less. You doubtless need no such proof. I have produced them for two reasons: the first, to justify myself, in some measure, for not attempting a definition, in which no one has yet succeeded; the second, to show that notwithstanding all the fruitless attempts at definition, which have been made, and notwithstanding the variety of method in which men have chosen to make these attempts; yet, for substance, there is a far greater unanimity of opinion among Trinitarians, than you and your friends seem to be willing to concede. I grant freely, that there is a great variety, in the mode, by which an attempt at definition or illustration is made. With my present views, I can never look upon any attempts of this nature, but with regret. But I am very far from accusing them, generally, of any ill design; much less can I treat them with contempt.

Patient investigation and candor will lead one to believe, as it seems to me, that the thing aimed at was, in substance, to assert the idea of a distinction in the Godhead. To do this with the more success, as they imagined, they endeavoured to describe affirmatively the nature of that distinction. Here they have all failed. But does this prove, that there is actually a great variety of opinion among Trinitarians, in regard to the principal thing concerned, merely because endeavours to define this thing, have produced a great variety of illustration? I cannot help feeling that this matter is sometimes misrepresented, and very generally but little understood.

And now can you by arguing a priori, prove to me that the doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent with itself, or "subversive of the doctrine of divine Unity," and therefore untrue? We say the divine essence and attributes are numerically one, so far as they are known to us; but that there is in the Godhead, a real distinction between the Father and the Son. (I omit the consideration of the Holy Spirit here, because your Sermon merely hints at this subject; and because all difficulties, in respect to the doctrine of the Trinity, are essentially connected with proving or disproving the Divinity of Christ.) We abjure all attempts to define that distinction; we admit it simply as a fact, on the authority of divine Revelation. Now how can you prove

that a distinction does not exist, in the Godhead? I acknowledge that the want of evidence, in the Scriptures, to esta

D

blish the fact, would be a sufficient reason for rejecting it. But we are now making out a statement of the subject, and answering objections that are urged a priori, or independently of the Scriptures. The proof, which the New Testament exhibits, we are hereafter to examine. How then, I repeat it, are you to show that we believe in a self contradiction, or in an impossibility? If the distinction in question cannot be proved, independently of the Scriptures, (and most freely I acknowledge it cannot;) it is equally certain that it cannot, in this manner be disproved. In order to prove that this distinction contradicts the divine Unity, must you not be able to tell what it is, and what the divine Unity is? Can you do either?

assert.

Allow me, for a moment, to dwell on the subject now casually introduced. It is a clear point I think, that the unity of God cannot be proved, without revelation. It may perhaps be rendered faintly probable. Then you depend on Scripture proof, for the establishment of this doctrine. But have the Scriptures any where told us what the divine Unity is? Will you produce the passage? The oneness of God they But this they assert always, in opposition to the idols of the heathen the polytheism of the Gentiles-the gods superior and inferior, which they worshipped. In no other sense, have the scriptures defined the ONENESS of the Deity. What then is Oneness, in the uncreated, infinite, eternal Being? In created and finite objects, we have a distinct perception of what we mean by it: but can created objects be just and adequate representatives of the uncreated ONE? Familiar as the assertion is, in your conversation and in your Sermons, that God is ONE, can you give me any definition of this oneness, except a negative one? That is, you deny plurality of it; you say God is but one, and not two, or more. Still, in what, I ask, does the divine Unity consist? Has not God different and various faculties, and pow ers? Is he not almighty, omniscient, omnipresent, holy, just, and good? Does he not act differently, i. e. variously, in the natural, and in the moral world? Does his unity consist, then, appropriately in his essence? But what is the essence of God? And how can you assert that his unity consists appropriately in this, unless you know what his essence is, and whether oneness can be any better predicated of this, than of his attributes?

Your answer to all this is; The nature of God is beyond my reach; I cannot define it. I approach to a definition of the divine unity, only by negatives.' That is, you deny the numerical plurality of God; or you say there are not two or more essences, omnisciences, omnipotencies, &c. But here all investigation is at an end. Is it possible to show, what constitutes the internal nature of the divine essence, or attributes; or how they are related to each other; or what internal distinctions exist? About all this Revelation says not one word; certainly the book of nature gives no instruction concerning it. The assertion then that God is one, can never be fairly understood as meaning any thing more, than that he is numerically one; i. e. it simply denies polytheism, and never can reach beyond this. But how does this prove, or how can it prove, that there may not be, or that there are not distinctions in the Godhead, either in regard to attributes, or essence, the nature of which is unknown to us, and the existence of which is to be proved, by the authority of the Scriptures only?

When Unitarians, therefore, inquire what that distinction in the Godhead is, in which we believe; we answer, that we do not profess to understand what it is; we do not undertake to define it affirmatively. We can approximate to a definition of it, only by negatives. We deny that the Father is, in all respects, the same as the Son; and that the Holy Spirit is, in all respects, the same as either the Father or the Son. We rest the fact, that a distinction exists, solely upon the basis of Revelation.

In principle then, what more difficulty lies in the way of believing in a threefold distinction of the Godhead, than in believing in the divine Unity.

I am certainly willing to allow, that the evidences of the divine Unity, in the New Testament, are sufficient. But I may be permitted to suggest, here, that in my view, the passages asserting it are fewer in number, than the passages which assert or imply that Christ is truly divine. I cannot but think that the frequent assertions of your Sermon, and of Unitarians in general, with regard to this subject, are very erroneous; that they are made at hazard, and without a diligent and faithful comparison of the number of texts that respect the divine Unity, in the new Testament, and the number of those which concern the divinity of the

Saviour. After all; to what purpose is it, that so great a multitude of texts should be required, to prove the divinity of Christ, by those who believe, as you do, that the decis ions of the Scriptures are of divine authority? The decis ion of one text, fairly made out by the laws of exegesis, is as authoritative as that of a thousand. Would a law a thousand times repeated, have any more authority attached to it for the repetition? It might be better explained, by the repetition in different connexions; but its authority is uniformly the same.

But, to return from this digression; suppose I should affirm that two subjects, A and B are numerically identical in regard to something called X, but diverse, or distinct, in regard to something else called Y: is there any absurdity or contradiction in this affirmation? I hope I shall not, by making this supposition, be subjected to the imputation, of endeavouring to prove the doctrine of the Trinity by the science of Algebra; for my only object in proposing this statement is, to illustrate the answer that we make, to a very common question, which Unitarians put us; "How can three be one, and one three?" In no way, I necessarily and cheerfully reply. "How then is the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity to be vindicated? In a manner which is not at all embarrassed by these questions. We do not maintain that the Godhead is three, in the same respects that it is one, but the reverse. In regard to X, we maintain its numerical unity; in regard to Y, we maintain a threefold distinction; I repeat it, we maintain simply the fact that there is such a distinction, on Scripture authority. We do not profess to understand in what it consists.

Will you not concede, now, provided the statements made above are correct, that we are not very unreasonable, when we complain, that from the time in which Tertullian maintained the doctrine of the Trinity against Praxeas, down to the present period, the views and statements of Trinitarians, in regard to this subject, should have been so frequently misunderstood or misrepresented?

I have dwelt sufficiently on my statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, and of the difficulties that lie in the way of proving this statement to be erroneous or contradictory. Before I proceed to the next topic, I will merely mention, in a brief way, two of the most formidable ob

jections to our views which I have seen, and which were adduced by two men, who must be reckoned among the most intelligent, that have embraced the cause of Unitarianism. The first is from Faustus Socinus, and runs thus:

"No one is so stupid, as not to see that these things are contradictory, that our God, the creator of heaven and earth, should be one only in number, and yet be three, each of which is our God. For as to what they affirm that our God is one in number, in respect to his essence, but threefold in regard to persons; here again they affirm things which are self-contradictory, since two, or three persons cannot exist, where there is numerically only one individual essence; for to constitute more than one person, more than one individual essence is required For what is person, but a certain individual, intelligent essence? Or in what way, I pray does one person differ from another, unless by the diversity of his individual or numerical essence?... This implies, that the divine essence, is numerically one only, yet that there is more than one person; although the Divine essence which is numerically one, and divine person are altogether identical." (Opp. tom. i. p. 697.)

Here, however, it is obvious that the whole weight of the objection lies in an erroneous use of the words person and essence. Socinus attaches to them a sense, which Trinitarians do not admit. How then can Trinitarians be charged with inconsistencies, in propositions which they do not make?

Of the same tenor with the objection of Socinus, is the objection mentioned by the famous Toellner, (Theolog. Untersuchungen, B. I. p. 29,) which, to save room, I shall merely translate, without subjoining the original. "The most considerable objection, (against the doctrine of the Trinity,) is this," says he, "that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are each a particular substance endowed with understanding; and at the same time, neither of them is said to have his separate being, his separate understanding, his separate will, his separate power of action; but all three together have only one being, one understanding, one will, one power of action. As it appears then, it is affirmed that there are three real beings, truly separate; each, consequently, having his own individual power of action, and not having it; three separate persons, and three persons not separate."