sold, and on his death the proceeds of the sale devolved as realty, and the question was how the heir to the deceased nephew's moiety was to be ascertained, was the descent to be traced from the original purchaser, James Fictor, or from the mother of the deceased nephew? Kekewich, J., by a judicious extension of the doctrine of Cooper v. France, 19 L. J., Ch. 313, held that the descent should be traced from the nephew's mother, notwithstanding the words of the Inheritance Act, 1833, s. 2. (R.S.O. 1887, c. 108, s. 14.)

RELIEF OVER AGAINST CO-DEFENDANT.

In re Holt (1897) 2 Ch. 525. This was an action brought against a tenant for life and the executor of a deceased trustee, of a settlement alleging that the deceased trustees had committed a breach of trust by advancing the trust funds to the tenant for life and her husband. The executors in their statement of defence claimed relief over against the tenant for life, a married woman, alleging that the alleged breach had been committed with her consent, and asking to be indemnified out of her interest in the trust estate. No notice had been given to the tenant for life of this claim, but at the trial of the action leave was given to the executors, without going into evidence, to apply in chambers, with reference to enforcing their rights, if any, to indemnity against the tenant for life. COSTS INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS ADJOURNED TO TRIAL COSTS RESERVED. British Natural P. P. Association v. Bywater (1897) 1 Ch. 531, was a motion after the trial for certain interlocutory costs, which had been reserved. Bryne, J., who heard the motion, stated that the following directions had been made by the judges as to interlocutory costs, viz.: "Where interlocutory applications have been ordered to stand to the trial, and are not then mentioned to the judge, the costs of such applications are to be treated as costs in the action and taxed accordingly, and need not be mentioned in the judgment. When interlocutory applications have been disposed of, but the costs have been reserved, such costs are not to be mentioned, in the judgment or order, or allowed on taxation, without the special direction of the judge."

ALIMONY-CRUELTY.

In Russell v. Russell (1897) A. C. 395, the House of Lords have by a majority of one decided that a false charge of having committed an unnatural criminal offence brought by a wife against her husband, although published to the world, and persisted in after she did not believe in its truth, is not sufficient evidence of legal cruelty to entitle the husband to a judicial separation. The Lords in favour of this opinion being Lords Herschell, Watson, Macnaghten, Shand, and Davey, and those of the contrary opinion, Lord Halsbury, L.C., and Lords Hobhouse, Ashbourne, and Morris.

RAILWAY-RIGHT OF RAILWAY TO EXCLUDE PERSONS FROM STATION.

The Perth General Station Committee v. Ross (1897) A. C. 479, was an action in a Scotch Court to determine the question how far a railway company has a right to exclude persons not being travellers from admission to their station, or to impose on such persons conditions of admittance. The controversy arose from the fact that the railway company had a hotel in connection with their station, and they refused to admit other hotel proprietors or their servants, except upon the terms that no such persons should wear any distinctive badge or livery. The House of Lords (Lords Halsbury, L.C., Watson, Davey and Macnaghten) reversing the decision of the Scotch Court held that the railway company had the right to do as they had done. Lord Morris, however, dissented from this judgment.

LIFE INSURANCE-PROVISO FOR CASH PAYMENT OF PREMIUM- -ONUS PROBANDI INSURER'S AGENT--PAYMENT OF PREMIUM BY NOTES

London & Lancashire Life Assurance Co. v. Fleming, (1897) A.C. 499, determines a very important point on the law relating to insurance. The action was brought to recover on a policy of life insurance, which contained a provision to the effect that it was not to be in force until the first premium was paid, and that if a note be taken for the first or renewal premium, and not paid, the policy should be void at and from default. The defence was that the premium had not been

paid, and that the policy was therefore not in force. The evidence showed that the agent had accepted a note for the amount of the premium, which note had been discounted, but had not been paid at maturity, but that the agent had been charged with the premium in an account current with the assurance company and had given his note to the company in discharge of the account. At the trial Meredith, C.J. C.P., held that the premium had been paid: the Court of Appeal were equally divided, Hagarty, C.J.O., and Burton, J.A., being of opinion that there had been no payment of the premium established; while Maclennan and Osler, JJ.A., thought the evidence established payment of the premium. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council Lords Macnaghten and Morris and Sir R. Couch and Sir Henry Strong) were of the opinion that the onus of proving payment was on the assured and that he had not discharged that onus, that there was no presumption arising from the agent's acceptance of the note, that he was to raise money thereon and pay the premium. Nor did the charging of the premium against the agent by the company in his account create any presumption of an intention on the part of the company to treat their own agent as the agent of the insured, or the policy as subsisting contrary to its express terms, the appeal was therefore allowed and the action dismissed. We may note that the judgment of the Privy Council was delivered by Sir Heny Strong.

MISDIRECTION-WITHDRAWAL OF CASE FROM JURY SETTING ASIDE VERDICT,

Kingston v. Kingston (1897) A. C. 509, was an action of ejectment. At the trial the plaintiffs' title was admitted, and the defendants set up title by possession. Conflicting evidence was offered as to the defendants' possession, and the jury were unable to agree on a verdict for the plaintiff, and they were thereupon recalled by the judge, who directed them that as the plaintiffs had not proved possession by themselves for twelve years prior to the action, their verdict should be for the defendant. This their Lordships of the

Privy Council (Lords Macnaghten and Morris, and Sir R. Couch and Mr. Way), held to the misdirection, and they allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial. In this case the judgment of the Privy Council was delivered by Mr. Way.

AGREEMENT-CONSTRUCTION-MONOPOLY OF SUPPLY.

Kimberley Waterworks Co. v. De Beers Consolidated Mines (1897) A.C. 515, was an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope, in which the point at issue was the construction of an agreement whereby the defendants agreed, during the continuance of the agreement, to obtain and purchase all the water required for their mines from the plaintiff company, and no other person or company “provided that nothing herein contained shall prevent (the defendant company) from using any water obtained by it from the mines or its wells or reservoirs." The defendants had procured a supply of water for their mines from a municipal corporation gratis, and the question was whether this amounted to a breach of the agreement. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Lords Hobhouse, Macnaghten and Morris, Sir Couch and Mr. Way), were of opinion that it did, and was not within the proviso above referred to.

PAROL EVIDENCE-WRITTEN AGREEMENT.

Bank of Australasia v. Palmer (1897) A.C. 540 turns upon a question arising on the the law of evidence. The plaintiff (Palmer) claimed damages for the dishonour of a cheque. He alleged that the cheque was drawn in pursuance of an agreement under which the bank was to allow him an overdraft or cash credit for six months certain, and that it was dishonoured in breach of this agreement. The defendants relied on a letter subsequently signed by the plaintiff, which purported to make the prior agreement terminable at any time at the option of the defendants. The question on the appeal was whether the judge at the trial was right in admitting evidence of a conversation between the plaintiff and the

defendant's agent at the time the letter was signed. The Bank contended that it ought to have been rejected because it was offered in contradiction of the written agreement, or part of the written agreement between the parties. The plaintiff on the other hand claimed it was properly admissible to explain the circumstances under which the plaintiff's name was subscribed to the letter which was no part of the agreement, but which was placed before him for his signature by the defendant's agent after the agreement was concluded. Their Lordships of the Privy Council (Lords Macnaghten and Morris and Sir R. Couch and Mr. Way) were of opinion that the evidence was admissible, notwithstanding that the subsidiary document in effect purported practically to make the prior agreement revocable at the option of the defendants. Lord Morris, who delivered the judgment, says: "Their Lordships cannot help observing that, if the bank should in future contract to advance money for a definite period, and at the same time desire to have the power of recalling the advance at their discretion, thus making the agreement nugatory, it would not be amiss to state clearly, what they do mean, and to take care that their meaning is understood by the person with whom they are dealing."

JUSTICES-DISQUALIFICATION-BIAS.

The Queen v. Burton, (1897) 2 Q.B. 468, was an application against two justices to show cause why the conviction of one Young should not be quashed on the ground that Burton, one of the justices, was disqualified. The prosecution was brought at the instance of the Incorporated Law Society against Young for falsely pretending to be a solicitor, and he was convicted and fined 40s. Burton was a member of the society, but no part of the fine was payable to the society. Lawrence and Collins, JJ. refused the motion, being of opinion that the facts furnished no reasonable ground for supposing that there would be any bias on the part of the magistrate, who was not disqualified from acting either on the ground of having any pecuniary interest in the proceedings, or as being a prosecutor. be noticed that the motion here was for a writ of certiorari to remove and quash the conviction. In Ontario it has

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may