Opinion of the Court.

223 U. S.

Provided, That the Commission may, mod

spected. in its discretion and for good cause shown, ify the requirements of this section in respect to publishing, posting, and filing of tariffs, either in particular instances or by a general order applicable to special or peculiar circumstances or conditions. No carrier, unless otherwise provided by this Act, shall engage or participate in the transportation of passengers or property, as defined in this Act, unless the rates, fares, and charges upon which the same are transported by said carrier have been filed and published in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

It is the contention of the defendants that a tariff is not published in the sense in which the act uses that term unless printed copies are "kept posted in two public and conspicuous places in every depot," etc., and it was this contention that prevailed in the Circuit Court. But, in our opinion, it is not sound. Publication and posting in the sense of the act are essentially distinct. This is the import of the provision that the requirements relating to "publishing, posting and filing" may be modified by the commission in special circumstances, for if publishing included posting, mention of the latter was unnecessary. And from all the provisions on the subject it is evident that the publication intended consists in promulgating and distributing the tariff in printed form preparatory to putting it into effect, while the posting is a continuing act enjoined upon the carrier, while the tariff remains operative, as a means of affording special facilities to the public for ascertaining the rates in force thereunder. In other words, publication is a step in establishing rates, while posting is a duty arising out of the fact that they have been established. Obviously, therefore, posting is not a condition to making a tariff legally operative. Neither is it a condition to the continued existence of a tariff once legally established. If it were, the inadvertent or mischievous destruction or

removal of one of the posted copies from a depot would disestablish or suspend the rates, a result which evidently is not intended by the act, for it provides that rates once lawfully established shall not be changed otherwise than in the mode prescribed.

Like views of the posting clause were expressed in Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Cisco Oil Mill, 204 U. S. 449, and upon further consideration we perceive no reason for departing from them. See also Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Albers Commission Co., ante, p. 573.

Whether, by failure to comply with that clause, a carrier becomes subject to a penalty is apart from the present case and need not now be considered.

The judgments are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed.

PHILADELPHIA COMPANY v. STIMSON, SECRETARY OF WAR.1

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.

No. 70. Argued November 16, 1911.-Decided March 4, 1912.

Exemption of the United States from suit does not protect its officers from personal liability to persons whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded.

In case of injury threatened by illegal action, an officer of the United
States cannot claim immunity from injunctive process.
Where complainant does not ask the court to interfere with an officer

1 This case was originally commenced against William H. Taft as Secretary of War; by suosequent orders of the court the successive incumbents of that office, Luke E. Wright, Jacob M. Dickinson and Henry L. Stimson, were substituted as defendants and appellees.

of the United States acting within his official discretion, but challenges his authority to do the act complained of, the suit is not against the United States.

While the general rule is that equity has no jurisdiction over the prosecution of crimes, it may, when it is essential to the protection of property rights, as to which the protection of a court of equity has already been invoked, enjoin the institution of criminal actions involving the same legal questions.

An officer transcending the limits of his authority under a constitutional statute may inflict similar injuries on property or individuals as though he were proceeding under an unconstitutional statute, and in either event, equity may intervene to restrain unfounded prosecutions.

A court of equity having control of the person of defendant has jurisdiction of an action to restrain him from violating the rights of the complainant in regard to property not within its jurisdiction and may compel obedience to its decree. Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U. S. 298.

While the establishment of a general system of harbor lines for the protection of navigation is not of itself an injury to property and cannot be restrained, equity may enjoin an officer from taking measures to maintain the limits against an individual proprietor and so prevent him from enjoying what he asserts to be a lawful use of his own property.

A riparian proprietor of land bounded by a stream continues to hold to the stream as a boundary where the banks are changed by accretion or erosion, but if the banks are changed by avulsion, the title is not changed but remains at the former line. This rule applies alike to all streams and rivers no matter how strong and swift they may be.

To bring a sudden change of channel within the rule that it will not affect the boundary line, it must be perceptible when it takes place. Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359.

In this case, held, that the changes in the line of complainant's property were due to gradual erosion and not to sudden change of channel, and that the stream remained the boundary line. The title to the soil under navigable waters within their territorial limits, and the extent of riparian rights, are governed by the law of the several States subject to the paramount authority of Congress; and under the authority of Congress, the Secretary of War may fix harbor lines superseding those fixed by the State.

Commerce includes navigation; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713;

223 U.S.

Argument for Appellant.

and the power of Congress over navigation has no limits except those prescribed in the Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196. The authority of Congress is not limited to water as it flowed at any preceding time. Alterations in the course of a stream do not affect the power of Congress.

The public right of navigation follows the course of the stream.

It is for Congress to decide what shall or shall not be deemed in judgment of law an obstruction to navigation. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., 18 How. 421.

Authority given by Congress to the Secretary of War to establish harbor lines is not exhausted in laying the lines once; the Secretary may change them at subsequent times in order to protect navigation from obstruction.

33 App. D. C. 338, affirmed.

THE facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality of acts of Congress giving the Secretary of War power to establish harbor lines in navigable waters of the United States, and the validity and effect of the action of the Secretary of War thereunder in regard to harbor lines established by him in the harbor of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. William L. Marbury, with whom Mr. Morgan H. Beach, Mr. W. Graham Bowdoin and Mr. Samuel McClay were on the brief, for appellant:

It was manifestly in the interest of navigation, as well as for the protection of riparian owners, that the legislature of Pennsylvania enacted Chapter 363 of the Acts of 1858, to establish high and low water lines in the Allegheny, Monongahela and Ohio rivers, in the vicinity of Pittsburgh, in Allegheny County.

The effect of this act and of the proceedings so taken thereunder was to secure to the owners of land along these rivers complete protection against any loss of their land or right to build upon the same because of any subsequent encroachment of the waters. Bridge Co. v. Pfeil, 42 Pitts. Leg. Jour. 18.

Argument for Appellant.

223 U.S.

Rights of riparian owners on navigable waters, including the question of how far, if at all, their title to land shall be deemed to be affected by the action of the water, are determined and governed by the laws of the respective States. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324; St. Louis v. Meyers, 113 U. S. 566; Water Power Co. v. Water Commissioners, 168 U. S. 349; Packer v. Bird, 137 U. S. 661.

In Pennsylvania the soil up to low-water mark in a navigable stream is the property of the Commonwealth. Monongahela Bridge Co. v. Kirk, 46 Pa. St. 112, 120.

Even if the overflowing of the complainant's property caused by the construction by the Government in improving the harbor might be damnum absque injuria, the owner of the property has the right to protect himself against such injury, if he can, at his own expense, either by excluding or expelling the water. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 336.

But, even though the Pennsylvania act of 1858 had never been passed, upon the facts appearing in this case the title of the plaintiff as the owner of Brunot's Island to the submerged land lying inside islandward of the commissioners' line of 1865 remains absolute.

If the waters of the river had encroached gradually and by imperceptible degrees upon the island, as it existed in 1865, so that the land now in dispute gradually became part of the bed of the river covered with navigable water, in the absence of any such statute as the act of 1858 above quoted, the owner of Brunot's Island would have lost title to the land thus submerged and the same would have be-` come the property of the State or of the municipality.

But, when as here, instead of the submergence or loss of land being caused by the gradual and imperceptible encroachment of the water, it is caused by sudden floods and freshets, the title of the owner of the island is not affected and he may at any time exclude the water or occupy