Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

knows it would bee a loot in your favor for he says that their is not a mark nor a brack to bee fond nor thair is no witness agance you but he says if you should hair it and try to get away tht it would bee offle bad agance you oh my darling if you think it is best come at one oh my dear I do wish I could see you right of but know matter what comes or goes i will never beleve that you dun it may god help us both for i dont know the menet their will be a warrent for me but i think that the lord will help us out of our truble oh do come to me at once if you can if i am not at home come right to fathers for i have not been home ever since and i will tell you what to do for i have found out a good dll and the say if the cant pruve inny thung againce you that you can make it hot for george emorey for skendel oh my dear i am so onsey that i dont know what to do my Dear we are all well and i hope you are the same oh my dear dont for get me for i am sure that i never will for get you my dear i think you had better come and sho them that you are not afraid for i know that you nev dun it but do as you think best but the say it would be so mutch better for you for it wood sho them you was innsed and was not afraid to come so good Bye my Dear love."

This letter read between the lines is a curious psychological study.

The evidence against Mrs. Emory proved conclusively that she had reason to believe that her husband would be slain by Davis, but there was nothing to show that she approved of it or took any part in it. The jury after a short absence brought in a verdict of guilty against Davis, but acquitted Mrs. Emory.

A curious point as to the advisibility of evidence arose in this case. There was no ruling upon the point as the Counsel for the Crown decided not to offer the evidence, At the Coroner's inquest a witness had sworn that he had met Emory the night before the murder coming from the hay marsh, that Emory was crying and upon being asked what was the matter he said that Davis had come to him and had said that if he (Emory) would leave the country so that he (Davis) might have Mrs. Emory, he would spare his life, but if not he would kill him. Emory stated to the witness that he had promised Davis to leave the country, but

he said now he had changed his mind and he would take his rifle with him to the swamp and run his chances. It would seem to be fairly clear that this was not evidence, but the fact of it not being so is a striking commentary upon the artificiality of the rules of evidence as administered by our courts. Nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand would say, without hesitation, that a statement of this kind made by Emory immediately before his murder would be strong proof of who the murderer was.

Davis died as stolidly as he had lived; he showed no desire for life or fear of death. Mrs. Emory, it is said, haunted the vicinity of the gaol where Davis was confined until his execution. She afterwards married again.

W. R. RIDDELL.

A contemporary relates the following incident which is worth noting now that attorneys have passed off the scene and solicitors have taken their place: When Lord Tenterden was Chief Justice a gentleman pressing into his Court, which was crowded at the time, complained that he could not get to his counsel. Lord Tenterden: "What are you, sir? "My Lord, I am the plaintiff's solicitor." Lord Tenterden : "We know nothing about solicitors here, sir. Had you been in the respectable rank of an attorney I should have ordered room to be made for you."

ENGLISH CASES.

EDITORIAL REVIEW OF CURRENT ENGLISH
DECISIONS.

(Registered in accordance with the Copyright Act.)

MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE INTEREST--REDEMPTION.

Hill v. Rowlands (1897), 2 Ch. 361, is a case touching the law of mortgages. The action was for foreclosure, and judgment had been obtained, and in pursuance thereof an account taken, and a day six months distant appointed for redemption. The defendant desired to redeem at once without the appointment of any day, and claimed that the plaintiff was bound to accept the money at once with interest only up to the date of payment; but the Court of Appeal (Lindley, Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ.) agreed with Romer, J., that the usual course of the Court is to allow six months to redeem in order to enable the mortgagor to find the money, and on the other hand to enable the mortgagee to find a new investment, and that after judgment it is not competent for the defendant to dispense with the usual time for redemption, if the plaintiff object. Although before judgment the plaintiff could not refuse to accept the money if tendered with interest to the date of tender. In view of 51 Vict. c. 15, s. 2 (O), and R.S.C., c. 127, s. 7, it is possible that a different view might be arrived at by the Courts in Ontario, where a mortgagor has a statutory right to pay off the mortgagor without notice, or the payment of interest in lieu thereof.

STAYING

PROCEEDINGS-NON-PAYMENT

VEXATIOUS PROCEEDINGS.

OF INTERLOCUTORY COSTS

In Graham v. Sutton (1897), 2 Ch. 367, an application was made by the defendants to stay the proceedings until the costs of an appeal had been paid by the plaintiff. The Court of Appeal (Lindley, Lopes and Chitty, L.JJ.), though conceding that according to the modern practice the mere non-payment of interlocutory costs is no longer of itself a ground for staying proceedings by the party in default, nevertheless

ordered the stay in the present case, on the ground that it appeared that the plaintiff had used the process of the Court vexatiously and oppressively.

BICYCLE-ARREST OF RIDER -NEGLECT TO CARRY LAMP.

Hatton v. Treeby (1897), 2 Q.B. 452, is a decision on a case stated by justices. By the Local Government Act, 1888, persons riding bicycles at night are required to carry lights. The complainant was riding a bicycle at night without a light and the defendant, a constable, had called on him. to stop, and, upon his refusing to do so, had caught hold of the handle bar whereby the complainant was thrown to the ground, and the complainant thereupon summoned the constable for assault. The justices found that the constable did not know the name and address of the complainant, and could not have ascertained them without stopping him, and that in so stopping him he used no more force than was necessary, and they were of opinion that as the complainant was committing an offence punishable on summary conviction, within view of the constable, he was justified in doing as he did, and they dismissed the complaint, subject to the opinion of the Court on the case stated. The Divisional Court (Collins and Ridley, JJ.), however, were of opinion that as the Act gave no power to apprehend without warrant a person committing a breach of its provisions, the act of the constable was illegal, and the appeal was allowed.

FIXTURES-MOVABLE CHATTELS-ANNEXATION TO FREEHOLD-STUFFED BIRD

COLLECTION.

In Hill v. Bullock (1897) 2 Ch. 482, the Court of Appeal (Lindley, Lopes and Chitty, L. JJ.), have affirmed the decision of Kekewich, J. (1897), 2 Ch. 55 (noted ante vol. 33, p. 656), holding that a collection of stuffed birds attached to movable wooden trays placed in iron glass fronted cases affixed to the walls of a mansion house, were not to be treated as annexed to the freehold, but were movable chattels, and did not pass to a tenant for life of the mansion.

COUNTER CLAIM-LIBEL-ACTION BY FOREIGN STATE-ORDS. XXI. R. 15: XIX. R. 27-(ONT. RULES 254, 298).

South African Republic v. La Compagnie Franco-Belge (1897) 2 Ch. 487, was an action brought by the plaintiffs (a foreign state) against the defendants for the appointment of a new trustee of a fund raised upon debentures issued by the defendants, and guaranteed by the plaintiffs, and which by agreement of the parties were to be vested in two trustees, one of whom had died. The defendants by way of counter claim set up an alleged libel by the plaintiffs, and claimed damages therefor. On motion of the plaintiffs, North, J. struck out the counter claim and the claim for damages, and his order was affirmed by the Court of Appeal (Lindley, Ludlow and Chitty, L.JJ.), on the ground that if the case had been one between private individuals within the jurisdiction a counter claim for libel in such a case would be struck out, and the defendant left to bring a cross action, as such a claim could not conveniently or properly be tried in an action to appoint a new trustee, and that the fact that the plaintiffs were a foreign state and therefore not amenable to a cross action for libel, was an additional reason why such a claim should not be allowed to be linked on to the present action. And the order was held to be justified by Ord. xxi. r. 15 (Ont. Rule 254), or Ord. xix. r. 27 (Ont. Rule 298).

TRACING DESCENT-HEIR AT LAW-INHERITANCE ACT, 1833 (3 & 4 W. 4, C. 106) SS 1, 2, (R S.O. (1887) c. 108, s 14).

In re Matson, James v. Dickenson (1897) 2 Ch. 509. The question to be determined was the manner in which real estate descends under the old law of descent in force in Ontario prior to the Devolution of Estates Act, 1886, under the following circumstances. The land in question was purchased in 1798 by one James Fictor. He died in 1804 intestate, and leaving one son and two daughters. The son entered as heir at law, and died intestate in 1862, leaving a sister, and a nephew and niece (the children of a deceased sister). The nephew became lunatic, and his moiety was

« AnteriorContinuar »