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absent from the subject, in regard of real union, (though never without that which the schools callunio objectiva,' union of apprehension in the understanding) without which there can be no passion: and the object thus considered, worketh, if it be good, desire; if evil, flight and abomination.—Thirdly, it may be considered as present, by a real contract or union with the faculty; and so it worketh, if good,-delight, and pleasure; if evil,—grief, and sorrow.— Again, as the object beareth with it the circumstances of difficulty and danger, it may be considered, either as exceeding the natural strength of the power; which implieth, in respect of good, an impossibility to be attained, and so it worketh despair; and in respect of evil, an improbability of being avoided, and so it worketh fear:-or secondly, as not exceeding the strength of the power; or at least, those aids which it calleth in :-in which regard, good is presented as attainable, and so it worketh hope: and evil is presented, either as avoidable, if it be future, and it worketh boldness to break through it; or as requitable, if it be past, and so it worketh anger to revenge it. Thus have we the nature and distribution of those several passions, which we are to enquire after of all which, or at least, those which are most natural, and least coincident with one another, I shall, in the proceeding of my discourse, observe some things, wherein they conduce to the honour and prejudice of man's nature: but first, I shall speak something of the generality of passions; and what dignities are therein most notable, and the most notable defects.

CHAP. VI.

Of Human Passions in general: their use, natural, moral, civil: their subordination unto, or rebellion against, right

reason.

Now Passions may be the subject of a threefold discourse, natural, moral, and civil. In their natural consideration, we should observe in them, their essential properties, their ebbs and flows, their springings and decays, the manner of their several impressions, the physical effects which are wrought by them; and the like.

In their moral consideration, we might likewise search, how the indifferency of them is altered into good or evil, by virtue of the dominion of right reason, or of the violence of their own motions; what their ministry is in virtuous, and what their power and independence in irregular actions; how they are raised, suppressed, slackened, and governed, according to the particular nature of those things which require their motion.

In their civil respect, we should also observe how they may be severally wrought upon and impressed; and how, and on what occasions, it is fit to gather and fortify, or to slack and remit them; how to discover, or suppress, or nourish, or alter, or mix them, as may be most advantageous; what use may be made of each man's particular age, nature, propension; how to advance and promote our just ends, upon the observation of the character and dispositions of those whom we are to deal withal.

And this civil use of passion, is copiously handled in a learned and excellent discourse of Aristotle, in the second book of his Rhetoricks, unto which profession, in this respect, it properly belongeth; because in matter of action and of judicature, affection, in some sort, is an auditor or judge, as he speaks. But it seemeth strange, that a man of so vast sufficiency and judgement, and who had, as we may well conjecture, an ambition to knit every science into an entire body, which in other men's labours lay broken and scattered, should yet, in his books de Anima,' overpass the discovery of their nature, essence, operations, and properties, and in his books of moral philosophy should not remember to acquaint us with the indifferency, irregularity, subordination, rebellion, conspiracy, discords, causes, effects and consequences of each particular of them, being circumstances of obvious and daily use in our life, and of necessary and singular benefit to give light unto the government of right reason.

Touching passions in order unto civil or judiciary affairs, I shall not make any observation: either of the other I shall in part touch upon, though not distinctly and asunder, but in a brief and confused collection of some few particulars.

The order which I shall observe in setting down the honour and corruption of them in general, (which method shall

in part be kept in their particular) shall be this: first, according to the antecedent of their motion, and acts; secondly, according to the acts themselves; and thirdly, according to the consequents of them.

First, touching the antecedents to the act of passion, they are either the outward motives thereunto; as namely, the objects unto which it is carried, and the causes whereby it is produced or the inward root and principles of the act, whereby it is wrought and governed.

For the two former, passion is then said commendable, when it is direct and natural. And the corruption is, when it is carried to an undue object, or proceedeth from an indirect cause but these are more observable in the particulars; and therefore thither I refer their distinct handling.

For the third, the dignity of passion chiefly consists in a consonancy and obedience to the prescription of reason for there is in man's faculties a natural subordination, whereby the actions of the inferior receive their motion and direction from the influence of the higher. Now appetite was in beasts only made to be governed by a sensitive knowledge: but in man, sense ought not to have any commanding or moving power, but only instrumental, ministerial, and conveying, in respect of the object. The action of sense, was not, from the first institution, ordained to touch the affection, but to present itself primarily to the understanding; upon whose determination and conduct, the passions were to depend, to submit all their inclinations thereunto, and to be its ministers, in the execution of all such duties as it should deem any way expedient for the benefit of man's nature. So that herein consists a great part of man's infelicity by the fall; that albeit his understanding itself be blinded, and therefore not able to reach forth any perfect good to the interior parts; yet that small portion of light which it yet retaineth for the government of our actions, is become ineffectual, as being able only to convince, but not to reform.

d

The corruption then of passion in this respect, is the independence thereof upon its true principle: when it stayeth not to look for, but anticipates and prevents, the discourses

4 Λόγος ἡνιοχεῖν 'τάχθη καὶ ἄγειν, ἀλλ ̓ οὐκ ἄγεσθαί τε καὶ σύρεσθαι. Theodor. Serm. 5. de Natur. Hom.

of reason; relying only on the judgement of sense, wherewith it retains an undue correspondence. So that herein is mainly verified that complaint of the prophet, "Man, being in honour, hath no understanding, and is become as the beasts that perish." For, as in the body, (to use the similitude of Aristotle') if any parts thereof be out of joint, it cannot yield obedience unto the government of the motive faculty; but when it would carry it one way, it falls another; so it is in the mind of man, when that natural continuity and union of faculties, whereby one was made in operation dependant on another, is once dissolved. When affections are disjointed from reason, and cast off the reins whereby they should be guided, there cannot be that sweet harmony in the motion thereof, which is required to the weal of man's

nature, g

It is prodigious to see an instrument (such as all appetite should be) to be the first and self-mover in its own actions: whence cannot, in the mind of man, but follow great danger: it being all one, as if a waggoner should commit himself to the wild and unswayed fancy of his horses; or, as if a blind man, who hath not the power of directing his own feet, should be permitted to run headlong, without wit or moderation, having no guide to direct him. For as fire, though it be of all other creatures, one of the most comfortable and useful, while it abides in the place ordained for it; yet, when it once exceeds those limits, and gets to the house-top, it is most merciless and overrunning; so passions, though of excellent service in man, for the heating and enlivening of virtue, for adding spirits and edge to all good undertakings, and blessing them with a happier issue than they could alone have attained unto; yet if once they fly out beyond their bounds, and become subject only to their own laws, and encroach upon reason's right, there is nothing more tumultuous and tyrannical. As Bias said of the tongue "; that "it was the best and the worst part of the sacrifice;" so may we of the affections, "Nec meliores unquam servos, nec dominos sentit natura deteriores; they are the best ser

• Psalm xlix. 20. Onpía μârλov † åveрwñoi, &c. Clem. Alex. Strom. lib.4. 'Apyaλewrala Inpía in Protrep. et Tatian. orat. ad Græc. f Ethic. 1. 1. c. 13.

Vid. Plutarch. lib. de Virtute morali.

b Plutarch. de Audit.

vants, but the worst masters which our nature can have."Like the winds, which being moderate, carry the ship; but drown it, being tempestuous. And it is true as well in man's little commonwealth, as in greater states, that there are no more pestilent and pernicious disturbers of the public good, than those who are best qualified for service and employment,-if once they grow turbulent and mutinous, neglecting the common end, for their own private respects, and desirous to raise themselves upon public ruins. And, indeed, it is universally true, things most useful and excellent in their regularity, are most dangerous in their abuse.

CHAP. VII.

Of the exercise of Passion: of stoical apathy: of permanency, defect, excess, with the cure thereof.

THE next consideration of Passions was according to the exercise of their act; which we may consider, either according to the general substance, or according to some particular accidents, in the manner of its being. For the first, it is altogether good, as being nothing else but natural motion, ordained for the perfection and conversation of the creature. For notwithstanding natural motion may haply argue some kind of imperfection in the state of the thing moving, as supposing it some way deprived of that wherein it should rest itself (which makes Aristotle conclude, that the noblest act of the understanding, knowledge and clear vision, is rather the rest than the motion of that faculty i) yet I say, it always implieth more natural perfection in those things whereunto it belongeth. For as fire, the perfectest of elements, and heaven, the perfectest of bodies; so the soul of man, the perfectest of forms, hath the most vehement motion. And in this consideration (so it be always motion natural,

i Intellectio quies intellectus: Arist. Physic. 1. 7. c. 4. Ethic. 1. 10. c. 7. Επιστήμη ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως, &c. Clem. Αlex. Strom. lib. 4. Ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὅτι τὴν ψυχὴν ἵστησι. Κινουμένης γὰρ καὶ φερομένης, οὔτε αἰσθέσθαι, οὔτε διανοnonvaι duvaτóv. Arist. Probl. sect. 30. qu. 14. Animi commotio aversa à recta ratione et contra naturam. Cic. Ορμὴ πλέον ἔχουσα, καὶ παρὰ φύσιν ψυχῆς Kivnois. Zen. apud Laertium.

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