we may say, it was clearly the intention of the amendment to do. He asks, does the clause mean that a tenant can claim for his goods exemption only when he is exactly two months in arrears with his rent; that if he be only one month in arrear, or three months in arrear, he can claim no exemption at all?" We do not think any such construction would be correct. The sub-section says: "In case of a monthly tenancy the said exemptions shall only apply to two months' arrears of rent." The fair reading of which we submit is that in respect of two months' rent or less, the exemptions can be claimed, but not for any excess beyond two months' rent. Although the learned judge suggests many alternative meanings of this sub-section 2, he does not refer to this, which seems to us to be the true one.

A

As to the learned judge's introductory remarks on the assumed harshness of the common law, which enabled a landlord to seize, with few exceptions, all of his tenant's goods, to satisfy his rent, it must be remembered that landlords are in an entirely different position to other creditors, and the common law very wisely and reasonably gave them special remedies for enforcing their claims. tenant gets into possession, and in spite of his landlord's wish often remains in possession without paying rent. The landlord may stipulate for rent in advance, but such stipulations can only be enforced with difficulty and a rigour which few landlords would care to employ, and the experience of most landlords is that such stipulations are easily overcome by designing tenants, and if attempted to be enforced expense is incurred which in most cases is not recoverable from the tenant. We think there has been of late a great deal too much sympathy extended to the tenant, and far too little to the landlord, who frequently has to mourn dilapidated premises and loss of rent as the result of the indulgence he has extended to an ungrateful tenant, and we venture therefore to criticise rather freely decisions which tend unduly to deprive landlords of a right which we believe the legislature intended to give them.

ENGLISH CASES.

EDITORIAL REVIEW OF CURRENT ENGLISH
DECISIONS.

(Registered in accordance with the Copyright Act.)

VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-DELAY - DEposit, LIEN FOR-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

case.

Levy v. Stogdon (1898) 1 Chy. 478, is a somewhat curious In April, 1886, Sir John Sebright contracted to sell to one Keays a contingent reversionary interest in £20,000 odd of Consols free from incumbrances, for £3,550. Keays paid £100 as a deposit. There were existing incumbrances which Sebright undertook to pay off, but did not. Sept. 25th, 1886, was fixed for completion, when the balance of the purchase money was to be paid, and in case of delay the purchaser was to pay interest at 5 per cent. Sebright subsequently. became bankrupt, and he and his trustee in bankruptcy executed an assignment of all his property to one Baker, who subsequently mortgaged the reversionary interest above mentioned; Keays interest under his contract subsequently became vested in one Birch. The contingent interest having come into possession, Birch now claimed specific performance of his contract, or a lien on the fund for his deposit and interest. The claim to specific performance was resisted on the ground of laches on the part of the purchaser, and this defence, Stirling, J., held was entitled to prevail-but as regarded the claim to a lien for the deposit and interest he held that by virtue of the contract the vendor became trustee of the fund for the purchaser for the amount of his deposit, and that no Statute of Limitations applied to the case, nor any by analogy on which the Court ought to act, and he therefore held that to that extent Birch's claim must succeed.

MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE-FURTHER ADVANCES-SUBSEQUENT INCUMBRANCES-MORTGAGE OF EQUITABLE INTEREST-NOTICE TO TRUSTEE -LIMITATION OVER IN EVENT OF ALIENATION BY CESTUI QUE TRUST.

The facts of West v. Williams (1898) 1 Ch. 488, are a little complicated, but are substantially as follows: Walter Williams under his father's will was entitled to an equitable

estate for life; this interest on 24th Dec., 1895, he mortgaged to the plaintiff, the plaintiff agreeing not to give notice to the trustees until 24th Dec., 1896. On April 2, 1896, Walter Williams made a mortgage in favour of P. A. Williams and another, to secure £2,297, and further advances agreed to be made to the mortgagor, and by a settlement of even date, in which after reciting the giving of the mortgage last mentioned, and that except as therein before recited the settlor had not otherwise incumbered his life interest, he thereby assigned the same to trustees in trust for himself for life, “or until he should assign charge or incumber, or affect to assign, charge or incumber the same or any part thereof," and after the determination of his life estate for the settlor's wife and children. The action was brought to enforce the plaintiff's mortgage, of which notice was not given to the trustees of the fund until after the execution of the settlement above referred to. The priority of the P. A. Williams mortgage was conceded by the plaintiff, except as to advances made after notice of the plaintiff's mortgage, and two questions were raised, first as to the effect of subsequent advances made in pursuance of an agreement contained in the prior mortgage; and secondly, whether the limitation over on the alienation by Walter Williams was affected by his alienation to the plaintiff made prior to the settlement,-in other words, whether the limitation over had a retrospective operation. Kekewich, J., held that it had, and consequently that the plaintiff's right as mortgagee had been completely cut out by the subsequent settlement executed by his mortgagor; which seems a somewhat singular result; and he also held that the subsequent advances made under the agreement in the P. A. Williams mortgage after notice of the plaintiff's mortgage, were, even if the plaintiff's mortgage were a subsisting security, entitled to priority over it. He distinguishes the case from Hopkinson v. Rolt, 9 H. L. C. 514, on the ground that in that case there was no obligation on the part of the mortgagee to make the subsequent advances; and his decision on the effect of the settlement is based on Manning v. Chambers, I D. G. & Sm 282; and Seymour v. Lucas, 1 Dr. & Sm. 177.

SETTLEMENT-POWER

OF

APPOINTMENT-REMOTENESS-APPOINTMENT

DAUGHTERS WHO SHALL HEREAFTER MARRY."

ΤΟ

In re Gage, Hill v. Gage (1898) 1 Ch. 498, an appointment of a fund was made under a power, in favour of the appointees, three unmarried daughters "who should thereafter marry," and also provided that so long as these daughters remained unmarried, the income of the residue of the fund. should be paid to them equally, and in case "one or two only of them should marry" (which happened), then after the death or marriage of such last one as should be last living and unmarried, the capital of the residue should be paid to four other children, and such of the three daughters as should marry, equally. Kekewich, J., held that the ultimate gift over of the fund was void for remoteness, also that the appointment in favour of the three daughters who should marry was void for the same reason: but that the appointment of the income of the residue of the fund to the three unmarried daughters was a valid appointment of one-third to each daughter, as long as she was living and unmarried.

CONTINGENT REMAINDER-INTERMEDIATE

LEGAL AND EQUITABLE LIMITATIONS.

RENTS BEFORE VESTING

In re Averill, Salsbury v. Buckle (1898) I Ch. 523, is an illustration of the maxim that equity follows the law. In this case a testator by his will dated in 1878, devised real property to the use of trustees in fee, upon trust for his daughter Annie for life, and after her death for her children, who being sons should attain 21, or, being daughters, should attain that age or marry, as tenants in common. Annie died in 1885 leaving six children, all infants under 21, and unmarried. The eldest child having attained 21 in March, 1897, it became necessary to determine what was the proper disposition of the rents; and Romer, J., held that the eldest child was entitled to the whole of the rents until the next child attained a vested interest, each child being admitted to share therein as he or she attained a vested interest, in the same way as if the limitations had been legal.

ARBITRATION AWARD-EXPROPRIATION OF LANDS BY RAILWAY-FINALITY OF

AWARD.

Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Turcan (1898) A. C. 256, is a decision of the House of Lords in a Scotch case. The appellants gave notice to treat for certain lands required for their railway,-a question arose whether the part they wished to take could be severed from the rest of the parcel without material detriment. This question was submitted to arbitration pursuant to statutory provisions in that behalf: before the arbitrator the railway company offered to allow access to the remainder of the respondent's property, under a bridge to be erected over the portion proposed to be taken by them. The arbitrator found that the portion proposed to be taken could not be severed without detriment to the remainder, and awarded compensation upon the assumption that the railway was bound to take the whole premises. The action was brought to recover the compensation awarded, and the railway set up that the arbitrator had erred in rejecting their offer of access: but the House of Lords affirmed the decision of the Scotch Court of Session, holding that whether the arbitrator had erred or not was immaterial, as, until set aside by proper process, his award was final and conclusive on both parties, and could not be reviewed by the Court.

DEBENTURES-AGREEMENT TO ADVANCE MONEY ON-COMPANY-BREACH OF CONTRACT TO LEND MONEY-SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-DAMAGES.

The South African Territories v. Wallington (1898) A.C. 309, was an action by a joint stock company to specifically enforce an agreement to lend money on the security of its debentures; the decision of the Court of Appeal (1897), I Q.B. 692, is noted ante, vol. 33 p. 619. The House of Lords (Lords Halsbury, L.C., Watson, Herschell, Macnaghten and Morris) have now affirmed the decision, holding that such an agreement cannot be specifically enforced, and that the plaintiffs could only recover such damages as they had actually sustained by reason of the breach of the contract, and as no such damages were proved the appeal of the plaintiffs was dismissed with costs.