sioned by that destructive efficiency which one hath upon the other.

Secondly, an evil of privation; which we hate formally and for itself, as implying nothing but a defect and absence of good.

Thirdly, an evil of contradiction, in the not being of any creature, opposed to its being. For being and immortality is that which Aristotle makes one of the principal objects of love annihilation, then, or not being, is the chiefest evil of things, and that which Nature most abhorreth.

Lastly, an evil of relation for as things, in their own simple natures evil, may have in them a relative goodness, and so to be desired; as the killing of beasts for the service, and the death of malefactors for the security, of men; so things, in their absolute being good, may have in them a relative or comparative evil, and, in that sense, be by consequence hated: as our Saviour intimates, "He that hateth not father and mother, and his own life for me, is not worthy of me" when they prove snares and temptations to draw us from the love of Christ, they are then to be undervalued in comparison of him. And therefore we find in the law, if a man's dearest brother, or child, or wife, or friend should entice him from God unto idolatry, he was not to conceal, pity, or spare him, but his own hand was to be first upon him. And thus the poet hath elegantly expressed the behaviour of Æneas toward Dido, who, being inflamed with love of him, would have kept him from the expedition, unto which, by divine guidance, he supposeth himself to be directed.

Quanquam lenire dolorem

Solando cupit, et dictis avertere curas;

Multa gemens, magnoque animum labefactus amore;
Jussa tamen Divom exsequitur.

Though he desir'd with solace to appease,

And on her pensive soul to breathe some ease,
(Himself with mutual love made faint) yet still
His purposes were fixt t'obey God's will.

So then we see what qualifications are required in the object of a just hatred, that it be evil, and some way or other offensive, either by defiling or destroying nature; and the

passion is ever then irregular, when it declineth from this rule.

But here, inasmuch as it is evident that the being of some evil comes under the will of God; (" Is there any evil in the city, and the Lord hath not done it ?") and our will is to be conformable unto his; it may seem, that it ought to fall under our will too, and by consequence to be rather loved than hated by us, since we pray for the fulfilling of God's will.

For resolution of this, we must first consider, that God doth not love those evils which he thus willeth, as formally and precisely considered in themselves. And next we will observe, how far the will of God is to be the rule of our will; whence will arise the clear apprehension of that truth which is now set down, that the unalterable object of man's hatred is all manner of evil, not only that of deformity and sin, but that also of destruction and misery.

First, then, for the will of God, we may boldly say what himself hath sworn, that he wills not the death or destruction of a sinner; and, by consequence, neither any other evil of his creature, as being a thing infinitely remote from his mercy. He is not delighted in the ruin, neither doth he find pleasure or harmony in the groans, of any thing which himself created: but he is said to will those evils as good and just, for the manifestation of his glorious power over all the creatures, and of his glorious justice on those who are voluntarily fallen from him. But now because it is left only to the wisdom of God himself, to know and ordain the best means for glorifying of himself in and by his creatures, we are not hence to assume any warrant for willing evil unto ourselves or others, but then only when the honour of the Creator is therein advanced. And so the apostle did conditionally wish evil unto himself, if thereby the glory of God's mercy towards his countrymen, the Jews, might be the more advanced.

Secondly, it is no good argument, 'God willeth the inflicting of such an evil, therefore it is unlawful for my will to decline it:'-for, first, the will of God, whereby he determi neth to work this or that evil on particular subjects, is a part of his secret counsel. Now the revealed, and not the hidden will of God, is the rule of our wills and actions. Whence it

cometh to pass, that it is made a part of our necessary obėdience unto God, in our wishes or aversations, to go a cross way to his unrevealed purpose. Peradventure, in my sickbed, it is the purpose of God to cast my body into the earth, from whence it was taken: yet for me herein to second the will of God by an execution thereof upon myself, or by a neglect of those ordinary means of recovery which he affords, were to despise his mercy, that I might fulfil his will. Peradventure, in my flight, a sword will overtake me: yet I have the warrant of my Saviour's example and precept, to turn my back rather than my conscience in persecution; always reserved, that though I will that which God willeth, yet my will be ever subordinated unto his. We owe submission to the will of God's purpose and counsel, and we owe conformity to the will of his precept and command: we must submit to the will, whereby God is pleased to work himself; and we must conform to the will, whereby he is pleased to command us to work. And therefore,

Secondly, Though the will of God were in this case known, yet is not our will constrained to a necessary inclination, though it be to an humble submission and patience in bearing that which the wisdom and purpose of God hath made inevitable: for as the promises and decrees of good things from God do not warrant our slackness in neglecting, or our profaneness in turning from them; so neither doth the certainty and unavoidableness of a future evil (as death intended upon us by God), put any necessity on our nature to deny itself, or to love its own distresses.

Of which that we may be the more sure, we may observe it in him; who, as he was wholly like us in nature, and therefore had the same natural inclinations and aversations with us; so was he of the same infinite essence with his Father, and therefore did will the same things with him;--yet even in him we may observe (in regard of that, which the scripture saith, was, by the hand and counsel of God, before determined') a seeming reluctancy and withdrawing from the divine decree. He knew it was not his Father's will; and yet, "Father, if thou be willing, let this cup pass from me:"-he was not ignorant that he was to suffer, and that there was an oportet,' a necessity upon it; and yet a second and a third time again, "Father, if it be possible,

.

let this cup pass from me." Consider it as the destruction of his Temple, and anguish of Nature, which he could not being in all things like unto us) but love; and then 'transeat,' let it pass: but consider it as the necessary means of procuring precious blessings for mankind, and of fulfilling the eternal decree of his Father's love, and then, "Not as I, but as thou wilt."

The same may be applied in any manner of human evils, notwithstanding we are, with an armed patience, to sustain them, or, with an obedient submission unto divine pleasure, to wait for them;-yet in regard of that pressure of nature, which they bring with them, (on which the God of Nature hath imprinted a natural desire of its own quiet and integrity,) so far forth all evil, not only may, but must, be hated by every regular will, upon pain of violating the law of its

creation.

And indeed, in all this there is not any deviation from the will of God, intending that which we abhor: for as it stands not with the nature of man to hate himself, or any good thing of his own making, so neither doth it stand with the goodness of God to hate his creature, or to delight barely in the misery or afflictions thereof; but only in that end of manifesting his glory and righteousness, where unto he, in the dispensation of his wisdom and justice, hath wonderfully directed them. And therefore, as to murmur at the wisdom of God in thus ordering evils unto a good end, were a presumptuous repining; so on the other side, not to entertain those natural desires of a straitened mind after deliverance from those evils, were to be, in Solomon's phrase, "too righteous," and, out of a purpose to answer the ends of God's wisdom, to cross the law of his creation.

So then it is evident, that the object and fundamental cause of hatred, is all and only evil, which however in respect of the existence of it, it be, in some cases, good ;-(for as it is in the power of God to bring order out of confusion,

light out of darkness, his own honour out of man's shame; so is it his providence likewise to turn unto the great good of many men those things, which in themselves do only hurt them) yet I say, notwithstanding this, as it worketh the deformity and disquiet of nature, it is against the created

law and inbred love, which each thing beareth to its own perfection; and therefore cannot but be necessarily hated. As on the other side, those ordinary and common goods, which we call, in respect of God, blessings,' as health, peace, prosperity, good success, and the like; notwithstanding they commonly prove unto men, unfurnished with those habits of wisdom and sobriety, whereby they should be moderated, occasions of much evil and dangers; so that their table is become their snare; (as the experience of those latter Roman ages proveth, wherein their victories over men had made them in luxury and vileness so prodigious, as if they meant to attempt war with God) notwithstanding, I say, all this, yet forasmuch as these things are such as do quiet, satisfy, and bear convenience unto man's nature, they are therefore justly, with thankfulness, by ourselves received, and, out of love, desired unto our friends.

I now proceed from the object, or general fundamental cause of hatred, unto some few which are more particular, and which do arise from it.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the other causes of Hatred; secret antipathy, difficulty of procuring a good commanded, injury, base fears, disparity of desires, a fixed jealous fancy.

THE first which I shall note, is a secret and hidden antipathy, which is in the natures of some things one against another as vultures are killed with sweet smells, and horse-flies with ointments. The locust will die at the sight of the polypus; and the serpent will rather fly into the fire, than come near the boughs of a wild ash. Some plants will not grow, nor the blood of some creatures mingle, together. The feathers of the eagle will not mix with the feathers of other fowls. So Homer noteth of the lion, that he feareth fire; and the elephant nauseates his meat, if a mouse hath touched

Arist. Hist. Anim. 1. 9. c. 44. See Plin. Nat. Hist. 1. 8, c. 4. 9, 10. 1. 9. c. 62. 1. 10. c. 37. 74. 1. 16. c. 13. 1. 20. in proœm. 1. 22. c. 20. 1. 24 c. 1. Elian, de Animal. 1. 3. c. 7. l. 4. c. 5. l. 5. c. 48, 50. 1. 6. c. 22. 45, 46. Plutarch. Symp. 1. 2. 47. Plutarch. de Odio et Invid.