Island. The consequences of the Spanish colonial system have been such that even before the present war Cuba was already ruined. The 1895-1898 war has completed and aggravated to the utmost degree the material ruin of the Island. The ultimate result of this industrial thraldom has been the never-ending removal of Cuban wealth to Spain, without any return. The means employed for securing that object were numberless.

The irresponsible methods of governing Cuba converted the Island into a powerful means of political influence in the hands of the Ministers. The most difficult political questions, either personal or otherwise, were usually decided at the expense of Cuba. Very often the single signature of a Minister of the Colonies was sufficient to make the fortune of a man for his whole life; and it is easy to understand that every political party in Spain would be opposed to any reform that should deprive it of such efficient means of influence and power. With very few exceptions, all the Spanish officials in Cuba, from the lowest to the highest, came from Spain. Their number was extraordinarily large, and their work, as a general rule, pitifully bad; their constant aim being to do as little work as possible, and to enrich themselves, at the cost of Cuba, as quickly as they could. The fleet of the Spanish transatlantic steamers was constantly employed in transferring impecunious officials from Spain to Cuba, and taking them back again with more or less wealth acquired during their residence in the Island, and sometimes with pensions during their lives and the lives of their widows and daughters. Even a share of the passage money of these officials "both ways" was paid by Cuba.

Besides this salaried staff of officials, backed by the army and navy (which were wholly paid by Cuba), Spain depended for the support of its rule in Cuba on the so-called Spanish political party, known since 1878 as the " Union Constitutional." This party comprises the whole of the Spanish population in Cuba, which is very numerous; and the blind

and unconditional support it gave to every measure of government, or of misgovernment, whether the ruling party in Spain was liberal or conservative, was paid for by the Government in many different ways, and in such a degree that whatever might be the economic situation of Cuba, the men belonging to the Spanish party had always the means of enriching themselves. To these causes of impoverishment must be added the results of the commercial policy of Spain; a subject which will receive attention later in this volume. In vain the productive classes of Cuba protested, during many years, against this deadly régime. It is no wonder, therefore, that the insatiable ambition of Spain should have led to such an antagonism of interests as to render a Cuban insurrection necessary, there being no peaceful means of convincing Spain of its folly. In the same measure as Cuba was reduced to utter bankruptcy and poverty, the importation of Cuban wealth into Spain, without any return, increased year after year. More particularly after the price of sugar fell permanently (in 1884) to about one-half of its former value, and after the complete abolition of slavery took place (in 1885), was the contrast strikingly manifested between the gradual exhaustion of Cuba and the ever-increasing exactions of the mother country. It may with accuracy be said that after the slavery of the negroes came to an end, Spain possessed the power of reducing to real slavery the whole native Cuban population, both white and black.

For this systematic process of thorough draining, Prime Minister Canovas invented the name or appellation of realidad nacional (national reality), meaning thereby that the necessity of maintaining the old colonial system could not be avoided, as it had become interwoven with the Spanish economics in such a degree as to make it impossible for any Government, either conservative or liberal, to interfere with it. The Cubans could not accept, without repeatedly protesting against it, the oppressive system of the "national reality," for which name they substituted, very properly and

accurately, the denomination of "economical slavery.'

It

is now useless to explain in how many forms, and how often, the Cubans have appealed to the Madrid Government, especially since 1890. But all their efforts failed, and the necessary outcome of those failures was war. Cuba, no more a European colony, will henceforth be an entirely American country. It is now completely ruined and devastated, and many years of peaceful industry will be necessary in order to convert its unhappy people into a prosperous nation. How that can best be accomplished is of far more importance to the people of Cuba at this time than the question of who shall administer the government. For the present, at least, if its people are wise, the Island will be content with the industrial freedom which has been accorded to it, and rejoice in the fact that it is an American country, and not a Spanish dependency.

CHAPTER II

CONDITIONS WHICH CONFRONT US

treat of Cuba as an American country is the purpose of this volume.

To treat of Cuba. If the people of the Island, regardless

T°

of nationality, will only postpone the question of the particular form of government for the present, and give all their attention to the new economic questions which confront them, the future will be full of promise. Cuba is no longer a European colony, but an American country, under the protection of the United States. So long as the Island is occupied and governed by the military forces of the United States, law and order will be maintained and equal rights will be granted to all the people. From an industrial point of view Cuba will have practically obtained what she has been fighting for for nearly a generation: namely, industrial and commercial freedom. The United States will administer the laws for the Cubans in the interest of Cuba. The United States asks nothing in return but the same opportunity for trade and commerce as is accorded to the other countries of the world. The Republic will levy no tribute, nor will it exact a dollar of taxation over and above the revenue necessary for protecting life and property, and the cost of inaugurating such works for the improvement of sanitation, or the carrying on of industries, as may become necessary.

Many Cubans, and a very large number of Spaniards, who appeared before the author when in Cuba, for the purpose of giving testimony on industrial and commercial matters, took it for granted that the United States would, in making

up the new fiscal laws for the Island, exact discriminating duties in favour of the United States and against European countries. When told nothing of the sort was contemplated, the Cubans were surprised and the Spaniards incredulous. Indeed, the latter were astounded, and seemed to wonder what the United States was in Cuba for. Even American citizens interested in pushing their Cuban trade have expressed surprise at the absolute freedom which has been allowed all fiscal legislation, and the scrupulous care exercised by our Government not to exact any right itself which is not accorded to other nations. In such matters we are of course bound by our international treaties, and so long as Cuba remains under the protection of the Republic, and not part of it, she must be treated, so far as customs regulations and navigation laws are concerned, as a free country. In the preliminary work of economic reconstruction these sound principles have been kept in mind and adhered to. In fact, the fullest and broadest plan was chosen by the Administration to secure information in Cuba; and the refrain of the instructions, both from President McKinley and his able and broad-minded Secretary of the Treasury, was, to spare neither time nor money to secure the views of all the people of Cuba; for whatever the United States Government finds necessary to do in the Island must be done, as far as possible, by the people of Cuba, for Cubans, and in the interests of Cuba. By this it must not be inferred that those of Spanish birth were to be excluded, but, on the contrary, that the views of all who proposed to remain in Cuba and help by their labour and thrift to build up the industry and commerce of the Island should be sought and considered.

In following out the spirit of these statesmanlike instructions, the author invited, through the newspapers, all persons interested in the industry, trade, foreign commerce, and currency and banking system of Cuba to express their views on these and kindred topics. Many responded, and as may be imagined the information gathered took a wide range,