Secretary of the Treasury, and it was undoubtedly intended to cover the full amount of the duties, whether the original estimate reached that amount or not. The word 'or' is frequently construed to mean 'and,' and vice versa, in order to carry out the evident intent of the parties. But such a change can not be made in this case; for if we make or' to read 'and,' the condition would require the importer to pay the actual duties in addition to the $425. Besides, there are two other alternative conditions dependent upon the same word 'or,' namely, that the bond should be void if the goods should be re-exported, or if they should be transported to the Pacific coast, within three years. This shows that the word 'or' was intended to have its ordinary sense. To make the condition mean what the counsel for the government contends it means, would require, in place of the word 'or,' the addition of several words, so as to make it read, "four hundred and twenty-five dollars, and any additional amount of duties to be ascertained to be due and owing on the goods.' The court would not have been justified, in this case, in making such a change and addition, by way of construction. Of course the importer is liable, without reference to the bond, for the entire amount of duties. But the surety is only bound by the condition of the bond. That is all the obligation which he assumes; and as it is clear, in this case, that the condition is in the alternative, the bond was discharged by the performance of one of the alternative conditions." Dumont v. United States. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Opinion by Mr. Justice BRADLEY. Judgment reversed.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DE ISIONS.

[In order to give more space to the Abstracts of Decisions of the Supreme Courts of the States, the names of the judges will hereafter be omitted from the heading.]

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

[Filed at Ottawa, January 25, 1879.]

[ SET-OFF JUDGMENT CONFESSED BY COGNOVITRIGHT TO SET-OFF ANTECEDENT DEBT.-The only question here is whether the court below erred in refusing to stay proceedings on a judgment confessed by cognovit until an issue of fact on the question of setoff could be tried. The affidavit alleges that appellant is a practising attorney in this State; that prior and subsequent to the making of the note upon which judgment was entered, he was frequently consulted by appellee as to matters of law growing out of and pertaining to the business of appellee; that he thus acted as attorney at law for appellee, and that his services were worth $200. It admits the execution of the note and a cognovit authorizing the entry of judgment thereupon, but alleges that the appellee subsequently and before judgment was entered agreed to give credit on the note for the value of his services which he neglected to do. SCHOLFIELD, J. says: "It does not appear but that all of the services, except a merely nominal part, were rendered before the execution of the note and cognovit. As to the services thus rendered, we are of opinion that the execution of the cognovit was a waiver of the right to interpose them as a set-off to the note, and it not appearing that services of any material value have been since rendered, no necessity is apparent for staying proceedings to await the result of an issue on that question. If we are correct in holding that the execution of the cognovit was a waiver of the right to interpose a set-off, for causes then known

to be existing, the subsequent promise to give credit on the note was but nudum pactum and binding in conscience only. Affirmed."-Gross v. Weary.

MORTGAGE-CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT -FORGERY OF NAME.-Plaintiff in error, the wife of B. was the owner of certain land. Loans were made by B. from defendant in error, and to secure the loans, plaintiff in error, and her husband, executed notes and mortgages on the land to defendant in error. Upon failure to pay the notes, by virtue of a power of sale contained in the mortgages, defendant in error advertised the land for sale. Thereupon, plaintiff in error, filed a bill to enjoin the sale. She alleged in her bill, that she did not execute either of the notes or mortgages; that her signature was forged thereto. On a hearing the court dismissed the bill. Complainant prosecutes error to reverse the decree. The testimony of complainent was in substance, that she never signed the documents, or authorized any one to sign them, and that she never appeared before the magistrate and certificate of the magistrate attached to the papers, and certifying that she came before him and acknowledged the papers. The magistrate however did not recollect the transaction. WALKER, J., says: "It has always been held that the certificate of the officer to the acknowledgment of a deed is conclusive to the same extent that is a record. They can like a record, only be impeached for fraud. The notary acts under the might of his official oath, and his certificate is entitled to great and controlling weight The until overcome by clear and satisfactory proof. evidence of the grantor will not overcome it. See 42 Ill. 536; 43 Ill. 477; 40 Ill. 325; 68 Ill. 426; 65 Ill. 505; 69 Ill. 666; 73 Ill. 337; 70 Ill. 46. Since all persors, including parties to suits, have, with few exceptions, been by statute, made competent witnesses, if the evidence of the grantor should be held sufficient to overcome the certificate of acknowledgment, then most real estate would be held by a slender and uncertaifi tenure. Affirmed."-Blackman v. Hawks.

SELLING INTOXICATING LIQUORS-HABITUAL INTOXICATION.-This was an indictment upon which appellant was convicted of selling "intoxicating liquor to one S. then and there, being a person who was then and there in the habit of getting intoxicated, etc." The point made by appellant on appeal here is, that in or der to maintain a conviction for selling liquors to a person in the habit of getting intoxicated it is necessary for the prosecution to establish by proof, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the person alleged in the indictment as the party to whom the liquor was so sold, had at the time of such sale a fixed habit of getting intoxicated, and that occasional acts of drunkenness do not constitute one, in the meaning of the law, a person who is in the habit of getting intoxicated. The court say: "The statute does not use the words 'fixed habit,' it simply says a person who is in the habit of getting intoxicated-that is, applying one of Webster's definitions of habit,- having the involuntary tendency to become intoxicated, which is acquired by frequent repetition.' The evidence shows S had been drunk from three to five times within the past two years before the trial. We are unable to say from this the jury were unauthorized to find that he was in the habit of getting intoxicated. A man having the full control of his appetite could hardly be supposed to be guilty of such excess. We lay no stress on the fact that some witnesses baving a pretty fair knowledge of S's habits, never saw him intoxicated. Such evidence is negative only, and does not disprove the affirmative (vidence of those who testify to having seen him Crunk. We cannot agree with counsel for appellant that to support a conviction in such cases, it is essen

tial the evidence shall show beyond reasonable doubt that the party to whom the liquor is sold is constantly or usually intoxicated, but hold that it is sufficient to show that he has been frequently intoxicated and has, thereby, acquired an involuntary tendency to become intoxicated." Affirmed.-Murphy v. People.

EMINENT DOMAIN CROSS PETITION TO BE FILED BY DEFENDANT IN CLAIMING DAMAGES TO CONTIGUOUS PROPERTY CHARACTER OF CROSSPETITION AS A PLEADING. This was a proceeding commenced by the Chicago & Iowa R. Co. under the eminent domain act, against H, to condemn a certain strip of land described in the petition for right of way. The jury affixed the compensation and damages of H at $1,500. The company brings the record to this court and assigns various errors. The lands described in the petition are all situate in section 15 and 16, T. 38, R 5 east, but upon the trial H was permitted to introduce evidence as to damages to his whole farm of some 730 acres, a portion of which farm is located in section 21, and which portion is distant one hundred rods from the railroad at the nearest point. BAKER, J., says: "It was decided by this court in the case of Mix v. L. B. & M. R. Co., 67 Ill. 319, that the evidence should be confined to the particular lots described in the petition, unless the defendant filed a cross-petition setting up that he was the owner of other ground not described in the original petition, which would be damaged and made claim to have the damages thereto likewise assessed. Jones v. C. & I. R. Co., 78 Ill., P. A. & D. R. Co. v. Sawyer, 71 Ill. 361, are to the same effect. The case of City of Bloomington v. Miller, 84 Ill. 621, cited by defendant in error announced no different rule, but expressly referred to the Mix case and recognized the rule therein enunciated. It appears. however, that the defendant Hopkins filed in this cause a cross-petition of an informal character and very indefinite in terms. It

is substantially a cross-petition and sufficiently complies with all the necessary requirements of the law and of the former decisions of the court, at least to give jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the proposed inquiry. It may be the court would have required, if it had been asked so to do by plaintiff in error, the defendant H to make his own cross-petition more specific in some respects, but this was not done." Affirmed.-Chicago & Iowa R. Co. v. Hopkins.

SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.

January Term, 1879.

LEVIED

OFFICER CAN NOT THRESH WHEAT UPON.-1. An officer who levies upon wheat in the mow has no authority to thresh the same before selling it. Threshing can not be supposed to be necessary, and the power to proceed and expend money in threshing at the debtor's expense is liable to great abuses, and can not be admitted without conceding that the officer may go as far as he may deem important or may chose in preparing the wheat for market before making sale. If circumstances could possibly make it necessary, the officer would have to show them. 2. Whether the officer acted in good faith in threshing the wheat is for the jury, and affects only the question of damages. 3. The execution defendant has a right of action against the officer for the injury done in exceeding his authority. Possibly the execution plaintiff might also have, if his judgment was not fully satisfied by the sale, and if he did not advise or consent to the officer's proceedings. Opinion by COOLEY, J.-Stilson v. Gibbs.

INJUNCTION DENIED AGAINST THREATENED ENCROACHMENT ON ALLEY. Defendant, owning a wooden building which for more than twenty years had encroached six inches on a private alley, in making necessary repairs attempted to veneer it with brick, thus encroaching three inches further. Held, that an injunction must be refused. It is not claimed that the proposed encroachment seriously interfered with complainant's right of way. It is doubtful whether one is ever entitled as matter of right to an injunction to restrain a threatened injury, and the court, when the relief sought is disproportioned to the nature and extent of the injury sustained or likely to be, will not interfere, but will leave the parties to seek some other remedy. Fox v. Holcomb, 32 Mich. 495; Briggs v. Withey, 24 Mich. 136; Norris v. Hill, 1 Mich. 210; White v. Forbes, Walk. Ch. 114. Opinion by MARSTON, J.-Hall v. Rood.

HUSBAND'S GIFT TO WIFE-SUBSEQUENT CHATTEL MORTGAGE TO CREDITORS CHANGE OF PosSESSION-ESTOPPEL-VALUE OF CHATTELS SHOWN IN TROVER.-Trover for the value of a horse, household furniture and ornaments and other articles which plaintiff claimed as a gift from her husband, but which were sold under a chattel mortgage given by him subsequent to the alleged gifts. Held, 1. That a wife's testimony, such as "my husband gave me some robes," is not a conclusion of law; it avers the act of giving, and justifies a finding that a gift took place, if nothing is drawn out to qualify it. 2. That the question of a change of possession must be considered with the other facts in the case. The wife's testimony that after the gift of the horse she went to the stable where it was kept and gave directions concerning its keeping, and afterwards controlled it, was proper as res gesta, and as tending to show that possession was delivered. 3. That an open and visible change of possession is not necessary to establish a gift from husband to wife when they are living tegether. The question in such cases is whether the wife has established her right by a fair preponderance of evidence; though the circumstances of the relation and the facility with which frauds may be accomplished under the pretense of sales or gifts between husband and wife, ought to be carefully weighed. In this State no such principle is recognized as Black, C. J., set forth in Gamber v. Gamber, 18 Penn. 363, 366, that a married woman claiming property must show her right "by evidence which does not admit of a reasonable doubt." Only convincing proof is required. 4. That a wife who knows that her husband is mortgaging in part for her own board, chattels he has previously given her, and who fails to assert her claim, is estopped from doing so thereafter; but evidence of her knowledge long afterwards, and when defendant had taken the property into his own possession, is immaterial. 5. That the creditor under the chattel mortgage has no concern with the fact that the husband when solvent gave his wife expensive presents. 6. That to rebut plaintiff's evidence as to the value of the property defendant was entitled to show that after he took the property he had it publicly advertised and sold, and that sums were realized much below the value as testified to by plaintiff's witness. Smith v. Mitchell, 12 Mich. 180; Worthington v. Hanna, 23 Mich. 530. Opinion by COOLEY, J.-Davis v. Zimmermann.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES- DEFECT IN MACHINERY CONSTRUCTED UNDER SPECIAL CONTRACT.-.Where a steam boiler put up in a vessel under special contract has such defects that it is worth less than the contract price, the measure of damages is the difference in value between the boiler as it is with its defects, and the boiler as it would have been if completed in compliance with the contract, whether the latter sum

is more or less than the contract price. Opinion by COOLEY, J.-White v. Brockway.

mittee of the church association were foreign to the issue raised by the pleadings and properly refused. Bank v. Murdock, 62 Mo. 70. Affirmed. Opinion by SHERWOOD, C. J.-Falkerson v. Thornton.

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.

October Term, 1878.

[Filed February 3, 1879.]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION FOR OFFENSE OF SHOOTING AT ANOTHER, BY WHICH LIFE IS ENDANGERED-REQUISITES OF INDICTMENT.-Defendant was indicted under sec. 33, Wag. Stat. 450, for shooting with a loaded pistol at one Gaston, and was convicted. It was insisted that as the testimony did not show Gaston was wounded or otherwise injured by the pistol shot fired at him by defendant, therefore the conviction could not stand: Held, 1. That it is as much an offense under said section to shoot at a man and miss him as it is to shoot at and hit him. Otherwise, the language of that section "or his life be endangered by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of another," is absolutely meaningless, since the first part of the section had already provided for cases where injury had resulted in consequence of the unlawful act. It is not necessary that an indictment based on that section should state that the act was done willfully, with malice, with a deadly weapon, or under circumstances which had death ensued, would have constituted manslaughter. State v. Moor, 65 Mo. 606, and cases cited. 2. As the record however fails to show an arraignment of defendant, this under-repeated adjudications must accomplish the reversal of the judgment. Opinion by SHERWOOD, C. J.-State v. Agee.

EVIDENCE-PARTY TO CONTRACT COMPETENT AS WITNESS IN HIS OWN BEHALF, UNLESS ALL THE ORIGINAL PARTIES WITH WHOM CONTRACT IN ISSUE WAS MADE ARE DEAD OR DISQUALIFIED.-Action for damages for breach of alleged contract, plaintiff claiming that defendants had employed him to build the church, and after its commencement and partial completion had prevented him from going on with the work. Answer, special denial, trial and verdict for plaintiff. Objection was made to plaintiff's testifying, on the ground that as Thornton, one of the alleged contracting parties was dead, plaintiff was an incompetent witness. Held, 1. The objection was properly overruled. Thornton, deceased, was not the sole contracting party; that party was composed of Thornton and Hitch, the latter being alive at time of trial. The legal party to the contract did not consist of a single individual, but of two persons. If the contract had been made with Thornton alone plaintiff would have been incompetent. The point is a new one in this State. In Massachusetts, where the statute in regard to witnesses is substantially like our own, the ruling, as to the competency of witnesses, under similar circumstances to those above stated, has been in accordance with the views here pronounced. Goss v. Austin, 11 Allen, 525; Haywood v. French, 12 Gray, 453. The reason of the statutory provision is the prevention of one person testifying where death has sealed the lips of his adversary, a reason which can not apply where there are other persons still alive, who were co-contractors with decedent, cognizant of all the facts, and therefore able to testify in opposition to the testimony of the witness objected to. As the reason for the rule does not exist, no more does the rule. 2. Defendants were liable individually under their answer, and instructions based upon the theory that they were merely liable as agents of or as a com

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ESTABLISHMENT OF COURTS BY POPULAR VOTE.-Chapter 143, Laws of 1876, enacted by the general assembly of Iowa, which provides that any city in the State containing five thousand inhabitants, whether organized under a special charter or under the general incorporation act, may by popular vote establish a superior court, is constitutional. Opinion by BECK, J.-Lytle v. May.

OFFICIAL BOND-LIABILITY OF SURETIES - SALE OF PROPERTY FOR ILLEGAL USE.-1. The sureties on the official bond of a coroner are liable for his negligence while acting as sheriff, it being one of his duties prescribed by statute to perform the duties of sheriff when that office is vacant, and it is no defense that the acts of their principal for which they are sought to be charged were done without authority of law, if they were done in his official capacity. 2. The fact that one who sells property knows that it will be put to an illegal use will not deprive him of the right to enforce a lien upon the property in the hands of an officer having it in custody. Opinion by ROTHROCK, C. J.-Freeman v. Haw.

EASEMENT WHEN DOES NOT PASS BY CONVEYANCE OF REALTY-WATER-POWER.-Action by the owner of a woolen mill for the abatement of a dam constructed below the mill by the defendants, and the recovery of damages for injury to the plaintiff's waterpower, caused by its maintenance. The land owned by both plaintiff and defendants was formerly owned by the same person who conveyed the portion now occupied by defendants to their grantor, with the right to maintain a dam, which right however was never exercised by him, and his deed to defendants contained no grant thereof. Before the conveyance to defendants the grantor of plaintiff acquired title to the land and water-power now occupied and used by plaintiff's mill. Held, that the right to maintain a dam not hav ing been exercised by defendants' grantor, did not become an easement appurtenant to the property, such as would pass by a conveyance thereof without a special grant, and that defendants took the land subject to plaintiff's right to use the water-power acquired by its grant. 2. Plaintiff's grantor acquired the right by parol from the then owners to construct a mill-race through certain land. Held, that after the race was constructed, the right constituted an easement which was irrevocable, and which passed to plaintiff by implication with the conveyance of the mill and water-power. Opinion by ADAMS, J.-Decorah Woolen Mills Co. v. Greer.

December Term, 1878.

MECHANIC'S LIEN CAN NOT BE ACQUIRED ON PUBLIC BUILDING.-A mechanic's lien can not be acquired on a public building, as such buildings are exempt from execution under the statutes of the State.

Citing, with approval, Bouton v. Board of Supervisors of McDonough Co., 5 Cent. L. J. 105, 108; Quinn. v. Allen, Id. 271. Opinion by DAY, J.- Loring v Small.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSA

CHUSETTS.

November Term, 1878.

INTEREST-VOLUNTARY PAYMENT OF MORE THAN LEGAL RATE. - Under the statute of 1867, ch. 56, § 2, providing that it shall be lawful "to contract for payment and receipt of any rate of interest, provided however, that no greater rate of interest than six per centum per annum shall be recovered in any action, except where the agreement to pay such greater rate of interest is in writing," if a greater rate than six per cent. is voluntarily paid, the excess over six per cent. can not be recovered back. Opinion by MORTON, J.-Marvin v. Mandell.

MARINE INSURANCE-DEVIATION.-By the terms of a policy a vessel was insured "at and from Plymouth to the Banks, cod-fishing, and at and thence back to Plymouth." No usage was shown in such voyages to leave the Banks and go into port for bait, but it appeared that it had been the practice to take out a limited supply and rely upon obtaining an additional supply at the Banks. Held, that a departure from the Banks for the purpose of renewing the supply which was nearly exhausted, could not have been contemplated by the parties in making the policy, and that the deviation discharged the insurer. Opinion by ENDICOTT, J.-Burgess v. Equitable Ins. Co.

CORPORATION-SUBSCRIPTION TO CAPITAL STOCK -CONTRACT.-The defendant signed a subscription paper which recited the incorporation of the "Ka tama Land Company," and that its capital stock was "fixed at fifty thousand dollars," and which contained the following agreement: "Now, therefore, the undersigned hereby associate themselves together to form said corporation, and severally subscribe for and agree each with the other and with said corporation to take the number of shares in said corporation affixed to their respective names, and to pay therefor the sum of one hundred dollars per share at such time as shall be determined, upon the organization of said corporation." The defendant subscribed for ten shares; the corporation called a meeting for the purpose of organization; the meeting appointed a committee "to report the names of subscribers to the original amount of capital stock of fifty thousand dollars," and the committee reported a list not including the defendant's name. The meeting voted to increase the capital stock to one hundred thousand dollars. An assessment of twenty-five dollars per share was levied upon the capital stock, and the defendant was sued as a stockholder. Held, that the contract contained two promises by the defendant; one that he would take ten shares of the par value of one hundred dollars each in a corporation of which the capital stock is fixed at fifty thousand dollars, and the other, which is collateral to the first, that he would pay one hundred dollars upon each share at such times as should be determined by the corporation. It was one of the essential conditions of each of these promises that the capital stock of the corporation should be fifty thousand dollars. He agreed to take and pay for one-fiftieth part of the capital stock of the corporation, and this action would impose upon him a contract different from that into which he entered. Atlantic Mills v. Abbott, 9 Cush. 423. Opinion by MORTON, J.-Katama Land Co. v. Jeringan.

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.

January, 1878.

ELECTIONS PRIMA FACIE RIGHT TO OFFICE EVIDENCE.-1. When the result of the canvass of votes cast at a legal election, as declared by the proper canvassing officers, shows the election of a certain person to a particular office, and he qualifies within the time and in the manner prescribed by law, he is entitled to the office as against every other person laying claim thereto, until the result so declared is set aside by the judgment of some competent court in a direct proceeding for that purpose; and every other person who assumes to exercise the duties of such office (as by holding over after the expiration of a former term), must be treated as a mere intruder or usurper, in any proceeding against him to compel him to deliver up the books and papers pertaining thereto, or to recover moneys or other property in his hands which he is required by law to deliver over to his successor in office. 2. It makes no difference in the application of the foregoing rule, that the predecessor in office was himself a candidate for re-election, and, on the ground of some alleged error or fraud in the vote or the canvass, or the declaration of the result, claims that he and not his opponent was duly elected. Such claimant, not having, by mandamus (as might be done in a proper case), compelled the canvassers to give him the certificate of election, can not retain the office as against an opposing claimant of the character above described, who demands the same, and put the latter to an action of quo warranto, but must himself proceed by such an action. 3. In an action on the official bond of O as town treasurer, for his neglect to deliver moneys, etc., in his hands to his successor, the evidence for plaintiff was, that at the close of the polls on the day of election the chairman of the town board of supervisors announced publicly as the result of the election that one S was elected to the office of treasurer; that a statement of the result of the election was drawn up on the records of the town by the authority of the inspectors, and signed by the town clerk, but not signed by the inspectors as required by the statute; that this statement showed the whole number of votes cast and the nnmber cast for each candidate, from which it appeared that S had a majority of the whole; that the statement made by the town clerk to the county clerk, as required by statute, showing the names of the persons elected to the several town offices at snch election, contained the name of S as town treasurer; that the town clerk also, six days after the election, notified S in writing of his election; that S duly qualified. O, in his answer and testimony, did not deny that S received a majority of the votes cast, or that the tally sheets showed a majority for S, but claimed that he himself received a majority of the legal votes cast. Held, that the evidence as to S's right was properly admitted, and warrants a judgment that there was a breach of the bond in suit, in O.'s failure to pay over to S. the moneys in his hands. 4. The mere fact that O., for a few days after his term expired, refused to deliver up the books and papers, and performed some duties pertaining to his office, did not render him treasurer de facto in such a sense as to prevent a recovery in this action of moneys in his hands which he ought to pay over to S.; he having had no color of title, and there having been no unreasonable delay in asserting the rights of S. or in bringing this action. 5. The act of S., in taking and filing the oath of office and his official bond, and demanding of O. the moneys, books, etc., in his hands, would have been sufficient to warrant quo warranto against him by a

hostile claimant. [ORTON, J., dissents from the judgment, holding, 1, that it does not appear from the record that at the town election in question there was any canvass of the votes, or determination of the result by the inspectors, or that the names of the persons declared to be elected were ever read to the town meeting by the clerk, or that the inspectors ever drew a "statement in writing" and "certificate" such as the statute requires, or that any such statement or certificate by them was left by the town clerk, or recorded in his office. Tay. Stats. 360, §§ 62, 63. 2, that in the absence of these S. has no prima facic right to the office. 3, that in the absence of any person having such a prima facie right, the former treasurer, holding over after his legal term, is de facto treasurer, and not an intruder, and is under no obligation to deliver the moneys and other property of his office to any person claiming to his successor.] Opinion by TAYLOR, J.-Supervisors of La Point v. O'Malley.

will be thankfully received, and due credit given when. ever requested. The queries must be brief; long statements of facts of particluar cases must, for want of space, be invariably rejected. Anonymous communications are not requested.]

QUERIES.

8. ARE NATIONAL BANKS subject to a license or occupation tax by the State? Is any of their property, except shares and realty, subject to State tax?

9. A HOLDS Two NOTES secured by vendor's lien, one due, the other not due, how will he proceed so as to preserve the lien as to both notes without waiting until the second becomes due? Can he foreclose on first subject to second? Suppose he can and sells for enough to pay it, what are the rights of debtor who tenders payment at maturity of second? In above case, would the matter be altered if the second note had been transferred by A? B.

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA.

November Term, 1878.

SURETY

PROMISSORY NOTE EXTENSION OF TIME.-Where the fact of suretyship does not appear upon the face of the note sued on, both signers appearing to be principals, to maintain the defense of suretyship, and the discharge of the surety by extension of time to the principal, the defendant must allege and prove that the plaintiff had notice that he was surety on the note at the time the plaintiff agreed with the principal to extend the time of payment. 2 Met. Ky. 247; 17 Conn. 97; 29 Iowa. 420; Pick. 423; 4 N. H. 221. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-Davenport v. King.

PARTNERSHIP- DISSOLUTION OF FIRM-RIGHTS OF PARTNERS.-The Indianapolis Cotton Man. Co. sued appellants for goods sold and delivered. Appellants answered that the plaintiff agreed to give them the exclusive sale for five years of the warps manufactured by the plaintiff, for the sale of which defendants were to receive commissions, etc., alleging a breach of the contract by the plaintiff, and claiming damages. The plaintiff replied that after the execution of said agreement, the firm of Dickson & Co. (composed of the appellants) ceased to exist, and so the defendants had abandoned said contract. A demurrer to this reply was overruled, and the plaintiff had judgment. WORDEN, J., says: "The contract executed by the defendants as partners, became the joint contract of all the defendants. 37 Ind. 264. They were jointly bound to the same extent as if they had each signed the contract in their individual name. The fact that the defendants were partners was of no special importance in any aspect of the case, except that they might sign the contract in the firm name, by one of the members of the firm. The continuance or discontinuance of the partnership between the defendants did not affect, in any way, their obligations to the plaintiff, or the plaintiff's obligation to them. The cessation of the partnership, therefore, was not an abandonment of the contract on the part of the defendants, nor did it authorize the plaintiff to treat the contract as rescinded. 16 Hurl. & N. 573; Par. on Part., 394; 1 Hoff. 524. The court erred in overruling the demurrer to the reply." Judgment reversed.-Dickson v. Indianapolis Cotton Mnfg. Co.

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.

[The attention of subscribers is directed to this department, as a means of mutual benefit. Answers to queries

NOTES.

JUDGE BLODGETT's vindication is complete. In a report signed by every member of a committee of Congress, composed of men from both the political parties, and from every section of the country, the charges made against him, and which have been before the public for months past, are declared not to have been proven. That no other result was possible, we intimated a fortnight ago; of his perfect innocence of the matters charged, the judge's friends have, from the beginning of the investigation, been assured. That the attacks were as groundless as they have been persistent, is now clear; and the bench and bar everywhere, in fact the whole country, can not but rejoice that the outcome is as it is. We are spared the spectacle of a judge of the Federal Court standing at the bar of the Senate, while the sight of a just judge coming unscathed through the fires of misrepresentation and calumny, is a matter of which the nation may well feel proud.Walter S. Cox, of Washington City, has been appointed and confirmed an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.-The newly-appointed Judge of the Federal District Court at Philadelphia, took his seat for the first time on the 26th ult. Judge Butler was addressed, on behalf of the bar, by Hon. Eli K. Price, and responded in graceful terms. In the course of his remarks Mr. Price said: "You have now taken a seat heretofore occupied by distinguished men and jurists; by Francis Hopkinson, who had signed the Declaration of Independence, and was appointed by George Washington, by Richard Peters, by Joseph Hopkinson, by A. Randall, by John K. Kane, and John Cadwalader. When this court was opened by your first predecessor, in 1790, there had been published by him, in February, 1789, his ‘Judgments in the Admiralty of Pennsylvania,' a paper-cov ered book of 131 pages. It was the first printed volume of all American reports. Now there have been printed, of American Reports, 2,823 different volumes."Henry E. Wallace, senior editor of the Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer, died in that city on the 23d ult. Mr. Wallace was born in Philadelphia in 1824, and was admitted to the bar in 1836. In 1843 he founded the paper with which he was connected at the time of his death, and which is, therefore, the oldest law journal in the country. In 1856, Mr. Wallace issued the first volume of the Philadelphia Reports. He published nine complete volumes, and at the time of his death he had personally revised the proofs of the larger part of the tenth volume. He was an industrious and careful reporter.