case within the exception as to "future rights" mentioned in the section of the Act above referred to. O'Dell v. Gregory, 24 S.C. R. 661, followed. Appeal quashed with costs. A. R. Hall and Smith, for the motion. St. Pierre, Q C., contra. Ontario.] BALDERSON V. THE QUEEN. [March 8. Statute, construction of Civil Service-Superannuation-R.S.C. c. 18—Abolition of office-Discretionary power-Jurisdiction. Employees in the Civil Service of Canada who may be retired or removed from office under the provisions of the eleventh section of "The Civil Service Superannuation Act, R.S.C. c. 18, have no absolute right to any superannuation allowance under that section, such allowance being by the terms of the Act entirely in the discretion of the executive authority. Appeal dismissed with costs. Hogg, Q.C., for the appellant. Newcombe, Q.C., for the respondent. Ontario.] DRESCHEL V. AUER INCANDESCENT LIGHT CO. [March 14. Appeal-Jurisdiction—Amount in controversy-Affidavits-Exchequer Court Acts, 50 & 51 Vict., c. 16, ss. 51-53 (D.) -54 & 55 Vict., c. 26, s. 8— Patent Act, R.S.C. c. 61, s. 36. On a motion to quash an appeal where the respondents filed affidavits that the amount in controversy was less than the amount fixed by the statute as necessary to give jurisdiction to the appellate court, and affidavits were also filed by the appellants, showing that the amount in controversy was sufficient to give jurisdiction under the statute, the motion to quash was dismissed, but the appellants were ordered to pay the costs, as the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the appeal did not appear until the filing of the appellants' affidavits in answer to the motion. Motion refused with costs. Duclos for motion. Sinclair, contra. Province of Ontario. HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. Street, J. [March 29. CORPORATION OF CORNWALL v. CORNWALL WATERWORKS COMPANY. Waterworks-Town taking over same-Arbitration to determine value-Necessary parties-Mortgagees. The omission to serve notice on the mortgagees of a waterworks company, of arbitration proceedings under R.S.O, 1887, c. 164, to determine the amount to be paid by a town for such works and property, and their not being parties, and in which the award made was less than the amount of their claim, does not entitle the company to have such award referred back, and the mort gagees made parties; but the rights of such mortgagees could not be affected thereby. Aylesworth, Q.C., and Cline, for Company. Leitch, Q.C., and E. D. Armour, for town. Bruce, Q.C., for certain mortgagees. Street, J.] GIVENS V. COUSINS. [April 2. Vendor and purchaser-Security for payment of purchase money-Portion of purchase money realized under security-Judgment recovered against purchasers for balance-Agreement-Right to rescind. Where a vendor under a contract for sale, sold certain lands to a purchaser, who, on the day named for payment of the purchase money, paid a portion thereof, giving security for the payment of the balance at a later date, when, having failed then to make payment, the vendor realized on the security, which, however, left a balance still due, for which the vendor recovered judgment against the purchaser on his promise to pay under the contract, and afterwards notified the purchaser that unless the amount was paid by a day his right under the contract and his interest in the land would be forfeited, time being declared to be the essence thereof. Held, that the recovery of the judgment did not affect the right of the vendor to terminate the contract, nor was it a condition precedent to cancellation that the plaintiffs should return the payments they had received. John Greer, for plaintiffs. W. H. Blake, for defendant. MacMahon, J.] WELLER V. CARNEW. [April 2. Landlord and tenant-Lease-Habendum for one year-Subsequent clause for notice to terminate-Repugnance. In a lease with habendum for a year, there was inserted, after the covenant for quiet enjoyment, a clause that it was agreed that either party might terminate the lease at the end of the year, on giving three months' notice prior thereto. Held, that the clause was repugnant to the habendum, and must be rejected, and that the lease terminated at the end of the year without any notice. Northrop, for plaintiff. E. Gus Porter, for defendant. Armour, C.J., Falconbridge J., Street, J. CUNNINGTON V. PETERSON. [April 5. Bills of exchange and promissory notes-Addition of maker's name-Alteration not apparent-Holder in due course-Bills of Exchange Act, 1890— 58 Vict., c. 33, sec. 63 (D ). In an action on a promissory note signed by several parties it was shown that the name of one of the alleged makers was not signed by him or with his authority, but was added to the note after others had signed it, although before the note came to the hands of the plaintiff, a holder for value, Held, that the plaintiff being the holder of the note in due course, and the alteration not being apparent he could avail himself of it as if it had not been altered under the proviso to s. 63 of the Bills of Exchange Act, 1890, 58 Vict., c. 33 (D.): Reid v. Humphrey (1881) 6 A.R. 403, distinguished. W. M. Douglas, for the appeal. E. G. Graham, contra. [April 12. Boyd, C.] IN RE TOWNSHIP OF HAMILTON SCHOOL SECTION. Public Schools-School section-Appeal from Township to County Council— "Alteration"-R.S.O., 1897, c. 292, s. 39. The amendment of the Public School Act made by 54 Vict., c. 55, s. 82 (R.S.O., 1897, c. 292, s. 39), has limited the right of appeal to the County Council against neglect or refusal of a township council to employ, with applications of trustees or ratepayers, for the formation, division, union or alteration of a school section or school sections. It is now only when the neglect or refusal is a neglect or refusal to "alter" the boundaries of the section or sections that there is such an appeal; and there is no appeal where the neglect or refusal is to form, divide, or unite. An "alteration" means some change of the course of lines delimiting the territorial area of the section or sections, leaving it in other respects intact ; and not a division of one section into two, which changes the thing itself. Clute, Q.C., for the Township of Hamilton. W. R. Riddell for certain ratepayers. Boyd, C., Ferguson, J.] HUNTER v. TOWN OF STRATHROY. The plaintiff claimed in this action damages for injury to person and property by the alleged negligence of the defendants in having a foul drain in front of his property, and an injunction. The defendants denied the plaintiff's allegations, and alleged that if the plaintiff had suffered any injury it was by his own negligence. Before trial of the action, the defendants opened and inspected the drain and did some work upon it. The plaintiff professing to regard this as a compliance with his demand, asked the defendants to consent to the costs being disposed of by order in Chambers, to which the defendants answered that the work was being done in the ordinary course of municipal work, without the intention of admitting any liability, and refused to consent. The plaintiff moved in Chambers, without consent and against the objection of the defendants, and obtained an order for payment by the defendants of the costs of the action. Held, that under these circumstances, there was no jurisdiction to summarily dispose of the costs in Chambers, the object of the action not having been substantially attained. Knickerbocker v. Ratz, 16 P.R. 191, distinguished. Osler, Q.C., and D. L. McCarthy, for defendants. W. H. Blake, for plaintiff. CLANVILLE V. STRACHAN. [April 28. Armour, C.J.] Bankruptcy and insolvency-Insolvent debtor-Ranking on estate-Valuing security-Party primarily liable-R.S.O. c. 147, s. 20-Construction of. By s. 20 of the Assignment Act. R.S.O. c. 147, it is provided that "every creditor in his proof of claim shall state whether he holds any security for his claim or any part thereof, and if such security is on the estate of the debtor, or on the estate of a third party for whom such debtor is only secondarily liable, he shall put a specified value thereon." Held, that this means that if, as between the debtor and the third party, the latter is primarily liable, and the debtor only secondarily liable, the creditor must put a specified value upon his security. It matters not if, according to the form of the transaction, the debtor and the third party are both apparently primarily liable to the creditor; if, as between themselves, the third party is primarily liable and the debtor only secondarily liable, the creditor must put a specified value upon his security, for in such case the third party is the party "for whom the debtor is only secondarily liable." The form of the transaction is not to be looked at, but the substance of it, in order to ascertain whether the third party is the party primarily liable for the claim; and if it be found that he is, the debtor is then only secondarily liable for the claim within the meaning of the provision. The reason and object of the provision was to prevent the estate of a debtor being burdened by claims for which the debtor was only secondarily liable to a greater extent than was necessary for the protection of a creditor, and to augment his estate as much as possible. In re Turner, 19 Ch. D. 105, referred to. Shepley, Q.C., for plaintiff. Worrell, Q.C., for defendants. Ferguson, J., Robertson, J., Meredith, J.] WRIGHT V. CALVERT. [May 2. Costs-Set-off-Interlocutory costs-Rules 1164, 1165-Discretion of taxing officer-Appeal. An appeal by the defendant Calvert from an order of Rose, J., in Chambers, allowing an appeal from the ruling of one of the taxing officers at Toronto, and directing a set-off of certain costs awarded to the appellant against the amount of the plaintiff's judgment debt and costs, notwithstanding the assertion of a lien by the solicitor for the appellant. The plaintiff had recovered judgment in the High Court against two defendants for debt and costs. The plaintiff, after examining the defendant Calvert as a judgment debtor, made a motion for a receiver, which was dismissed without costs, and a motion to commit the defendant Calvert for refusal to answer and for making unsatisfactory answers upon his examination, which was also dismissed without costs. The plaintiff appealed to a Divisional Court, by one appeal, from the orders dismissing these motions, and his appeal was dismissed with costs. On taxation of the costs of this appeal, the taxing officer was asked to set them off against the plaintiff's judgment debt and costs, but the defendant, Calvert's solicitor, asserting a lien on the costs awarded to him, the taxing officer refused to make the set-off. The motion to ROSE, J., was by way of appeal from the taxing officer's ruling, and also a substantive motion for an order directing a set-off. Rule 1164 provides that "where a party entitled to receive costs is liable to pay costs to any other party, the taxing officer may tax the costs such party is liable to pay, and may adjust the same by way of deduction or set-off, or may delay the allowance of the costs such party is entitled to receive, until he has paid or tendered the costs he is liable to pay; or the officer may allow or certify the costs to be paid, and the same may be recovered by the party entitled thereto, in the same manner as costs ordered to be paid may be recovered. Rule 1165: “A set-off of damages or costs between parties shall not be allowed to the prejudice of the solicitor's lien for costs in the particular action in which the set-off is sought; but interlocutory costs in the same action awarded to the adverse party may be deducted." H. T. Beck, for the defendant Calvert, contended that the costs awarded him were not interlocutory costs, and, even if they were, the granting of a setoff was in the discretion of the taxing officer, and no appeal from such discretion lay to a Judge in Chambers or other tribunal. Clute, Q.C., for the plaintiff. Held, that the costs were interlocutory costs, and a set-off was properly directed by the Judge in Chambers, to whom an appeal lay from the taxing officer's ruling. Appeal dismissed with costs, to be fixed by the Registrar. Armour, C.J., Falconbridge, J., Street, J. BANK OF TORONTO v. KEYSTONE FIRE INS. CO. [May 4. Trial-Jury notice-Striking out-Duty of Judge presiding at jury sittingsTransfer to non-jury list. An appeal by the defendants from an order of MEREDITH, C.J., made when presiding at the Toronto Jury sittings, striking out the jury notice served by the defendants, and transferring the action for trial to the Toronto non-jury sittings, was allowed, STREET, J., dissenting, and the case was ordered to be reinstated on the list of actions for trial with a jury, and the jury notice restored; but this not to interfere with the right of the Judge presiding at the trial to direct that the action should be tried without a jury; and the costs to be costs in the cause. Per ARMOUR, C.J.-The Chief Justice of the Common Pleas was not the judge presiding at the trial of the action within the meaning of s. 110 of the Judicature Act, for he declared as soon as it was called that he would not try it, and then ceased to have any power over it. Nor could the order be supported as one made in Chambers under s. 44 of the Judicature Act, for the order, as issued by the plaintiffs, did not profess to have been made in Chambers, nor did the Chief Justice in making it profess to make it as a Judge sitting in Chambers, nor was any foundation laid for it as for an order in |