Opinion of the Court 114 C. Cls. For the year 1937 (case 45997), plaintiffs say that they complied with the program as outlined by the Secretary and the regulations relating thereto and became entitled to receive a payment of $29,261.78, and for the year 1938 (case 45779), plaintiffs rely upon the rule applied in United States v. Great Northern Railway Co., 278 U. S. 144, that in the absence of fraud or mistake of fact the action of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration in making original payments for 1933 to 1936, inclusive, was final and could not be reopened and reconsidered. Plaintiffs also say that defendant has the burden of proof with respect to the correctness of the offsets of the amount due for 1938 against payments made for the years 1933-1936, and that it has not sustained this burden. Counsel for defendant say (1) that the payments which the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to make in amounts determined by him to be fair and reasonable, were gratuitous grants and that this court does not have jurisdiction of a claim for such grants for participation in the soil conservation programs under the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of February 29, 1936, as amended; (2) that the applicable statutes gave to the Secretary of Agriculture wide discretion and drastic power with respect to the making of such grants; that his determination with respect to the facts upon which any grant was to be made, and as to the amount thereof, was made conclusive, and that Congress manifested its intention in the various provisions of the statutes, and particularly in section 14 (49 Stat. 1151) of the Soil Conservation Act of February 29, 1936, and section 385 (52 Stat. 68) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, that the opportunity which it was giving agricultural producers to receive grants, if they adopted prescribed soil conserving practices, was to be administered solely by the Secretary of Agriculture; (3) that plaintiffs are, therefore, bound by the determinations made by the Secretary, and involved in these cases, as to their noncompliance with the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (Sec. 10 (e), 48 Stat. 37) and the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 (Sec. 14); (4) that, in any event, the Government has the undoubted right to 94 Opinion of the Court offset all or a portion of the amount due from it (for 1938) against overpayments determined to have been made to the claimants in other transactions for other years, and that plaintiffs' proof in the 1938 case is not sufficient to warrant a finding that this action of the Secretary of Agriculture was erroneous, arbitrary, or illegal. The question of our jurisdiction to consider plaintffs' claims should be first decided. We are of the opinion that these cases are not governed by the decisions in United States v. Babcock, 250 U. S. 328, 331, and Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 551, 561, especially relied upon by defendant, and other cases cited. The Babcock case involved a claim under the Act of March 3, 1885, for loss of personal property of officers and enlisted men in the military service, which provided that such loss should be "examined into and determined" by the proper accounting officers of the Treasury and that the payment of the amount of such loss so ascertained and determined "shall be in full for all such loss or damage," and "That any claim which shall be presented and acted upon under authority of this act shall be held as finally determined, and shall never thereafter be reopened or considered." The Court held that "These words express clearly the intention to confer upon the Treasury Department exclusive jurisdiction and to make its decision final." From a study of the statutes involved in these cases, in the light of the reports of the congressional committees thereon, we do not find such clear language by Congress expressing its intention to confer upon the Department of Agriculture exclusive jurisdiction, and to make the decision of the Secretary, with respect to claims such as are here involved, final in all respects and not subject to further consideration by this court. In the Williamsport Wire Rope Company case, supra, the statute vested discretionary authority in the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to grant relief to taxpayers from exceptional hardships by reason of having to pay abnormally high excess profits tax. Cf. Montgomery Ward and Company v. United States, 94 C. Cls. 309. The statutes of February 29, 1936, and February 16, 1938, supra, involved in these cases, made specific provision for Opinion of the Court 114 C. Cls. payment and fixed definite standards to be followed by the Secretary of Agriculture in making regulations to carry out the declared purposes of the statutes, and made it mandatory upon him to make the specified cash payments when agricultural producers had complied with the terms and conditions of the statutes and the regulations issued thereunder. Thus far we think it is clear that plaintiffs' suits present claims founded upon a law of Congress under 28 U. S. C. 1491 (2). Cf. Thomas v. United States, 16 C. Cls. 522, 527; United States v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 268, 275. There can be no question as to the power of Congress to provide for such payments. The fact that no contract existed between the parties nor the fact that the payments which the statutes provided should be made were grants or bounties, does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. F. Parlin, Executor v. United States, 1 C. Cls. 174; Campbell v. United States, 107 U. S. 407, 410-413; Grand Lodge v. New Orleans, 166 U. S. 143, 149; United States v. Realty Company, 163 U. S. 427; The Manila Prize Cases (Dewey v. United States), 188 U. S. 254; Sampson v. United States, 35 C. Cls. 578; United States v. Weld, 127 U. S. 51, 54–57; Mumford v. United States, 31 C. Cls. 210, 214–215; Maddux et al. v. United States, 20 C. Cls. 193, 198, 199; Drier v. United States, 108 C. Cls. 487. However, in view of the nature of the grants; the purposes intended to be accomplished by the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936 and the Agricultural Act of 1938; the nature of the programs thereunder and the performances required of agricultural producers, and the provisions of the statutes vesting authority in the Secretary of Agriculture to determine the facts constituting the basis for any payment and the amount of the payment due, we are of the opinion that the extent of our jurisdiction in these cases is governed by the principles announced in Dismuke v. United States, 297 U. S. 167, 171–173. In that case the court said: The United States is not, by the creation of claims against itself, bound to provide a remedy in the courts. It may withhold all remedy or it may provide an administrative remedy and make it exclusive, however, mistaken its exercise. See United States v. Babcock, 250 U. S. 328. But, in the absence of compelling language, resort to the courts to assert a right which the statute 94 Opinion of the Court creates will be deemed to be curtailed only so far as * * The Commissioner is required by section 13, "upon receipt of satisfactory evidence" of the character specified, "to adjudicate the claim." This does not authorize denial of a claim if the undisputed facts establish its validity as a matter of law, or preclude the courts from ascertaining whether the conceded facts do so establish it. * In view of the provisions of the statutes, hereinafter referred to, concerning the findings of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and the Secretary of Agriculture, we must accept such findings as conclusive since plaintiffs' proof fails to establish that the findings of the investigators, the officials of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and the Secretary of Agriculture were arbitrary or capricious. There was certainly evidence to support such findings and decisions, as is shown by our special findings of fact herein. These officials clearly followed a procedure which satisfied the standards of fairness and reasonableness. Section 10 (a) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933, provided for the appointment by the Secretary of Agriculture of the officers and employees of the “Agricultural Adjustment Administration, which the secretary shall establish in the Department of Agriculture for the admin Opinion of the Court 114 C. Cls. istration of the functions vested in him by this title." Subsection (c) vested in the Secretary of Agriculture authority, with the approval of the President, "to make such regulations with the force and effect of law as may be necessary to carry * * *" and out the powers vested in him by this title subsection (e) provided that "The action of any officer, employee, or agent in determining the amount of and in making any rental or benefit payment shall not be subject to review by any officer of the Government other than the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of the Treasury." (Certain taxes were imposed by this Act and the Secretary of the Treasury was vested with authority to make regulations with reference to the powers vested in him.) Section 13 of the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of February 29, 1936, provided as follows: * * the Secretary [of Agriculture] is authorized and directed to provide for the execution by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration of such powers conferred upon him under sections 7 to 14, inclusive, of this Act as he deems may be appropriately exercised by such Administration * And Section 14 of this Act provided: The facts constituting the bases for any payment or grant or the amount thereof authorized to be made under section 7 or 8 hereof, when officially determined in accordance with rules or regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture, shall be reviewable only by the Secretary of Agriculture. In Senate Report No. 1481, 74th Cong., 2d Session, on S-3780, which became the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of February 29, 1936, the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry said: Section 10 [13] provides that the Secretary is authorized and directed to provide for the execution by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration of such powers conferred upon him under the act as he deems may be appropriately exercised by such Administration and for such purposes the provisions of law applicable to the appointment and compensation of persons employed by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration shall apply. The purpose of this section is to facilitate the most economical and effective operation of the bill through the utilization of such of the existing personnel |