STATUTE-ACT COMMENCED UNDER STATUTE SUBSEQUENTLY REPEALED--Comple

TION OF ACT COMMENCED BEFORE REPEAL OF STATUTE AUTHORIZING IT.

Heston v. Grout, (1897) 2 Ch. 306, is deserving of attention, although it turns to some extent on statutory enactments not in force in Ontario. By a statute of 1875 a municipal body was authorized to give a notice to property owners to repair the street in front of their property, and in default of their executing the repairs the municipal body was empowered to perform them and apportion the expense. After the giving of the notice, the municipal body adopted another statute of 1892 which provided that after its adoption the former Act of 1875 should cease to apply, and notwithstanding this the municipal continued the proceedings commenced under the Act of 1875, and the Court of Appeal (Lindley, Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ.) agreed with North, J., that they had a right so to do even apart from the provision of a statute which expressly provided that the repeal of any Act is not to affect the previous operation of any enactments repealed, or anything duly done or suffered under the enactment so repealed. But the latter provision the Court held in any case enabled the municipal body to complete any proceeding begun under the repealed Act before its repeal.

COSTS-COMPROMISE TO DEFEAT SOLICITORS'

LIEN- PRACTICE RIGHT OF

APPLICANT TO READ RESPONDENT'S AFFIDAVITS AS PART OF HIS OWN CASE.

In re Margetson, (1897) 2 Ch. 314. In this case Kekewich, J., reaffirmed the well settled rule that the parties to a litigation although at liberty to compromise their differences without the intervention of their solicitors, provided they do so honestly and without any intention to cheat the solicitors of their costs; yet wherever the compromise is effected for the purpose of cheating a solicitor, the latter will have a right to an order for payment of his costs, notwithstanding the compromise. In the present case Pugh retained Mr. Margetson to obtain the delivery of a bill of costs by Mr. Jones and a taxation thereof. Before the taxation was completed Jones, without Margetson's knowledge and with the intention of stopping the taxation and so defeating Margetson's lien for

costs, paid Pugh, who was in distressed circumstances, a small sum in settlement of the taxation, which was consequently dropped. Margetson thereupon applied to Kekewich, J., for an order to compel Jones to pay his costs up to the time of the compromise, which was granted the Judge being of opinion that Jones as a solicitor must have known from the circumstances of Pugh that the money paid by him. would not be applied towards payment of Margetson's costs. A point of practice arose also in the case which is worth notice. The case of the applicant was not made out on his own affidavits, but affidavits were filed in answer, which he claimed to be entitled to read, and which supplied what was lacking in his own affidavits. The respondents objected, but Kekewich, J., held that the applicant was entitled to use his opponent's affidavits to make out his own case.

PATENT LAW-INFRINGEMENT FOREIGN MANUFACTURER SENDING INFRINGING ARTICLES FROM FOREIGN COUNTRY BY POST-PLAINTIFF OUT OF JURISDICTION JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF AT TRIAL-SECURITY FOR COSTS-RETENTION OF COSTS IN COURT PENDING APPEAL.

Badische Anilin v. Johnson (1897), 2 Ch. 322, was an action by a plaintiff resident abroad to restrain the infringement of an English patent. The defendant was a foreign manufacturer, and the infringement complained of was his sending into England by post in response to an order from a trader in London, a parcel containing articles which were an infringement of the patent. North, J., was of opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to succeed, and he granted an injunction and an inquiry as to damages. The majority of the Court of Appeal (Lindley and Smith, L.JJ.) were, however, of the opinion that the action could not be maintained. They considered that the defendant's part of the transaction ceased when he delivered the package to the post office, and that he could not be held responsible for its being imported or carried into England. Rigby, L.J. dissented from this, and thought that the defendant was responsible for the importation of the package into England, and its carriage there as being a necessary consequence of his initial act, in depositing it in the post office for that purpose. The plaintiffs had been required to

give security for costs, and had paid money into court therefor; and on the judgment being given by North, J., in their favour, the defendants asked that the money which the plaintiffs had paid into court should be retained, pending an appeal from the judgment. North, J., granted the application on the defendants' undertaking to present the appeal within a fortnight. The plaintiffs claimed that an equal amount should be paid into court by the defendant as security for the plaintiffs' costs of the appeal, but this North, J., refused. to order. The injunction and inquiry as to damages were not stayed, and the costs of the plaintiffs' solicitors were ordered to be paid upon their giving the usual undertaking to refund them in case the appeal should be successful.

MARITIME LAW-SEAMAN - MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT, 1894 (57 & 58 VICT., c 60), s. 186-" PASSAGE HOME."

Edwards v. Steel, (1897) 2 Q.B. 327, is a decision of the Court of Appeal (Lord Esher, M.R., and Smith and Rigby, L.JJ.) affirming the judgment of Collins, J., (1897) I Q.B. 712, noted ante vol. 33, p. 620. Upon the appeal the plaintiff seems to have raised in addition to the point mentioned ante p. 620, that he ought to have been provided with maintenance during his journey as well as his transportation, but the Court of Appeal held that as the master had deposited the amount called for by the Consul's certificate given under clause d. of s. 186, the ship owners were relieved from any further liability. Their Lordships in the Court of Appeal seem, however, to have differed with Collins, J., as to the meaning of the words "a passage home," and intimate that they mean the port at which the seaman was shipped, or some port of the United Kingdom agreed to by him; but they upheld the judgment of Collins, J., on the ground that the plaintiff had agreed to go to the port to which he was given a passage.

INTERPLEADER GOODS IN EXECUTION-ORDER FOR SALE-APPLICATION OF PROCEEDS IN DISCHARGE OF SECURITY NOT DUE-ORD, LVIII. R. 12 (Ont. Rule 1,112).

Forster v. Clowser, (1897) 2 Q.B. 362, was an interpleader proceeding by a sheriff, in which the goods were claimed by a chattel mortgagee whose security was not due, and which bore a high rate of interest. A Judge (Grantham, J.) in pursuance of the power conferred by Ord. lvii. r. 12 (Ont. Rule 1,112) directed a sale of the goods in question, and the application of the proceeds in discharge of the chattel mortgage, though it was not due, and without making any allowance to the mortgagee in respect of the additional interest which would have accrued had the debt not been paid off before the day appointed for payment. From this order the mortgagee appealed, but the majority of the Court of Appeal (Lord Esher, M.R., and Smith, L.J.) were of the opinion that in exercising jurisdiction under the Rule in question the Judge. was not limited by the rules of equity and had a discretion to make the order he did, which under the circumstances they considered to be proper. Rigby, L.J., however, dissented. He is probably right in principle, but then the rate of interest was 60 per cent., and this is possibly an instance of a hard case making bad law,

DISCOVERY-PRODUCTION-Crown, RIGHT OF, TO DISCOVERY,

Attorney-General v. Newcastle (1897), 2 Q.B. 384, was an information by the Attorney-General on behalf of the crown against a municipal corporation in which the rights of the crown to discovery are discussed. Apart from certain technical points of practice to which it is not necessary here to refer, the Court of Appeal (Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ.) on appeal from Wills, J., decided that the crown is entitled to the same rights of discovery from a subject which any ordinary litigants have against each other, but the subject has not the same right of discovery as against the crown; and furthermore that the crown in virtue of its right to discovery was entitled to the production of documents which might tend to show that the defendants had not the absolute right

which they claimed to have in the property in question. Rigby, L. J., is careful to point out that although the crown cannot be compelled to give discovery as a matter of practice, it always does so unless the public interests conflict with its doing so.

SOLICITOR-COSTS-LIABILITY OF DORMANT PARTNER FOR COSIS INCURRED

AFTER DISSOLUTION BY SOLICITOR RETAINED BEFORE.

In Court v. Berlin (1897), 2 Q.B. 396, the question was whether the dormant partners of a firm were liable for the payment of costs incurred by a solicitor retained by the active partner of the firm, to collect a debt due to the firm; and whether such liability extended to the costs incurred after the firm had been dissolved, but of which as well as the existence of the dormant partners, the solicitor had no notice. A Divisional Court (Wills and Grantham, JJ.) had decided that the dormant partners were not liable for any costs incurred after the dissolution, but the Court of Appeal (Lord Esher, M.R., and Smith and Rigby, L.JJ.) unanimously reversed that decision. The defendants endeavoured to escape liability under the provisions of the Partnership Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict., c. 39) s. 36 (3), which enacts that "the estate of a partner who dies, or who becomes bankrupt, or of a partner who, not having been known to the person dealing with the firm to be a partner, retires from the firm, is not liable for partnership debts contracted after the date of the death, bankruptcy, or retirement respectively." This Act has been held to be merely declaratory of the common law, and the answer which the Court of Appeal gave to the argument founded on this section, was, that the debt in question was contracted when the retainer was given, and therefore before the dissolution, and did not arise de die in diem, as the Divisional Court appears to have assumed. See Friend v. Young (1897) 2 Ch. 421 noted post.

LICENCE-REVOCATION-BREACH OF CONTRACT BY LICENSOR-LICENSEE, RIGHT

OF ACTION OF.

In Kerrison v. Smith (1897) 2 Q.B. 445, the plaintiff sued for damages for breach of a contract, whereby the defendant. had orally agreed to let his wall to the plaintiff for the pur