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Federal court is estopped to deny the jurisdiction of such court to render judgment against him therein unless on the ground that the state court was without jurisdiction. Cowley v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 159 U. S. 569; Mastin v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 123 Fed. Rep. 827.

Even if the state court had jurisdiction, there was no equity in the bill. It is not averred that appellee was without adequate remedy at law. In fact, appellee had a complete remedy at law for the recovery of the damages, if any, it had sustained by appellant's refusal to ship and deliver shipments of beer offered by it for shipment, consigned to persons at the local option points in Kentucky, whose licenses to sell intoxicating liquors had expired. It is not alleged by appellee that it had any other kind of customers in Kentucky besides those who were engaged in the sale of such liquors under licenses so to do.

The rule of the appellant not to accept, transport, or deliver intoxicating liquors consigned to points in Kentucky, where the sale of such liquor is prohibited by law, is reasonable and valid.

At common law a common carrier was not required to transport all commodities; he was only bound to carry the things which he was in the habit of carrying and which were within his profession as a common carrier. Dickson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 5 Eng. Ruling Cas. 358.

Assuming the Kentucky act of 1906, prohibiting the shipment of liquor into local option districts, to be invalid as to interstate shipments, a common carrier which has adopted a rule or regulation to conform to the law as written cannot be required by mandatory injunction to accept liquor offered for shipment from a point outside of Kentucky for local option points within that State. 5 A. & E. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 162; 4 Elliott on Railroads, §§ 1465, 1466; Moore on Carriers, § 5, p. 98; Hutchinson on Carriers, §§ 144-147.

Where it treats all of a class alike, a railroad company

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can make reasonable rules, and can refuse to accept goods for carriage; Harp v. Choctaw &c. Ry. Co., 118 Fed. Rep. 169; S. C., aff'd, 125 Fed. Rep. 445; Int. Com. Comm. v. Cincinnati &c. Ry. Co., 167 U. S. 479; Int. Com. Comm. v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 37; S. C., aff'd, 145 U. S. 263; Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Nichols, 9 Kansas, 243; Johnson v. Midland Ry., 4 Exch. 367.

The question is whether the rule or regulation restricting the business is a reasonable one. The carrier cannot arbitrarily refuse to carry a certain kind of goods which it has every facility to carry, and the carriage of which will not endanger its property, or the lives, property, health or morals of others. It cannot be said that it is unreasonable for a carrier to adopt a rule that it will not ship liquor into districts in which the sale of liquor is prohibited by state law, and into which the legislature has declared that it shall be unlawful to ship liquor, although the statute prohibiting the shipment is invalid as to interstate shipments.

Carriers have some discretion, upon giving due notice, as to what they will carry, provided all persons are treated alike, without discrimination. The legislature cannot require the carrier to separate interstate passengers from intrastate passengers, but the carrier may make the separation if it elects to do so. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485. The carrier ought not to be required to take the risk of litigation and penalties. Under the statutes we are considering the carrier must, in order to be sure that it will escape the penalty, know that the goods have been ordered by some person in the State to which they are to be shipped, and if what purports to be an order is presented to the carrier, it takes some risk, unless it knows that the order is genuine. American Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 30 Ky. Law Rep. 207; Crigler &c. v. Commonwealth, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 921.

The risks are so great as to justify the carrier in making

Argument for Appellant.

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a regulation, upon due notice, that it will not carry intoxicating liquors at all into any local option district, and that it will treat all shinders, both resident and nonresident, alike.

The legislature of Kentucky has legally determined, while dealing with a matter within its jurisdiction, that the shipment of liquor into the local option districts from any point is dangerous to the health, safety and good morals of the people of that district, and the carrier has a right to aid the people in avoiding that danger. It may refuse to carry high explosives because of the danger to life and property, although such explosives are essential to the conduct of useful business enterprises, but the theory upon which the statute in this case is based is that liquor is not only dangerous to life and property, but to the health and good morals of the people. See Adams Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 630; S. C., 92 S. W. Rep. 932, where the court said that an express company could not legitimately thrust the shadow of its greed between the people and their uplift.

See Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321, upholding an act of Congress prohibiting the carriage of lottery tickets by express companies engaged in interstate commerce. See also Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343.

One who sells goods to be delivered in another State may have the constitutional right to deliver them, but he has no constitutional right to have them delivered by a carrier who does not profess to carry that class of goods, but refuses to do so for anyone, after giving due notice to all. Cook v. Marshall County, 196 U. S. 261; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 662; State v. Goss, 59 Vermont, 266.

A carrier may lawfully refuse to carry goods where such service will be exposed to peculiar and unusual danger, for instance, to the fury of a mob. Pearson v. Duane, 4 Wall. 605, 615.

Already Congress had made considerable progress in

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providing restrictions upon the interstate transportation of intoxicating liquors by common carriers. See act of March 4, 1909, §§ 238-240; U. S. Comp. Stat., Supp. 1909.

The people of prohibition States and of localities in other States who have voted out or prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors have long waited for an act of Congress positively prohibiting the transportation of such liquors from points without to points within such States and localities; and, in the absence of Federal legislation to that end, it is within the lawful powers of interstate carriers to establish reasonable regulations, such as this record shows appellant unselfishly adopted, foregoing the revenue to be derived from such traffic, after due notice to the public, whereby they will not transport or deliver such liquors to points in prohibition territory, no matter whether the same be interstate or intrastate traffic.

In Kentucky to-day there are ninety-six "dry" counties, and only twenty-three "wet" counties. See Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129; Milwaukee Malt Extract Co. v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 73 Iowa, 98.

There is manifest and well-recognized difference between intoxicating liquors and all other kinds of merchandise. By the common consent of mankind the trade in intoxicants is regarded as dangerous and a menace to the public. Such liquor is an article which is in a class by itself, and it is made by the Wilson Act of 1890 subject to the will of the State, and so it is competent for the legislature to prohibit the sale of liquor in original packages by the consignee within the limits of the State, although it may have been shipped from a point without the State and thus have been the subject of interstate commerce. Platt v. LeCocq, 158 Fed. Rep. 723.

Mr. George A. Cunningham for appellee:

This suit does not arise under the Interstate Commerce

Argument for Appellee.

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Act, nor does it arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the appeal should be dismissed. Empire State-Idaho M. & D. Co. v. Hanley, 198 U. S. 292; Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 191 U. S. 405; Spencer v. Duplan Silk Co., 191 U. S. 526; Bonin v. Gulf Co., 198 U. S. 115; Bankers' Mutual Casualty Co. v. Railway Co., 192 U. S. 371; Cochran v. Montgomery County, 199 U. S. 182, 260; Chapman v. Brown, 207 U. S. 88, 116; Empire State-Idaho M. & D. Co. v. Hanley, 205 U. S. 225; Weir v. Rountree, 216 U. S. 603; St. L., K. C. & C. R. Co. v. Wabash Co., 217 U. S. 247; Bagley v. General Fire Ex. Co., 212 U. S. 477.

This is not a case in which the remedies provided by the Interstate Commerce Act are exclusive. Those remedies are exclusive only when it is sought to enforce some provision of the act itself, and not when it is sought to enforce a right theretofore existing either at common law or by statute, unless the enforcement of such right is by the act committed to some other tribunal. Central Stock Yards Co. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 112 Fed. Rep. 823, and Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, do not apply, and see Danciger v. Wells-Fargo & Co., 154 Fed. Rep. 379.

The state court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties, so that it was authorized to issue a temporary restraining order.

Where a court has jurisdiction of the parties, especially in cases of injunction and specific performance, it will grant relief, even though the property to be affected is in another State. Even proceedings in the courts of one State may be enjoined by courts of another State where the latter have jurisdiction of the parties. 1 High on Injunctions, 4th ed., § 103; 6 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., § 670; Eingarter v. Illinois Steel Co., 59 Am. St. Rep. 859, note; Hawkins v. Ireland, 58 Am. St. Rep. 534, note; Hayden v. Yale, 40 Am. St. Rep. 232; and see C., B. & Q. Ry. Co.