"77th General Assembly, Regular Session.

"COLUMBUS, O., April 20, 1906.

"To the Auditor of State:

"In compliance with provisions of Senate Resolution No. 23, I hereby certify that The Robertson Realty Company is entitled to the sum of two hundred and sixty-five and 30-100 dollars for rent, light and repairs as per annexed account, to be paid from Appropriation for Cincinnati Investigating Committee.

"$265.30. (Payable only on endorsement of payee.)

"JOHN C. DRAKE,

"Chairman of Select Committee of the Senate."

The respondent waived the issuing and service of process and specifically waived the issuing of an alternative writ of mandamus herein, and demurred to the petition on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or to entitle the relator to any relief whatsoever against the respondent.

Mr. Jacob Shroder and Messrs. Butler & Carlile, for the relator.

The sole question presented to this court is whether or not this Drake Committee has sufficient legal standing and vitality to enable it to receive and to expend money which has been duly and legally appropriated to its use and benefit by the General Assembly of the State of Ohio.

Argument for Relator.

For we assume that even the exigencies of this case will not carry any one so far that he will attempt to deny the validity or regularity of the appropriation made for the benefit of this committee, if the committee has any legal standing whatsoever in the eyes of the law.

Therefore we pass to an examination of the only question in the case, not as to whether or not the committee is clothed with this or that special or specific power, but as to whether or not the committee has any power, standing or authority whatsoever.

The preamble to Senate Resolution No. 23 as a basis for the resolution proper is broad and comprehensive. The basic purpose of the resolution and of the proposed investigation is very clearly disclosed by the form of the resolution. The supplemental resolution, Senate Resolution No. 30, while briefer, is as clear in its fundamental statements, for it recites, in addition to many specific averments, "that there have been other forms of misgovernment in said city and county."

The only provision of the Constitution which seems to have any bearing upon the precise question presented to the court is the following section of Article II:

"SEC. I. The legislative power of this state shall be vested in a General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate, and House of Representatives."

No authority can be found which will negative the theory that a Legislature, or either branch thereof, has the right to gather information, to investigate, to investigate in its own way, and to

Argument for Relator.

use in that investigation money which has been appropriated for that purpose.

It is not for the courts to enter upon an inquiry as to whether or not the means used by a legislative body in gathering information by investigation or otherwise are either wise or proper. The legislative body must be left to use its own free and uncoerced judgment in this particular. There can be but one possible limitation upon this right, or rather but one possible modification of this statement of that right, and that is that if, when exercising its power of investigation, the rights of an individual either as to his person or his property are jeopardized, ignored or destroyed, the court will then determine whether or not in the exercise of its conceded power to gather information and to investigate it had the authority to do the things about which the particular complaint has been made.

A legislative committee has the right to investigate, to gather information and to make a report to the parent body, and substantially the greater part of useful legislation comes through such channels.

And the case at bar goes no further than these principles. No property rights are invaded in this case. No question of personal liberty or personal privilege based upon constitutional guarantees, state or national, is invoked here. No visitorial power is here drawn in question.

It is true that the man who wishes to throttle investigation, who has something to fear, whose salvation depends upon technicalities, may criticize the resolution and find it too broad or too narrow, too long or too short, too deep or too

Argument for Relator.

shallow, unconstitutional, subversive not only of the Constitution of the state of Ohio, but also of that of the United States. But over and beyond all this special argument for special defenses, so clearly that he who runs may read, is the written fact that the Senate of the State of Ohio, so far as the case at bar discloses, is simply engaged in its inherent, constitutional right to gather information in its own way, a right fundamental to legislation and not denied by the Constitution, venerated by the custom of the centuries, and invigorated in this opening of the twentieth century as never before, by the strong necessities which demand this right and power for legislative bodies.

In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S., 168, we find a striking recognition of this principle. The Supreme Court of the United States there decided that the House of Representatives was without authority to punish a witness because the subjectmatter of the inquiry being for the government as a creditor was beyond legislative control. Yet the court, while denying the right to punish as for contempt, did not deny the committee the right to gather information from voluntary witnesses.

It would seem to us too clear for discussion. that it is not for any court to say that a legislative body not interfering with property rights or trespassing upon personal privileges must, before it can use money for gathering information, proceed in this or that particular way. We do not perceive the necessity for making any court a receiver for the General Assembly of the state or of either branch thereof.

Argument for Relator.

It is admitted that our state Constitution is not a grant, but a restriction upon the powers of the Legislature. But this Constitution contains not a single restriction which limits the inherent legislative powers and rights.

It is important to observe how the fundamental principles are considered by an eminent author. Cushing's Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, ninth edition, contains many interesting, instructive and authoritative observations. (see pages 221, 246, 253, 255, 257, 721 and 739).

In the case at bar, independent of the right of any branch of the General Assembly of itself to appoint a committee for investigation, the passage of the Resolution No. 23 by the Senate was authorized and aided by the statutes as embodied in Revised Statutes, Sections 50-55, inclusive. These sections constitute acts of the entire Legislature, which invest as an act of Legislature either branch of the General Assembly with powers to appoint committees of investigation with the authority mentioned and specified in these sections. While no other act prescribes the appointment of either standing or select committees or their duties, these sections necessarily confer on either branch of the Legislature the authority to appoint them for purposes of legislation, and also to invest such committees with authority to do whatever may be proper and necessary for the discharge of their duties. These sections necessarily confer authority on the General Assembly, or either branch of it, to empower the committees to do all things that are usual and proper for the efficient discharge of their duties. It reposes in the authorizing body the discretion as to the subject-matters of investi