particular part of the "Merrimac's" casemate, had the "Merrimac" poured hers upon the "Monitor's" pilot-house all through the engagement, the result must have been more decisive. Again, had the Confederate ship possessed and employed solid shot, or the "Monitor" thirty or fifty-pound charges of powder for her guns, the effect of the continuous firing would have been far more destructive. The "Merrimac's" crew of landsmen seems to have fought well; their gunnery was very fair, and no great fault can be found with them, while the "Monitor's" seamen, if not severely tried in the battle, gave good proof of their endurance. The attempt to destroy the Union fleet was completely frustrated; henceforward the wooden ships felt that they were safe; Washington and the towns on the Northern seaboard were relieved from all fear of attack, the blockade was maintained, and the fact demonstrated to the South that the engineering talent of the North would outmatch any ironclad vessels which it built.

It was the opinion of Jones and the other Confederate officers that the "Monitor" should have easily sunk the "Merrimac." Why she did not is hard to explain, except upon the supposition, which does not appear to be supported by any evidence, that Worden and Greene had received orders to be very tender with their ship. With a higher speed, and maneuvering better than the "Merrimac," she should have been able to ram her, and disable her steering-gear, if ramming is a possibility, but she only seems to have made one very half-hearted attempt to do this. She was struck twenty-two times in the action, nine times on her turret and twice on her pilot-house, but received no damage beyond slight indentations. She fired forty-one shots. The "Merrimac," as a result of the fighting of the 8th and 9th, had ninety-seven indentations in her armor; both courses of plating were shattered, but the backing was uninjured where hits had been made by the "Monitor" at an angle; where the shots had struck perpendicularly the backing also was broken and splintered, though it was not perforated.

The first encounter between ironclads is not only in itself noteworthy as one of the decisive battles of the civil war, definitely and finally securing to the North the command of the sea, but

it produced an instant and tremendous effect in Europe and in England. The deepest misgivings as to the value of broadside ironclads were at once aroused. Ericsson had somewhat boastingly predicted that his little vessels could overcome with ease the English ironclads of that era, and his predictions were too readily taken for fact. The "Warrior" with her four and a half-inch solid rolled plates, and her speed of fourteen knots, would have been a very different antagonist to the "Merrimac"; she could have chosen her own distance, and, moreover, being a seagoing ship, could have fought in a seaway, which no monitor could do. The truth is that the requirements of the English navy are very dif ferent from those of other countries: others may be content to use their ships on their own coasts, but we never. Our ironclads must be sea-keeping, be the loss of invulnerability what it may. The "Monitor" was no type for our fleet, and time, which brings many revenges, has demonstrated the foresight of our Admiralty and the ability of our designers in the universal adoption of a high freeboard.

The turret system of mounting guns is one of the legacies of this fight to the world, but as adopted it was Captain Coles' turret with roller bearings, and not Ericsson's with a central spindle. It has now been accepted universally for heavy guns, whether in the form of a turret or barbette, giving as it does a wide angle of fire with the minimum of armor, and the maximum of protection to the gun-crews and mechanism for loading. The "Royal Sovereign" of 1864 was the first English turret ship due to the influence of this sea fight, and she has a numerous progeny in our "Devastations," our "Niles," and our "Majesties."

The bloodlessness of an encounter which had so wide and farreaching an effect may well surprise us; but in those days artillery was in its infancy, and rifled ordnance a somewhat distrusted novelty. The guns on either side failed to penetrate, nor can we be startled at this. But the energy exerted by the projectile has risen from 1,850 foot tons in the 7-inch rifle to 35,230 foot tons in the 68-ton gun, which is the standard heavy weapon of our fleet. Armor has, indeed, increased in thickness from four and a halfinches to eighteen inches and twenty inches of greatly improved

quality, while latterly the Harvey process has given an increase of fifty per cent to its resisting power as compared with the wrought-iron of 1862, thereby insuring, in a thickness of nine inches, the protective power which required fourteen inches at this epoch. But it is certain that the offense has developed more rapidly than the defense.

This battle, following upon the lesson of the 8th so closely, emphasized yet more clearly the doom of the old line-of-battle ship. Where the "Congress" and "Cumberland" had failed so hopelessly, a vessel infinitely smaller, infinitely less imposing in appearance, had encountered their antagonist without any loss at all. It had been maintained by some that the greater number of guns carried upon the unarmored vessel would compensate for the absence of protection. On the contrary, it was now demonstrated that an impenetrable ship cannot be overcome by hurling a mass of projectiles against her side, to glance idly off it. It was not found practicable to silence either the "Merrimac" or "Monitor" by firing upon their portholes. Some damage was done to the former ship by this method of attack, it is true; but she never ceased to be battle-worthy. And the whole aim of naval tactics is to render an opponent's ship no longer serviceable for action. Till this has been done there is no victory.

The subsequent fate of the two ships which took part in the battle deserves a word. After the engagement the "Merrimac" refitted, and came out once more, this time with solid steel shot, and with every preparation to board. She was now commanded by Captain Tatnall, who will ever be honored by Englishmen, since he it was who, three years before, with the words, "Blood is thicker than water," had come to the aid of his kindred in the Peiho. The wooden ships were, however, under the shelter of the Federal batteries, and showed no inclination to risk an engagement. The "Vanderbilt," a fast merchant steamer, which had been fitted with a formidable ram expressly to destroy the "Merrimac," remained inactive by the side of the "Monitor." The Southern ship had with her six gunboats, which were sent in to capture some barges lying near the Federal fleet. These were carried off and destroyed without bringing on an engagement.

Seeing that the "Monitor" would not accept his challenge, Tatnall, for his part, did not care to go in under the batteries and attack her. The "Merrimac" was the only vessel of any power which the South possessed to protect the James River, and the water approach to Richmond. In the same way the "Monitor" was the only ironclad to cover Washington and the Northern coastline. Each commander had, therefore, to be very careful of his ship, and there was nothing to be gained by another doubtful battle. Tatnall had been refused permission to go below Fort Monroe by the Confederate government; and, as all the wooden ships were moored below that fort, he could not make a dash upon them, disregarding the "Monitor." A month later, the "Merrimac" was scuttled and abandoned by her crew. It was necessary for the Confederates to evacuate Norfolk, and the ironclad's draught of water would not allow her to ascend the James River. At the same time, her destruction was a great blow to the hopes of the Southerners, since those among them who were not sailors greatly overestimated her offensive power. It was an equal relief to the Northerners, who were thus relieved of a dangerous and unsubdued antagonist, in the vicinity of the host of defenseless transports which McClellan had seen fit to bring to the Peninsula. On May 15, 1862, the "Monitor" "Galena," "Aroostook," and "Port Royal" ascended the James River to within twelve miles of Richmond. At this point the passage was defended by Confederate batteries on Drewry's Bluff, and by obstructions placed in the channel. The ships were unable to silence the batteries, and retired after the "Galena" had received serious injury. But the "Monitor" did not long survive her enemy. Most unwisely she was sent to sea, and foundered off Cape Hatteras in a storm, sixteen men going down with her. She never was meant to be a seagoing vessel, and thus her loss cannot be laid at her designer's door. [H. W. WILSON.

CHAPTER XXXVI

THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS

UNCLE SAM'S WEB FEET - FARRAGUT TO THE FRONT- THE ENGAGEMENT - CANISTER AND GRAPE-THE OLD NAVY WINS

A

A. D. 1862

T the outbreak of the war the Mississippi from Cairo to New Orleans had passed into the hands of the Confederates. The possession of this great stream which sundered the Confederacy into two unequal parts, which drains the rich and fertile central plains of North America, and which also gives ready access to the heart of the Continent, was-as is stated by Mr. H. W. Wilson, to whom we are indebted for the following account -naturally of immense value. While they held it they could draw corn stuffs and bacon from the slave States to the west of it-Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, and the greater part of Louisiana. In these States, where every man carried his life in his hands, and where blood-feuds linger on to this day, they could recruit admirable soldiers, men who could use the rifle and who did not value life. The Mississippi lost, the great centers of population in its basin must pass to the North, the Confederacy must lie open, exposed to the attack of Northern armies using the river and its tributaries as their base, the resources and food supply of the West would be no longer at the command of the Southerners, and the single land frontier which did not face the North could not be utilized for the importation of war material. "Uncle Sam's webfeet," as Lincoln called the Union fleet, could come and go as they chose, if this river could be wrested from the South.

Every nerve was strained by the North, after the first months of hurried preparations, to reconquer the Mississippi. Foote, with