April, 1849. The Attorney-General demurred to the answer of the defendant June 25, 1849. The demurrer was argued before Mr. Justice Johnson in October, 1849, who gave judgment for the defendant Feb. 18, 1850. From this decision the plaintiffs appealed, and the appeal was argued at the general term at Rochester, in November, 1850. The judgment was affirmed, an appeal to the court of appeals was prosecuted, and the cause was argued in the court of appeals at the January term, 1851. It is not yet decided by that

court.

THE PEOPLE, &c., agt.

WILLIAM ARNOLD.

Ejectment for lands in the county of Livingston. (Pultney purchase.)

This action was commenced by Mr. Jordan contemporaneously with the cause against Butler, and it has taken the same course in all respects.

If these two last mentioned causes are ever tried on an issue of fact, the Legislature must provide means to obtain the indispensable testimony of several witnesses residing in Europe. The sum required will not be less than $2,000 I beg leave to refer the Senate to my suggestions of last year in connection with this subject.

THE PEOPLE, &c., Ejectment to recover possession of lands agt. STEPHEN VAN RENSSELAER. in Albany county. (Rensselaerwyck.)

This action was commenced by Mr. Jordan, May 1st, 1849. TheAttorney-General demurred to the answer of the defendant, and the issue of law joined thereon was argued in Oct. 1849, at a special term, before Mr. Justice Hand. Judgment on demurrer was given for the plaintiff in May 1850, with leave to the defendants to amend.. An issue of fact was joined, on an amended answer, July 31, 1850. The cause was placed on the calendar, by the defendant, for trial at the last Albany circuit, but it was not tried in consequence of the inability of Mr. Van Buren, the counsel appointed by the Governor to try the cause at that circuit.

THE PEOPLE, &c.,
agt.

WILLIAM P. VAN RENSSELAER,

and others.

Ejectment to recover possession of lands in the county of Rensselaer. (Renselaerwyck.)

This action was commenced by Mr. Jordan, May 1, 1849, and the proceedings were the same in this as in the last preceding cause until an issue of fact was joined therein.

The cause was placed on the calendar for trial at the last October circuit in Rensselaer, by the defendants, but was not tried in consequence of my necessary attendance on the trial of the People, vs. Overing & Gammel, at the Delaware circuit.

It was again placed on the calendar at the last Rensselaer circuit, and a jury being waived, the parties proceeded to trial before Mr. Justice Harris. After taking testimony, the further trial of the cause was postponed, by agreement, until the close of the next Albany general term. It will probably be finally concluded during the

month of March next.

THE PEOPLE, &c., agt.

HARMON LIVINGSTON.

Ejectment for lands in Columbia county. (Livingston manor.)

This action was commenced by Mr. Jordan, August 7, 1849. Issues of fact were joined therein September 19, 1849. The cause was tried at the Columbia circuit, in April, 1850, before Mr. Justice Wright. After the testimony was closed, the parties waived the jury, and, by agreement, postponed the final argument of the law and facts in the cause to a future day. This argument was made before the said Justice at Albany, May 27, 1850. The decision was delayed by Judge Wright until November last, when he gave judgment for defendant, as I am informed. I have not, as yet, been furnished by the Judge, or by the opposite party, with a copy of the opinion, or of the rule for judgment.

THE PEOPLE, &C., Scire facias to recover a grant of land in
agt.
Montgomery county.
GEORGE CLARK.

This action was commenced by Mr. Jordan, under the code, by a proceeding in the nature of a scire facias, to annul a patent or grant of lands, Nov. 1, 1849. Issues of law were joined therein on the 1st of February, 1850. On the 16th of March the complaint was amended, and issues of law and fact were finally joined on the 22d of October last. The parties deemed it advisable so to frame the issue of law as to present the single question, whether the statute of forty years limitation can be interposed as a bar to an action brought to annul a patent, and this issue will probably lead to a construction of the act of 1801 and of 1849, and the final decision will, in a great measure, be decisive of all questions relating to the validity of the

ancient patents or grants of land in this State. This issue of law was very elaborately argued, at the last Montgomery special term, before Mr. Justice Cady, by Mr. Van Buren, for the people, and Messrs. Beardsley and Hill for the defendants. Without doubt Mr. Cady will bring to the examination of this important question, that great learning and profound judgment for which he is so justly distinguished, and his decision will be regarded as nearly, if not entirely, conclusive.

THE PEOPLE, &c., agt.

GEORGE CLARK.

Scire facias to annul a grant of lands in Otsego county.

This action was commenced by me on the 18th of February last past, by the service of a summons. No proceedings have been taken in the cause since the service of the summons, nor has the suit been discontinued. The decision of Mr. Justice Cady, in the preceding case, may be decisive of this action.

THE PEOPLE, &C., Scire facias to annul the Oriskany patent, Oneida against county.

GEORGE CLARKE.

This action was commenced by me in February, 1850, and stands in the same situation as the last preceding case.

The above statement embraces all the facts connected with the prosecution of rhe "manorial suits."

The inquiry, (which I regret to believe contains a covert and implied censure,)" why the pending actions instituted pursuant to said resolution have not been tried," cannot need, if it deserves an answer. The senate must be aware, that the questions arising in these cases are not within the usual range of professional avocations, and that more time and labor must be devoted to the collection of facts and the examination of the law preparatory to a trial of them, or any of them, than is necessary in cases of ordinary character and magnitude.

The ordinary duties of the office of Attorney general, if properly and faithfully performed, require the constant and active services of the incumbent; and I certainly do not feel conscious of any want of attention to these suits; on the contrary, I am satisfied that they have been prosecuted with as much expedition as fair minded men could justly expect.

I am also asked, "whether, in my opinion, the people of this State have any claim or rights to recover any lands within any of said manors or tracts of land, including any which have been occupied or cultivated under leases for more than forty years past."

This question involves a variety of important considerations, and covers the whole ground of the pending controversy. These considerations have been presented in the suits which have been tried, and all the grounds of action and of recovery, relied on by the State, are now pending in some form in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. I choose to await the judgment of the courts, without expressing any opinion I now entertain in relation to the ability of the State to maintain title to any of these manor lands. If the courts shall hold that a possession of forty years bars an action brought directly upon a patent to annul it, then it is most obvious that the State cannot maintain any action for the recovery of any considerable portion of the lands covered by the early grants, and the fragments which have not been occupied for forty consecutive years are too worthless and inconsiderable to justify any litigation or question of the title by the State.

How far the statute of limitations may be interposed as a defence to the proceeding, in the nature of a scire facias, and with what effect, are questions which have recently engaged the attention of able and ingenious counsel, but a wide diversity of opinion exists with regard to them. The courts will ere long definitively settle the law of these and all other questions involved in these suits, and I trust in such a manner as to secure the confidence of the public, and restore permanent tranquillity to localities where discontent has for so many years and so generally existed.

If it shall be determined that the limitation of forty years does not apply to cases of scire facias, the proprietors of these lands will be driven to rely on the validity of their respective patents. The defects which are supposed to exist in most if not all of these patents, were prominent in the grants to Robert Livingston, and were as clearly and satisfactorily proved on the trial of the case of "The People vs. Harmon Livingston" as I can hope or expect to prove them in any other case. The final adjudication of this action will therefore determine all the questions, (except the statute of limitations,) on which the claim of the people to recover rests.

I hold it to be clearly my right, if not my duty to refrain from the expression of any opinion in any case under my charge which is undergoing judical investigation, and the great anxiety which is felt in relation to the result of these actions, and the immense interests which are embarked in them, render it peculiarly appropriate that the law which is to govern and determine these important interests should be judicially pronounced, and I shall leave it to the courts to pronounce it.

I shall take this occasion to renew the expression of my dissatisfaction with this leasehold tenure of farm lands. It is utterly opposed to the spirit of our institutions, and unsuited to the tastes, dispositions and habits of our people. Wherever it exists, discontent, ignorance, and a want of thrift and improvement will abound, and its continuance is alike injurious to the landlord and tenant. If the sovereign power cannot rightfully and justly interpose to remedy the evil, it is hoped that the interests, patriotism and love of order of both landlord and tenant, will speedily lead to an amicable adjustment of existing difficulties and to an early extinguishment of this tenure by fair and equitable bargain and sale, thus converting the large tracts now subject to this incubus into free and prosperous estates. The public good requires this to be done, and I should be most happy to be able to impress the conviction on the minds of all interested in this controversy, that it is better to buy and sell on such terms as justice and conscientious dealing will sanction, than to be subject to the harrassing inquietude, fear, hope, strife and bitterness which litigation on any terms, and under any circumstances is sure to bring in its train.. Respectfully submitted.

L. S. CHATFIELD, Attorney General.