Which bears the name of Ea, Kindle thou the holy purifying exorcism of Eridu. Put fire above and below, that the seven may not come near the sick man. Like a broad net thrown over the wide space thou shalt Glowing, it stands at his head by day and by night. O Gibil, there to guard him. Drive away the evil seven, and scare them far away.' Thus, The great collection of Exorcisms, called Maqlu1 is especially rich in references to the Fire-God. the bewitched person is made to say: "For the loosening of the witchcraft, and the spell which is upon me. I fly to the hands of Ea, Merodach, and the Fire-God." And we find sorcerers threatened with the vengeance of the Babylonian trinity in formulas like the following: "Your sorceries, with which ye have bewitched me, May Ea, the exorcist dissolve. May your witchcrafts be torn asunder By Merodach, the divine exorcist, the son of Ea the decider. I will bind ye, I will fetter ye, and I will deliver ye To the Fire-God; to the burning, the singeing, the binding. To him who overthrows the sorcerers." We may sum up the evidence before us, therefore, in the words of Dr. Zimmern :2 "In the Babylonian religion we meet with a triad of Gods, of whom the two first, Ea and Merodach, stand to one another in the relation of Father and Son; while the third, the FireGod, carries out the commands of both, and acts specially as the Intercessor between God and Man." Thus, we have a circle of ideas which approaches very closely to the fundamental dogma of Christianity. We have a God the Father, a God the Son, and a third hypostasis, the Spirit of Fire. And in this connection it is important to note that in the New Testament the idea of the Holy Ghost is frequently associated with fire. In Matt. iii 11, John the Baptist declares that the coming Messiah will baptise the people "With the Holy Ghost and with fire"; and in Acts ii 3, we read that "There 1 Die Assyrische Beschwörungsserie Maqla, by Knut Tallqvist (Leipsic, 1895). 2 Vater, Sohn und Fürsprecher, p. 11. appeared unto them cloven tongues, like as of fire, and it sat upon each of them. And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost." It should also be noted that the peculiar marshalling of the Triad "Father, Son, and Holy Ghost," makes its appearance in a fully developed form in the earliest Christian period. Further, the formula was expressed liturgically (compare 2 Cor. xiii, 13, Romans i, 1-4, Revelations i, etc.). The formula does not explain itself, and there is nothing to show how it arose in apostolical times. The probability is that it already existed in Jewish speculation; and was taken over by the Apostles; but, on the other hand, it cannot be deduced from the Old Testament theology; and has every appearance of being introduced from a foreign source. It has, further, been pointed out by commentators that the introduction of the Holy Ghost as the "Paraclete" (John xiv, 16,) is made quite suddenly, and no explanation is vouchsafed. It appears to be assumed that the readers of the Gospel are already acquainted with him, as ПIapákλŋtos, intercessor; and in Rom. viii, 26, we are told that "The Spirit himself maketh intercession (vπepevτvyxáva) for us". I John ii, 1, tells us "We have an Advocate (Ilapákλnтov) with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous"; and in John xiv, 16, the "Spirit" is said to be "another Comforter" (Iapáкλŋтov); much as Gibil takes the place of Merodoch as intercessor in the Babylonian faith. It is true that our knowledge of the Babylonian religion is derived from documents which are separated by several centuries from the Gospels; and that we have no knowledge of its later developments, except what we can glean from its influence upon Judaism, Parseeism, Gnosticism and Mendaism; but it has been shown above that in its ancient state it exhibits very remarkable approximations to Christian dogma, so that it is not at all unreasonable to suggest that for the true origin of the Christian Trinity we must look to THE BABYLONIAN FATHER, SON, AND PARACLete. CHILPERIC. EGOISM THE SOLE BASIS OF ETHICS. IF one fact, plainer than any other, is discernible from a study of the history of morality, it is that moral ideas have been continually changing. It is therefore not a little remarkable that even advanced thinkers have so little recognised this in their teaching. Accused of sapping the foundations of current morality by destroying its religious sanction, rationalists, in reply, have labored to prove that the destruction of religious belief makes no difference to current morality. Instead, they should have subjected current morality to the same crucial tests as have been applied to religion. That even Herbert Spencer is not altogether free from the fatuity of bending the knee to current morality is pointed out by Nietzsche in the above quotation. Now, while not entirely agreeing with all that the German philosopher has to say on this score, it is a fact to be noted that, notwithstanding Herbert Spencer's monumental labors, a system of ethics based on egoism is not merely not accepted by the world at large, but finds very few adherents even among the scientific and cultured. Leaving out of account the religious bias, against which no system, however sane, can make rapid headway, it is somewhat remarkable that in quarters. where the religious bias does not exist, the recognition that egoism is the basis of all morality should be so limited. I say this is remarkable because the “Data of Ethics" is beyond question the greatest contribution to moral science in the English language. With a strong battery of logic, and an array of indisputable facts, the evolutionary philosopher has proved beyond cavil that egoism is the sole basis of ethics. Seeing the extent of Herbert Spencer's influence on modern thought, why is it that in Ethics his teaching should be so barren of results? This want of acquiescence in Spencer's ethical teaching is perhaps due to his own timidity. The desire to conciliate the followers of accepted ethical concep( 344 ) tions, for such I conceive it to be, has led him to weaken his position, with the result that while temporarily softening the criticism of opponents he has rendered obscure the central point of his teaching. Clearly recognising himself that altruism is only a phase of egoism, in those sections where he argues for the necessity of cultivating altruistic conduct, he has not clearly kept before the reader the fact that all conduct is egoistic. That this necessarily results in a confusion of the reader's mind he himself sees, for in the appendix he notices the probability and endeavors to make light of it. But nothing short of recasting the sections on altruism can free the "Data of Ethics" from this weakness. Even where Spencer is plainly egoistic in thought, he is non-egoistic in speech, using approvingly such terms as "duties ", "social obligations", and the like. But in some passages the tendency to conciliate existing. prejudice results in complete self-stultification. 'Finally, it may be remarked that a rational egoism, so far from implying a more egoistic human nature, is consistent with a human nature that is less egoistic." ("Data of Ethics," p. 199.) What obvious absurdity to talk of an egoism which is not egoism. The explanation of course is, that in this sentence he speaks of two different varieties of egoism. Where he speaks of rational egoism he refers to an enlightened egoism which proceeds to the attainment of happiness through the happiness of others, and when he speaks of " egoistic human nature" he adverts to an unenlightened egoism which has not learnt that the sum of happiness for the ego is increased by giving pleasure to others. But to say that either kind of egoism is more or less egoistic than the other is to use language unworthy of the builder of a synthetic philosophy. Let us examine the following sop to the altruists: 'If we define altruism as being all action which in the normal course of things benefits others instead of benefitting self, then, from the dawn of life, altruism has been no less essential than egoism (p. 201). Spencer, let it be noted, has already defined right action as being that which subserves the life of the individual. If altruism, therefore, means action which subserves the life of some other at the expense of the individual, then altruism being only another word for self destruction is, from Spencer's own shewing, immoral. If however, by altruism is meant that action which benefits self in a higher or more complex way through the happiness of others, then this is really egoism, and the passage above conveys no more intelligent meaning than that 2=2. But Spencer does not mean this. He here speaks of altruism in the sense of conduct which is destructive of the ego, forgetting that elsewhere he has described such conduct as immoral. This is evident from the following passages: "And then might be dwelt on the multitudinous cases, where, as generally throughout the insect world, maturity having been reached, and a new generation provided for, life ends; death follows the sacrifice made for progeny' (p. 202). "Self sacrifice, then, is no less primordial than self preservation; altruism has been evolving simultaneously with egoism" (p. 204). Nothing but the fatuity which springs from the attempt to conciliate opponents could have blinded Spencer to the fact that the procreative act, to which he here specially refers, although it involves loss of tissue and sometimes loss of life is in reality egoistic. The insect copulates because it is its greatest pleasure to do so. Therefore its conduct is egoistic and not altruistic. But because death follows is it even an unwise egoism? Not necessarily. In postulating that only those acts are good which conserve life, Spencer founds on the assumption that life brings a surplus of pleasure. How to get out of his short life this surplus of pleasure over pain, is then, on Spencer's showing, the insect's main business, and if it should prove that the one brief sexual act gives the insect greater pleasure than could be got by a continuation of its monotonous existence, minus the sexual pleasure, then the insect acts wisely in taking the pleasure which straightway kills it. It may even be, as Schopenhauer contends, that the |