L.C., and Watson, Herschell, Morris and Davey) have unanimously reversed, their lordships holding that the case was governed by Cox v. Hickman, 8 H. L. C. 268, and that until the making of the winding up order the receiver was clearly the agent of the company only, and although after the making of the winding up order the receiver ceased to be agent of the company, he did not thereby impliedly become the agent of the trustees by whom he was originally appointed. Lord Herschell in discussing the question as to who in fact became liable for goods ordered by the receiver after the winding up order, seems to come to the conclusion that it does not follow necessarily that anyone became liable on the contract, but that the receiver might possibly incur liability for breach of an implied warranty that he had authority to contract as agent.

DAMAGE TRUSTEES-INJURY TO TRUST PROPERTY.

Owners of Steam Sand Pump Dredger v. Greta (1897) A. C. 596, is a decision of the House of Lords on a point which, but for a contrary judgment of the Court of Appeal, one would hardly have thought to be debatable. The action was brought by harbour trustees to recover damages occasioned to their steam pump dredger by the defendant's ship colliding therewith. The Court of Appeal held that because the plaintiffs were a public body and not entitled to make any profit out of the dredger, they could not therefore recover damages for the time they were deprived of the use of it while undergoing repairs consequent on the collision, their Lordships (Lords Halsbury, L.C., Watson, Herschell, Macnaghten and Shand) were of opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages for the loss of the use of the dredger, but Lord Morris dissented, and agreed with the Court of Appeal.

STATUTORY RIGHT OF ACTION-JURISDICTION OF HIGH COURT DECLARATORY JUDGMENT.

In Barraclough v. Brown (1897) A. C. 615, the House of Lords has determined that where a statute gives a right of recovery in a court of summary jurisdiction against a person

not otherwise liable, there is no jurisdiction in the High Court to make a declaratory judgment that the applicant is entitled to recover his claim in such court of summary jurisdiction.

TRADE NAME NAME INDICATING MANUFACTURER IMITATION OF RIVAL TRADER'S GOODS-FRAUD INJUNCTION.

In The Birmingham Vinegar Co. v. Powell, (1897) A.C. 710, the House of Lords (Lords Halsbury, L.C., Watson, Herschell, Shand and Davey) unanimously affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal (1896) 2 Ch. 54, (noted ante vol. 32 p. 613) and holding that the plaintiff who had for many years manufactured a sauce according to a secret recipe, which he called and sold by the name of “ Yorkshire Relish," was entitled to an injunction restraining the defendants from selling a sauce manufactured by them under that name, or using the words "Yorkshire Relish" in connection with their sauce, without clearly distinguishing it from that made by the plaintiff.

APPEAL TO HER MAJESTY IN COUNCIL IN CRIMINAL CASE, WHEN GRANTED.

In re Caren, (1897) A.C. 719, was an application for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council from a conviction in a Consular Court in a criminal case in which their Lordships reiterate the rule laid down in such cases, In re Dillet, (1887) 12 App. Cas. 459, viz., that "Her Majesty will not review or interfere with the course of criminal proceedings unless it is shown that by a disregard of the forms of legal process, or by some violation of the principles of natural justice, or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done." No such case having been made out, the leave was refused. We may observe that the principal point relied on by the applicant was that she had been tried by a jury of five instead of twelve pursuant to the order in Council establishing the consular Court, which the applicant claimed to be invalid, but their Lordships were of the opinion that the Crown had power so to constitute the Court and to provide for the trial of criminal cases therein by juries of less than

twelve.

WRIT OF SUMMONS-SERVICE OUT OF JURISDICTION - SUBSTITUTed Service -DEFENDANT LEAVING JURISDICTION AFTER ISSUE OF WRIT-ORD, IX. R.2 (ONT. RULE 146).

In Jay v. Budd (1898), 1 Q.B. 12, the majority of the Court of Appeal (Lord Halsbury, L.C., and Collins, L.J., have distinguished the cases of Fry v. Moore (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 395; and Wilding v. Bean (1891) I Q.B. 100,-and have held that they do not apply where a defendant goes out of the jurisdiction, not for the purpose of evading service, after the issue of the writ of summons; and in such a case, notwithstanding the defendant is actually out of the jurisdiction, substituted service of the writ for service within the jurisdiction may be ordered to be made on some person within the jurisdiction. Rigby, L.J., on the other hand was of opinion that the only case in which substitutional service of a writ for service within the jurisdiction could be ordered where defendant was actually out of the jurisdiction was where defendant had left the jurisdiction after the issue of the writ for the purpose of evading service.

Correspondence.

QUASHING SUMMARY CONVICTIONS.

To the Editor of the Canada Law Journal.

Having noticed a letter of "Subscriber" in your last volume p. 658, on this subject I respectfully suggest this as a remedy. That in place of having recourse to the certiorari and quashing the conviction, the complainant or defendant ought, upon depositing the fine and costs and the sum of ten dollars, to have the right thereupon to give a verbal notice of appeal. or within ten days an appeal in writing for a motion to come up before the Local Judge of the High Court for the county. The notice of motion might be served by registered letter and if given while both parties were still present to be noted by the Justice in the proceedings. This course would give an inexpensive and speedy mode of relief, and

would make a cheap remedy and would save the costs of recognizances, etc. There might also be given an appeal to the Divisional Court from the Local Judge. I would also suggest an amendment to the Criminal Code to permit either party before or after the Justice had intimated what his finding would be to ask the Justice to reserve his decision and send the proceedings to the Local Judge of the High Court for the county, in order that such Judge might review the proceedings and say what the finding should be, and that the finding of the Justice should conform thereto, and that in order to obtain such review the party asking it should deposit the costs and five dollars and postage on the proceedings both ways. Either party having the right to notify the Local Judge of his wish to be heard on the review, and with the privilege to the said Judge to ask either or both parties or the County Attorney to appear before him to be heard generally or on some point to be stated. Also that no conviction or return of conviction, of conviction, for publication should be made until after the report of the Local Judge, and the result of the appeal therefrom. The latter to have the right to award five dollars costs to the party successful before him, and either party to have a right of appeal from him to a Divisional Court. The effect would be that no conviction would be recorded against a man's good name unless some reasonable ground existed therefor. As it is now, once a conviction has been made, no matter how unreasonable, and although afterwards quashed, the justice must return it for publication, and a man's probably good name is tarnished. The advantage of this is that everyone would have a cheap and speedy remedy against an improper conviction. I only make the suggestion. The details could easily be worked out by the lawmakers.

ANOTHER SUBSCRIBER.

Statute-Construction—Amendment-Retroactive effect-Limitation of actions, 54 Vict., c. 42, s. 16 (O).

Unless there is a clear declaration in the Act itself, to that effect, or unless the surrounding circumstances render that construction inevitable, an Act should not be so construed as to interfere with vested rights. 54 Vict., c. 42, s. 16 (O), limiting the time for the enforcement of claims for compensation by persons injuriously affected by the exercise of municipal powers of expropriation does not apply to a claim existing at the time of the passage of the Act. Judgment of the Official Arbitrator affirmed.

Fullerton, Q.C., and W. C. Chisholm, for appellants. H. M. Mowat, for respondent.

From Robertson, J.]

LUFFMAN V. LUFFMAN.

[Jan. 11. Ship-Sale-Unregistered lien-Notice-Merchants' Shipping Act, 1894. While under s. 57 of the Merchants' Shipping Act, 1894, 57-58 Vict., c. 60 (Imp.) unregistered equitable interests can be enforced as between the parties immediately affected, the effect of section 56 is that a purchaser from the registered owner takes a title free from unregistered equitable interests even though he knows of them. Judgment of ROBERTSON, J., reversed. W. Nesbitt, for appellant. C. J. Holman. for respondent.

[Jan. 11.

From Drainage Referee.] STEPHENS v. TOWNSHIP OF MOORE.
Drainage-Repairs-"Person injuriously affected"-Mandamus - Drainage
Act, 1894, s. 73.

Under s. 73 of the Drainage Act, 1894, (57 Vict., c. 56 (O.) ) a ratepayer whose property has been assessed for the maintenance and repair of a drain, as deriving benefit from it, is a person injuriously affected by its want of repair, even though he has not suffered any pecuniary loss or damage by reason thereof, and is entitled to a mandamus to compel the municipality, whose duty it is to keep the drain in repair, to do such work as may be necessary, unless the municipality can show that, even if the drain were repaired, it would, from changes in the surrounding conditions, be useless to the applicant's property. Judgment of the Drainage Referee reversed.

M. Wilson, Q.C., for appellant. Aylesworth, Q.C., and Lister, Q.C., for respondent.