That same morning the fleet compelled the surrender of a Confederate force at Chalmette. Forts Jackson and St. Philip still held out, but their fall was only a question of time. They were cut off from the Confederacy, and their garrisons, unable to obtain food or ammunition, much shaken and demoralized by the bombardment, surrendered on April 29th. Four days earlier Farragut's fleet had anchored off New Orleans.

The consequences of this engagement, followed as it was almost immediately by the capture of the forts and New Orleans, cannot be overestimated. It was the third great blow which the Federal navy had struck during the war, and if it were of less importance than the battle between the "Merrimac" and "Monitor," it was of greater moment both to victors and to vanquished than the capture of Port Royal. It lessened the number of ports to be blockaded by one, and that one a port which, owing to the nature of the coast, the numerous mouths of the river, the comparative proximity of Havana, and the excellent communication from it inland, both by rail and by water, was exceptionally well situated for the blockade-runner's trade. The Confederate forts on the Central Mississippi could now be taken in rear, and the final opening of the river was foreshadowed. Nor is Farragut's victory without military importance. It showed that forts alone cannot forbid passage to a fleet, cven when the channel which they command is narrow, tortuous, and swept by a rapid current. Luck, of course, was on the side of the Northerners. Had not the freshet accommodatingly broken the boom, their task would have been, if not impossible, at any rate very much harder. All admiration is due to Farragut for his daring and resolution, but there are certain circumstances to be taken into account when considering the small damage done to the fleet.

First, a large number of the garrison were Northerners who had asked to be permitted to serve in the forts that they might not be compelled to fight against their country. There were in addition many Irish and Germans. So bad was the feeling of the men that they broken into open mutiny and spiked many of the guns on April 27th. We can well believe that an affection for the North would not tend to good shooting on the part of the gunY-VOL. II.

ners. They knew the ranges, and yet their fire almost uniformly passed above the heads of the Federals. We must also remember that they had been shaken by the bombardment. Fort St. Philip maintained a more accurate fire than Fort Jackson, which may be accounted for by the fact that during the preliminary bombardment it had received very little attention from the Federals. Highangle fire on this occasion produced but small result. The mortar vessels discharged bombs till their ammunition ran short, but for all practical purposes Fort Jackson was intact after all this sound and fury. Yet Farragut still retained some faith in them, and in his subsequent actions upon the Mississippi used them for bombardments. Secondly, we must recall the indifferent nature of the artillery which the Confederate works mounted. Had Colonel Higgins' and General Duncan's entreaties for heavier guns been complied with, the issue of the action might have been different. Twelve guns throwing shot of sixty-eight pounds and upward were not a very large allowance for the defense of a port of such political and strategical importance. No doubt the physical difficulties to be faced by the Federals contributed in some measure to the heedlessness which the Confederate War Office showed in this direction. To ascend a swift river in the face of the most moderate opposition is a difficult task, and the South looked rather for a descent from the north. Thirdly, there was the fatal defect of divided command. Had the forts, the ironclads, and gunboats been under the direction of one man, the Confederate resistance would have had far more chance of success. Instead there were no less than three various commanders. There was General Duncan in charge of the forts, there was Commander Mitchell with the vessels of the Confederate navy, and there were the "River Defense" boats, whose captains did each what seemed good in his own eyes. The officers and men of the Confederate navy fought with a gallantry to the full as great as that of Farragut's sailors, but they did not act in combination. Fire-rafts were not sent down as they should have been at the commencement of the attack, and the most was not made of the "Louisiana." The "River Defense" sailors did not understand in the least what was to be expected from brave men. "When I saw all those ships coming,"

said one captain, "I just fired the vessel and skipped." This man had no idea of fighting resolutely against great odds, and it is such resolution which often wins when the chance of success appears hopeless. Fourthly, there were no mines or torpedoes sowed in the channel. Not one of these considerations detracts from the reputation of Farragut. The task before him was, in the opinion of unprejudiced foreign officers on the spot, a most formidable one, and they freely prophesied defeat. A slight mischance to the "Hartford" at the critical moment, and there might have resulted not defeat, but disaster.

In war great risks must frequently be run to obtain great success, and the truly able commander is not he who, with a vast superfluity of resources or a great superiority in force, wins victories; but the man who with little does much. Had Farragut failed, his failure would have been meritorious. He had weighed and considered the possibilities, and he had made every preparation which science, ingenuity, and foresight could suggest. Like Nelson, he won, not because he despised his enemies, but because, after careful calculation and reflection, he had come to the conclusion that the odds against him were not so great as they seemed. His promptness is a point to be commended. By attacking when he did he came upon the forts before the Confederate ironclads were completed, and thus escaped one great danger. If, after facing the Confederate gunners on land, he had had to encounter a powerful mobile force on the water, he might have met with disaster.

It is curious that it never occurred to the Confederates, when their first boom was breached by the cu rent, to place other obstructions across the river, just under the guns of St. Philip. Even a weak boom in such a position could not very well have been destroyed by small gunboats, and would have held the ships right under the guns of the forts, where they must have been sunk by the Confederate fire.

This operation of the Northerners was in one way a greater feat than the passage of the forts at Mobile, since the strong current had to be reckoned with. It is not then a simple case of running past works on land. The utter inability of the ships to silence the forts at the very close ranges which the scant breadth of the river

necessitated is remarkable. Fort Jackson lost fourteen killed and thirty-nine wounded. No serious injury was done to the work, and it could have held out indefinitely if supplies could have been assured. Not a man in the water battery was driven from his post, in spite of the hundreds of rounds of grape which the Federals fired into it. The total loss of Farragut's fleet was thirtyseven killed and one hundred and forty-seven wounded, though included in this number are those who fell in the action with the gunboats. In proportion to her size, the heaviest loss was suffered by the "Pinola," one of the smallest ships.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG

THE DECISIVE BATTLE OF THE CIVIL WAR-THE CONFEDERATE INVASION-MEADE'S VICTORY AND LEE'S REPULSE -ALL QUIET ON THE POTOMAC

A. D. 1863

N September, 1863, the Confederate army of Northern Virginia, under command of General Lee, crossed the Potomac with the

IN

intention of invading the Northern States. At Antietam Lee was repulsed and obliged to retreat. In June of the following year he again attempted a Northern campaign. At Gettysburg (Pennsylvania) severe fighting ensued. This battle, which was fought July 1-3, resulted in another retreat. Following shortly after the Confederate triumph at Chancellorsville and immediately preceding the fall of Vicksburg, it may be regarded as the decisive battle of the war. It rendered further invasion of the North impossible, and indirectly as well as directly paved the way for Lee's final defeat at Five Forks and the surrender of the Confederate troops.

The place and the battle are described as follows in Gates's "Ulster Guard":

Gettysburg lies upon the north slope of a hill which rises in its immediate rear, some four hundred and eighty feet above the valley, just north of the town, through which flows a rivulet called "Stevens' Run." The contour of this hill is not unlike a fishinghook, and taking this familiar figure as a guide, we will briefly describe it. Turning the apex of the convex bend so it will point due north, it will embrace "Cemetery Hill." Standing now, with your back toward Gettysburg, and your eye following the course of the hook on your left and to the southward, and toward its point, you find it crosses a slight depression a few hundred rods from the apex of the bend, and then begins to rise until it attains the top of "Culp's Hill," and passing that, terminates at the point, on "McAllister's Hill." The distance from on this side the hook is a little less than two miles. Along the base of this hilly ridge runs "Rock Creek," and on the east side of it, opposite "McAllister's Hill," abruptly rises another bluff, which swells into "Wolf Hill," at a short distance from the creek, and then continues in a high ridge toward the northeast, for a considerable distance. Turning now to the other side of the hook, you will first observe that it is a mile longer than the left side, and is more uniform in its course, but characterized by the same general outlines. A few hundred rods from the apex of the bend is a bluff, rising higher than "Cemetery Hill," then follows a depression for a distance of half a mile, where the ridge is but twenty feet above the bed of "Stevens' Run"; then the ground rises again in a bold rocky ledge into "Little Round Top," and making another ascent culminates in "Round Top." The distance across, from point to shank, is about two and a half miles, and the circumference about five miles. Within the hook the ground is low and tolerably level, but as you approach the bend it becomes hilly and finally rises abruptly into "Cemetery Hill." The Baltimore Pike and the Taneytown Road enter Gettysburg, through the level space within the hook, and cross it at the bend.

Retaining the same position, but looking to the north, Gettysburg lies at your feet, extending from near the top of Cemetery Hill to the foot of the valley, through which flows "Stevens' Run," and which empties into Rock Creek, a mile northeast of the vil