconnoiter the ground at our front and on my right. The choice was a lucky one. He performed the duty in a satisfactory manner, bringing back a map of all the country over which the battery was likely to move. On the 6th I continued him on the same kind of duty. On the 12th, after having learned the position to be occupied by the Third Artillery on the 13th, I sent Sergeant Fisher out with a party of 5 men-Sergeant Berlin, Corporal Fisher, Corporal McMeekin, and Private Quanby-to “map as much of the country in front as possible." The party returned with a correct map of practically all of the front up to the enemy's trenches. They had gone up as far as the clear space (150 yards in extent) immediately in front of the trenches of the enemy. This map contained all the paths, thickets, and ditches on our front. On the morning of the 13th Sergeant Fisher, in charge of a working party, cut roads to the front and built bridges across the worst ditches, so that our advance was not broken up, as it would have been otherwise. His ability at reconnoissance, his readiness to volunteer for duty, and his soldierly bearing and conduct deserve special recognition. Very respectfully, LLOYD ENGLAND, Second Lieutenant, Third Artillery, Commanding Battery K, Third Artillery, from August 2 to 15, 1898. The ADJUTANT GENERAL, LA INSULAR BUILDING, Manila, August 18, 1898. Second Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, United States Army. SIR: I have the honor to report the following operations on the 13th of August, 1898, of my command, consisting of a separate light battery, instituted by Special Order No. 5, Second Division, Eighth Army Corps, current series. Early in the morning, while at Camp Dewey, I received the following order: "Lieutenant HAAN. "The Hotchkiss guns under your command will remain with the reserve, ready to move quickly into Manila if ordered. "AUGUST 13." but "F. V. GREENE, Brigadier-General. About 10.30 a. m., after the navy had ceased firing, I was ordered forward on the Calle road. I proceeded with the column of infantry, being accompanied by one company of the First Nebraska Volunteers. I crossed our trenches with some difficulty, but with scarcely any delay, continuing on the same road. When about halfway between our trenches and those of the Spaniards we were fired upon-I think from some houses in the town. I unlimbered and ran two pieces by hand to the front till we got to the Spanish trenches, where part of the First Colorado (I was told it was the First Colorado) was firing volleys. I secured a place for my pieces at the trenches and prepared to open fire, but saw nothing to fire at. The scattering shots that now struck around us seemed to come from long range, since they struck the water near the intrenchments after passing over them. I reported my battery near the old fort on the Spanish lines to General Anderson, who directed the company of engineers to assist me over the Spanish intrenchments, which I crossed without much difficulty. Then I crossed the stone bridge across a small river and proceeded with the infantry, reporting to General Greene at the first bridge that crosses the moat into the walled port of Manila. Here I received orders to follow the First Nebraska Regiment, which I did until I reached La Plaza Binondo, where I was directed to await further orders. At about 5.45 p. m. I was assigned quarters in "La Insular" tobacco factory, where I have been ever since. I did not open fire, and had no casualties, although my command was twice under considerable fire-first between the trenches already mentioned, and second, in the street leading to Manila, about half a mile inside the Spanish lines. W. G. HAAN, First Lieutenant, Third Artillery, The ADJUTANT, Eighteenth Infantry. COMPANY B, EIGHTEENTH INFANTRY, SIR: I have the honor to report that I left Camp Dewey, near Manila, with my company, B, Eighteenth Infantry, at 8 o'clock a. m. July 29, 1898, and marched to a point west of Old Church, arriving there at 9.20 a. m. Halted the company and relieved the insurgents, Companies B and G, Eighteenth Infantry, being the first of the American troops to occupy these trenches. I posted three outposts, each consisting of noncommissioned officers and 9 privates, who were relieved at intervals of two hours. During the day and until 12 o'clock midnight the company remained in an old house by the roadside about 200 yards in rear of outpost No. 1. At midnight the company relieved Company G, Eighteenth Infantry, and formed outposts in front and to the right of the trenches, protecting the First Regiment Colorado Volunteers, who were digging trenches and remained there until 9.30 a. m., July 30, 1898, when the company was relieved by First Regiment Nebraska Volunteers, and marched back to camp, arriving there at 11.30 a. m. same date. The company was repeatedly fired upon while protecting the Nebraska regiment. On August 3, 1898, I left camp with my company at 8 a. m. and marched through rice fields on a line parallel with the shore line of the bay to a point west or to the left of the trenches occupied by our troops. From this point I marched south on the main Manila road to a road running east about 1,000 yards, then marched on a road running north about 75 yards, then took a road running east about 300 yards, where I halted and made the following dispositions of men of the company: One noncommissioned officer and 9 men were detailed to occupy a post about 700 yards in advance of position of trenches occupied by Company A, Eighteenth Infantry, and about 50 yards to the left of a road running north from position taken by Company A, Eighteenth Infantry, and 1 noncommissioned officer and 8 men detailed to take position in advanced trench on road running north from Pasay and about 700 yards from main trench. These dispositions were made to relieve a company of the First Regiment Colorado Volunteers. During the afternoon I made an intrenchment on left side of the Pasay road and about 350 yards in rear of advanced post on same road, and detailed 1 noncommissioned officer and 8 men as a support to both advanced posts, to occupy this trench. At 6 o'clock I relieved the noncommissioned officer and 9 men with 1 noncommissioned officer and 15 men, with orders to remain all night, and in case the enemy advanced beyond their flanks of trench occupied by them they were to retire and rejoin the company which occupied a building on the Pasay road and about 25 yards in rear of intrenchments occupied by Company A, Eighteenth Infantry. The building occupied by company was intrenched. In addition to these posts, I detailed two additional single sentinels, one between the company and rice fields on our right and the other as a connecting sentinel between advanced posts Company A and the reserve. To define the position of the company more clearly, I occupied the extreme right of our line and both of my advanced posts were in the same trenches as insurgents. Soon after the heavy firing commenced on my left post No. 2 rejoined company and reported that the enemy had advanced beyond their left flank. I sent them back early next morning and they remained until relieved by a detail of Battery K, Third Artillery, at 9.40 a. m. The company was relieved from outpost duty by Battery K, Third Artillery, at 9.45 a. m., August 4, 1898. There was not a shot fired by any member of my company during my tour of twenty-four hours. About 9.45 p. m. heavy firing commenced in our front and left and continued for about one hour; many bullets passed over our heads and struck embankments. A large number of shells also passed over us and around us; one exploded about 50 yards to our left and rear. On August 6, 1898, the company left camp at 8 a. m. and marched through rice fields and took position in the trenches between Company E, Eighteenth Infantry, on the right, and Company G, Eighteenth Infantry, on the left. I immediately ordered the company to strengthen the trenches by filling bags with sand and laying them on the top of the trenches. While this was being done the men were fired upon by the enemy. As soon as the firing ceased work was finished on trenches. There was no more firing until about 9.55 p. m., which lasted about thirty-five minutes. A great deal of this firing was done by the enemy's artillery, as many shells bursted near our trenches and some of the bags were knocked off. The enemy did not leave their trenches and the company did not fire upon them. There was no more firing that night, and about 10 o'clock a. m. August 7, 1898, the company was relieved by First Regiment California Volunteers. Marched back to camp, arriving there about 11 o'clock a. m. Very respectfully, G. W. MARTIN, First Lieutenant, Eighteenth Infantry, Commanding Company B. MANILA, P. I., August 19, 1898. The ADJUTANT FIRST BATTALION, Eighteenth United States Infantry. SIR: Pursuant to instructions, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my company (G, Eighteenth Infantry) in engagements of July 29 and 30, August 2 and 3, August 6 and 7, August 13. On July 29, at 8 a. m., the company marched to the trenches occupied by the insurgents near the beach. The insurgents were marched out, leaving the trenches in possession of Companies G and B of the Eighteenth Infantry, which were therefore the first American troops to occupy the trenches around Manila. During the day an advance line of trenches was constructed by the First Colorado Volunteer Infantry. At dark my company was ordered to establish Cossack posts in front of this new line, and two double and three single posts were established. The moon was very bright, and shots were fired at the reliefs for the posts every time a change was made, and at other times. At 12 o'clock midnight the company was relieved by Company B, Eighteenth Infantry. At 6 a. m. the company commenced work on the trench east of the convent, and at 7.30 completed it across the Malate road. During this hour and a half the men were exposed to a constant fire from the Spanish lines. The shots fired during this twenty-four hours' duty of Companies G and B of the Eighteenth Infantry were the first shots fired by American troops at the Spanish near Manila. At about 9 a. m. the company was relieved by the First Nebraska Volunteer Infantry and returned to Camp Dewey. At 8 a. m. on August 2 I left Camp Dewey with my company, G, with the battalion of the Eighteenth Infantry under command of Lieut. Col. C. M. Bailey, Eighteenth Infantry, and marched to the trenches opposite the Spanish lines. The company consisted of 2 officers and 66 men, and was posted on the right of the First Regiment Nebraska Volunteer Infantry, near the center of the line, occupying a front of about 200 yards. The line was on the farther side of a ditch 34 feet deep and filled with water, and inside of a hedge. There were no field intrenchments except about 20 feet across a road on the right of the line. Down this road about 300 yards 2 noncommissioned officers and 9 soldiers were posted in a fieldwork built by the insurgents and occupied by them, also to the left of the road and about 60 yards in front of the line. I also established a Cossack post of 3 soldiers. The remainder of the company was posted along the line I was to defend. During the day shelter pits of adequate thickness were dug. Nothing of importance occurred until 9.40 p. m., when a volley from the advanced post was fired, followed almost instantly by a volley from the Spanish. I waited until my Cossack post came in, reporting they had seen men along the front and also flashes of fire. One man also came back from the advance post and made the same report, and as the intensity of the fire increased in quantity and sound I opened fire. I had posted 18 men behind the breast work, and with these men fired volleys. The remainder of the line, occupied by groups of from 2 to 6 men under noncommissioned officers, fired by volley and at will. The line was a long one, and thin, and it was necessary to make up in intensity of fire what it lacked in strength. Several shells were fired at the line, but only one came near. The Spanish fire for the first half hour was largely by volley. After I had fired about 35 or 40 volleys and the deployed men along the line had several of them fired nearly all their cartridges, I was reenforced by a company of the First Nebraska Infantry, led by Major Stotsenberg in person. The firing had commenced to slacken about this time, and later ceased. I do not know at what time, but was told by an officer of the Nebraska regiment that it was at 11.10 p.m. There were no casualties, due, I think, to the fact that the men were all in position behind the shelters when the attack was made. I had three guns hit, but none permanently injured. I was relieved at 10 a. m. August 3, and marched my company back to camp. I would also state that every one in the company was wet during the entire twenty-four hours from wading the deep ditches and the hard rains, and that no one had any sleep. I desire to commend the entire company for their conduct during the engagement, lasting one and a half hours, especially Sergeant Mahoney and Corporal Donnelly and the 8 men under their command for the manner in which they held on to the advanced outpost, thus giving a flank fire on the enemy. On August 6 I was assigned to duty with my company in the trenches between the beach and convent. I had orders from Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey, Eighteenth Infantry, to reconstruct the earthworks in my front and remove a lot of stone, boards, etc., that had been put in by other troops. In order to do this it was necessary to tear down a great deal of the work in some places. This was undoubtedly discovered by the Spanish, who commenced to fire shell, solid shot, and shrapnel at us. This was kept up for some time, and many of the shots struck very near. I counted six shells alone, none of which were more than 50 feet in rear of the line when they exploded. After the shelling ceased the work was completed. At about 10.30 p. m. the shelling was resumed, accompanied by a strong infantry fire from the first Spanish trench, about 350 yards in front of our line. In accordance with strict orders no reply was made to this fire. The men were kept well covered, and there were no casualties. The company returned to Camp Dewey on the 7th, after being relieved by the First California Infantry. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, W. A. WOOD, Captain, Eighteenth Infantry, Commanding Company G. HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, ACTING ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Manila, P. I., August 22, 1898. Second Division, Eight Army Corps, Cavite, P. I. SIR: In reporting the operations of the 13th instant, which resulted in the occupation of Manila, I respectfully append, for ready reference, copies of memoranda and orders in accordance with which the movements of this brigade were conducted, together with a most excellent map, prepared by Lieutenant Hagadorn, Twenty-third United States Infantry, showing the organizations engaged, original formation thereof, and character of the terrain upon which the operations were conducted. The Idaho regiment and the Wyoming battalion were assigned to the general reserve of the division, and thus fell under the personal authority of the division commander. A detailed account of their subsequent movements will be found in the regimental reports submitted herewith. Several hours before the operations of the day were intended to commence there was considerable desultory firing from the Spanish line, both of cannon and small arms, provoked, no doubt, by Filipino soldiers, who insisted upon maintaining a general fusillade along their lines, with which the American line connected just east of the Passia road. The fire was not returned by our troops, and when the formation of the day was commenced things at the front were comparatively quiet. By 8 o'clock the position was occupied as indicated upon the map. About 9.35 the naval attack commenced, and some twenty minutes thereafter the gun of Battery B, Utah Artillery, opened on blockhouse 14, the guns of the Astor Battery having engaged an opposing battery some minutes after the opening of the naval attack. There was no reply from the blockhouse or contiguous lines, either by guns or small arms. The opposition to the Astor fire, however, was quite energetic, but after a spirited contest the opposition, consisting probably of 2 pieces, was silenced. This contest was the only notable feature of the first stage of the action, and was especially creditable to the organization engaged. The position, selected by Lieutenant March after careful personal reconnoissance, was, perhaps, the only one possible in the vicinity, and it was occupied with great skill and held with commendable firmness, the battery loosing 3 men wounded, 1 of whom has since died. The Utah gun on the road fired 14 shots at blockhouse 14 with good effect, as was subsequently ascertained upon inspection of the work. Lieutenant Grow and detachment deserve great credit for the commendable manner in which the piece was served and pulled through the mud without the assistance of horses. Sometime about 11 o'clock concentrated infantry fire was heard in front of the Second Brigade, and not long thereafter an exultant shout indicated substantial success for our arms on the left. It was therefore assumed that the enemy had been so shaken as to make the advance practicable without a serious disadvantage to our troops," as indicated in memorandum No. 1, attached hereto. Sergeant Mahoney, with a squad of Company D, Twenty-third United States Infantry, by a well-conducted scout, soon ascertained that the Spanish line was abandoned, and a general advance was immediately ordered. At about 11.20 a United States flag was placed upon blockhouse 14, thus concluding the second stage of the action without opposition and without loss. A battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel French, was stationed at this point to prevent armed bodies other than American troops crossing the trenches in the direction of Manila. The general advance was soon resumed, the Thirteenth Minnesota leading, with Company K as advance guard, then the Astor Battery, a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry, the battalion Fourteenth Infantry, and the North Dakota regiment, following in the order named. At a point indicated on the map for a 3-gun emplacement, just south of Singalong, a blockhouse was found burning, causing a continuous explosion of smallarms ammunition, which, together with a scattering fire from the enemy, retarded the advance for a time; all difficulties were soon overcome, however, including the passage of the Astor Battery, by the determined efforts of Lieutenant March and his men, assisted by the infantry of the Minnesota regiment, over the gun emplacement which obstructed the road. In the village of Singalong the advance fell under a loose fire, the intensity of which increased as the forward movement was pressed, and very soon the command was committed to a fierce combat. This strong opposition arose at blockhouse 20, of the Spanish defenses, a detached work with emplacements for six guns, which fortunately were not filled on the 13th instant; but the work was occupied by a detachment of infantry, probably a strong rear guard. The advance party, consisting of men of the Minnesota regiment, reenforced by volunteers from the Astor Battery, led by Lieutenant March, and Captain Sawtelle of the brigade staff, as an individual volunteer, reached a point within less than 80 yards of the blockhouse, but was obliged to retire to the intersecting road in the village, at which point a hasty work was improvised and occupied by a firing line of about 15 men. Aside from conspicuous individual actions in the first rush, the well-regulated conduct of this firing line was the marked feature of the contest, and it is proposed, if possible, to ascertain the names of the men engaged, with a view to recommend them for special distinction. The main body of the fighting line, consisting of Company C, Twenty-third Infantry; Companies C, E, G, H, K, and L, Thirteenth Minnesota, and the Astor Battery, were well screened behind the village church and stone walls of adjacent gardens. In the early stage of the contest it seemed possible that an offensive return might be attempted; accordingly the position was secured by detached posts east and west on the intersecting road, and the construction of a succession of hasty intrenchments in the village street, and the occupancy of a strong defensive position by the main body in the rear. It soon became apparent, however, that the enemy was making a paroxysmal effort and would soon yield to steady pressure. Lieutenant-Colonel French, commanding a battalion of the Twenty-third Infantry, composed of Companies D, F, G, and H, acting on his own initiative, advanced without orders to the sound of the combat and placed his battalion in position on the intersecting road, to the west of the village, in precisely the position where, in the event of a crisis, he would have been most useful. At about 1.30 p. m. all firing had ceased, and two scouting parties, voluntarily led by Captain Sawtelle and Lieutenant March, soon thereafter reported the retreat of the adversary. The city was entered without further incident through the Paco district, detachments being placed at the bridges indicated in memorandum No. 2 herewith. The contact was made about 12 o'clock and the contest continued with great ferocity until 1.35-that is to say, about an hour and a half. The loss in the combat was 3 officers wounded, 4 enlisted men killed, and 33 wounded, including one man of the North Dakota regiment wounded far in the rear of the fighting line; making the total casualties for the day 43 killed and wounded. The character of the ground absolutely precluded the possibility of any regular deployment, and as a consequence most of the troops present were unable to participate in the actual conflict, a fact much to be regretted, as all were eager to be at the front, and from the well-known character of the officers and men, there |