These operations extended the lines so much that the need of more troops to hold them was instantly felt. Accordingly, General Shafter telegraphed for reinforcements, which were hurried forward—6,000 men reaching him within eight days after the battle. With these the city was completely invested from Caimanes on the northwest to the bay south of Santiago. Siege guns were brought up and placed in position, reinforcements of field artillery arrived, entrenchments were thrown up and every preparation made for a quick reduction of the place by bombardment. On Sunday, July 3d, Admiral Cervera tried to run past the American fleet, but lost all his vessels, and was taken. prisoner, and on the same day General Shafter demanded the surrender of Santiago, on pain of bombardment.

This demand was refused by General Jose Toral, commanding in the city, and the foreign consuls in Santiago then requested that the bombardment should be delayed until the foreign residents had been removed to places of safety, in and beyond the American lines. This request was granted and a truce was allowed, which continued until July 9, when General Shafter renewed his demand for surrender, again threatening to bombard. General Toral offered to evacuate the city provided he were allowed to do so with men and arms. This was refused by General Shafter, and on July 11, the army and fleet opened fire on the city. Some little damage was done by the heavy shots of the warships, but the Spaniards kept well within their trenches, and the only casualties were three Americans wounded.

General Miles arrived in front of Santiago on July 12th, having left Tampa four days before, and as a result of his urging, a meeting was held between the lines, at which General Toral and Generals Shafter and Wheeler discussed the terms of capitulation. Further negotiations followed and on July 16th these terms were reached: Twenty thousand refugees to go back to Santiago; an American infantry patrol on roads surrounding the city; our hospital corps to give attention to sick and wounded Spanish soldiers; all Spanish troops in the province of Santiago, except 10,000 at Holguin, to come to the city to surrender; the guns and defenses of Santiago to be turned over to the Americans in good condition; Spanish troops to surrender their arms; all Spaniards to be conveyed to Spain and to take portable church property, and Spaniards to co-operate with Americans in destroying harbor mines.

This surrender covered one-tenth of the island of Cuba and the

surrender of more than 20,000 Spanish troops. It was formally completed on July 17th and the American troops took possession of Santiago. "Upon coming into the city," telegraphed General Shafter, "I discovered a perfect entanglement of defenses. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first day, it would have cost 5,000 lives to have taken it." As it was, this important victory, with its substantial fruits of conquest, was won by a loss of 1,593 men killed, wounded and missing. Lawton, in the severe fighting around El Caney, lost 410 men, Kent lost 859 men in the still more severe assault on San Juan and the other conflicts of the center. The cavalry lost 285 men, many of whom fell at San Juan. In a military sense, our victory had not been dearly bought. Combined with the loss of the Spanish fleet, it had led to an important capitulation, and, as events proved, materially hastened the end of the

CHAPTER IX.

GENERAL SHAFTER'S OWN STORY OF SANTIAGO.

By

Wan Shafter

Major-General.

T WAS NOT UNTIL nearly two weeks after the army landed that it was possible to place on shore three days' supplies in excess of those required for the daily consumption. On June 30th I reconnoitered the country about Santiago and made my plan of attack. From a high hill, from which the city was in plain view, I could see the San Juan Hill and the country about El Caney. The roads were very poor, and indeed little better than bridle paths until the San Juan River and

El Caney were reached.

Lawton's division, assisted by Capron's light battery, was ordered to move out during the afternoon toward El Caney, to begin the attack there early the next morning. After carrying El Caney, Lawton was to move by the Caney road toward Santiago and take position on the right of the line. Wheeler's division of dismounted cavalry and Kent's division of infantry were directed on the Santiago road, the head of the column resting near El Poso, toward which heights Grimes' battery moved on the afternoon of the 30th, with orders to take position there early on the next morning, and at the proper time prepare the way for the advance of Wheeler and Kent on San Juan Hill. The attack at this point was to be delayed until Lawton's guns were heard at El Caney and until his infantry fire showed he had become well engaged.

The preparations were far from what I desired them to be, but we were in a sickly climate; our supplies had to be brought forward by a narrow wagon road, which the rains might at any time render impassable; fear was also entertained that a storm might drive the ves

sels containing our stores to sea, thus separating us from our base of supplies.

Lastly, it was reported that General Pando, with 8,000 e-enforcements for the enemy, was en route from Manzanillo and might be expected in a few days. Under these conditions I determined to give battle without delay.

Early on the morning of July 1st Lawton was in position around El Caney, Chaffee's brigade on the right, across the Guantanamo road; Miles' brigade in the center, and Ludlow's on the left. The duty of cutting off the enemy's retreat along the Santiago road was assigned to the latter brigade.

The artillery opened on the town at 6:15 A. M. The battle here soon became general, and was hotly contested. The enemy's position was naturally strong and was rendered more so by blockhouses, a stone fort and intrenchments cut in solid rock and the loopholing of a solidly built stone church. The opposition offered by the enemy was greater than had been anticipated and prevented Lawton from joining the right of the main line during the day, as had been intended.

After the battle had continued for some time Bates' brigade of two regiments reached my headquarters from Siboney. I directed him to move near El Caney, to give assistance, if necessary. He did so and was put in position between Miles and Chaffee. The battle continued with varying intensity during most of the day and until the place was carried by assault about 4:30 P. M. As the Spaniards endeavored to retreat along the Santiago road Ludlow's position enabled him to do very effective work and practically to cut off all retreat in that direction.

After the battle at El Caney was well opened and the sound of the small arm fire caused us to believe that Lawton was driving he enemy before him, I directed Grimes' battery to open fire from the heights. of El Poso on the San Juan blockhouse, which could be seen situated in the enemy's intrenchments extending along the crest of San Juan Hill. This fire was effective and the enemy could be seen running away from the vicinity of the blockhouse.

The artillery fire from El Poso was soon returned by the enemy's artillery. They evidently had the range of this hill and their first shells killed and wounded several men. As the Spaniards used smokeless powder it was very difficult to locate the position of their pieces, while, on the contrary, the smoke caused by our black powder plainly indicated the position of our battery.

At this time the cavalry, under General Sumner, which was lying concealed in the general vicinity of El Poso, was ordered forward, with directions to cross the San Juan River and deploy to the right on the Santiago side, while Kent's division was to follow closely in its rear and deploy to the left. These troops moved forward in compliance with orders, but the road was so narrow as to render it impracticable to retain the column-of-fours formation at all points, while the undergrowth on either side was so dense as to preclude the possibility of deploying skirmishers. It naturally resulted that the progress made was slow, and the long-range rifles of the enemy's infantry killed and wounded a number of our men while marching along this road, and before there was any opportunity to return this fire. At this time Generals Kent and Sumner were ordered to push forward with all possible haste and place their troops in position to engage the enemy. General Kent, with this end in view, forced the head of his column alongside of the cavalry column as far as the narrow trail permitted, and thus hurried his arrival at the San Juan and the formation beyond that stream.

A few hundred yards before reaching the San Juan the road forks, a fact that was discovered by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby of my staff, who had approached well to the front in a war balloon. This information he furnished to the troops, resulting in Sumner moving on the right-hand road, while Kent was enabled to utilize the road to the left.

General Wheeler, the permanent commander of the cavalry division, who had been ill, came forward during the morning and later returned to duty and rendered most gallant and efficient service during the remainder of the day.

After crossing the stream, the cavalry moved to the right with a view of connecting with Lawton's left when he could come up, and with their left resting near the Santiago road. In the meantime, Kent's division, with the exception of two regiments of Hawkins' brigade, being thus uncovered, moved rapidly to the front from the forks previ ously mentioned, in the road, utilizing both trails, but more especially the one to the left, and, crossing the creek, formed for attack in the front of San Juan Hill. During this formation the Second brigade suffered severely. While personally superintending this movement, its gallant commander, Colonel Wikoff, was killed. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, Thirteenth Infantry, who was soon severely wounded, and next upon Lieutenant-Colonel Lis