ment as king over Turkey also. Far be it from me to entertain any repugnance to a contingency promising so much advantage to a fine country and to well-disposed industrious peoples; but it would scarcely find favour in the eyes of France. No doubt Austria must be compelled to relinquish the "occupation," and to waive her pretensions to the exclusive right of watching over the navigation of the Danube. She has acted so equivocal a part all through the dispute with Russia, that it would be no very harsh measure on our side were we to refuse to let her exercise any authority over the Principalities in time to come. France will in all likelihood expect to receive some advantage from the "settling" of the affairs of Turkey; and nothing would suit the emperor better than to establish a military post on the Bosphorus, such as might constitute the nucleus of a future empire, and meantime enable him to push his advantages in a thousand ways in the East: and for an opening such as this, the French people would have cause to feel really grateful to their sovereign.

Now, sir, if these vaticinations have any reasonable basis, you must perceive what a perplexing tissue of consequences connects itself with their fulfilment. It is not to be expected that Austria should quietly look on and allow France and England to erect themselves into "executors and assigns" of the expiring state. We must not pass over the hostility which would animate the Court of King Otho, or the general aversion with which French ascendancy would be regarded; though that nation has contrived to earn a reputation for abusing it wherever it has been planted. But I look chiefly to the opposition of Austria, which

might, not unnaturally, end in her making common cause with Russia.

In any case, much embarrassment will attend the ultimate distribution of those countries. The inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia, I have reason to believe, would prefer to fall under Russian rule rather than under Austrian. Perhaps the simplest way out of this dilemma would be, to let those peoples choose a Government for themselves. Will the Allies accept so humiliating a solution? I fear not.

Conversing with a German friend lately (not an Austrian) on these thorny questions, he remarked, "Settle the Turkish succession as you will, we Germans can never approve your course. If you give advantages to Austria, we shall all condemn the deci sion of the Allies. If you augment the power and credit of France, the sentiment will be little less acrimonious. What renders Germany (and I always include kings and subjects in the word) so apathetic about this contest, is, first, the feeling of deep hatred towards the French, (for which, God knows, ample ground exists!) and secondly, a cold, jealous distrust of England. When any one of our numerous states has attempted to better its political condition by resistance to misrule, the Government of England has thrown cold water upon its efforts. In 1848, your then Foreign Minister went so far as to use menacing language towards the patriotic few who strove to kindle public spirit and effect needful reforms. England is, in truth, never found on the side of peoples, but always casts her weight into the opposite scale. And, I tell you plainly, we fear France quite as much or more than Russia, and wonder how you can fail to

apprehend danger from her stupendous military organization; connected as it is with anti-social passions, an unscrupulous government, and an overweening national vanity." "I agree with you," said I, "in regarding France with uneasiness: but you must observe that she can only send armies to the south of Europe, or into Asia, on shipboard; which insures to England a certain control over her movements by reason of our naval superiority-whilst Russia can pour down her hosts, landwards, into Bulgaria, or into Syria and Egypt." "Well, but what do you say to Cherbourg?" rejoined my Wirtemburgher friend; "look at that splendid port, with its vast docks and arsenal, and couple these with their propinquity to your shores! Why, the money expended on Cherbourg, during the last forty or fifty years, far exceeds in amount the outlay upon Sebastopol!" "Yes," I answered, "the rise and expansion of Cherbourg is, beyond question, a formidable fact. But the English seldom look far forward; they always adapt their national policy and measures to circumstances as they arise. We happen to be on friendly, nay, on loving terms with the French emperor just now; so John Bull takes little heed of what changes may by and by Before this hot friendship sprang up (from motives which were sketched out in my former communication,) we really were alarmed lest Louis Napoleon should come over and ravage our defenceless cities and lands, if he did no more. But these fears were dissipated by a sudden gust of mutual interest, and we went off to the East together." "Your interests," said my interlocutor, "are more commercial than anything else. You want to have the

supervene.

run' of the Black Sea with all its immense supplies, and also to keep the Red Sea passage open for your Indian trade.". "Exactly so," I retorted; "but why we should not be able to trade in the Black Sea, equally under Russian as under Turkish rule, I am at a loss to guess. Russia is more indebted to her commerce than to any other source for her increased importance, and the English are, perhaps, about her best customers." "Well, but you are not sure of Egypt continuing unmolested, if Russia should grasp the parent state," said the German. "Agreed," I replied; "but if we could defend Egypt successfully against France, what is to make us incapable of defending it against Russia?"

Englishmen really talk about the "designs of the Czar" as something which it would be vain to gainsay, as though we, and every one else, would be easily beaten out of every possession which he might think fit to attack! No more talk of England's magnificent ships or floating batteries, of her gallant soldiers, of her admirable artillery, from the instant Russia is named as a possible assailant. Yet the Times is perpetually putting forward the superiority of the Western armies in open conflict, and adducing the victories over Russian troops by even Turkish arms, as evidence how little she is to be dreaded as an attacking foe. For my part, I see even less difficulty in barring out Russia from Egypt, should she make the essay, than in keeping her out of Turkey. And granting that she might get possession of Egypt,-which, however, is a monstrous hypothesis,-she would never find it her interest to isolate that country from European

S

258 THE War from an uNPOPULAR POINT OF VIEW.

commerce; her principal object being to enrich her people.

I conclude my long disquisition by repeating, that the real objects of this ruinous war seem to me as disproportionate to the sacrifices it involves, and as little calculated to realize tangible benefits to Great Britain, as any war which could in these times be undertaken. The avowed purposes are a sham; the real motives are the offspring of a timorous panic and delusion, reflecting small honour upon English dignity and self-reliance.

* Id est, the desire to uphold "civilization and the independence of nations."