It must be remembered that the Westphalian and Rhenish provinces were divided from the rest of the kingdom by the interlying territories (now annexed) of Hanover, Hesse Cassel, and Nassau. Of these Powers, all favouring Austria, the first possessed an army of 20,000 men; formidable by its training, its traditions, and even its weapons, which were Prussian. If opposed by no troops but landwehr, it seemed probable that this force might maintain itself against their attacks; might even cut off all communication between the Lower Rhine and Berlin; and form a powerful advanced guard to the levies to be raised by Bavaria and her allies upon the Main; so that the latter might be enabled by a very slight advance to unite with the Hanoverians, and threaten that capital. To avoid this special danger, a full division, forming one-half of the 7th (Vogel's) corps, was collected under General Goeben at Minden. Vogel himself, a fierce old soldier of the Blucher school, was to command; and to aid him in the occupation of Hanover, the troops under Manteuffel (which had just driven the Austrians out of Holstein) were to move southward to his support; and the reserves of the adjacent garrisons (most of them assembling at Wetzlar under General Beyer) were added to his command. Of the successes he obtained-extraordinary in their way, but derived chiefly from the divisions of his opponents and the moral support of the Bohemian victories-we have no space to speak. It is of more importance to observe that he was left to operate partly with the distrusted landwehr (whose recent mutiny at Frankfurt, in the hour of Prussia's rejoicing proves their sentiments far other

than those of unreasoning loyalty); in order that the superiority of Moltke might be assured on the Bohemian frontier. Here the other half of Vogel's corps, added to Herwarth's, formed the third or Elbe army, which after occupying Saxony became part of the general force destined for the invasion. Deducting Goeben's division, and excluding also the garrison artillery, depôts, Holstein troops, and the necessary detachments, there were assembled, under the three commanders, eight and a half of the nine mobilised corps of the regular army, numbering, according to the lowest Prussian estimate, 260,000 fighting men.

To bring this great army over the mountains, and unite it before the enemy, was the problem to be solved. This once accomplished, the superiority of numbers, weapons, and physical condition would lie on the side of the Prussians; and the Austrian chief could hope only by some successful defensive scheme to prevent the threatened danger. It is easy to condemn defeat and criticise misfortune; and to speak briefly, Benedek's own generalship will not bear examination in detail. From the first, however, the rapid tactics with which the Austrians had of late years manœuvred their infantry proved ineffectual (as the Prussians had plainly foreseen) in attacks made on open ground in face of the needle-gun. Nor does General Gablenz appear to have varied this for any better mode on the 27th, when he obtained his advantage over Bonin before Trautenau-the only success of his side during the campaign. Be this as it may, he was left unsupported; was turned next day by the advance of the guards through the unguarded pass of Eipel on his flank; and the progress

continued, without further check, which united the Prussians around Horwitz. Benedek was less happy here than Lacy; although had he taught his troops to follow the lesson bequeathed by the latter, and to keep to the defensive, his success might have been the same as his predecessor's. A few days' arrest of the Prussian advance would have made a strange change in the tone of that triumphant army; as even the three hours of uncertainty at Sadowa showed by its serious effect upon their staff.

Even so late as that day of Austria's ruin, had Benedek guarded his right with the same care as his centre, who can say what would have been the result? It needed a gross tactical error, unequalled even at Austerlitz, to give the Prussians the victory, which their superior combinations as to numbers, and their moral advantage from the recent successes of the needle-gun, seemed to ensure beforehand. If here we condemn Benedek for his ill-fought battle, let us not forget that Napoleon fell before the same disproportion of numbers at Leipsic; and that the Austrian general at least escapes the censure which is fairly due to the French Emperor for an ill-secured retreat. That the army was brought across the Elbe the same evening, was due no less to his precautions

1 According to the fairest estimate (that of Cathcart), the numbers engaged on the great day of Leipsic were, on the side of the allies, 230,000, of the French, 160,000. At Koniggratz, the Prussians had 250,000, the Austrians, 185,000, by the most moderate accounts. It will be observed that this exceeds in dimensions the former-previously the greatest battle, as to mere numbers, recorded in any authentic history. There is a strange tactical similarity between these two gigantic conflicts; and in each the defeat, though not (as certain partisan writers allege) due to, was enhanced by, the misbehaviour of contingents fighting against their will.

as to bridges, than to the fine conduct of the Austrian cavalry. Had Blucher's spirit been with the pursuing horse, the war should have ended on the field without further effort. The prosperous staff of the victors, and the pens they have inspired, have done but scant justice to their opponents in this

matter.

If it be asked what moral should our nation draw from the history of the recent war, the reply must needs be twofold. A military writer cannot but observe that the new Prussian system is not merely firmly established in North Germany by Bismarck's success, but that it is more than likely to become, with some modifications, that of the other chief Powers of the Continent. It behoves our statesmen to look closely to that of their country, and to see whether it may not, without increase of the paid staff, be made more elastic, in case of the sudden demands which war would inevitably bring. That our infantry must be not only armed with the breech-loader, but trained especially to its use; that our light artillery must learn to put but little faith in the practical effect of fire at long ranges; that cavalry are still essential to the service of an army in the field; are obvious lessons of detail. Not less so is it one, that whatever combatant force is maintained, the complete equipment and machinery for the service of a much larger one must be prepared and kept at all times ready for immediate use.

There are deeper and graver questions to be solved than these, since Prussia's success was won. It may be that those have truth on their side who say that Bismarck is but an instrument for working out the

longed-for unity of the German race; and that his task once done, the minister, with the monarch he guides, will sink into secondary positions before the progress of constitutional government. We confess that we are not so sanguine. It is too early by far to attempt to foretell the end of this mighty drama: but there have been signs, in threats directed at Holland, Denmark, and even Belgium; in dark allusions to the opening Eastern question; in the demand for funds in hand against new wars foreseen yet not plainly spoken of, which may well make the greatest lover of the doctrine of nationalities doubt whether the new empire-founded as it was, and built up on Sclavonic spoils-will of necessity stay its bounds where the German tongue ceases to be spoken.

We have endeavoured in the preceding pages to trace the historical growth of the military power of Prussia, and to describe the present condition of the military institutions which have suddenly conferred upon her an indisputable supremacy in Germany, and one of the foremost political positions in Europe; and we have done no injustice to the patriotism of her princes, the dexterity of her statesmen, and the valour of her armies. But the triumphant success of what may be termed a great military conspiracy against the existence of her own confederates, who were ill-prepared for so fierce a contest, and the political results to Northern Germany, although in themselves advantageous, cannot efface the recollection of the overbearing and illiberal policy on the part of the Prussian Court, which marked every stage of the late transactions, or of the mysterious and clandestine understanding which procured for the time