take part in the assault, but the excitement of that day, coupled with the contusions he received, were too much for his enfeebled constitution, and he died on April 26th, on his way back.

Sir R. Napier wrote thus on the event:

"The Commander-in-Chief has received with great regret the report of the death of Lieutenant Morgan, R.E., in charge of the signals of the 10th Company R.E. Sir Robert Napier had constant opportunities of observing the unflagging zeal and energy of this young officer, and the cheerful alacrity with which he embraced every opportunity to render his special work useful to the force. Lieutenant Morgan set a bright example to those under his command, and by his premature loss-owing to prolonged exposure and fatigue-Her Majesty's service and the Corps of Royal Engineers are deprived of a most promising officer."

Thus closed the campaign, which has a peculiar interest for Engineers, in that it is the first in which the supreme command was entrusted to one of their corps. Until that moment it had been held as an axiom at the Horse Guards that an officer of the scientific branch of the service was for that very reason incompetent to fill such a post. It was left for Sir Robert Napier to prove the fallacy of the notion. The difficulties attending the operations were probably more considerable than would be encountered in most campaigns, but it was universally admitted that, great as those difficulties were, they were clearly foreseen and admirably provided for. Since that date, and probably owing largely to that experiment, the veto has been withdrawn. Officers of Artillery and Engineers have been employed in high positions in command of troops other than those of their own services, and the results have proved as satisfactory as in the case of the Abyssinian campaign. The peerage earned by Lord Napier of Magdala shows the value set by public opinion on his work, but he has received beyond this the warm gratitude of his brother officers for having demonstrated how fallacious was the idea that men of the scientific corps were wanting in the military genius. necessary for the command of an army.

THE ASHANTI WAR, 1873-1874.

Difficulties of the Operation-Mode of Advance-Home's First ExperiencesDescription of the Mansue Station and of the Huts constructed for the Troops-List of Stations to the Prah--Different Forms of BridgesCrossing Swamps-Sickness amongst the Engineers-Road Clearing-The Telegraph-The Steam Sapper-Advance to Amoaful-Collision with the Enemy Captain Buckle killed Advance on Coomassie Lieutenant

Bell's Gallantry-Destruction of Coomassie-Return of the Force--Difficulty with the Bridges-Embarkation for England.

THE Ashanti campaign was in many respects not dissimilar to that undertaken a few years previously in Abyssinia. They were both Engineer wars in their main characteristics. In each the difficulty to be overcome was the introduction of a force into the interior of a country entirely unprovided with roads, and which did not afford any means of subsistence. In both the Engineers were called on to fight against obstacles of no common character, and in each it was evident that as soon as the troops could be brought into contact with the enemy the war would be over.

In the case of the Ashanti war the difficulties were greater in many respects than those which were so successfully overcome by Lord Napier and his Engineers. The road had to be cut through a dense jungle. It was therefore impossible that any adequate protection could be afforded to the advanced parties of Engineers engaged in the task. The only labour available was that of the natives, the Fanti tribe furnishing nearly all the workmen. These men, feeble and inferior as they were, and totally unaccustomed to the use of European tools, were at the same time most insubordinate and difficult to deal with. They had, moreover, been inspired with such a terror of Ashanti power that they were perpetually subject to panics, whole gangs of them vanishing on the least rumour of the approach of the dreaded enemy. Add to this that the climate was pestilential, the moist and steaming atmosphere of the days and the equally moist but chilly temperature of the nights soon striking down the hardiest with fever, and some notion may be obtained of the difficulties under which the operation was carried out.

The Engineer branch of the expedition was thus composed:Major R. Home, C.R.E., Major R. O. Jones, Captain Buckle, Lieutenants Bell, Jekyll, Mann, Skinner, and Cotter. Of these Major Home accompanied Sir Garnet Wolseley, and landed with him on September 27th, 1873, Captain Buckle with Lieutenants Bell and Mann on October 10th, and Major Jones, Lieutenants Jekyll, Skinner, and Cotter with the 28th Company Royal Engineers on December 10th.

The object of the campaign was to reach Coomassie, the headquarters of the Ashanti tribe and the residence of their king. Between Cape Coast Castle and this point (a distance of about 160 miles) there was a mere track, passable by natives, but utterly impracticable for troops. It became necessary, therefore, to cut a roadway through the jungle the entire distance. The principle adopted was to establish stations at the most convenient distances, to allow of troops passing from one to the other in a day. these stations huts were erected, rough fortifications constructed, to enable them to be held by small parties against the attack of hostile natives, and the ground cleared for some distance around them. Bridges were thrown across the innumerable streams encountered, and in some instances, notably that of the River Prah, these structures were of considerable importance.

At

The first day's work was not a happy one. The station at Acrowful, a small village about fifteen miles from Cape Coast Castle, had been already made defensible, when, on October 13th, Major Home started with 175 native labourers, assisted by Captain Buckle and Lieutenant Mann. He thus records his experiences :

"In this the first march made by the C.R.E. with native labourers, the greatest confusion prevailed. There was no order, men flung down their loads, and stopped when they chose, began to cook at all times, and, far from getting into Acrowful at twelve o'clock, the last of the men did not arrive till dark. This was by no means a hopeful beginning. "October 14th. At 6 p.m., the C.R.E. determined on going on to Dunquah, about six miles, and sleeping there that night. The men refused to move in a body, they all determined not to go. Lieutenant Jones, commanding the detachment 2nd West India Regiment, marched a party to the spot, and after some of the ringleaders were flogged, the greater part ran over the bridge, and went in the direction of Dunquah, which the C.R.E. reached at 11 p.m.

It should be stated that Lieutenant Gordon, of the 90th Regiment, had been for some time in the country, and was performing the duty of an acting Engineer before the arrival of an expeditionary force. He had been engaged with a party of native police and volunteers in cutting a road from Acrowful backwards towards

Cape Coast Castle and forwards to Dunquah. When Major Home overtook him he was at work beyond the latter point towards Yancomassie Fantee, and the Commanding Royal Engineer thus reported of the work:

"I have now seen the road from Cape Coast to Yancomassie Fantee. With the exception of 3 miles between Yamoranza and Assay boo, it is all fairly passable for infantry in fours. I think Gordon deserves great credit for what he has done."

In fact there is no doubt that Gordon had proved himself a most valuable man. He seemed to have an influence over the native workmen very difficult to obtain, and he showed great skill and tact in the selection of those he engaged. The consequence was, that whilst desertions were rife in all the other parties, those which had worked under Gordon proved steady and trustworthy. The next point to be secured was Mansue, about half way to the river Prah. This it had been decided should be the main station on that part of the road, which was to the south of the river. It had many advantages, amongst others a large open space only covered with Guinea grass easily cleared, a good and plentiful supply of water, and a quantity of bamboo. These were required for the construction of the huts, which are thus described by Major Home :

"The huts were built seventy feet long, seven feet to the eaves, and seventeen feet wide. The method of making these huts is as follows:A framework of bamboos was formed, uprights placed every five feet to carry the rafters, which were supported by centre bamboos or forked sticks. The whole of the plates, ridge pole, and rafters, were lashed together with creepers, and a solid framework thus formed; indeed, it was extraordinary how strong the framework of the hut so made became. While the hut was being framed, a number of bamboos cut to the proper length, i.e. the height of the eaves from the ground, were prepared. They were struck repeatedly at the knots with a sharp, hard hatchet, until the bamboo (almost all the bamboos were female bamboos) opened and unrolled, becoming, in fact, a bamboo plank. This was forced in between the plates of the wall. Each bamboo unrolled to about fourteen inches wide, and a succession of the fourteen-inch planks formed the walls of the hut. The roof was formed by getting the palm leaves, stripping them off the central stem, and tying them with creepers to a light framework; this was pulled up to the ridgepiece, and lashed to the eaves and the ridge, the whole being finished by filling in the space with dry plantain leaves, and a capping of thatch made on purpose. Guard beds were formed in each hut down the sides. These were of split bamboo, with the round sides up, supported on longitudinal bearers, which ran the whole length of the hut. These guard beds had some spring, and with a blanket were far from uncomfortable."

an

As the station at Mansue was more or less a type of the more important posts established on the road, some little description of it may be interesting. The clearance was about 500 yards in length, by an average width of 300 yards, the road running nearly through its centre. Commanding the latter was enclosed work called Fort Cambridge, an irregular polygon of some 200 feet by about 120 feet, surrounded by a stockade of bamboo, beyond which was a small ditch some five feet deep, well fraised on the escarp. At one side was an anthill, which dominated over the rest of the fort. This was made into a keep, by forming a bamboo redoubt, the walls of which were sunk within the hill to such a level as to protect them from an enemy's fire, and yet to enable that of the defenders to sweep the interior of the fort. Besides this redoubt, the fort contained four large huts for stores and a guard room. Outside the fort the camp was laid out with eleven huts, echeloned on the north side for the European troops, with three smaller ones for the officers. On the south-west were the lines of the coloured troops, viz., the West India Regiment, the Cape Coast Rifles, and the Native Allies; and on the east were the lines of the Police, the Royal Engineer labourers, and the Volunteers. In the centre, close to the fort, were seven hospital huts. There was also a Royal Engineer Park with forge, a Control store yard and transport office, and a telegraph and post office.

The station at Mansue was larger and more complete than any of the others between Cape Coast Castle and Prahsue, on the River Prah, but they all, more or less, partook of the same character. They were as follows, starting from Cape Coast, viz., Inquabim, Acrowful, Yancomassie-Fantee, Mansue, Sutah, YancomassieAssin, Barraco, and Prahsue, on the river Prah.

The next important work to be performed was the bridging of the numerous streams that were encountered on the way. Fortunately for the Engineers there was an abundance of timber, in the form of trees of all dimensions, as well as strong bamboos, whilst the creepers gave an inexhaustible supply of rope. The bridges were of three kinds of construction, in accordance with their importance, the width to be spanned, and the depth of the stream. The simplest form, which was all that was required in the majority of cases, was that of trees felled and thrown across, supported in the centre by forked uprights wedged in the bed of the stream; the roadway made of rough timber lashed to the bearer trees by creepers, and every here and there spiked down. Where the width was greater, the ordinary form of single lever bridge was adopted, whereby three points of support were obtained. In the case of the Prah, where the span was sixty