223 U.S. Opinion of the Court. the amount of the policy to the Provincial Treasurer of Quebec. Cloutier then brought suit upon the policy, making the heirs, widow and son of the insured parties defendant. None of the defendants appeared; judgment by default was entered in favor of Cloutier, and the money was paid over to him by the Provincial Treasurer. During the pendency of Cloutier's suit, however, and before the latter obtained his judgment, Patrick F. Tremblay sued the insurance company in a court of the State of Maine, and recovered judgment for the full amount due upon the policy. 97 Maine, 547. The insurance company then unsuccessfully attempted, by a suit in equity, to stay the collection of the judgment in the action at law. 101 Maine, 585. Presumably in consequence of an intimation of the court when dismissing the equity cause, the insurance company began this proceeding for a review of the action at law, and the same culminated in a judgment in favor of the insurance company against Tremblay for $818.33 and interest, the sum found to be due to Cloutier, as equitable assignee of the policy for his advances to the original holder of the policy, thereby operating a set-off of the amount against Tremblay's judgment upon the policy. This writ of error was then allowed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. The assignments of error are three in number, but they merely allege in various forms the commission of error by the state court, sitting as a court of law, in not holding as requested that the judgment obtained upon the policy by Cloutier which had been pleaded in bar by the insurance company, was a bar to the action upon the policy brought by Patrick F. Tremblay, thereby denying "full and proper faith and credit" to the Cloutier judgment. Plainly the writ of error was improvidently allowed. The authority conferred by Rev. Stat., § 709, to review a final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of a State, in which a decision in the suit could be had, Opinion of the Court. 223 U.S. is limited to cases "where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under, any State on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity; or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or immunity, specially set up or claimed, by either party, under such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or authority." The first section of Art. IV of the Constitution confers the right to have full faith and credit "given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings in every other State." No such right, privilege or immunity, however; is conferred by the Constitution or by any statute of the United States in respect to the judgments of foreign states or nations, and we are referred to no treaty relative to such a right. Neither expressly nor by necessary intendment was there asserted in the state court during the course of the litigation in question any claim on behalf of the insurance company of the possession of a right, etc., protected by the Constitution of the United States. Since, therefore, entirely aside from all question as to the correctness of the judgment below rendered, we are without authority to review the decision made by the state court, it results that the writ of error must be and it is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Writ of error dismissed. 223 U. S. Opinion of the Court. UNITED STATES v. BARUCH. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 190. Argued November 13, 14, 191'-Decided February 19, 1912. Cotton featherstitch braids are properly assessed at sixty per centum as braids under the trimming schedule, par. 339, and not at fortyfive per centum as tapes or bindings under notions schedule, par. 320 of the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897. Where a conflict which had existed under prior tariff acts as to the classification of articles had been settled, Congress will not be presumed in enacting a new tariff to renew the conflict by not adhering to the commercial and tariff meaning of the terms as it had been settled. The soundness of the judicial construction of a statute is reinforced by the fact that it had been the construction given by the Executive Department charged with its enforcement ever since its adoption. 172 Fed. Rep. 342, reversed; 159 Fed. Rep. 294, affirmed. THE facts, which involve the classification of cottonfeatherstitch braids under the tariff act of 1897, are stated in the opinion. Mr. Assistant Attorney General Wemple, with whom Mr. Charles E. McNabb, Assistant Attorney was on the brief, for the United States. Mr. Wade H. Ellis, with whom Mr. John A. Kratz, Jr., was on the brief, for respondents. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court. This case concerns the proper classification of merchandise imported in 1899, and subsequent years, by the Opinion of the Court. 223 U.S. respondent at the port of New York, invoiced as cottonfeatherstitch braids." The goods consisted of articles ranging variously from about one-fourth to one-half of an inch in width, loom woven, of white or colored threads throughout, or of mixed white and variously colored threads of cotton or other vegetable fiber, and ornamented with raised figures in various designs, some of which had plain and others scalloped or looped edges. They were officially appraised as "cotton braids-sixty percentum;" and were accordingly classified by the collector as "braids" under paragraph 339 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897 (30 Stat. 151, 181, c. 11), generally referred to as the "trimmings" schedule, the pertinent provision of which is as follows: "Embroideries and all trimmings, including braids, edgings, insertings, flouncings, galloons, gorings and bands, composed wholly or in chief value of flax, cotton, or other vegetable fiber, and not elsewhere specially provided for in this Act." Asserting that the articles should not have been assessed at 60 per cent. but were dutiable at the rate of 45 per cent. ad valorem under paragraph 320 of said act, usually styled the "notions" schedule, as "bindings" or as "tapes made of cotton or other vegetable fiber," the importers duly protested, and the question of the proper classification was considered by the Board of General Appraisers. That body, on July 24, 1906, sustained the decision of the collector, upon the authority of a ruling made in the case of Straus Bros. & Co., wherein the Board but acted upon the evidence taken in and applied the ruling made in what is known as the Vom Baur Case. The importers carried the case to the Circuit Court, and in that court additional evidence was introduced by both parties. Upon such additional evidence and the evidence taken before the board, the decision of the board was affirmed on November 23, 1907. 159 Fed. Rep. 294. On appeal, however, the Circuit Court of Ap peals held the merchandise dutiable at 45 per cent. ad valorem as "binding," under § 320, and the decision of the Circuit Court was reversed. 172 Fed. Rep. 342. This writ of certiorari was then allowed. Under the tariff acts of 1890 (May 9, 1890, 26 Stat. 105, c. 200) and 1894 (August 27, 1894, 28 Stat. 509, c. 349) braids were enumerated in the "notions" schedule, which carried a lower rate of duty than articles in the "trimmings" schedule. In re Dieckerhoff, 54 Fed. Rep. 161, involved a review of the decision of the Board of General Appraisers (G. A. 1301) in the matter of an importation, in 1891, of articles similar to those here in question, dutiable under the tariff act of 1890. The controversy was whether the goods should have been assessed at the rate of 60 per cent. ad valorem as cotton trimmings under the "trimmings" schedule, paragraph 373 of the tariff act of 1890, or assessed as cotton braids at 35 cents per pound under the "notions" schedule of the same act. The Government insisting on the higher duty, contended that the articles. should be classified as cotton trimmings, and were not braids, because to be such they must be braided. The importers, however, contending for the lower duty, urged that the goods were commonly known as featherstitch braids, and should be classified as braids, and thus be brought under the notion schedule bearing the lower duty. The court overruled the contention of the Government, accepted the commercial designation, and sustained the ruling of the Board of General Appraisers that the goods were braids, and dutiable as such. The Government acquiesced in this decision. The administrative rule, therefore, under the tariff act of 1890, was to classify the articles in question as braids embraced within the notions schedule, and thereby cause them to carry a lower duty than they would have carried had they been embraced in the trimmings schedule; and under the act of 1894 the VOL. CCXXII-13 |