MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a writ of habeas corpus. It was dismissed by the District Court, 176 Fed. Rep. 933, but was sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals, which ordered the parties concerned to be discharged from custody. 181 Fed. Rep. 313. 104 C. C. A. 535. The parties are Chinamen who entered the United States surreptitiously, in a manner prohibited by the immigration act of February 20, 1907, c. 1134, § 36, 34 Stat. 898, 908, and the rules made in pursuance of the same, if applicable to Chinese. They were arrested in transitu and ordered by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to be deported. §§ 20, 21. But as it transpired in the evidence that they were laborers, the Circuit Court of Appeals held that they could be dealt with only under the Chinese exclusion acts of earlier date. Those acts make it unlawful for any Chinese laborer to come from any foreign place into the United States, or, having so come, to remain there, and provide a different procedure for removing them. Hence it was concluded that such persons were tacitly excepted from the general provisions of the immigration act, although broad enough to include them and although of later date.

We are of opinion that the Circuit Court of Appeals made a mistaken use of its principles of interpretation. By the language of the act any alien that enters the country unlawfully may be summarily deported by order of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor at any time within three years. It seems to us unwarranted to except the Chinese from this liability because there is an earlier more cumbrous proceeding which this partially overlaps. The existence of the earlier laws only indicates the special solicitude of the Government to limit the entrance of Chinese. It is the very reverse of a reason for denying to the Government a better remedy against them alone of all the world, now that one has been created in general terms.

To allow the immigration act its literal effect does not repeal, alter, or amend the laws relating to the Chinese, as it is provided that it shall not, in § 43. The present act does not contain the clause found in the previous immigration act of March 3, 1893, 27 Stat. 569, c. 206, that it shall not apply to Chinese persons, and, on the other hand, as it requires deportation to the trans-Pacific ports from which such aliens embarked for the United States, § 35, it is rather hard to say that it has not the Chinese specially in mind.

Judgment reversed.

LOUISVILLE & NASHVILLE RAILROAD CO. v. F. W. COOK BREWING CO.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

No. 64. Submitted November 13, 1911.-Decided January 22,

1912.

This court has jurisdiction of an appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case, as the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court did not depend only on diversity of citizenship, but the constitutionality of a state law and the construction of a Federal statute were also involved.

Where relief in equity may be admissible under any circumstances at all, the objection of adequate remedy at law comes too late when made for the first time in this court.

Where a common carrier threatens to abjure its functions and duties as such in regard to a commodity, equity can grant relief to a dealer in such commodity whose business would be ruined by such continual action by the common carrier.

Beer and other intoxicating liquors are a recognized and legitimate subject of interstate commerce.

223 U.S.

Statement of the Case.

A State cannot forbid a common carrier to transport intoxicating liquors from a consignor in one State to a consignee in another State. Until transportation of intoxicating liquor from one State to another is concluded by delivery to the consignee, the article transported does not become subject to state regulation.

The Wilson Act of August 8, 1890, c. 728, 26 Stat. 313, does not apply to interstate shipments of liquor until delivery to the consignee. The Kentucky statute of 1906, prohibiting common carriers from transporting intoxicating liquors to "dry" points in Kentucky, while a valid enactment as to intrastate shipments, was not effective as to interstate shipments; in that respect it was an unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce.

A state statute regulating shipments of common carriers, although legal as to intrastate shipments, if illegal as to interstate shipments imposes no obligation upon the carrier in regard thereto, nor affords any excuse for refusal to perform its duties as a carrier. Where the action of the common carrier is not discriminatory and the question is not an administrative one within the scope of the Interstate Commerce Commission, a question of general law as to the duties of the carrier arises which is one for a judicial tribunal, and not competent for the Commission; and the fact that the carrier may have filed notice with the Commission does not give it jurisdiction of the subject.

Where reasonableness of, or discrimination in, rates, is not an element, but the common carrier bases a refusal to perform its duty as such on legislative enactments, a shipper can resort to the courts to compel him to do so without first obtaining a finding from the Interstate Commerce Commission. Texas & Racific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 246, distinguished.

172 Fed. Rep. 117, affirmed.

THIS Suit started in a court of the State of Indiana and was removed by the defendant, now the appellant, to the Circuit Court of the United States.

The Brewing Company is an Indiana corporation, engaged in brewing beer at Evansville, Indiana, and sells its product in state and interstate trade. The Railroad Company is a Kentucky corporation, owning and operating a line of railway extending into many States, including Indiana and Kentucky.

Statement of the Case.

223 U. S.

The complaint averred, that although prepayment of freight had been tendered and every shipping regulation complied with, the railroad company had refused to accept for carriage from Evansville, Indiana, to stations on the line of its railway in the State of Kentucky, beer in kegs and cases, consigned to points which were "local option" or "dry" localities under the law of Kentucky, and had notified complainant and the public that it would discontinue receiving consignments of beer or other liquors for points in the State of Kentucky where the local option law of that State was in operation. The prayer of the bill was that the railroad company be enjoined from so refusing to accept the product of the brewing company for transportation from Evansville to such local option points in Kentucky.

A preliminary injunction was issued as prayed. Thereupon the defendant removed the case to the Circuit Court of the United States, upon the ground that there was diversity of citizenship, and also because the case involved questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States, namely, the validity of the law of Kentucky prohibiting the transportation and delivery of liquors to points in that State where the sale was próhibited, and also as a case arising under the act of Congress regulating interstate commerce of February 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 379, c. 104, as amended June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, c. 3591. An answer was then filed and the cause heard upon bill and answer, with the result that the preliminary injunction allowed by the state court was made permanent and the railroad company enjoined from refusing to receive and carry beer from Evansville to any point upon its line of road in the State of Kentucky, wet or dry. An appeal by the railroad company to the Circuit Court of Appeals resulted in an affirmance of the order of the Circuit Court. For the opinion, see 172 Fed. Rep. 117.

223 U.S.

Argument for Appellant.

Mr. Henry L. Stone and Mr. Philip W. Frey, with whom Mr. George R. DeBruler was on the brief, for appellant: Shipments of beer or intoxicating liquor are interstate shipments, and as such constitute interstate commerce, and are regulated and to be governed by the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce and the amendments thereto. See § 1, as amended June 29, 1906; § 3, commonly known as the discrimination section, and §§ 13, 15 and 16, which prescribe the methods of civil procedure for the enforcement of the orders of the Commission where the carrier fails or neglects to obey the same.

This machinery was provided by Congress for the regulation of interstate commerce and the redress of all grievances and was intended to be exclusive of all other remedies for all unlawful acts of the carriers. Central Stock Yards v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 112 Fed. Rep. 823; Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; Howard Supply Co. v. Ches. & Ohio Ry. Co., 162 Fed. Rep. 188; Balt. & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 481; Danciger v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 154 Fed. Rep. 379.

The order granting the preliminary injunction is void, because the state court of Indiana in which the suit started thereby undertook to affect property and rights of the parties beyond its territorial jurisdiction, or that of the Circuit Court into which the case was removed. The state court had no power to grant a mandatory injunction requiring appellant to perform acts in Kentucky affecting property in that State. 11 Cyc. 684; Western Union Teleg. Co. v. West. & Atl. R. R. Co., 8 Baxter (Tenn.), 54.

After removal, it was the duty of the court below to dissolve the temporary restraining order and dismiss the action. Auracher v. Omaha & St. L. Ry. Co., 102 Fed. Rep. 1; Swift v. Phila. & Reading R. R. Co., 58 Fed. Rep. 858; Sheldon v. Wabash R. R. Co., 105 Fed. Rep. 785.

A party on whose petition a cause is removed into the