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pathy on the occasion; but supposing they did, an alteration in the circumstance will prove, that they would run equally to see the ruins of London, where no sympathy could possibly excite them to it. Let us suppose then, that the legislature deemed it necessary to remove the seat of government to some other part of England; that they built another city, equal to it in extent and accommodation, that they removed all the inhabitants of London to this new city, and gave them the same rights, privileges, and advantages which they enjoyed before; that after having thus completed their views, they found it conducive to the national prosperity of the country to destroy London, and, accordingly, committed it to the flames, having first removed from it every thing of value, either to the nation at large, or to the citizens in particular: I would ask, whether, after every thing having been thus arranged for the general good, the ruins of London would not still be a spectacle capable of attracting thousands of spectators, whether those who came to see it, in the case supposed by Burke, would not now come to see it also, though there could be no motive for smypathy whatever, as in this case, there is not an individual with whom we could sympathize. Every citizen is as happy as before, and, therefore, we have nothing to sympathize with but mute walls, demolished houses, and public buildings in ruins, which, as they can neither feel pain, nor respond to our sympathies, cannot, consequently, excite them. The pleasure, then, resulting from the view of these ruins could not be the effect of sympathy, nor, as I have already shewn, could it be the effect of curiosity, for those who spend their

life in London, and were perfectly acquainted with every street in it, would be more powerfully impelled to contemplate its ruins, than the ruins of some insignificant village which they never saw, or heard of before, though the latter must necessarily be a matter of greater curiosity to them than the former.

Neither curiosity nor sympathy, then, can be the cause or original source of Tragic pleasure. As Mr. Knight, however, forgetting that he had ever traced any part of this pleasure, either to sympathy or curiosity, adopts a new theory on the subject, it is but proper to enquire, whether, in ascending to a higher source, he has discovered that mysterious fountain, of which we are in pursuit.

After getting rid of sympathy and curiosity altogether, having, no doubt, forgot that he had attributed to them any portion of the pleasure arising from Tragic scenes, Mr. Knight adopts a theory totally different from all his predecessors. His ideas on the subject seem to be perfectly original, at least, I could discover no trace of them in any former writer. Originality has frequently some merit, even when it is unsupported by truth, for it requires not only considerable ingenuity, but a considerable exercise of mind to arrive at certain ideas, though they are ultimately found to be mere chimeras of the understanding. ravings of a man of genius are but little allied to mental imbecility. Mr. Knight's theory is ingenious, but this is its highest merit; for the feelings of which Tragic pleasure is composed, emanate from a much more general cause than that to which he traces them. The cause he assigns will certainly account for some

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portion of this pleasure, and so will each particular cause assigned by each particular writer on the subject; but, until we discover a cause that embraces all the causes by which it is produced, we can never discover the primary source of which we are in pursuit, and which alone will account for the aggregate of pleasures derived from Tragic representations, in the same manner as the general law of attraction, accounts for all the particular laws of motion. Before this general law was discovered, the theories of all the ancient philosophers, however ingenious, were unavoidably erroneous, and so must all theories be, whose bases are not as extensive as the superstructures which they uphold.

Mr. Knight derives the pleasure of which we are in search from "the energies and violent efforts displayed in feats of strength, courage, and dexterity, or the calm energies of virtue, called forth by the exertions of passive fortitude." He tells us, this is the delight which the Romans took in the fights of gladiators, that it is still the source of our delight in cock-fighting, bull-baiting, bull-feasts, and boxingmatches; and even traces to it our propensity to witness the execution of criminals. If particular instances of this kind could tend to confirm Mr. Knight's theory, he might adduce some hundreds more; but thousands of instances would be quoted to no purpose, if it can be shewn, that a part, at least, of the pleasure which we enjoy, cannot, by any torture of argument or of expression, be traced either to the active or passive energies of the mind. The fact, however, is, that if even this could not be shewn, than which nothing is

easier, it will still be found, that we never sympathize, in any one instance, with energy alone, abstracted from the motives by which these energies are called into action; and that our sympathies are influenced by these motives a hundred-fold more than by the energies themselves.

If a daring, active, and intrepid villain attack three men, and succeed by mere personal strength and dex terity to rob them, after a short scuffle, do all our sympathies and feelings arise from, or owe their existence to, the superior encgies exerted by this desperado, and do we feel more pleasure in sceing him successful, than we should in seeing him defeated? I doubt whether any one could enjoy such a triumph, except a chip of the same block. We sympathize, then, not with energies alone, but with motives also; and the interest excited by the latter, is, beyond all comparison, greater than the former. This will appear still stronger, if we reverse the former case, and suppose three robbers to attack one honest man. If such an individual should prove successful against his adversaries, how strongly are our sympathies excited in his favour: we seem, by the force of sympathetic affection, to assist him in every exertion of strength which he puts forth our very bodies are unconsciously put in motion; we recede at every blow that is made at him, as if aimed at ourselves; we incline forward when his adversaries bend beneath his strokes, and seem to invigorate his arm by exerting all the energies of our own. Every motion in his body produces similar one in ours, without being in the least conscious of the offensive and defensive attitudes which

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we involuntarily assume by the force of sympathetic affection. The apparent causes of these strong sympathies, are the energies which he displays, but the least change in the circumstance convinces us, that they are not the real cause; for all our sympathy for him would immediately vanish, if we knew him to be a murderer or highwayman. Every change, consequently, in the motives, produces a corresponding change in our feelings, so that our sympathies are but little influenced by energies or exertions, considered abstractedly by themselves.

If we imagine, however, that we have now a clue to the cause of our pleasure, and that all arises from the motives that call our energies into action, we shall find ourselves mistaken, and that, as Lord Kaimes expresses it, on a different occasion, "the variety of nature is not so easily reached." The motives that engage men in action have not greater influence over us, than the circumstances in which they are placed; a fact which will immediately appear, if we only change the latter, without making any change in the former. If all our pleasure arise from the motives, it is obvious, that while they remain unchanged, no alteration of circumstances can disturb it; but, as every change of circumstance increases or diminishes the impressions which we feel, though the motives remain unchanged, our sympathics cannot be solely referred either to the motives or to the circumstances, but to the combined influence of both. If a robber attack three boys, how much stronger is the interest we take in their fate, than in that of three men, who should happen to be placed in their situation, though the motive by which

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