have been made, it will issue a policy for two-tenths of the sum originally issued, * * * and in the same proportion for any number of payments;" and that if the premiums should not be paid "on or before the date above mentioned, then in every such case the said company shall not be bound for the payment of the whole sum assured, but only for a part therefor, proportionate with the annual payments made as above specified, and this policy shall cease and determine." The assured paid four annual premiums, according to the terms of the contract. When the fifth premium matured, he paid thereon to the company in cash $2001 and executed his note to the company, payable in about three months after its date, for the balance of the premium then due, and received a renewal certificate. The note contained this stipulation: "If the amount of this note shall not be paid when due, the said policy shall be null and void." This note dated in September, 1872, was never paid. The assured died in September 1875, without paying any more premiums, or surrendering the old policy. In the suit on the old policy by the beneficiary thereof, Held: 1. The right to a part of the sum originally insured, proportionate with the number of premiums paid, was not lost by the failure to surrender the old policy within twelve months from the time of making default in the payment of the premiums. 2. Four thousand dollars of paid-up insurance having been paid for before the note of September, 1872, was executed, and the stipulation of forfeiture having been inserted in the note for the sole purpose of securing the prompt payment of the amount of the note, the failure to pay it at maturity did not have the effect of forfeiting the policy. 3. The note having been accepted for a part of the cash premium, and a renewal certificate issued, the policy continued in force until the maturity of the note. If the company intended to insist on the provision in the note to forfeit the insurance for that year, it ought to have promptly returned the note after its maturity, and the excess of the cash paid on the premium, paid for that year over and above the cost of the carrying of the policy from the date of the note to its maturity; and, having failed to return the note or money, or to give notice of its intention to insist on the forfeiture of the policy for the residue of that year, the company waived any right it may have had to do so, and the policy continued in force to the end of the fifth year, and the insured is entitled to judgment for five-tenths of the sum originally insured. Reversed. Opinion by COFER, J.-Montgomery v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.

SURETY IN REPLEVIN BOND NOT SUBSTITUTED TO LIENS OF CREDITOR.-1. A surety will not be substituted to the rights and liens of the creditor, so as to defeat an interest acquired and held by a third person. when that interest, though subordinate to that of the creditor, is prior to the undertaking of the surety Farmers & Drovers' Bank v. Shirley, 12 Bush. 304' 2. If the creditor, without resorting to his lien, attempts to collect his debt at law from his debtor, and, before the debt is replevied, a second valid lien is credited in favor of a third person, the surety, who has replevied the debtor, aud thereby prevented a sale of the debtor's property, ought not, when the same is coerced out of him, to be substituted to the rights of the judgment-creditor, and thereby overreach a lien for value created before he became bound as surety for the debt. Affirmed. Opinion by ELLIOTT, J.Fishback v. Bodman.

THERE are no divorces in France, only judicial separations. From 1846 to 1850 there was an average of 1,080 of these, which in 1876 had increased to 3,251. Out of the hundred only fourteen separations was asked for by the husband.-The Massachusetts district judge ship will be filled by the appointment of Thomas L. Nelson, of Worcester.

Judges.

INSURANCE - WHERE LICENSE OF COMPANY TO TRANSACT BUSINESS HAS BEEN REVOKED, MONEY PAID AGENT AS PREMIUM, IN IGNORANCE OF SUCH REVOCATION, CAN BE RECOVERED BACK,-This suit was brought to recover back money paid as premium by plaintiff to defendant as agent of a foreign insurance company, about ten days after the state superintendent of insurance had revoked the license of the company to do business in this state. The publication of the fact of revocation is required to be for four weeks. The agent, the defendant, did not see it, and therefore took the premium, Held, that plaintiff is entitled to recover. The revocation of the license is the material fact. The four weeks' publication is intended to distribute the information as extensively as possible, but the power to do business and agency cease when recalled and notice is given. Affirmed. Opinion by NAPTON, J.-McCutchon v. Rivers.

FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES

CONTINUED POS

SESSION BY GRANTOR OF GOODS SOLD CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE OF FRAUD-VISIBLE INDICATION OF ACTUAL CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP NECESSARY TO RENDER CONVEYANCE VALID AGAINST CREDITORS.-This was a suit by attachment against defendant P. W. Henley, brought December 15, 1875, for goods sold and delivered by plaintiff to said defendant. Defendant Thomas Henley filed interplea claiming the goods under the attachment, by virtue of purchase thereof from P. W. Henley, on the 2d day of December, 1875. Verdict for interpleader and judgment thereon, from which plaintiff appealed. P. W. Henly was a merchant tailor, and Thomas Henley, who was his brother, worked in his shop as a journeyman tailor. From day of sale to his brother to day of attachment defendant, P. W. Henley, was absent in an adjoining county, but there was no such open, visible and unequivocal change of possession as would apprise the community or those accustomed to deal with P. W. Henley that the goods had changed hands, and that the title had passed from him to his brother, Thomas Henley. Neither the owner of the building in which defendant did business, nor any one else, save the attorney, under whose direction the sale was conducted, were notified thereof. The same sign, "P. W Henley, mer. chant tailor," in the local newspapers remained unchanged. Held, these facts being undisputable, the trial court should have declared, as a matter of law, that there was no such actual change of possession of the goods sold as is required by the statute relating to fraudulent conveyances. Claflin v. Rosenberg, 42 Mo. 439; Lessem v. Herriford, 44 Mo. 323; Bishop v. O'Connell, 56 Mo. 158; Wright v. McCormick, 67 Mo.; 7 Cent. L. J. 169. Opinion by HOUGH, J.— Stern v. Henley.

BEEN MADE.-Plaintiff instituted suit in the circuit court of Buchanan county, and in his petition alleged that plaintiff and defendant's intestate, Barrett, were, in lifetime of latter, engaged as partners in the purchase and sale of real estate. An account is stated by plaintiff of various sums of money paid out and received by himself and Barrett in said business during the existence of the co-partnership, and plaintiff asks for an adjustment of said accounts, and that certain real estate to which Barrett had taken title to himself be declared partnership property, and subjected to payment of balance found due plaintiff on final settlement of their accounts. The circuit court dismissed petition for want of jurisdiction and plaintiff brings the case here by appeal. Held, 1. A court possessed of general equity powers is undoubtedly the proper tribunal in which to settle the affairs of a co-partnership between the living. But when such co-partnership has been dissolved by death of one of the partners, the settlement must be made under the provisions of the administration law, and for this purpose the probate court exercises, to a certain extent, chancery powers. Pearce v. Calhoun, 59 Mo. 271. If surviving partner fails to administer, the administrator of estate of deceased partner is required to give bond and forthwith take the whole partnership estate into his possession and administer the same. §§ 59 and 61, ch. 120, Gen. Stats., 486; and by 63d section of the same chapter, the probate court is expressly invested with full jurisdiction to hear and determine all demands against the partnership, provided only that the judgment or allowance in such cases shall not bind any property of the survivor other than the partnership effects. In the present case plaintiff has proceeded precisely as if Barrett were alive. This he can not do. The act creating the probate court of Buchanan county invests it with full probate jurisdiction, and the law imperatively requires that when a co-partnership is dissolved by death the affairs of the firm shall be settled by administration. 2. If upon a settlement of the partnership account it should be found that the firm is indebted to plaintiff, and that there is property of the firm to which it is necessary to resort, to satisfy plaintiff's demand, which can not be reached through the instrumentality of the powers conferred upon the probate court, then plaintiff may resort to such tribunal as has the requisite authority. As far as the jurisdiction of the probate court extends it is exclusive, and it certainly extends to the settlement of the accounts of the firm. Dodson, Admr. v. Scruggs, Admr., 47 Mo. 285; Cones v. Ward, Admr., 47 Mo. 289; Tilleringtoo v. Hooker, 58 Mo. 593; Pearce v. Calhoun, 59 Mo. 271; Wernecke v. Kenyon's Admr., 66 Mo. 284. 3. It is insisted that the act establishing the probate court of Buchanan county is unconstitutional, because it in effect amends several statutes which are not set forth; because the act relates to several subjects, all of which are not expressed in the title; because it is a special law, and because the judge is authorized to appoint a clerk. The first ground of objection is answered by State v. Griger, 65 Mo. 306. As to the second, the title of the act is sufficiently comprehensive to include all matters contained in the act, and whether the general law could have been made applicable has been held by this court to be a question for the legislature under the Constitution of 1865. State ex rel. Henderson v. Boone Co., 50 Mo. 317; State ex rel. Robbins v. County Court of New Madrid Co., 51 Mo. 83; Hall v. Bray, 51 Mo. 288. That the judge was authorized to appoint a clerk in violation of the Constitution would not invalidate other portions of the act. Cooley Const. Lim. 178. Affirmed. Opinion by HOUGH, J.-Ensworth v. Curd.

INDICTMENT-OBSCENE PICTURES - VARIANCE.In an indictment under the statute punishing the importation, etc., of obscene literature, etc., the allegation was that the defendant printed and published pictures and figures of naked girls, and the proof was that the defendant took photographic pictures of two young girls naked down to the waist. Held, that the government having described the pictures was bound by the description, and the defendant could not be convicted upon proof that he printed and published substantially different pictures, though the jury might find such pictures to be obscene. Opinion by MORTON, J.-Com. v. Dejardin.

INDICTMENT-INTENT-EVIDENCE.-Upon the trial of an indictment for willfully and maliciously burning a building belonging to the defendant's sons, with an intent thereby to defraud the insurer, it is admissible to prove that the defendant set fire to the same building a few nights before, and that the fire was then extinguished by a neighbor, for the purpose of showing the intent with which he subsequently burned the building and committed the offense for which he was then tried. Com. v. McCarty, 119 Mass. 354; Thayer v. Thayer, 101 Mass. 111. Opinion by COLT, J.— Com. v. Bradford.

ACTION ON JUDGMENT-SET-OFF.-In an action of contract upon a judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the defendant, the defendant filed a declaration in set-off, alleging that the judgment was assigned by the plaintiff to one M, and that M had previously exeecuted a bond to the defendant, and had committed a breach thereof. It appeared that M proposed to the plaintiff to purchase the judgment and the plaintiff agreed to sell it to him for $60, executed an assignment upon the execution issued on the judgment, and sent it by express to another town, with instructions to deliver it to M upon payment of $60. M not being willing or able to pay the sum required, suggested to H to purchase it, and H paid the $60 to the expressman and took an assignment of the execution from M. This action was begun in the plaintiff's name by H. After this assignment between M and H, but before its consummation, M was notified by defendant's attorney of the claim declared on in set-off. Held, that the demand could not be set-off in this action. Gen. Stats., ch. 30, §§ 1, 11; Shelton v. Kimball, 7 Cush. 217. PER CURIAM.-Avery v. Russell.

CONTRACT WARRANTY CAVEAT EMPTOR. Where in an action of contract to recover the price of certain leather sold by plaintiff to defendant, it appeared that the plaintiff was a leather dealer and the defendant a manufacturer of boots and shoes; that the leather was sold at plaintiff's store; that at the time of purchase the defendant had full opportunity to examine the whole lot purchased, and did examine two rolls, which equaled the bulk in quality; that the leather was bought for the purpose of being manufactured into boots and shoes, and that the plaintiff

supposed such to be the purpose, but nothing was said about the purpose, but an inquiry was made whether the leather would crimp; that it appeared to be good and suitable for the purpose above stated, but turned out to be rotten and nearly worthless and unfit for the purpose, containing a latent defect, it was held, that there was no warranty, express or imimplied, and that the maxim caveat emptor applied. Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383; Cunningham v. Hall, 4 Allen, 273; Downer v. Dow, 64 N. Y. 411. Opinion by COLT, J.-Hight v. Bacon.

INDICTMENT-ABORTION- EVIDENCE.-On an inindictment under Gen. Stats., ch. 165, § 4, for procuring an abortion resulting in death, evidence having a tendency to show that the defendant had in his possession, not long before the sickness and death of the deceased, a metallic instrument which the jury might believe adapted to procure abortion; that he understood and described it as well adapted to such use and safer than other instruments that might be employed for such a purpose, is admissible; and evidence having been given for the purpose of showing the existence of cuts, wounds and bruises in the womb of the deceased, such as indicated the forcible use of some instrument, and it appearing that the defendant had the opportunity and was knowingly in possession of the means, of committing such a crime, all this was admissible and competent, and its weight and effect were to be judged of by the jury. Com. v. Brown, 121 Mass. 81. Opinion by AMES, J.-Com. v. Blair.

CORPORATION-LEASE EXECUTED BY COMMITTEE -CONTRACT.-1. In an action of contract upon a lease it appeared that the defendant corporation appointed a committee with instructions to lease the plaintiff's hall for five years; that it reported that it had made this lease for the defendants; that the report was accepted and thereupon the defendant entered under the lease and occupied the leased premises for two years. The lease was duly executed by plaintiffs, and was not executed on behalf of the defendant in its own name, but was executed in their private names by a majority of said committee. Held, that the defendant having accepted the lease and entered and occupied under it, was bound by its provisions and liable to pay the rent therein reserved to the same extent at least as if it were a deed poll executed by the plaintiffs. The estate vested in the defendant and could not be terminated by notice sufficient to determine a tenancy at will. Kabley v. Worcester G. L. Co., 102 Mass. 392; Lamson, etc., Co. v. Russell, 112 Mass. 387; Clark v. Gordon, 121 Mass. 330. 2. In the same case the defendant appointed a committee to ask for a reduction of the rent, the committee reported that the plaintiffs said they could not reduce the rent, but if the society would pay the amount of rent reserved till October 1, 1876, then the lease should terminate, and the defendant voted to accept the report of the committee: Held, that the mere acceptance of the report of the committee was not an acceptance of the plaintiffs' proposition. Opinion by MORTON, J.Carroll v. St. John's, etc., Society.

IN Latham v. Latham, lately decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, it is held that visits to a house of ill-fame are not conclusive evidence of adultery. On the other hand, in Lovedon v. Lovedon, 2 Hag. Con. 124, it is said that such evidence is universally held as proof of adultery, the court remarking that "the act of going to a house of ill-fame is characterized by an old saying that people do not go there to say their pater noster."

NOTES.

The present number commences the eighth volume of this JOURNAL. The two volumes which have been issued during the past year, contain over TWO HUNDRED decisions reported in full. Appended to a large number of these cases are to be found exhaustive and practical notes, in which all the authorities bearing on the questions discussed by the court are collected and examined. These are all leading cases; to obtain the same number of which the practitioner would require to purchase at least six volumes of the state and federal reports published during the year. In addition to this there have appeared, in the last two volumes, abstracts of over SEVENTEEN HUNDRED cases, decided in the Supreme Courts of the different States; in the Supreme Court of the United States; in the different Federal Courts, and in the courts of Great Britain. Besides all this, volumes 6 and 7 contain no less than SEVENTY-FIVE articles on disputed questions in the law, many of them from the pens of writers whose works are daily consulted by the practitioner. We have endeavored to give a fair and unprejudiced estimate of every law book and volume of reports published during that period, and have not failed to note every item of interest to the profession which has transpired since the beginning of the past year. Our department of Queries and Answers has become popular, and we have abundant testimony that it has in very many cases proved valuable. To those States in which we have regular correspondents are now to be added two more, New Hampshire and Vermont, and an arrangement has been made during the pest month which will enable us to give the decisions of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, to the satisfaction of the bar of that State. During the next twelve months we hope to make the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL more of a necessity to the practicing lawyer than it has ever been, and in order that the eyes of onr subscribers may not suffer we commence this volume with new type.

THE roll of deaths among the bench and bar during the past year is unusually long. In this country are the names of Sidney Breese, of the Supreme Court of Illinois; Daniel Gantt, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nebraska; Chief Justice Pearson, of North Carolina; William F. Allen, an Associate Justice of the New York Court of Appeals; William T. McCoun, once Vice Chancellor, and John A. Lott, once a Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York; John A. Inglis, Chief Justice of the Orphans' Court of Baltimore; F. B. Dwight, some time a Judge of the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia; J. G. Dickerson, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Maine; Benjamin T. Thomas, formerly a Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts; Murray Hoffman, a Justice of the Supreme Court of New York for eight years, and a Vice Chancellor for eight; Samuel B. Garvin, once Attorney General of New York State, and a Judge; Asa Briggs of Virginia; Alexander S. Johnson and George F. Shepley, of the United States Circuit Court; Wm. B. Egan, of the Supreme Court of Louisiana; Henry Armitt Brown, of Philadelphia; Francis Hilliard, the well-known writer of legal treatises; George W. Paschall, also a legal author, but less known. Outside of our own country are to be added the distinguished names of Lord Chelmsford, Ex-Chancellor of England; Russell Gurney, Recorder of London, Chief Justice Monahan and Mr. Justice Keogh, of Ireland; Chief Justice Harrison, of Canada, and Mr. Thomas Chitty.

SAINT LOUIS, JANUARY 10, 1879.

CURRENT TOPICS.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee, in the case of Staub v. Williams, have lately ruled upon an important question as to appeals in chancery, in attachment cases.

66

A defendant, whose land had been attached, appealed from the decree of sale and gave an appeal bond for costs only, under the act of February 1, 1871, ch. 106, which provided that, in all cases in which real estate was, by a decree of a court of equity, ordered to be sold, the owner of the real estate appealing to the Supreme Court should be required to execute a bond in an amount sufficient to pay the costs of the cause in the court below, and in the Supreme Court." In the appellate court an order was made that the appellant should give bond for the entire debt covered by the decree of sale, under the statute (code, § 3164.) which provides that, in all cases of appeals from chancery decrees for the payment of money, the appeal bond should cover the amount of the decree, damages

and costs." The court overruled a motion to rescind this order, COOPER, J., in his opinion, exhibiting his accustomed familiarity with the fundamental principles of equity jurisprudence. "Obviously," said he, "in this, as in other cases of statutory construction, we must look beyond the mere letter of the law, to the real intent of the legislature. The best mode of arriving at that intent, is to ascertain the evil of the pre-existing law, which the act was intended to remedy. Originally, equity had no jurisdiction to give judgment upon notes of hand, even as an incident to the exercise of acknowledged juris diction, the remedy being plain at law. Thus, upon a bill to enforce a vendor's lien for the purchase notes of land, or to foreclose a mortgage of realty by sale, the rule was to sell the land, leaving the complainant to sue at law for any part of his debt not satisfied by the proceeds of sale. Afterwards, either by statute as in New York, by rule of court, as in the courts of the United States, or by usage, as in this State, it became the practice to render a judgment for any balance of the debt. In this Vol. 8-No. 2.

rule to render judgment for the whole debt in advance of the sale. (e. g., see Mitchell v. McKinny, 6 Heisk. 85.) In this condition of the law, it was obviously a hardship to require security for the entire debt upon appeal, for the complainant had already the security of the property, a security recognized as sufficient by the terms of the contract in most instances. The statute (of 1871) was intended for this class of cases." And it was said that the legislature could not be supposed to have intended to extend that statute to cases of at tachments of land, because in such cases the value of the land is frequently less than the creditor's demand, and a bond for costs alone would be inadequate; and because such a construction would require a different bond in equity from that required at law in the same class of cases.

IN Fletcher v. Rodgers, 27 W. R. 97, the plaintiff and defendant were members of two firms in Liverpool, and a dispute having arisen between them in which damages were claimed, the defendant seized one of the plaintiff 's vessels lying at San Francisco. The plaintiff, thereupon, applied to the English Court of Chancery for an injunction, which was granted, restraining the defendant from proceeding in the foreign court. On appeal to the Court of Appeal the order granting the injunction was set aside. JAMES, L. J., said: "I am of opinion that this order is improperly made, and that there are no authorities on which it can be maintained. The case is simply this: There are two persons, partners of firms in Liverpool, between whom there is a contest as to the amount of damages, if any, due from one to the other. The plaintiff, by reason of having certain property in San Francisco, is, by the law of that country, within its jurisdiction, and any one who has a claim against him and proposes to try it in San Francisco, may 'I intend to try my claim there, and to avail myself of the property which is there, and which the law of the country gives me leave to seize.' Either he has a legal right according to the law of San Francisco, to bring an action there, and to avail himself of the power of seizing the property there, or he has no such right. If he has a legal right to pro

say:

supposed such to be the purpose, but nothing was said about the purpose, but an inquiry was made whether the leather would crimp; that it appeared to be good and suitable for the purpose above stated, but turned out to be rotten and nearly worthless and unfit for the purpose, containing a latent defect, it was held, that there was no warranty, express or imimplied, and that the maxim caveat emptor applied. Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383; Cunningham v. Hall, 4 Allen, 273; Downer v. Dow, 64 N. Y. 411. Opinion by COLT, J.-Hight v. Bacon.

INDICTMENT-ABORTION- EVIDENCE.-On an inindictment under Gen. Stats., ch. 165, § 4, for procuring an abortion resulting in death, evidence having a tendency to show that the defendant had in his possession, not long before the sickness and death of the deceased, a metallic instrument which the jury might believe adapted to procure abortion; that he understood and described it as well adapted to such use and safer than other instruments that might be employed for such a purpose, is admissible; and evidence haying been given for the purpose of showing the existence of cuts, wounds and bruises in the womb of the deceased, such as indicated the forcible use of some instrument, and it appearing that the defendant had the opportunity and was knowingly in possession of the means, of committing such a crime, all this was admissible and competent, and its weight and effect were to be judged of by the jury. Com. v. Brown, 121 Mass. 81. Opinion by AMES, J.-Com. v. Blair.

CORPORATION-LEASE EXECUTED BY COMMITTEE -CONTRACT.-1. In an action of contract upon a lease it appeared that the defendant corporation appointed a committee with instructions to lease the plaintiff's hall for five years; that it reported that it had made this lease for the defendants; that the report was accepted and thereupon the defendant entered under the lease and occupied the leased premises for two years. The lease was duly executed by plaintiffs, and was not executed on behalf of the defendant in its own name, but was executed in their private names by a majority of said committee. Held, that the defendant having accepted the lease and entered and occupied under it, was bound by its provisions and liable to pay the rent therein reserved to the same extent at least as if it were a deed poll executed by the plaintiffs. The estate vested in the defendant and could not be terminated by notice sufficient to determine a tenancy at will. Kabley v. Worcester G. L. Co., 102 Mass. 392; Lamson, etc., Co. v. Russell, 112 Mass. 387; Clark v. Gordon, 121 Mass. 330. 2. In the same case the defendant appointed a committee to ask for a reduction of the rent, the committee reported that the plaintiffs said they could not reduce the rent, but if the society would pay the amount of rent reserved till October 1, 1876, then the lease should terminate, and the defendant voted to accept the report of the committee: Held, that the mere acceptance of the report of the committee was not an acceptance of the plaintiffs' proposition. Opinion by MORTON, J.Carroll v. St. John's, etc., Society.

IN Latham v. Latham, lately decided by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, it is held that visits to a house of ill-fame are not conclusive evidence of adultery. On the other hand, in Lovedon v. Lovedon, 2 Hag. Con. 124, it is said that such evidence is universally held as proof of adultery, the court remarking that "the act of going to a house of ill-fame is characterized by an old saying that people do not go there to say their pater noster."

NOTES.

The present number commences the eighth volume of this JOURNAL. The two volumes which have been issued during the past year, contain over TWO HUNDRED decisions reported in full. Appended to a large number of these cases are to be found exhaustive and practical notes, in which all the authorities bearing on the questions discussed by the court are collected and examined. These are all leading cases; to obtain the same number of which the practitioner would require to purchase at least six volumes of the state and federal reports published during the year. In addition to this there have appeared, in the last two volumes, abstracts of over SEVENTEEN HUNDRED cases, decided in the Supreme Courts of the different States; in the Supreme Court of the United States; in the different Federal Courts, and in the courts of Great Britain. Besides all this, volumes 6 and 7 contain no less than SEVENTY-FIVE articles on disputed questions in the law, many of them from the pens of writers whose works are daily consulted by the practitioner. We have endeavored to give a fair and unprejudiced estimate of every law book and volume of reports published during that period, and have not failed to note every item of interest to the profession which has transpired since the beginning of the past year. Our department of Queries and Answers has become popular, and we have abundant testimony that it has in very many cases proved valuable. To those States in which we have regular correspondents are now to be added two more, New Hampshire and Vermont, and an arrangement has been made during the pest month which will enable us to give the decisions of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, to the satisfaction of the bar of that State. During the next twelve months we hope to make the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL more of a necessity to the practicing lawyer than it has ever been, and in order that the eyes of onr subscribers may not suffer we commence this volume with new type.

THE roll of deaths among the bench and bar during the past year is unusually long. In this country are the names of Sidney Breese, of the Supreme Court of Illinois; Daniel Gantt, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Nebraska; Chief Justice Pearson, of North Carolina; William F. Allen, an Associate Justice of the New York Court of Appeals; William T. McCoun, once Vice Chancellor, and John A. Lott, once a Judge of the Court of Appeals of the State of New York; John A. Inglis, Chief Justice of the Orphans' Court of Baltimore; F. B. Dwight, some time a Judge of the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia; J. G. Dickerson, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Maine; Benjamin T. Thomas, formerly a Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts; Murray Hoffman, a Justice of the Supreme Court of New York for eight years, and a Vice Chancellor for eight; Samuel B. Garvin, once Attorney General of New York State, and a Judge; Asa Briggs of Virginia; Alexander S. Johnson and George F. Shepley, of the United States Circuit Court; Wm. B. Egan, of the Supreme Court of Louisiana; Henry Armitt Brown, of Philadelphia; Francis Hilliard, the well-known writer of legal treatises; George W. Paschall, also a legal author, but less known. Outside of our own country are to be added the distinguished names of Lord Chelmsford, Ex-Chancellor of England; Russell Gurney, Recorder of London, Chief Justice Monahan and Mr. Justice Keogh, of Ireland; Chief Justice Harrison, of Canada, and Mr. Thomas Chitty.