When statutory courts jurisdiction. to questions of no little difficulty and importance: e.g., What are the extent and limits of the jurisdiction so created?—how far it is exclusive? In what cases the judgments of such special tribunals are final, and to what extent and in what circumstances they are subject to review? The reported decisions upon such matters are sufficiently numerous, both in this country and in England; but though they will be found to contain general principles of great value, it can hardly be said that the subject has been exhausted, or that any set of rules has yet been elaborated which can be confidently relied on as decisive of every question that may arise in practice. This is partly attributable to the fact that the phraseology employed by the Legislature presents considerable variety, and is not always characterized by technical accuracy; and partly to the circumstance that the Supreme Courts, in their anxiety to do substantial justice, have not always been very consistent in their interpretation of the statutory words. The following, however, is submitted as the general import of the decided cases:— When a new civil jurisdiction is created by statute, with a have exclusive power of judging in special matters, the jurisdiction of the tribunal formerly competent to that species of causes is not thereby held to be ousted, unless the statute expressly declares the jurisdiction of the new court to be exclusive (a). But the case is different where the subject-matter of the causes intended to be dealt with by the new jurisdiction is purely the creation of the statute, and could not, except for the interference of the Legislature, have had any existence. Here the statutory tribunals seem to have exclusive jurisdiction (b). Thus, the compensation due to persons whose lands are taken for the construction of railways in virtue of and in accordance with the provisions of the special act, can only be assessed by the special tribunals which the Legislature has appointed for that purpose (c). No encroachment on the ordinary tribunals inferred. On the other hand, no encroachment on the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals is to be presumed; but the jurisdiction of the new statutory tribunals is limited to the purposes and sphere of (a) Ersk. i. 2, 7; Stair ii. 3, 32. Bremner v. Huntly Friendly Society, 1817, 19 F. C. 416. (b) Ersk., supra; Stair, supra ; Edinburgh, Perth, and Dundee Ra. Co., 1850, 22 Jur. 573. (c) See cases in note (a), p. 501. operations specified by the statute. Hence it follows, that compensation cannot be obtained before the statutory tribunals for damage caused by railway companies in the completion of their lines, when such damage has not been caused by acts done in virtue of and in conformity with their statutory powers. Such proceedings, if illegal, must be remedied by having recourse to the ordinary courts (a); and if not illegal, as sometimes happens, found no claim for compensation in any court (b). tribunals When the Legislature gives a new special jurisdiction to an Existing existing tribunal, this does not in anywise affect its common law receiving jurisdiction, which remains intact in all matters not specially regu- jurisdiction. lated by the statute (c). statutory jurisdiction courts may be Even where special tribunals have been created with exclusive Exclusive jurisdiction for dealing with claims arising in consequence of the of statutory exercise of special statutory powers, the parties may, by converting the statutory claims into matter of agreement, bring themselves under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts (d). All new statutory jurisdictions are presumed to be subordinate, and therefore subject to the review of the Supreme Courts, unless the contrary is so expressed by the Legislature as to exclude all doubt (e). The mere use of words expressing finality will not exclude review, but will be held to mean that the statutory tribunal has power to exhaust the cause in the first instance; and the specific exclusion of one mode of review will not be held to imply the exclusion of others (f). If, however, the statutory words admit of no other interpretation, all review will be excluded (g). got over. Review of Court, when excluded. competent But however express may be the statutory provisions excluding Review always review, they will not be interpreted to exclude the intervention of when there is the Supreme Court when the statutory tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction. (a) Goldie v. Oswald, 1814,2 Dow 534; Shand v. Henderson, 1814, 2 Dow 519; Burnet v. Knowles, 1815, 3 Dow 280. (b) See cases in note (b), p. 501. (c) Edin. and Glasgow Ra. Co. v. Cadder Road Trs., 1842, 5 D. 218. (d) Hutchison v. Edin. and Glasgow Ra. Co., 1848, 10 D. 760. (e) Ersk. i. 2, 7. (f) Guthrie v. Cowan, 1807, 14 F. C. 43, M. App. Juris. 17; Anderson v. Campbell, 1811, 16 F. C. 207; Key (g) Chivas v. Duke of Gordon, 1804, excess of Court of powers, or plainly travelled out of its jurisdiction (a). Where the question of competency and the merits are mixed up together, the Court will interfere (b); and where the proceedings of the statutory tribunal have been so irregular as to amount to a violation of the provisions of the Act, the Court may order them to be begun and proceeded with de novo (c). When a question is raised as to what claims are authorized to be made for compensation under an Act, it may be determined statute prima prima instantia by the Court of Session (d). interpret the instantia. Rules regarding. DECLINATURE OF JUDGE. When a judge is interested as a partner or shareholder in a mercantile partnership or company, it is a good ground of declinature (e); but where the grounds of declinature apply to so many judges, that, were they to be sustained, the cause could not be decided, the declinator will be repelled ex necessitate (ƒ). It has, moreover, long been fixed, that a judge may deliberate and vote in a cause affecting a corporation in which he holds stock (g). By Act of Sederunt 1st Feb. 1820, it was declared that the fact of a judge holding shares or stock in a chartered bank is no ground of disqualification; and the principle of this Act has been held to apply where a near relation of a judge holds shares in other chartered companies (h). (a) Fraser v. Burnet, 1806, Hume 256; Grant v. Gordon, 1833, 12 S. 167; Brown v. Heritors of Kilberry, 1825, 3 S. 334, 1826, 4 S. 176, aff. 1829, 3 W. S. 441; Tennant v. Turner, 1837, 16 S. 192; Graham v. Caled. Ra. Co., 1848, 10 D. 495; Edin. and Glas. Ra. Co. v. Cadder Road Trs., 1842, 5 D. 218. See Scott v. Anderson, 1832, 10 S. 760; Brown v. Richmond and Co., 1833, 11 S. 407; Guthrie v. Millar, 1827, 5 S. 663. (b) Edin. and Glas. Ra. Co. v. Earl of Hopetoun, 1840, 2 D. 1255. (c) Young v. Milne, 1814, 17 F. C. 664; Fraserv. Burnet, 1806, Hume 256. (d) Macdonell v. Caled. Canal Comrs., 1830, 8 S. 881. (e) Shand's Prac. i. 60; Douglas, Heron, and Co. v. Earl of Galloway, 1774, 5 Brown's Sup. 424; Maclean v. Muness, 1776, 5 Brown's Sup. 455; Aberdeen Town and County Bank v. Scot. Equit. Insur. Co., 1859, 22 D. 162. (f) Shand's Prac. i. 61; Friendly Insur. Co. v. Royal Bank, 1749, Elch. Jurisd. No. 50; Blair v. Sampson, 1814, 18 F. C. 501; A. S. 22 July 1774, and 22 Jan. 1789; Hercules Insur. Co. v. Hunter, 1837, 15 S. 800. (g) Bank of Scotland v. Ramsay, 1738, 5 Brown's Sup. 206; Anderson v. Bank of Scotland, 1840, 15 F. C. 547. (h) Speirs v. Ardrossan Canal Co., 1823, 2 S. 221; Friendly Insur. Co. v. Royal Bank, supra. of Lords. It is a rule of the House of Lords, that a peer will not take Rule in House part in hearing an appeal in which a company of which he is a shareholder is a party; and it has been doubted whether this rule could be altered otherwise than by statute (a). (a) London and North-West. Ra. Co. v. Lindsay, 1858, 3 Macq. 114. CHAPTER VI. CITATION OR SERVING OF PROCESS. I. FIRMS AND COMMON LAW COMPANIES. General rules. As has already been seen, there are three ways in which associations of this kind may be called as defenders, viz.: 1. By making all the partners defenders; 2. By calling the company in its descriptive name, with joinder of at least three partners; and 3. By the social name in which the firm signs obligations. Whichever of these forms has been adopted, service must be made on the quasi person of the company. This is done by leaving a copy with one of the partners, or other known official of the company, at the company's place of business. The place of business is in law the home of the company; and as an individual may have more than one residence, a company may have more than one domicile. This happens as often as a company has two or more offices in which it receives orders and transacts business with its customers. When this is the case, service may be made on the quasi person of the company at any of the offices lying within the jurisdiction of the Court (a). With whom the writ As to the person with whom the writ ought to be left, the anashould be left. logy of service on an individual affords a guide. When they can be found present, a partner, or managing official, such as a secretary, is the proper person; but where these cannot be got after due inquiry, it should seem that service on an inferior assistant will suffice (b). (a) Wordie, 1831, 10 S. 142; Bishop v. Mersey and Clyde Nav. Co.,1830, 8 S. 558; Aberdeen Ra. Co., 1854, 16 D. 422. (b) Young v. Livingstone, 1860, 22 D. 983. |