their hand go in equipage with their wit, yet commonly mea of vigorous fancies are so far in love with their own conceptions, that they will many times venture upon some hazards to bring them into act, trusting the same dexterity to bring them out of danger; which hath at first made them to adventure on it: as Darius was wont to say of himself, that in a pinch and extremity of peril he was ever wisest :" and Sylla gave the same judgement of himself, that he came off best in those businesses, which he was most suddenly put upon.' Which also I find observed in the character of our Henry the Seventh, (who hath had the felicity above ail his predecessors, to have his lineaments drawn by the ablest pen that hath employed itself in our story) that his wit was ever sharpened by danger, and that he had a greater dexterity to evade, than providence to prevent them."

Another cause of boldness, (as I have formerly noted on that passion) is strength of love; as we see weak creatures, in defence of their young ones, will set upon those that are strong. And the tribune in A. Gellius, out of love either of his country, or of glory, did not only advise, but himself undertake the executing of a service, wherein he was beforehand certain to perish. And the same author' telleth us of Euclides, a disciple of Socrates, who ventured in a disguise, upon the evident danger of his life, to enjoy the discourses. and counsels of his master.

Lastly, pride, grea'ness of mind, or parts, and opinion of merit, especially if it meet with discontentedness and conceits of being neglected, doth very often embolden men to great and new attempts: for it is a very hard thing, when great abilities and vast hopes meet together, to govern them with moderation; private ends being in that case very apt to engage a man's parts, and to take them off from public service unto particular advantage. And, therefore, I take it there is no temper of mind that will, with an evenness and uniformity of proceeding, or felicity of success, so well promote public and honourable ends, as height of abilities, with moderation of desires; because in that case a man

Plut. Apoph.

h Plut. in Sylla.-Consilium in arena. Seneca.—póvei βεβὼς αὖ νῦν ἐπὶ ξυροῦ τύχης. Soph. Antig. 1008. i Audacem faciebat

kA. Gell. 1. 3. c. 7.

amor. Ovid. Met. 4.
Vile est corpus iis, qui magnam gloriam quærunt. Liv. 1. 2.

A. Gell. 1. 6. c. 8.

can never stand in his own light, nor have any mist or obstacle between his eye and his end.

Now from this ground, I believe, did arise that maxim of some of the states of Greece, noted by Tully, and at large debated by the philosophers, Nemo de nobis unus excellat;' that they would not have one man to be notoriously eminent in abilities above the rest;-and thereupon instituted Ostracism, or an honourable banishment, as a restraint either to abate the excessive worth of eminent men; or to satisfy and assuage the envy, which others might conceive against them, who are apt to hate the virtues" which they can only admire: or lastly, to prevent the dangers, which greatness of parts, taking advantage of popularity and vulgar applause, might haply venture to bring upon things. Upon this ground the Ephesians expelled Hermodorus, and the Athenians Aristides, because he was too just for the rest of the people. As one voice in a concert, which is loud above the proportion of the rest, doth not adorn, but disturb the harmony; and therefore usually men of great parts, have lien either under envy or jealousy; men's minds, out of I know not what malignity, being apt to suspect that that will not be used unto good, which might be abused unto evil;-which Tacitus noted to have been the quality of Domitian,-and Ammianus Marcellinus, of Constantius,-towards men of the greatest worth.

Now according to the difference of this affection in different men, so it worketh two different effects.

1. There is a happy and discreet boldness, which doth not anticipate, but second and attend the mature counsels of the mind, and doth first call out and stir up itself by wisdom, before it proceed unto action or execution; like the boldness of the lion, which is slow, but at last prospers in what it undertakes. For after counsel hath ripened resolutions, boldness is then the best instrument to accomplish. them; and in that case, 'Quo minus timoris, minus ferme periculi,' as the historian speaks: The less fears are, the less

m Cic. Tusc. Q. 1. 5.-Arist. Polit. 1. 3. c. 13.-Plut. in Alcib. et Aristid, ex Nicia. a Fandem virtutem et oderant et mirabantur, Liv. 1. 5. • Ta

P Ammian. 1. 15.

cit. vit. Agr. 4 Οὐρῇ δὲ πλευράς τε καὶ Ισχία ἀμφοτέρωθεν Μαστίεται, ἕε δ' αὐτὸν ἐποὶρύνει μαχέσασθαι. Πiad. v. 171. Φιλεῖ γὰρ ὀκνεῖν πρᾶγμ ̓ ἀνὴρ πράσσων μέγα, Sophoc. Electr.

Lw. 1. 22. Semper in præ

VOL. VI.

also are their dangers; and the greater their confidence, the surer their success.

-Ες Τροίαν πειρώμενοι ἦνθον ̓Αχαιοί. 5

The Greeks by venturing did enjoy

Their ten years' wish, and gained Troy.

2. There is a hasty and rash boldness', which, beginning too speedily without counsel, doth usually end too cowardly, without courage for rash men whom the philosophers call Spaσúde, men made up of confidence and fear, are bold and boasting before a danger; but, in it, very timorous, or at least inconstant. Lions in peace, but harts in war; as Tertullian's proverb hath it. Like those of whom Livy and Florus tell us, that they were more than men in the onset, and less than women in the issue; melting away from their resolutions like snow.

X

And another ill property of the rashness of this passion is, that it will expose a man to more danger than the success which it aims at, can compensate: as he that fishes for a gudgeon with a golden hook: or as Ulysses, who went back to the Cyclops' den, to fetch his cap and girdle, which he had left behind him.

Another is, that it makes men overvalue themselves, and so undertake things too hard for them to endure or hold out in. Like Menelaus in the Poet, who would venture to fight with Hector; or Aristoxenus in Tully, who being a musi cian, would needs determine in questions of philosophy.

a

Lastly, it hath a property, as we say, to break the ice, and to give the first onset upon dangerous attempts, which is a thing of very perilous consequence, not only to the author, but many times to the public peace too; froward, exulcerated, and seditious spirits being too ready to follow what they dare not begin.b

lio iis maximum est periculum, qui maxime timent: audacia pro muro est. Sallust. Cat. • Theoc. Idyl. 15. t Malo te sapiens hostis metuat, quam stulti cives laudent: omnia audentem contemnet Hannibal. Liv. 1. 22. Arist. Eth. 1.3. c.7. * Novi ego istos in pace leones, in prælio cervos. Tertul. de Coron. y Liv. 1. 10. et 1. 38. Flor. 1. 2. c. 4. Temeritas, ubi primum impetum effudit, velut quædam animalia amisso aculeo, 'torpet. Q. Curt. 1. 4. Cum uitimi discriminis tempus advenerit, in solicitudinem versa fiducia est. ib. c. 3. z Plut. in Cat.—Iliad. . 97, 112. a Tusc. Q. 1. 1. • Propere sequi, quæ piget inchoare. Tacit.-Magis eis auctor ad seditionem quam animus deerat. Liv. 1. 26.

CHAP. XXV.

Of the Passion of Fear: the causes of it: Impotency, obnoxiousness, suddenness, nearness, newness, conscience, ignorance of an evil.

THE opposite passion to this of hope, is fear; which, being an equivocal passion, and admitting of many different kinds, can scarce have any whole and simple definition to explain it. There is a virtuous fear, a fear of sin and shame: an intellectual fear of admiration, when the excellency of the object dazzleth our eye; a fear of reverence; an astonishing fear, by reason of the newness; and an oppressing fear, by reason of the nearness and unavoidableness of the evil feared. It is a grief, trouble, flight, aversation of some approaching evil apprehended, either as destructive, or as burthensome to our nature, and not easily resistible by our strength. For the qualification of the object thereof, because it is in all circumstances like that of hope, (save in the evil of it) I shall therefore forbear to touch it, and shall only in brief consider the dignities and defects thereof in its causes and effects.

Fear is an humbling and debasing passion, which always importeth some manner of servitude and subjection in whom it resideth. So then, as in the former passion of hope, I noted the fundamental cause thereof to be weakness and want; so likewise in this of fear, the root and first principle is weakness and subjection; whereof the one implies a disability in us to resist, the other a necessity to undergo, an evil.

Hence it is that we fear the displeasure of great men; or the power of unjust men; or the competition of popular and plausible men; or the cunning of close and malicious men ; or the revenge of provoked men; or the guilt of injurious men that have wronged us already because, in all these cases, there is some notice of weakness and subjection in So that fear is, of all other, a naked passion: for as

us.

nakedness hath three evil properties; to disable for defence, to expose to injury, and, from both, to work shame in the consciousness of our dejected condition; so likewise fear hath three properties to make us impotent and obnoxious; and from both these to beget shame: for though his speech was true,. Rubor est virtutis color,' that shame and virtue have the same colour, (which makes it seem a companion rather of perfection than of weakness) yet indeed it is rather a sign of a mind virtuously disposed in testifying the quick apprehensiveness of its own defects, than any adjunct of virtue itself. ©

So then the roots of this passion are weakness and subjection both together. So that where either condition is wanting, there is not any proper ground of fear: and therefore we see, sundry times, strength takes off the yoke of obedience, not only in the civil government of men, but in the natural government of creatures by men, to whom, by the law of creation, they are all made subject: yet the strength of many of them hath taught them to forget their original subjection, and instead of fearing, to terrify man their lord; and whenever we tame any of them, and reduce them to their first condition, this is not so much an act of our dominion, whereby we awe them, as of our reason, whereby we deceive them; and we are beholden more therein to the working of our wit, than to the prerogative of our nature. And, usually, every thing which hath knowledge enough to measure its own abilities, the more it hath of strength, the less it hath of fear: that which Solomon makes the strongest, the apostle the fittest to expel fear, to wit, Love.

So likewise, on the other side, immunity from subjection. in the midst of weakness removes fear. Of this we may give an instance in guilty persons, who notwithstanding their weakness, yet when once by the privilege of their sanctuary, or mercy of their judge, they are free from the obligation of the law, though not from the offence, their former fears do presently turn into joy and gratulations. And that is the reason why good men have such boldness, confidence, and courage, that they can bid defiance unto death; because,

• Diogenes apud Laert. 1. 6. "Απας ἐρυθριών νηστὸς εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ. Meur ider.