a certain thing shall be done by a third person as that he snall sign a guarantee are not within the statute: Bushell v. Beanan, 1 Bing. N.C. 103. Promises to answer for another's debt are not within the statute when that other is not also liable: Birkmyr v. Darnell, 1 Sm. L.C. 310: Mountstephen v. Lakeman, L.R. 7 Q.B. 196. The result is the same though the consideration was received by that other, as in the case of promises to answer for an infant's contracts (not being for necessaries): Harris v. Huntbach, 1 Burr. 373. The same is true where the the liability of that other, though previously existing, is discharged by the guarantee: Goodman v. Chase, I B. & Ald. 297.

Promises are not within the statute if there is any interest or liability in the guarantor or his property, except such as arises out of his promise: Fitzgerald v. Dessler, 7 C.B. N.S. 374, for instance where a lien or security is given up in consideration of the promise: Walker v. Taylor, 6 C. & P. 752, or where a right to distrain goods in which the promissor is interested is given up: Williams v. Leper, 3 Wils. 308. The statute does not apply where the immediate object of the guarantee is not the discharge of a third person's liability, though such discharge follows indirectly: Castling v. Aubert, 2 East. 325; for instance, the promise of a del credere agent, the immediate object being only to secure care on his part, is not within the statute, though he is personally liable if the purchasers make default: Wickham v. Wickham, 2 Kay & J. 478, nor are promises to pay another's debt in consideration of a transfer of the debt within the statute: Anstey v. Marden, I B. & P.N.R. 124.

Secondly, of agreements in consideration of marriage. Part performance of such agreements is sufficient to except them from the operation of the statute: Taylor v. Beech, I Ves. Sr. 296, and of course promises to marry are not in any sense within it: Harrison v. Cage, I L'd. Ray'd 386.

Thirdly, of contracts for the sale of land. Contracts collateral to a transfer of an interest in land are not within the statute: Morgan v. Griffith, L.R. 6 Ex. 70, or preliminary to such a transfer, as for instance a contract for the searching of a title: Jeakes v. White, 6 Ex. 873.

Shares in companies though owning and using land are not "land" within the statute: Watson v. Spatley, 10 Ex. 222; Bradley v. Holdsworth, 3 M. & W. 422; nor fixtures: Hallen v. Runder, 1 C. M. & R. 266; nor such products of land as come within the definition of fructus industriales: Evans v. Roberts, 8 D. & R. 611; nor fructus naturales unless still standing, and unless it is intended that they should obtain some benefit from so remaining: Marshall v. Green, L.R. 1 C.P.D. 35. An agreement for improvements by a landlord to be paid for by an increase of rent is not within the statute: Hoby v. Roebuck, 17 R.R. 477; Donellan v. Read, 3 B. & Ald. 899; nor an agreement to build upon land: Wright v. Stavert, 2 E. & E. 728. An equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds is not within the Act: Russel v. Russel, 2 Bro. C.C. 269; and a lease within section 2 of the Act is not an agreement concerning land within section 4 and does not require writing, if the tenant enters, and the tenancy will be governed by all the parol terms: Edge v. Stafford, I C. & J. 391; Bolton v. Tomlin, 5 A. & E. 856. Sales before an officer of the court confirmed by order are not affected by the statute: Attorney-General v. Day, 1 Ves. Sr. 220. Any agreement concerning land will be taken out of the operation of the statute by part performance: Butcher v. Stapely, 1 Ver. 363.

Lastly, of agreements not to be performed within a year. An agreement is not within the statute unless it appears by its whole tenour that it is to be performed after the year: Peter v. Campton, 1 Sm. L.C. 9th ed. 308; nor if it is intended to be performed by one party within a year, for instance, a sale of goods not to be paid for within a year: Donellan v. Read, 3 B. & Ad. 906. A parol lease good under section two is not invalid under this section, because not to be performed within one year: Bolton v. Tomlin, 5 A. & E. 856. A hiring for one year and so from year to year as long as the parties please is not within the Act: Beeston v. Collyer, 12 Moo. 552. A contract to share the profits of an undertaking not to be completed within one year is not within the Act: McKay v. Rutherford, 6 Moo. P. C. 414.

We next turn to section seven, dealing with parol declara

tions of trusts of land, and find as follows: Trusts for the Crown are not within the statute: Addington v. Cann, 2 Atk. 153. The statute cannot be used as a cloak for fraud, for instance, secret trusts for the grantor of property will be enforced against the grantee: Haigh v. Kaye, L.R. 7 Ch. App. 469; Booth v Turle, L.R. 16 Eq. 182; an apparently absolute conveyance may be shown by parol to be a mortgage: Lincoln v. Wright, 4 DeG. & J. 16; and where an agent has taken a contract or conveyance in his own name the agency may be shown by parol to vest the beneficial interest in the principal: Archibald v. Goldstein, 1 Man. L.R. 8; Rochefoucault v. Boustead, (1897) 1 Ch. 196; and secret trusts in wills have always been held to be without the statute: Re Boyes, 26 C.D. 531, Russell v. Jackson, 10 Ha. 204. Where a conveyance is made for an illegal purpose not fulfilled the grantee will be declared a trustee for the grantor: Davies v. Otty, 35 Beav. 208.

Coming last of all to the seventeenth section we find a very limited number of exceptions, due doubtless to the fact that the requirements of the statute as to evidence may be satisfied in several different ways. Investigation shows, however, that stocks and shares are not goods and merchandise within the statute: Duncuft v. Albrecht, 12 Sim. 189; Watson v. Spatley, 10 Ex. 222, nor are fixtures: Lee v. Risdon, 7 Taunt, 188; and an agreement to build a house is not within the section: Cotterell v. Apsey, 6 Taunt. 322.

In considering this formidable array of cases by which the field of this famous statute has been eaten into and curtailed, one is inclined to agree in the doubt expressed by Mr. Justice Kekewich, as to the benefit resulting from its passing, when he says in James v Smith, 63 L.T.N.S. 525, "It is not part of my duty to say whether on the whole the Statute of Frauds has been a beneficial or a mischievous statute. As to that there have been many opinions. Perhaps the only satisfactory answer to this doubt will be found in another quotation from the opinion of the judges upon which the judgment of the House of Lords in the case of Warburton v. Loveland, 6 Bligh, N.R. 29, was founded, as follows: "But the general rules of construction

which have been established from the earliest times require a large and liberal interpretation of any provision made for the suppression of fraud. In Heydon's Case, 3 Rep. 7, the Barons of the Exchequer resolved that the construction of the statute then under consideration before them must be made "by enquiring what was the mischief and defect against which the common law did not provide: what remedy the Parliament had appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth, and what was the true reason of the remedy." And the observation which follows in the report is one which ought never to be lost sight of in any case, and is peculiarly applicable to the present, namely, "that the office of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief and pro privato commodo; and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono publico."

W. MARTIN GRIFFIN.

ENGLISH CASES.

EDITORIAL REVIEW OF CURRENT ENGLISH
DECISIONS.

(Registered in accordance with the Copyright Act.)

EXECUTOR-DELAY IN TAKING OUT PROBATE-)
-NEGLECT AND DEFAULT.

In re Stevens, Cooke v. Stevens (1898) 1 Ch. 162 the Court of Appeal (Lindley, M.R., and Chitty and Williams, L.JJ.) have affirmed the judgment of North, J. (1897) 1 Ch. 422 (noted ante vol. 33, p. 486), holding that where there is delay in collecting assets, owing to the delay of executors in applying for probate, whereby interest is lost to the estate, the executors are not liable to account for such loss on the footing of wilful neglect and default. The remedy of parties likely to suffer by delay in taking probate, is to cite the executor in the Surrogate Court.

TRADE NAME INJUNCTION.

Pinet v. Maison Louis Pinet (1898) 1 Ch. 179, was an action brought by the plaintiffs to restrain the defendant companies from using the name of "Pinet" in connection with the sale or manufacture of boots and shoes not of the plaintiffs' manufacture. The facts were, that a person of the name of Dunch in 1892 took the name of Pinet," and carried on business thereunder as a maker of boots and shoes, and subsequently sold this business to the defendant company, "Maison Pinet." The plaintiffs were well-known French boot and shoe makers, and the object of Dunch and the Maison Pinet Company in using the name "Pinet" was to obtain for their goods the benefit of the plaintiffs' reputation. Subsequently Maison Pinet went into liquidation, and a new company was organized styled "Maison Louis Pinet," also defendants. In this latter company a person alleged to be named Louis Pinet was a director, but as the judge found this was an assumed name. North, J., granted the injunction as prayed against both companies.

COMPANY-AGREEMENT TO ISSUE DEBENTURE-EQUITABLE SECURITY.

Pegge v. Neath & District Tramways Co. (1898) 1 Ch. 183, may be taken as illustrating that maxim of equity, whereby a thing is considered to be done, which ought to be done. The plaintiff had lent money to the defendant company in 1882 upon the security of a promissory note, bearing 5 per cent. interest, and the company then undertook that, whenever required so to do, they would issue debentures bearing interest at 4 per cent., of a series which constituted a second charge on the company's assets. In 1894 an action was brought by holders of the first series of debentures to enforce their security, and the plaintiff in the present action was one of the plaintiffs in that action, and did not then claim to be a holder of a debenture of the second series. He continued to receive interest at five per cent. on his note, and had not applied for debentures in respect of the amount secured thereby. After judgment in the action by the holders of the first series of debentures, he for the first time claimed to have