The son turned

cold out of a certain quarter-he turned his back upon it; stayed as little as was possible in his father's presence; and when there, averted his eyes as much as was decent from his father's face. The lamp shone for many hundred days upon these two at table-my lord ruddy, gloomy, and unreverent ; Archie with a potential brightness that was always dimmed and veiled in that society and there were not, perhaps, in Christendom two men more radically strangers. The father, with a grand simplicity, either spoke of what interested himself, or maintained an unaffected silence. in his head for some topic that should be quite safe, that would spare him fresh evidences either of my lord's inherent grossness or of the innocence of his inhumanity; treading gingerly the ways of intercourse, like a lady gathering up her skirts in a by-path. If he made a mistake, and my lord began to abound in matter of offence, Archie drew himself up, his brow grew dark, his share of the talk expired; but my lord would faithfully and cheerfully continue to pour out the worst of himself before his silent and offended son.

"Well, it's a poor hert that never rejoices!" he would say, at the conclusion of such a nightmare interview. "But I must get to my plew-stilts." And he would seclude himself as usual in the back room, and Archie go forth into the night and the city quivering with animosity and scorn.

ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON.

(To be continued.)

THE ORIGIN OF THE WAR OF 1870.

THE appearance this year of General Lebrun's book, "Souvenirs Militaires," places the public for the first time in possession of information which had been the secret of the Cabinets. No serious contradiction of Lebrun's allegations has anywhere appeared, and their truth may be accepted, save so far as Italy is concerned. With regard to the position of Italy in 1870, we are still left to conjecture, if we have not secret means of information, for Lebrun's statements about Italy are unsupported by evidence, and in conflict with previous revelations.

*

When, in 1887, I mentioned the Archduke Albert's mission to Paris, and General Lebrun's mission to Vienna, my accuracy was, somewhat vaguely, contested in the introduction to the English edition of the Memoirs of Count Beust. General Lebrun then wrote that he would one day publish the engagements of Austria, and this has now been done.

We may wonder at the small amount of attention which has been attracted by Lebrun's volume, when we consider what passions raged a few years ago over the questions upon which it throws so brilliant a light. Book upon book used to appear on the bearings of 1866 upon 1870, and on the attitude of all the personages concerned in preparing for the greater war. No full, and therefore no truthful, revelation of facts which are essential to an accurate historical view has ever been made till this year, and when made this year-reducing, as it does, to waste paper most of what had been previously written on the subject-it passes almost unperceived.

*"The Present Position of European Politics." By the author of "Greater Britain,"

There can be no more interesting controversy in relation to the history of our times than that on the responsibilities for the war of 1870, and there certainly has never been a historical question on which the public has held, at short intervals, views more widely different. When the draft treaty about Belgium was issued in 1870, opinion, which had been halting as between the sides, pronounced itself fiercely against France. When afterwards the Duc de Gramont first privately circulated, and then published, the despatch of Count Beust of July 20, 1870, which showed that Austria had expressed her intention of co-operating with France, a feeling arose that perhaps Austria had tempted France into an alliance intended to undo the effects of 1866. Then came gradually to light a portion of the history of the Hohenzollern candidature, showing that this scheme was no new one in 1870, and suggesting that it had been prepared from a far earlier date, a revelation which left an uncomfortable feeling upon the public mind as to whether all men had been wrong in their previous judgment. Then came an interview with a journalist, in which Prince Bismarck seemed to take upon himself the whole burden of the war by declaring that he had altered a telegram for publication in such a way as to make war inevitable, though peace had been possible until that moment. A similar statement by Prince Bismarck had been twice previously published at Berlin, but had not attracted much notice in England or France. Now comes Lebrun, who shows that war had been carefully prepared by Austria and France for 1871, and who seems at first sight to justify Germany for taking steps in July, 1870, to prevent that postponement of a declaration of war until April or May, which, according to Lebrun, the Archduke Albert considered essential to the success of the Austrian arms in an antiGerman war.

On, however, a fuller examination of all the circumstances of the case, that occurs which generally happens with regard to historical events, namely, that the impartial observer must come to an impartial view, and admit that the causes which were at work rendered war inevitable, and that in the minds of all those by whom war could be postponed or made its certainty was recognised. All through the Paris Exhibition, and

the meeting of Sovereigns and the series of peaceful speeches, Louis Napoleon knew, and the Emperor of Austria knew, and the King of Italy knew, and the Prussian Chancellor and Prussian Chief of the Staff knew, that war must come about soon. Each was trying to bring it about in such a fashion as to make it the most profitable or the least harmful to his country.

What is, then, the sequence of events from which this historical conclusion has to be deduced? As early as January 6, 1868, the French Ambassador at Berlin had written that Count Bismarck had resolved on uniting Germany under Prussian leadership, and would create an opportunity for carrying out that design, which the Chancellor was convinced he could not accomplish without war. Believing in the Prussian army to a degree in which perhaps no Prussian general believed in it, Bismarck, the Ambassador declared, looked forward to the certainty of that war promoting the success of his scheme. He had concluded, in 1866, treaties of alliance with the South German States, and the Chief of the Staff had prepared a plan of campaign against France, in which the numbers of the South German contingents and the precise use to be made of them were determined, and in which it was assumed that the war would be brought about under circumstances in which the French would find themselves without allies. In the meantime Count Manteuffel was sent to St. Petersburg to secure Russian neutrality, in return for a promise to support Russia in a denunciation of the Black Sea Treaty. After this General Ignatieff was sent to Berlin to promise the friendly attitude which had been asked for. The Prussian army had not done so well as it should have done in 1866, and immense pains were taken in the following year to make it adequate for its task. France had been exhausted by the Mexican campaign, and for internal reasons was specially desirous of peace. A scheme was prepared for the reduction of the active army, and nothing was done towards the preparation for war of the principal reserve, which, after its legislative creation, continued to exist upon paper only. In April, 1868, the Chief of the Prussian Staff walked over the whole of the common frontier of France and of the Bavarian Palatinate

the country on which the concentration of the hostile armies took place two years and a quarter afterwards; and he prepared at that time the memorandum freely quoted in the Prussian official history of the war-a memorandum which exactly foretold the numbers which the French would be able to put in the field, what they would attempt to do with them, and how they would be outnumbered, cut off from Paris, and driven on to the Belgian frontier. Professor Bluntschli held in 1868 a conversation with the North German Chancellor, in which Count Bismarck told him that France could place on the frontier not more than 300,000 men; that Germany could meet her "with double, and more," of equal quality; that Austria would be neutral, as the Magyars were aware that "a victorious Austria would deprive Hungary of her Constitution," while in Italy, though the King might be personally bound to Louis Napoleon, all danger was over, as a Ministry hostile to Germany could not in future be formed. All through 1868 General Ducrot was writing from Strasburg to General Frossard, and keeping the French Court exactly informed as to the military preparations of Prussia. In October, 1868, he wrote that Madame de Pourtalès, returning from Berlin, had just told him how one of the Prussian Ministers had assured her that by the early summer of 1870 Alsace would be Prussian. It is clear from the terms of this letter that Moltke had held similar language, and the prophecy is remarkable when we remember that it is contained in documents which were in the Tuileries, and that they did not leave the palace until September 4, 1870, having been under lock and key for nearly two years before the prophecy was accomplished.

Already, in 1868, the Hohenzollern candidature had been foreseen. Queen Isabella had been driven from her throne and country by an insurrection; Serrano was Regent, but Prim (Minister of War and Prime Minister) had the crown in his pocket. Prince Leopold, an elder brother to Prince Charles of Roumania, married to a Portuguese princess, had been from the first moment of Prim's dictatorship talked of for the Spanish throne. The French Republicans, including a historian of high standing-M. Jules Simon, and M. Jules Favre (the latter writing just after having for five months acted as French