THE UPTOWN CLUB OF MANHATTAN, INCORPORATED, PETITIONER, v. THE UNITED STATES
[113 C. Cls. 422; 338 U. S. 823]
Excise tax on club dues; club where social features were not subordinate to business purposes.
Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court, October 10, 1949.
THE P. DOUGHERTY COMPANY, PETITIONER, v. THE UNITED STATES
[113 C. Cls. 448; 338 U. S. 858]
Eminent domain; just compensation; action of Government did not constitute taking or involve duress. Petition dismissed.
Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court, October 24, 1949.
THE UNITED STATES, PETITIONER, v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY
[113 C. Cls. 437; 338 U. S. 848]
Transportation of mails under the Act of 1940; release required by the Act effective on date of filing. Judgment for plaintiff.
Defendant's petition for writ of certiorari denied by the Supreme Court October 17, 1949.
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT.
I. In two suits to recover amounts alleged to be due them
for 1937 (Case No. 45779) and 1938 (Case No. 45997)
by reason of their compliance with the programs of
the Department of Agriculture relating to soil-
rebuilding and soil-conservation practices, in con-
nection with the production of cotton, under the
provisions of the Soil Conservation and Domestic
Allotment Act of February 29, 1936, as amended;
it is held that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover.
(See 104 C. Cls. 713 and 756). Crain and Wilson,
Trustees, 94.
II. A study of the statutes under construction in the in-
stant suits, and of reports of Congressional Commit-
tees, fails to reveal clear language by Congress ex-
pressing its intention to confer upon the Department
of Agriculture exclusive jurisdiction and to make the
decision of the Secretary with respect to claims, such
as are here involved, final in all respects and not
subject to further consideration by the Court of
Claims. United States v. Babcock, 250 U. S. 328,
331, and Williamsport Wire Rope Co. v. United
States, 277 U. S. 551, 561, distinguished. Id.
III. The instant suits present claims founded upon a law
of Congress under 28 U. S. C. 1491 (2). The fact
that no contract existed between the parties and the
fact that the payments which the statutes provided
should be made were grants or bounties does not
deprive the Court of Claims of jurisdiction. Id.
IV. In view of the nature of the grants; the purposes to be
accomplished by the Soil Conversation and Domestic
Allotment Act of 1936 and the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act of 1938; the nature of the programs there-
under and the performances required of agricultural
producers, and the provisions of the statutes vesting
authority in the Secretary of Agriculture to deter-
mine the facts constituting the basis for any pay-
ment and the amount of payment due; the extent of
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in these cases
is governed by the principles announced in Dismuke
v. United States, 297 U. S. 167, 171-173.
AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT-Continued
V. Under the provisions of the statutes concerning the
findings of the Agricultural Adjustment Administra-
tion and the Secretary of Agriculture, the findings
are to be accepted as conclusive without proof that
they are arbitrary or capricious. Id.
VI. When Congress intends to make administrative find-
ings and decisions conclusive for all purposes and
not subject to consideration by the courts, Congress
usually expresses this intention in clear language.
Id.
VII. In the instant cases, the court holds that plaintiffs
had the burden of proof to show that the Secretary's
findings and decisions were arbitrary or capricious
not only with respect to the year 1937 but also with
respect to the offsets, and plaintiffs have not sus-
tained this burden. The record affords no basis for
the conclusion that the Secretary of Agriculture did
not properly apply the provisions of the statutes
and the regulations to the facts found by him. Id.
VIII. Where the Secretary of Agriculture found, and the
evidence adduced shows, that the distributions
originally made by plaintiffs to certain of their
tenants and share croppers for the years 1933 to
1936, inclusive, were not made in accordance with
the intent and purpose of the statute and the pro-
visions of the written instructions and regulations
issued by the Secretary of Agriculture; and where
the evidence further shows that plaintiffs' departure
from the regulations was unauthorized; and where
the record shows that until an investigation was
begun in 1939 these irregularities were not known
to the Department and the Secretary; it is held the
action of the Secretary in 1941 in reopening the
payments for the years 1933 to 1936, inclusive, was
within his authority under the statutes; that the
Secretary properly made the offsets in question; and
plaintiffs are not entitled to recover.
IX. Defendant's counterclaim as to certain payments made
to a partnership in which plaintiffs owned a con-
trolling interest is dismissed, since it is not shown
that the plaintiffs had the land operated through the
partnership for the purpose of defeating the agri-
cultural program.
Id.
ANTICIPATION.
See Patents I, II, III, IV.
See Contracts XLVI, XLVII, XLVIII, XLIX, L.
APPROPRIATION LIMITATION.
See Overtime Pay I, II, III.
ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIM.
See Taxes IX, X, XI.
"BALL AMENDMENT”, THE.
See Overtime Pay I, II, III.
See Contracts XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII, XXIX, XXX.
BONUS, REFUND OF.
See Taxes XVIII, XIX.
BREACH OF CONTRACT.
See Contracts XXI, XXII, XXIII, XXIV.
CLAIMS CONVENTION.
I. By virtue of the ratification of the Claims Conven-
tion between the United States and Norway signed
March 28, 1940 and ratified by the Senate on
April 30, 1948 (62 Stat. -), providing for the
settlement of the claim of the Government of
Norway on behalf of the plaintiff against the United
States, it is held that the Court of Claims has been
divested of jurisdiction of the claim in suit, the
defendant's motion to dismiss the petition is accord-
ingly allowed, and the petition is dismissed.
Hannevig, 410.
II. Under the provisions of Article VI, Clause 2, of the
Constitution, a treaty is the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Claims Convention, upon ratification
by the Senate had the effect of withdrawing the
claim made in plaintiff's petition from the juris-
diction of the Court of Claims as effectually as if
this had been accomplished by a statute enacted
by both Houses of Congress and approved by the
President. Id.
III. The consent given by the United States to be
sued is not a vested right and such consent may be
modified or withdrawn at any time. Id.
IV. The treaty between the United States and Norway,
of which country plaintiff is a national, deals
specifically with plaintiff's claim involved in the
instant case and it requires no additional legis-
lation insofar as the right and authority conferred
thereby to settle the claim by diplomatic means is
concerned. Id.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL.
See Contracts XLV.
CONGRESS, DISCRETION OF.
See Report To Congress VI.
CONTRACT SETTLEMENT ACT.
I. Under Section 14 (b) of the Contract Settlement Act
of 1944 (41 U. S. C. 114), the language of which is
very broad, the Court of Claims has ample authority
to issue a summons to any or all persons with legal
capacity to be sued to appear as a party or parties
in any suit or proceeding of any nature whatsoever
pending in the court and defend their interests, if
any, in such suit or proceedings. Central National
Bank, 390.
II. The Government's motion in the instant case does not
comply fully with all the requirements of Rule 39 (c)
of the Court of Claims but since the matters upon
which the motion is predicated as disclosed by the
briefs and argument became apparent during the
taking of testimony before the Commissioner of the
Court; it is held that the defect in the motion is one
of form and not of substance and under the facts
and circumstances the defect is not of sufficient merit
to defeat defendant's motion on this ground. Id.
III. Plaintiff's objection that the general jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims is limited by the Act to claims by
the United States, and that, accordingly, the court
cannot adjudicate the legal rights between plaintiff
and another is not sustained in view of the broad
authority conferred upon the Court of Claims by
Section 14 (b) of the Contract Settlement Act. Id.
CONTRACTING OFFICER.
See Contracts VIII, IX, X, XV.
CONTRACTS.
I. Under the provisions of a Resolution (No. 122) of the
United States Senate referring to the Court of Claims
a pending bill (S. 708) "pursuant to Section 151 of
the Judicial Code"; it is held that the Court of
Claims has jurisdiction to render judgment on
plaintiff's claim because said claim is "founded
upon a contract with the United States" and it is
not barred by the statute of limitations (28 U. S. C.
1491; 62 Stat. 869). McCrary, 12.
II. Executive Order No. 9328, dated April 8, 1943, which
"froze" labor on the Government contracts on which
they were then employed so long as they were needed,
was a war measure issued in the exercise of the
sovereign power of the United States and under all
the decisions it was thus an act for which the
Government is not liable as a contractor. Id.
III. In the instant case the proof shows that when it
developed that the plaintiff was unable to secure
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