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Obj. 2. Something might be objected with regard to fear, as he whom we habitually fear, does excite unpleasing sensations by his appearance. But it is obvious to reply, that sentiments which differ from each other, may be rightly described, though they are said to agree in one particular. Our fearing a person may be one cause of our hating him; his exciting fear may be the way in which he raises those feelings which in the end form the passion or sentiment of hatred: but fear, being the sentiment arising on a probable expectation of impending evil, whether that evil seems likely to come from persons or things, is so distinct from hatred, which has no immediate concern with evil, and is di. rected to persons only, that our practice does not seem likely to suffer from any confusion to be apprehended between them. As therefore we enter into these disquisitions merely as foundations of practical rules, this objection needs not to draw us into any length of dis.. cussion.
Obj. 3. It may, however, be objected, in the third place, that sometimes we feel the sentiment of hatred towards a person at first sight; which seems inconsistent with the notion, that hatred depends on what are called associations of ideas, since such associations are formed after the manner of habits, by frequent repetition: ideas before they become associated must have appeared frequently to the mind united or connected. But we say in answer, that the reason why we feel any degree of hatred to a person at first sight, is, because there are certain looks, gestures, manners generally agreed upon as signs or marks of odious qualities. The first sight of a particular man who is proud or mean, is not the first sight of a behaviour expressive of pride or mean
The acknowledged marks of an odious character may excite the usual feelings in us, though they be exemplified in persons hitherto unknown. And it should seem, that if there were a people whose characters were denoted by looks, gestures, manners different from those to which we have been accustomed, we could not, at first sight, feel, towards one of that people, either love or hatred.
12. Having then endeavoured to ascertain or dedermine, in some measure, the nature of Hatred, by considering some cases in which the term is used, and describing some of the objects by which the passion is excited, we may proceed to take a view of the language of Scripture relative to it. Here we find the term used in a variety of senses, but these may admit of some systematical arrangement, arising out of the different occasions on which scriptural expressions were used, and the different kinds of composition of which the sacred volume consists. It is never to be forgotten, that the sacred authors express themselves easily, artlessly, naturally; in a manner suited to the customs and feelings of men of ordinary attainments in literature; and therefore allow theinselves in all those idioms and phrases, which would appear most natural and familiar to men unused to scientifical niceties.
Where a word is used in a variety of senses the chief business is, to find that sense which may be considered as the stem from which all the others have branched out. This sense when found out, may be called the literal sense, and when we have connected the other senses with it, and with each other, they all together form a system, the parts of which may be contemplated with satisfaction: their symmetry prevents all embarrassment and perplexity in the mind, and we can with ease take any one which is suited to our purpose.
I see no reason to think, that what we have laid down as the proper sense of hatred may not be taken as the literal sense of hatred in scripture. And this sense occurs more frequently than any other. Hatred is most usually spoken of as that sentiment which is excited by the appearance, real or imaginary, of a person, who by custom or habit, always brings to our minds a train of unpleasing ideas.
But though it be in strictness a person who is the object of hatred, yet it must again be observed, that our imaginations can personify; can give forms and characters and manners to things inanimate. Hence we are said in Scripture, in some few instances, to hate things, as well as persons. (d).
The matter principally to be observed is this; it seldom happens that we feel the sentiment of hatred pure and unmired: being more apt to hate those who injure us, or make us feel disappointed, than we are to hate other men, and there being other sentiments arising towards such persons, we generally feel some other passion at the same time with hatred; and therefore what we have most commonly occasion to express, is really a compound sentiment; and for the compound we have no name: we are obliged therefore to express the compound by the name of one of its ingredients. Supposc then the compound to be made up of hatred and envy, it may be indifferent by which of those two names it is called. If indeed onc of them were much stronger than the other, it would be natural to use the name of that which happened to predominate.
But the word hatred may not only express the pure simple feeling of hatred, or a compound sentiment of which it makes a part, but may be used, according to the custom of language, (so many more ideas have we than words,) to express the state of our minds when we feel, in any great degree, as we feel when we hate, in the strict and proper sense of the word. If therefore we only wish to avoid any object, we may be sometimes said to hate it; or if it be irksome or wearisome to us; nor must we think it strange or inaccurate if we are said to hate when we might with equal propriety have been said to envy, or resent, or disapprove. These uses of the word hatred will not appear forced or unnatural after the account which has been given of them: nor will there be more difficulty about what may be called hating comparatively, and hating in effect. Blating any person comparatively is preferring others to him: and hating in effect is doing that from some other principle, which is as hurtful as if it had proceeded from hatred.
13. Some instances will make these remarks more intelligible. And first of hatred in its strict and proper sense; in which we must understand what is said of Ahab and Micaiah, 1 Kings xxii. 8. Ahab was King of Israel, or Samaria, or of the ten Tribes; Jehoshaphat of Judah, or Jerusalem, or the two Tribes, Judah and Benjamin. " And the King of Israel said unto Jehoshaphat, There is yet one man, Micaiah the son of
Imlah, by whom we may enquire of the Lord: but I hate him; for he doth not prophesy good concerning me, but evil.” The very idea of Micaiah made Ahab feel unpleasant to himself: mortified and disappointed; feelings uneasy to any private man; still more so to a Monarch. Solomon says, in the same sense, Prov. xxv. 17. “ Withdraw thy foot from thy neighbour's house; lest he be weary (margin, full) of thee, and so hate thee.” In the second Book of Samuel xiii. 15. there is an instance which may be important in practice, of a man's hating the partner of his guilt, though what is called love had occasioned the offence. " Then Amnon hated her exceedingly; so that the hatred wherewith he hated her was greater than the love wherewith he had loved her.” The partner of guilt naturally becomes odious to any one who has any moral feeling, as strongly exciting remorse and dissatisfaction. When the connubial affection is said to be changed into hatred, we inay understand the word in its proper sense: of this we find more than one instance in the book of Deuteronomy, xxii. 13. and xxiv. 3. Hatred is also to be understood strictly when the vicious are spoken of as hating the virtuous: the mere sight of a virtuous man may make one of an opposite character feel inward mental pain; and, if not wholly abandoned, remorse and shame. The virtuous continually, though silently, check all the desires, thwart all the views of the vicious. (see before, $ 8.) The life of a good man is a perpetual reproach to a bad one; and what affects him more, he feels that all impartial, rational and worthy, spectators join in condemning him. Here is foundation enough for hatred; independent of actual reproof; independent of the opposition to worldly interests, which Christianity, whether incidentally or necessarily, occasions. " The blood-thirsty” says Solomon, “ hate the upright," Prov. xxix. 10. « Reprove not a scorner, lest he hate thee,” Prov. ix. 8. " They hate him, saith the prophet Amos, v. 10. “ that rebuketh in the gate, and they abhor him that speaketh uprightly.” Our Savior tells his twelve Apostles, Matt. x. 22. “Ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake:” though nothing can be inore amiable in itself, to any one who can relish what is good, than the Gospel, When the Scriptures call vicious actions works of darkness, Eph. v. 11. and affirm that 66
every one that doeth evil hateth the light,” John iii. 20. and that “ all things that are reproved are made manifest by the light," Eph. v. 13. they confirm our solution of such hatred. I am induced to offer one more instance of hatred in the proper sense, by its practical utility. Solomon says, Prov. xiv. 20. (see also xix. 7.) “ The poor is hated even of his own neighbour: but the rich hath many friends.” Or, according to the marginal translation, “ many are the lovers of the rich.” It might be doubted whether the word hatred is to be taken here in its proper sense; but it is to be feared there may be, if we speak from fact, too much ground for such interpretation. Poverty is apt to be associated in the mind with ideas that make men shrink from it, if they are not upon their guard; if they do not ward off disgust by calling up moral feelings. It is associated with ideas of want, distress, hardship, sordidness, complaint, of helplessness, want of resource in time of sickness, age, infirmity; want of accommodations; cold, hunger, nakedness; oppression, mortification. It excites a fear that the spectator may be pressed to part with that by which he hopes to procure enjoyment; even refusal in such a case is very painful, and the apprehension of being driven to refuse is very repulsive. If poverty suggest to us every thing we want to avoid; no wonder we avoid poverty. Moreover, a inan is never dwelling on ideas of poverty, but ideas of wealth and splendor interfere with his deliberations: and riches are associated in the mind with what we desire; with that which flatters and dazzles us: with hope, plenty, luxury, sensual pleasure, power, superiority, and ingratiating caresses. The fine arts also, when employed in ornaments, of dress, buildings, hababitations, equipage, with politeness of behaviour, have great attractions; and contribute greatly to conciliate Love and prevent Hatred. Nor is vanity a little concerned. But one of the chief attractions of wealth, as viewed by a common spectator, is, that it rouses the imagination, and makes it expand, in grasping at happiness, far beyond any bounds of reason and moderation. The practical effect of all this is, that even those who in general mean well, deceive themselves, and