ration, which was overruled. In sustaining the ruling, the court of appeals, by Denio, J., said: "But I am of the opinion that when it appeared on the trial that the plaintiff's attorney had fallen into the mistake of stating the name which Mr. Cook had given to his bank as the creditor of Wickham and as the plaintiff in the suit, instead of his own name, a plain case was presented for amendment under the 173d section of the code." The error was disregarded. So in Traver v. Eighth Av. R. Co. 6 Abb. N. S. 46, the Court of Appeals of the State of New York, Grover, J., delivering the opinion, cited the foregoing case with approval, and held that where an action was brought by a married woman in her maiden name it was a mere misnomer, and when not objected to at the trial would be disregarded on appeal.-Anthony v. Bank of Commerce. In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of South Carolina. Opinion by Mr. Justice HUNT. Judgment affirmed.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

COURT OF APPEALS OF KENTUCKY.

January Term, 1879.

THE REAL ESTATE OF AN INFANT can not be subjected to the payment of board and tuition. Sec. 9, art. 2, ch. 48, G. S. A father can not make a contract for the board and tuition of his infant daughter, so as to make her real estate liable for the debt thus created. Reversed. Opinion by PRYOR, C. J.-Coe v. Storts.

A POST NUPTIAL CONTRACT BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE, whereby she put her money in his hands to be invested by him in a house and lot, to be conveyed to her,'would be enforceable, as between husbond and wife, but after the husband had invested the money and caused the house and lot to be conveyed to himself, and becoming embarrassed had made an assignment and conveyed the house and lot to his assignee for the benefit of his creditors, such contract between himself and wife will not be enforced in favor of the wife in preference to creditors. Pryor v. Smith, 4 Bush, 379; Whitesides v. Davies, 7 Dana, 108; Martin v. Trigg, 8 B. Mon. 529; Lattimer v. Glenn, 2 Bush, 543; Watson v. Roberts, 4 Bush, 39; Maraman v. Maraman, 4 Met. 90. Affirmed. Opinion by ELLIOTT, J. -Darnaby v. Daruaby.

PERFORMANCE OR EXCUSE FOR NON-PERFORMANCE OF CONDITION PRECEDENT MUST BE PLEADED AS REQUIRED AT COMMON LAW-VICIOUS CONSIDERATION.-1. At common law it was ordinarily required of the pleader not only to make an allegation of the performance of a condition precedent, but a statement of the time and manner of its performance, in order that the court might determine, as a matter of law, whether the intention of the covenant had been fulfilled, and in order that the traversable issue might be presented. 2. Sec. 149 of the code of 1851 providing that; "in pleading the performance of a condition precedent in a contract, it shall not be necessary to state the facts showing such performance, but it may be stated generally that the party duly performed all the conditions on his part," etc., was omitted from the code of 1877, and its omission must be construed as an intention to restore in such cases the common law rule of pleading as it had been interpreted prior to the adoption of the code of 1851. 2. Contracts having for

their consideration an agreement to impede, hinder or defeat the administration of the criminal or penal laws, are void as against public policy. A part of the entire consideration being vicious, the whole contract is void. Kimbrough v. Lane, 11 Bush, 558; Tool Company v. Norris, 2 Wall. 55. Affirmed. Opinion by HINES, J.-Overback v. Hall.

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

[Filed at Ottawa, January 25, 1879.]

INDICTMENT CENSE-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION-INTERPRETATION OF TERM "PUBLIC RESORT."-This was an indictment against B for selling intoxicating liquors contrary to sec. 2, ch. 43, Rev. Stats. 1874, entitled "Dramshops," which declares that whoever not having a license to keep a dramshop "shall by himself or another * sell any intoxicating liquor in less quantity than one gallon, or in any quantity to be drunk upon the premises, or in or upon any adjacent room, building, yard premises, or place of public resort, shall be fined," etc. In the court below defendant was found guilty. The ground relied upon to reverse the judgment is that the court erred in giving an instruction in substance that if they found from the evidence that defendant sold beer to various persons by the gallon, and that at the time of such sale he knew or had good reason to believe the person to whom he sold were going to drink the beer in the public street or alley adjoining his brewery where the sale was made, and that the beer was so drunk, they might find the defendant guilty under such counts of the indictment as charged a sale of liquor to be drunk on premises adjacent to the premises where the sale was made. It appeared from the evidence that the beer was obtained from defendant's brewery and was taken out and drunk on a public street or alley adjoining the brewery. CRAIG, C. J., says: "The argument of the counsel for defendant. as we understand it, is that a public street or alley is not a place of public resort, either in the sense in which these words are used in the statute, or according to the ordinary acceptation of the term 'public resort.' Whether a street and alley would be regarded as a place of public resort would, to a great extent, depend upon the manner in which they were used. We see nothing to prevent a street or alley from being so used by the public that they might be regarded as plaees of public resort, within the intent and meaning of the statute. Here, as appears from the evidence, persons numbering from six to twelve, were in the habit daily of congregating for the purpose of drinking beer. We see no reason, when the evidence is considered, why the street and alley adjoining the brewery might not be regarded as places of public resort, within the meaning of the act." Affirmed.-Bondalow v. People. INDICTMENT-PROCURING ABORTION-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE.-This was an indictment for the crime of murder in procuring an abortion on a woman, from the effect of which she died. Motion was made to quash the indictment, but overruled. On trial had defendant was found guilty. Defendant appealed, and urges two grounds for reversal: 1st. Because the indictment was not returned into court by a grand jury empannelled under the laws of the State. 2d. Because the indictment fails to allege that the miscarriage was not produced as necessary to save the life of the person alleged to have been murdered, and imply negatives the absolute necessity of producing

SELLING LIQUORS WITHOUT LI

abortion, in order to save the life of the woman, and would make defendant criminally liable for an honest and excusable error. SCOTT, J., says: "Twenty-three grand jurors were in fact chosen, but on the roll being called only twenty-two of the number chosen answered, and the one failing to answer was, by the court, excused from service. The grand jury thus consisted of twenty-two members. Sec. 16, ch. 78, entitled 'Jurors,' declares that a panel of a grand jury shall consist of twenty-three persons, sixteen of whom shall constitute a grand jury.' But the 9th section of the same chapter provides that if for any reason the panel of the grand jury shall not be full, the judge shall direct the sheriff to summon from the county a sufficient number,' etc. It is said that it was error to omit the duty enjoined. That depends upon the construction that shall be given to this clause of the statute, whether it shall be held as mandatory or directory. Reading the word 'shall' as 'may,' as is allowable from the context, it is simply directory. That is plainly its meaning. Whether the indictment was defective in negativing in the precise language of the statute, the fact that the abortion may have been produced, or attempted as necessary for the preservation of the life of the mother, presents a question of some difficulty and one not altogether free from doubt. The law makes the producing of a miscarriage a crime' unless the same were done as necessary for the preservation of the mother's life.' Undoubtedly the general rule is, where an act is made criminal, with exceptions embraced in the same clause of the statute which creates the offense, so as to be descriptive of the offense intended to be punished, it is necessary in the indictment to negative the exceptions so as to show aflirmatively the precise crime defined has been committed.

But it is immaterial that the precise words of the statute are not employed for that purpose. The words of the indictment are, 'it not being necessary,' etc. Philologists give to 'as,' when used in the English language, when the context seems to require it, the same meaning as 'it' or 'that.' Adopting this construction as fully authorized, we understand negatives the exceptions of the statute by use of the converse 'it not being necessary.'" Affirmed.-Beasly v. People.

GARNISHMENT-RIGHT TO GARNISH MONEY DEPOSITED IN BANK BY ONE AS SHERIFF FOR A DEBT DUE BY HIM AS AN INDIVIDUAL.-This was a garnishment proceeding brought by the Excelsior Stone Co. against M, a banker, to garnish any moneys credit, etc., belonging to Francis Agnew, against whom the said company had recovered a judgment, an execution whereon had been returned "no property found." The answer of M to the interrogatories filed stated explicitly that he had no property, credits, etc., in his possession belonging to Agnew, and that he was not in any manner indebted to him, but that he, as a banker, had a bank account with Francis Agnew, sheriff, upon which there was a balance to the credit of "Francis Agnew, sheriff." At this stage of the proceedings the said Francis Agnew voluntarily came into court and filed his sworn interpleader, in which he stated that he was sheriff of Cook couniy; that as such he had collected money upon various executions, and deposited the same in the bank of the defendant M to the credit of an account entitled "Francis Agnew, sheriff," and that it was a special deposit made in trust for the use of and to be used for the sole purpose of paying the moneys which the said Agnew had collected on executions in his official capacity of sheriff. Judgment was rendered against the defendant, from which he appeals. SHELDON, J., says: "Upon the facts set forth in the interpleader there should have been no judgment, we think, against the garnishee. The money had been collected for execution creditors, and

was deposited for the purpose of being paid over to such creditors when called for. We can not adopt the view of appellee that Agnew had no authority as sheriff to deposit in bank money so collected, and that by that act he converted the funds to his own use. It is objected that no execution creditor appears to claim the money. We regard Agnew as appearing as trustee for the execution creditors and on their behalf. The money was not the proper money of the sheriff applicable to the payment of his general debts; it would have been wrongful for the sheriff himself to have so applied it, and the law should not compel such a misappropriation." Reversed.-Meadowcraft v. Agnew.

FORECLOSURE-MORTGAGE NOTICE BY MASTER IN CHANCERY TAKING TESTIMONY TO GUARDIAN OF MINOR HEIRS-STRICT FORECLOSURE.- This is a writ of error brought to reverse a decree of the circuit court rendered against plaintiffs in error as the minor heirs of B in a suit to foreclose two mortgages given by said B in his lifetime. A guardian ad litem was appointed for the minor heirs, who answered, and the case was referred to a master in chancery to take proofs, which being done, and a report made, a decree as above was rendered. It does not appear that there was any notice to the guardian ad litem of the taking of the testimony before the master. The usual decree for the sale of the property was not made, but a strict foreclosure of the equity of redemption, and that the mortgagee take the mortgaged property, was decreed. SHELDON, J., says: "In Turner v. Jenkins, 79 Ill. 228, it was held that where testimony is taken before a master in chancery without any notice to the guardlan ad litem of infant defendants, it is not admissible as against the infant, for want of notice, and this though the guardian may have made no objection at the hearing. As the decree is not sus

tainable without the facts found by the master's report, we must hold under the decision referred to that there was error in the admission of and acting upon the proof taken before the master without notice to the guardian ad litem. We would not however be understood as holding that this ground of error would have lain had the master's report merely contained proof of the execution of the mortgage and a computation of the amount of the mortgaged debt, but it went further, finding the insufficiency of the security. The decree found that the mortgagor B had previously died insolvent; that the the mortgaged. property was not worth the mortgage debt, and a strict foreclosure. In 50 Ill. 275, it was said: 'In our State, and in view of our statute, it is only in strong cases which form exceptions that there should be decreed strict foreclosure or a sale without redemption. It may be in rare cases when it appears that the property is of less value than the debt for which it was mortgaged, and the mortgagor is insolvent, and the mortgagee is willing to take the property in discharge of the debt. that a strict foreclosure may be allowed.' The insolvency of the deceased mortgagor's estate assimilates the present case to that where there are other incumbrances upon the property. In England, where the practice in common cases is that of a strict foreclosure, the courts of equity have departed from that general rule, and decree a sale in certain and special cases, among which are those where the mortgagor is dead and there is a deficiency of personal assets, and where the mortgagor dies and the estate descends to an infant. 2 Story's Eq. Jur. §1026, where the authorities are cited. We are inclined to the view that, under the circumstances of the present case, the usual practice should have been followed and a sale decreed of the premises instead of a strict foreclosure." Reversed.-Boyer v. Boyer.

SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.

January Term, 1879.

PROMISE TO STOCKHOLDERS TO PAY DEBTS OF CORPORATION- DAMAGES.— Pratt promised certain stockholders, in consideration of their transferring to him some of their stock, to pay the debts of the corporation. They were not liable, being interested only as stockholders. He failed to pay a certain debt, and the creditor brought assumpsit on an assignment of this agreement with the stockholders. Held, 1. That a verbal promise to the creditor to pay another's debt is within the statute of frauds and void, but if made to the debtor is good. Green v. Brookins, 23 Mich. 48. 2. That the creditor, claiming as assignee of the stockholders, can only recover the same amount and on the same conditions with them. 3. That the assignment conveyed nothing but their damages arising out of the non-payment of one debt. 4. That where a promise is made to a debtor to pay his debt the measure of damages for failure is the whole amount of the debt; but where, as here, the promisees were not liable, they or their assignee can only recover what they have lost by the default. 5. That there is no cause of action, since nothing was assigned but the damages resulting to them as stockholders from the non-payment of one debt, and that can not be effectually ascertained in a court of law or severed from the entire transaction. Opinion by CAMPBELL, C. J.-Pratt v. Bates.

--

PRESUMPTION

POSSESSION OF STOLEN GOODS OF GUILT. - Conviction of larceny. Several of the stolen articles were found four months after the theft on premises occupied by respondent, some of them in his bed. Search was made without success the day before, but on going again they were discovered in his bed. His brother, who occupied another part of the same house, and who had previously pleaded guilty to the same larceny, testified that he put the articles where they were found after the first search was made, and that respondent had nothing to do with them. Held, that it was error not to charge the jury as requested, that the fact of possession of stolen property, standing unconnected with any other circumstances affords but slight presumption of guilt. If immediately subsequent to the larceny, it may sometimes be almost conclusive. Walker v. People, 38 Mich. But the presumption weakens with the time that has elapsed, and may scarcely arise at all if others beside the accused have had equal access with himself to the place of discovery. Opinion by COOLEY, J.-Giblich v. People.

INTEREST CAN BE IMPLIED ON SECURITY ONLY AT STATUTORY RATE - CHANCERY PROCEDURE DECREE BASED ON COMMISSIONER'S REPORT-EXCEPTIONS-APPEAL. Complainant having cashed $24,000 of paper made by defendant, the latter took it up and gave his notes instead for that amount on two years' time, at ten per cent. interest. Eight months after he gave complainant a mortgage deed for $21,000, containing no express identification ot the debt, and no terms expressly applying the deed to a specific $21,000; and it was silent as to time of payment and in regard to interest, Held, 1. That the mortgage was due as soon as given, and was by implication an interest bearing security from date, or at least from the maturing of the notes. Sheeby v. Mandeville, 7 Cranch, 208; Farquhar v. Morris, 7 T. R. 124; Purdy v. Phillips, 1 Duer, 369; Young v. Godbe, 15 Wall. 562; N. Penn. R. Co. v. Adams, 54 Penn. St. 94. 2. That as it was a distinct security, not connected with the notes,a material stipulation in the notes cannot be imported into it

without destroying its legal identity as a contract; and this security contains no written stipulation for ten per cent. interest; therefore it bears only the statutory rate of seven per cent.; seven per cent. interest can be implied. but ten per cent. can not be. 3. That whenever a matter is by decree duly committed to a commissioner to obtain the result of his investigation and judgment to serve as a basis for a subsequent decree of the court, his regular report, if not excepted to or complained of, binds the parties, and the court should decrce accordingly; and when it has been con firmed without objection, and been followed by a final decree that is allowed to stand, an appellate court can not review it or re-examine the matter of the final decree which rests upon it. 4. That, however, when the interlocutory decree preceding reference decides the turning point of the case, exceptions to the court are not available to compel a re-examination on that point; there should be a motion or petition to the court, or resort to the appellate court. Clark v. Willoughby, 1 Barb. Ch. 168. 5. That where an interlocutory decree, ordering a reference, has decided that the complainant was entitled to interest and fixed the rate,an omission to except to the commissioner's report does not preclude defendant from an appeal on these points. Opinion by GRAVES, J-Eaton v.. Truesdail.

-

RESCISSION OF

DELIVERY AND POSSESSION SALE.-D, owning a stock of goods, was induced by M and G, into an agreement to form a corporation, they agreeing to pay to the corporation a large amount of money, and he joined with them in a bill of sale to the company, which was delivered to M, to be held, as D swore, conditionally, and not to be delivered to the company until he was paid. M and G, as president and secretary of the company, afterwards mortgaged the goods, and they even seized under the mortgage. Held, 1. That as M was one of the original grantors to the company with plaintiff and G, so that there could be no delivery in the ordinary sense of the term, the bill of sale could not become operative against the grantors until they had in some way manifested an intent to make it operative. 2. That possession by a person who is an officer of a company is not the company's possession, unless received or held for that purpose. 3. That a vendor may protect himself by rescission against the fraud of an insolvent vendee who has not paid and does not mean to pay him. 4. If one mortgages goods to which he has no right, the mortgagee is in no better position than he. 5. That where the plaintiff's testimony makes out a prima facie case, it is error to take it from the jury because of evidence introduced for the defense. Opinion by CAMPBELL, C. J.-Doyle v. Migner.

EJECTMENT AMONG TENANTS IN COMMON-ALLOWANCE FOR IMPROVEMENTS BUYING UP ADVERSE CLAIMS-TAX TITLE-ESTOPPEL.-Ejectment by defendant in error, claiming, as an heir at law, of the original patentee from the United States, an undivided fifth of certain premises. Held, 1. That the Michigan statute, Laws 1875, 207, allowing a defendant in ejectment to pay for improvements does not apply to tenants in common holding undivided interests. 2. That the United States patent is the first instrument which makes an absolute legal title in any one. Until entry of purchase, which is completed by the patent, land is not open to private transfer, or ownership, or taxable. 3. That the record of the patent in the government office at Washington has the same force as the patent itself. McGarrahan v. Mining Co., 6 Otto, 316. Failure to record a patent in the county registry does not affect its validity or operation. 4. That a purchaser from one who holds but an undivided interest in patented lands, and who enters as a stranger to the claims of the co-tenants of the other undivided inter

ests, is not estopped from setting up against an adverse claim which originated before his purchase-e. g., a tax title originating from his grantor's default. As remarked by the United State Supreme Court, in Blight v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 548: "The propriety of applying the doctrine between the lessor and lessee to a vendor and vendee, may well be doubted. The vendee acquires the title for himself, and his faith is not pledged to maintain the title of the vendor. The rights of the vendee are intended to be extinguished by the sale, and he has no continuing interest in the maintenance of his title, unless he should be called upon in consequence of some covenant or warranty in his deed. The property having become by the sale the property of the vendee, he has a right to fortify that title by the purchase of any other which may protect him in the quiet enjoyment of the premises. See, further, Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. 25; Willison v. Watkins, 3 Pet. 43; Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Pawlet, 4 Pet. 480; Bradstreet v. Huntington, 5 Pet. 402. 5. That there is no estoppel against purchasing tax titles, except against one whose duty it is to pay the tax or remove the burden. Opinion by CAMPBELL, C. J.-Sands v. Davis.

BOOK NOTICES.

[NEW BOOKS RECEIVED. Abbott's Digest of the Law of Corporations: Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York. Amer. ican Decisions, Vol. 7: A. L. Barncroft & Co., San Francisco. Taylor on Landlord and Tenant: Little, Brown & Co., Boston.]

A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF PLEADING under the Codes of Civil Procedure of the States of New York, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, Nebraska, California, Nevada, Oregon, Colorado, North Carolina, South Carolina and Florida, and the Territories of Dakota, Wyoming, Montana and Idaho. By PHILEMON BLISS, LL.D., Professor of Law in the Missouri State University, and late Judge of the Supreme Court of Missouri. St. Louis: F. H. Thomas & Co. 1879.

In one of the many congratulatory notices which this excellent work has already received, the fact is pointed out that its publication has come about in the same manner as so many of our best legal treatises have been produced; that is to say, it has been written by a practical lawyer, after a constant study and review of his subject as a lecturer on law. Blackstone, Kent and Story are mentioned as prominent examples of this in other days; Judge Cooley's Treatise on Torts as the most recent but one, and to these should be added Mr. Smith's work on Contracts. The author of the volume before us-the latest and, for the practicing lawyer, the best treatise on pleading under the codes in print-leaving a seat on the Supreme Bench of this State which he had filled with distinction, accepted a professorship of law in the State University. As a practitioner, and as a judge, he had long felt the need of a proper work on the code system of pleading; as a teacher on law he determined that the students under bis charge should receive as good a training in the new system as it was possible for him to give them, in the absence of text and reference books adapted to the study of the subject as a science. The knowledge he himself had acquired, and the study he had given to the codes, he set to work to arrange, classify and apply, and a series of lectures to his classes was the first result of this resolve. It was not long before he was urged by many of his friends to place the fruits of his labors in this department before a larger audience, and he was on the point of preparing his lectures for

publication, when the announcement of Mr. Pomeroy's work on Remedies and Remedial Rights changed his plans, and delayed their issue for more than two years. The whole profession is the gainer through this circumstance. Meanwhile the manuscript has been in the author's possession, receiving constant additions as the later decisions of the courts were made public, and, doubtless, many alterations, as closer study and further investigation will, as a rule, prompt. We have, therefore, a book which has not been hurried, but which has had time to form and to grow. Thus must every work which is to endure be conceived and be executed.

It would, perhaps, seem that a proper review of Judge Bliss' work must necessarily embrace a comparison with Mr. Pomeroy's; and that the questions which should first present themselves would be as to the relative value of the two, and which one will be of most use to the lawyer in his practice. But we shall not attempt this; we have neither the time nor the space for the proper execution of such a task. We can only say that we have always read Mr. Pomeroy's book with pleasure and profit; that we consider it a great work -an opinion which the author of the present treatise himself expresses in his preface-but that, for the practicing lawyer, we have no hesitation in stating it as our belief that Judge Bliss' treatise will prove the most useful. Where the former is rhetorical, the latter is clear; where the first work is diffusive, the latter work is concise. The reader of Mr. Pomeroy's book is always charmed with his elegance of expression, his apt illustrations, his powerful arguments, his appropriate examples; but he is likely, as we have often done, to lose sight of the principles which are there laid down; and this, too, notwithstanding the author may very well be charged with a too frequent repetition of his rules and reasons. We have not felt this in reading Judge Bliss' work, but have left, for a time, its perusal, with the feeling that we know much more about the subject than before we saw it, and can not soon forget what we have learned. The further we went through its pages the more were we convinced that it is the work of one familiar with the common law system of pleading as but few are, and understanding the theory and object of the code system as not one lawyer in a thousand does. A good library must possess both Pomeroy and Bliss, but it can better do without the earlier than without the later work.

We had marked several passages, which we desired to cite as examples of the clearness and brevity of the author's style, but have only space for two: "When the statute," he observes," says there shall be but one form of action, form and not substance is spoken of. Without classification there is no science" (§ 6). Again, in showing that, although the code expressly abolishes the distinction between the two forms of action, legal and equitable relief may still be spoken of, this passage occurs: "The distinctions abolished are simply those which formerly existed between the two classes of actions, in the manner of stating the facts, in the style of the writ and the mode of submitting evidence; those which arise from the mode of trial, and from the nature of the relief, are as marked as before. While, in reference to the statute, it may not be proper to designate one class as legal actions and the other as equitable actions, yet we are not forbidden to speak of the one as actions for legal relief and of the other as actions for equitable relief. We should not be driven to unnecessary descriptive phrases-be compelled to abandon a familiar and an appropriate word. Legislation may affect modes of procedure; it will be found more difficult to reform a language." No words are wasted here; but the idea intended to be conveyed is driven home with force and directness. The arrangement of the work is as follows: It is di

vided, first, into two parts, one of which treats of actions, the other of pleadings. Part one discusses the nature and forms of actions, election, parties and joinder; part two, the complaint or petition, the answer and reply, the remedies and cure for defective pleading. The subdivisions of these divisions are many, but are so distinct and logical that the lawyer, consulting this work for the first time, will have little difficulty in getting very close to what he is searching for at the first glance. A few of these many subdivisions only need be named, such as the title of the petition, the relief, the oath, the answer, the denial, new matter, the counterclaim, the facts which it is necessary and not necessary to state, and the manner in which they should be stated. But the contents of the work can be but poorly shown in this way; the inquirer is respectfully directed to the book itself. The lawyer who studies the chapters on the complaint or petition will have fewer amendments to ask for when his goes into court; and he who gives his attention to the chapters on the answer, and follows the author in his directions there, need have little fear of demurrers. We are sure this book will be popular with the profession in eighteen States and four of the Territories. There, at least, the library of the lawyer who does not have it on his shelves will not only not be complete, but he will lack the most necessary of those necessary articles of his profession which Mr. Bishop has aptly denominated the "tools of the legal trade."

We desire, in conclusion, to compliment the publishers on the handsome manner in which this work is issued. The printing, paper and binding are all that could be desired. The proof-reading-no small matter in a book of over 600 pages--has been done with great care.

The third edition of the LIFE OF RUFUS CHOATE, by SAMUEL GILMAN BROWN, President of Hamilton College, is just issued by Little, Brown & Co., Boston. The great American advocate is here seen in all the phases of his busy life-at home, in court, in the office, in the Senate.- -The SOUTHERN LAW REVIEW for February-March, contains the concluding part of Mr. Bump's Paper on Composition at Common Law; an interesting and critical account of the Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, and an article on the Religious Phase of the Dartmouth College Causes. In addition to these, are the usual book reviews and digest of cases reported in the American law periodicals during the last two months. The present number completes the fourth volume (N. S.) of this excellent law review.-The reprint by the Leonard Scott Publishing Co., 41 Barclay street, New York, of the standard English reviews-BLACKWOOD, THE LONDON QUARTERLY, EDINBURGH, WESTMINSTER, and THE BRITISH QUARTERLY-places in the hands of the reading portion of the profession the best magazines of Great Britain, at a low figure. The first numbers of the reviews for the current volume are just out; the present is, therefore, a good time to subscribe. There is hardly a number of any of those periodicals which does not contain something of interest to the profession. paper on England in the Nineteenth Century, in the EDINBURGH REVIEW for January, we find this picture of the criminal law of England a little more than fifty years ago: "With pauperism crime multiplied. The legislature believed that society could be protected only by Draconian penalties. Sir James Mackintosh stated, in 1819, that two hundred felonies were punished with death. He was once told by Burke that, although from his political career he was not entitled to ask any favor of the ministry, he was persuaded he had interest enough at any time to obtain their assent to a felony without benefit of clergy.

In a

Hazlett wrote: "There are more people hanged in England than in all Europe besides.' A majority of those sentenced were reprieved; but it all depended on the temper of the judge. Lord Eldon defended the severity of the laws, because it enabled judges to rid the world of hardened offenders. Transportation, the alternative of death, was inflicted more frequently, but operated as unequally. Male convicts welcomed transportation, and were accustomed to go off shouting and rejoicing, as though some great achievement had been performed." A touching anecdote is told of one woman who was induced to commit a capital offense from her desire to follow her husband who had been transported for the same felony: "But the judge thought it proper to make an example of the unhappy creature, and she atoned by her death on the gallows for her exceeding love. Yet this judicial murderer was no Jeffreys, but probably a kindly gentleman who believed in a future state and would have declaimed against the Bloody Assize."—In another interesting paper in the WESTMINSTER REVIEW, on Dr. Johnson; his Biographer and Critics, his acquaintance with Thurlow and other great lawyers is shown. Johnson said of himself "that he ought to have been a lawyer," and Boswell relates that Sir Wm. Scott (Lord Stowell and a brother of Eldon) said to Johnson, “What a pity it is, sir, that you did not follow the profession of the law! You might have been Lord Chancellor." There can be no doubt that Johnson was eminently qualified to be a great advocate. At the bar his power of arguing at any moment, on any side of any question, would have made him primus inter pares. Some idea of his forensic ability may be gained from reading the arguments with which, on several occasions, he supplied Boswell for use in court. But in the opinion of the writer he would not probably have made a good judge. Like his friend Thurlow, he would have been too dogmatic; like him, he would have decided, not reasoned.

NOTES.

CHIEF JUSTICE CAMPBELL, of Detroit, has been again nominated to the Supreme Bench of Michigan.

-The New York Daily Register calls attention to the fact that legal subjects are at present very prominent, not only in the "excellent professional journals and reviews" of this country, among which the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL, the Albany Law Journal, the Southern Law Review,and the American Law Review are specially named, but in the current monthlies and magazines. It proposes to aid its readers in finding access to that which may be of interest to them in this vast and scattered mass of discussion by presenting from time to time a summary of the subjects which are thus treated in both classes of periodicals, grouping them according to the topics considered. The first number of the Register, in which this feature appears, opens the index with the subject of International Law, giving a digest of four articles-three from the English Law Magazine and Review, viz.: "On the Obligations of Treaties" (November, 1877); "Albericus Gentilis on the Right of War," and "The Laws of War and the Institutes of International Law" (February, 1878); and one from the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL, viz., "The Supremacy of a Treaty and the Sovereignty of a State" (November 29, 1878). The idea is an excellent one, and if carried out will be of much service

-The disbarment, at the instance of the Bar Association of this city of F. J. Bowman, an attorney, whose case we have previously noticed (see 6 Cent. L. J. 220), has been approved by the court of appeals which, in very lengthy opinion just filed, affirms the judgment of the circuit court.