tion, drills, and discipline, just as do officers of the line, awarding punishments and being guided and governed in these military duties by the same regulations that guide and govern officers of the line.

"The command of a hospital ship should unquestionably be vested in a medical officer and no line officer should be aboard it. The medical officer in such case is simply the responsible head of a large hospital plant, which by reason of his training he is peculiarly fitted to command. It is not his province to navigate the vessel; that should be left to a civilian sailing master; but he, and he alone, is best qualified to respect and guard the neutrality of the ship. "The absurdity of permitting a line officer to command a hospital ship was shown in the case of the United States hospital ship Solace during the war with Spain, when the line officer in command actually attempted to put in a claim for prize money for the part the Solace took in the capture of the Adula while the Solace was flying the Red Cross flag and professing neutrality. On another occasion the Solace interfered with the progress of a schooner in the old Bahama channel, so that the United States torpedo boats near by could board and investigate her.

"On yet another occasion, but for the vigilance of the medical officer aboard her, the Solace would have carried armed men from New York to Cuba. Her senior medical officer reported the violation of neutrality to the Navy Department and the ship was recalled after passing through the narrows and the armed men removed.

"In the Russo-Japanese War a Russian hospital ship violated her neutrality, and was captured and confiscated by the Japanese. In time of war the presence of combatants—that is, of line officers or crew-would certainly cast a suspicion upon the neutrality of the ship, and no lineofficer worth his salt would wish to be on such a ship, while it seems incredible that any line officer should desire to have another line officer on board such a ship. Hospitals, afloat or ashore, should no more be under the command of line officers than regiments or warships should be under the command of surgeons; one kind of appointment is quite as inappropriate as the other. Hospital ships should be maintained in time of peace exactly under the same conditions as in time of war. The system has been tried in the army and tried in foreign navies and has worked without a hitch. It is the only system that should be tolerated, and if it fails to work well this failure can only be due to lack of desire to have it work well on the part of those concerned.

"I direct that unless Congress provides otherwise the practice in the navy be assimilated to that now obtaining in the army. In the army the hospital ship is treated as a general hospital, and Article 1467 reads as follows: 'General hospitals will be under the exclusive control of the Surgeon-General, and will be governed by such regulations as the Secretary of War may prescribe. The senior surgeon will command the same."

"THEODORE ROOSEVELT."

THE ACTION TAKEN BY SECRETARY BONAPARTE

Reference to the records of the Navy Department has brought forth the complete text of the "indorsement"

made by Mr. Bonaparte on the report of the "Joint Board of Medical Officers Convened by the President to consider Improvements in First Aid Dressings and Uniformity of Equipment for the Medical Departments of the Army and Navy in regard to Hospital Ships." So far as can be ascertained from departmental records, Mr. Bonaparte gave no "order" for the placing of a surgeon in command of a hospital ship. The complete text of his "indorsement," copied verbatim from the Department's records, is as follows:

"Department's indorsement on the report of the joint board of medical officers convened by the President to consider improvements in first aid dressings and uniformity of equipment for the medical departments of the army and navy in regard to hospital ships.

"The department, having carefully considered the original report and the several preceding indorsements, holds, with respect to the matters not covered by its fifth indorsement of June 14, 1906, as follows:

"First-It is expedient to have one hospital ship in commission in time of peace, partly for the benefit of the personnel of the Atlantic fleet, to which such ship should be attached, but mainly as a school for surgeons, nurses, and the Hospital Corps in peculiar duties they would be required to perform in time of war. When such a ship is provided the department holds that the space allotted to sick bays on our more recent battleships and armored cruisers can be and ought to be materially reduced and employed for other purposes. The department does not deem it advisable, under existing circumstances, to construct such a hospital ship, inasmuch as a vessel of this class is already in existence and can be commissioned.

"Second-The department holds that such a ship, when in commission, should be treated as a floating hospital and as such placed under the command of a medical officer, her navigation being controlled by a competent sailing master. In war time the entire crew should be, so far as possible, specially enlisted from civilians as men of the Hospital Corps and for such time only as their services probably will be needed. In time of peace the crew, except such as are engaged in hospital duties, could be organized substantially as is that of a naval auxiliary, but subject to the provision above set forth as to the command. "Third-A hospital ship should be provided with a chaplain or chaplains of such faith as to be most serviceable to the greater number of patients aboard. "CHARLES J. BONAPARTE,

"Dec. 12, 1906.

Secretary."

RESIGNATION LETTER "INADVERTENTLY OMITTED" On January 6 Admiral Brownson's letter of resignation and the President's acceptance of it were given out at the White House. In giving out these letters it was stated: "The following correspondence was inadvertently omitted from that made public this morning". Admiral Brownson's letter was as follows:

"DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,

"BUREAU OF NAVIGATION,

"WASHINGTON, December 24, 1907.

"Sir: In April last I was detached by your order from the command of the United States Asiatic fleet and ordered to Washington and appointed chief of the most important bureau in the Navy Department, the bureau which under the Secretary is charged with matters relating to the personnel, the discipline, and the efficiency of the fleet.

"This transfer from a command which ranks second in importance afloat to one which is second to none on shore, coming on the eve of my retirement from active service, while not to my personal liking, was deeply gratifying to me, as it appeared to be an evidence of your confidence in my professional ability.

"In order, however, that any effort of mine to maintain a high standard of efficiency and discipline in the service be attended with success, it is absolutely essential that I should have the confidence of the service at large as well as that of higher authority. The efficiency of the fleet can only be maintained when the officers and men feel that the chief of the Bureau of Navigation has the confidence of the Commander in Chief of the army and navy and when a strong military spirit exists in the service. Anything that shows a lack of confidence or that tends to break down this military spirit, which has been the safeguard and principal asset of the navy since its beginning, can but impair such efficiency.

"The recent order placing a medical officer in command of a hospital ship is, in my opinion, and as I have endeavored on several occasions to point out to you, clearly opposed to the intent of the law, is a radical departure from established naval usage and fraught with danger to the efficiency of the fleet, will tend, I believe, to break down the military spirit of the service, and shows a want of your confidence in my advice regarding a matter so vital to the best interests of the service. I am left, therefore, with no alternative but to tender my resignation as chief of the Bureau of Navigation, much as I regret to sever my active connection with the service to which I have been devoted and to which I have given my best efforts for more than 46 years. Very respectfully, "WILLARD H. BROWNSON, "Chief of Bureau.

THE GILL RESOLUTION

On the following day Representative John Gill, Jr., of Maryland, offered his resolution, which the House passed several days later, directing Secretary Metcalf to furnish the House, for its information, copies of all official letters, reports, and orders connected with the resignation of Rear Admiral Brownson and the assignment of Surgeon Stokes to command the Relief. In securing the passage of this resolution, Representative Gill declared it was offered because he understood there were other letters which had not been made public by the Administration. He expressed the belief that correspondence between the President and Rear Admiral Brownson setting forth fully the latter's argument had been withheld from the public.

THE RESPONSE TO THE GILL RESOLUTION.

Responding to the resolution offered by Representative John Gill, Jr., of Maryland, the Secretary of the Navy transmitted to the House of Representatives on January 23 what purports to be all of the data on file in the Navy Department dealing with the resignation of Rear Admiral Brownson and the assignment of Surgeon Stokes to command the hospital ship Relief.

The material transmitted comprises:

Rear Admiral Brownson's letter of resignation dated December 24, 1907.

A copy of Special Order No. 61, under date of August 23, 1904, authorizing medical officers in charge of shore hospitals to use the term "in command of" to designate their respective official positions.

General Order No. 84, under date of May 5, 1906, War Department, giving the report of the Joint Board of Army and Navy Medical Officers which recommended the assignment of medical officers to the "command" of hospital ships.

The various departmental endorsements upon that report, including the endorsement of June 4, 1906, by Rear Admiral G. A. Converse, then Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, in opposition to the adoption of such a policy, and former Secretary Bonaparte's final endorsement of December 12, 1906, holding that, when commissioned, hospital ships should be "commanded" by medical officers.

Surgeon General Rixey's letter of November 6, 1907, to Secretary Metcalf, recommending the placing of the hospital ship Relief in commission.

Memoranda bearing no date, which was submitted to Secretary Metcalf by Surgeon General Rixey, setting forth "precedents," recent "examples of violation of neu

trality," argument for "medical officers to command hospital ships," and certain general remarks.

Rear Admiral Brownson's letter of November 18, 1907, setting forth, in twelve typewritten pages, his reasons for opposing the assignment of surgeons to the command of hospital ships.

The order of December 23, 1907, detailing Surgeon Stokes to command the Relief.

Surgeon General Rixey's request of December 23, to have the Relief commissioned by February 1.

Secretary Metcalf's order of December 30, 1907, detaching Surgeon Stokes from special temporary duty and ordering him to command the Relief when commissioned. Secretary Metcalf's letters of January 8 and 9, 1908, to the Commandant of the Mare Island Yard, directing that the Relief be placed in commission by February 1, 1908, as a naval auxiliary, with merchant officers and crew and a surgeon of the navy in command.

President Roosevelt's letters of January 2 and 4, 1908, to Secretary Metcalf, relative to Rear Admiral Brownson's resignation and the hospital ship question. And last, A letter written January 22, 1908,- only a day before the data were transmitted to the House,- directed to Secretary Metcalf, submitting an answer to Rear Admiral Brownson's letter of November 18, 1907.

THE ATTITUDE OF REAR ADMIRAL BROWNSON

The most important portion of this correspondence thus made public is the Brownson letter, or memorandum, of November 18. It is dignified and unbiased in tone, and sets forth fully the contention of the line officers. This is the communication which the Administration especially refrained from making public, until compelled to do so by a direction from the House of Representatives. It is the letter in which Rear Admiral Brownson declares that "The commissioning of a hospital ship for sea service as recommended by the Surgeon General will be fraught with endless complications." This letter shows that Rear Admiral Brownson objected to the Rixey policy because he regarded the assignment' of a naval surgeon to ship command as "contrary to the law," as conducive to "divided responsibility leading to confusion and poor command," and contrary to the best interests of the naval service. The complete argument of Rear Admiral Brownson, as set forth in this memorandum, is such an essential part of the controversy, that the text of the Brownson memorandum to Secretary Metcalf is set forth, as follows:

[The "Relief" to meet the Fleet at Magdalena Bay] "The Bureau appreciates the fact that at the present time the necessary accommodations for the sick on the Pacific Coast are inadequate, and, as stated in a recent endorsement by this Bureau on a communication from the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the Bureau intends to recommend the commissioning of the Relief as a hospital ship, in order that the vessel may be available when the battleships arrive at Magdalena Bay.

"The Bureau earnestly requests that the question of providing the officers and crew for the Relief, particularly as regards the command of the vessel, be reconsidered by the Department, and begs to submit the reasons which in the opinion of this Bureau should influence the Department in reversing its previous decision.

"An examination of the accompanying papers shows that the decision of the Department, dated December 12, 1906, which states, among other things, that a hospital ship when placed in commission shall be under the command of a medical officer, appears to be the outcome of the recommendation of a joint board of medical officers of the Army and Navy, convened by order of the Secretary of War. This board was appointed to "consider improvement in the first aid dressing and uniformity of equipment in the medical departments of the two services. [A Question for Line Officers to Decide]

"While the Bureau freely admits that the question of the medical equipment of a hospital ship is one on which the medical officers of the Army and Navy are eminently qualified to express an opinion, the Bureau begs to submit that the question of manning a sea-going vessel is one which sea line officers of the Navy are best qualified to decide.

"While a hospital ship is a vessel of peculiar international status and can only be employed in time of war for a specific purpose, the fact still remains that whether it is a hospital ship or not, it is a sea-going vessel, and in order to accompany the fleet to fulfill the purpose for which it is designed, it must be navigated and handled in the same seamanlike manner which is required of all vessels to ensure safety on the high seas.

"The Bureau begs to submit that, however qualified medical officers may be in their profession, there is on the other hand nothing in the training of a medical officer which fits him to command a sea-going vessel.

[Hospital Ships not exempt from Navigation Dangers] "The contention of the Surgeon General that a medical officer should command a hospital ship appears to be based entirely upon the assumption that such a ship is a floating hospital, as he states: 'It must be borne in mind that a hospital ship is a floating hospital and that the most finished professional training in navigation, ordnance, and seamanship does not render line officers well fitted to command hospitals.'

"The Bureau is well aware that it does not require professional training in navigation, ordnance, and seamanship to command a hospital, provided such hospital is located on shore or even if such a hospital were a hulk

securely and safely moored and not required to move; but the fact must not be lost sight of that the use to which a vessel is put has no effect whatever in lessening the dangers which will be encountered in navigating such ship in all kinds of weather and under various circumstances.

"It requires just as skillful a navigator to pilot a hospital ship as it does to pilot a man-of-war, a mail steamer. or a yacht. The difficulties of pilotage, navigation, and handling a vessel are wholly independent of its internal arrangements or the uses to which the vessel may be put.

[Not Floating Hospitals, but Sea-Going Vessels] "The statement of the Surgeon General that a hospital ship is not a man-of-war but a hospital' does not give a complete statement of the case. Without doubt a hospital ship is not a man-of-war, but has a peculiar status, which is clearly defined by the Geneva Convention. On the other hand, to call it a hospital does not fully describe the ship. It would be more nearly correct and descriptive of its true character to state that a hospital ship is a sea-going vessel having a large hospital on board, and it is for the general administration, navigation, and handling of the sea-going vessel that a sea line officer should be ordered to command. As to the control and administration of the medical department of such a vessel, existing regulations give the medical officers all necessary authority to control and care for their department on board ship.

"The Surgeon General again states that 'the command. of the medical officer should be absolute' and that the captain should not be a naval officer, but should belong to the merchant marine and should have entire control of the navigation of the ship and of the civilian crew and regulate discipline and matters pertaining to them. It would seem from this statement that in the opinion of the Surgeon General the navigation, safe conduct, and general administration of a sea-going vessel are secondary as regards the responsibilities of command.

"Telegraph operators or cable engineers are not put command of cable ships, nor are postmasters put in command of mail steamers. A battleship can with propriety be called a floating fort, but artillery officers are not fitted for the command of them. It must not be forgotten that a ship is an inanimate object and requires at all times a competent officer in command to ensure the safety of the vessel at sea.

"Long experience with merchant crews and officers on board naval colliers, tank ships, transports, supply vessels. etc., shows that officers of the merchant marine do not perform this duty as efficiently as naval officers.

[Methods of manning Naval Auxiliaries]

"Some years ago on the Asiatic Station the auxiliaries were manned in three different ways. First, a number with full naval crews. Second, others with merchant crews; and, third, several with a merchant crew and officers and one line officer of the Navy in command. In addition to the line officer there was a paymaster.

"As the result of experience with the various systems, all in force at the same time and under similar conditions, officers who have had experience with naval auxiliaries

agree that the most efficient organization is obtained when these vessels are manned with a full naval crew and it is only the fact that at present there is such a shortage of officers and men that naval auxiliaries are not so manned.

"Of the three systems above noted, that which caused the greatest number of complications and was the least efficient, i. e., a naval officer in command with a full merchant crew and officers. On board such vessels the crew and officers are amenable only to the navigation laws of the United States. They are shipped and discharged in the presence of a United States Naval Officer or the Shipping Commissioner, or in a foreign port in the presence of a United States Consul or U. S. Naval Officer. Neither the U. S. Navy Regulations nor the Navigation Laws of the United States contemplate any division of authority as exists on board a vessel so manned.

[The Colliers "Iris" and "Nanshan"]

"The following is an extract from a letter addressed by the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Asiatic Fleet to the Naval Officers in command of the Colliers Iris and Nanshan, defining the status of the officer in command and the Master:

""The naval officer in command will be held responsible for the navigation, safety, movement, preservation, and cleanliness of the vessel to which he is attached, and he shall relieve the master of such responsibilities whenever he finds it necessary to assume direct control himself.

""There are peculiar conditions existing on the Government vessels carrying merchant officers, with naval officers on board who have been placed there in the interest of the Government. By merchant laws all punishments, shippings, and discharges of crew, must be made by the master under existing laws. In addition to these, there are many functions on board these vessels that may not be exercised by the naval officer in command. But the naval officer in command is to be obeyed in all orders that he sees fit to give, and he will be held responsible for any orders promulgated by him. that are incompatible with the merchant laws of the United States, except as set forth in paragraph I of this letter, which are deemed essential for the best interests of the Government.

""The foregoing instructions being absolute, the naval officer in command will endeavor to arrange matters, through the Master, so that everything may work harmoniously, and that the Master may not seem to lose any of the privileges or authority due him by the merchant shipping laws of the United States.

"A copy of this letter shall be furnished the master of the vessel you command. He must agree to the conditions herein set forth, or be discharged from his position, if he is not satisfied with these decisions.' "The following letter was also addressed by the Commander-in-Chief to the masters of these vessels:

"A commissioned line officer of the United States Navy having been ordered to command the vessel of which you are master, you are hereby informed that all functions, duties and responsibilities regularly belong

ing to you as a duly installed master, under the laws governing the Merchant Marine of the United States, are retained by you.'

"Notwithstanding the fact that these instructions appear to be explicit, complications constantly arose, not only as regarding the navigation of the vessels, but also in respect to the administration of affairs including relations with the crew.

"As regards the navigation of the vessel, the case of the Iris running ashore on Sikijor Island may be cited, and the case of a disturbance created by the Second Officer of the Nanshan in the harbor of Hong Kong may also be mentioned as regards the relations of the naval officer with the crew.

[The "Iris" was run Ashore]

"A brief description of both these incidents may be of interest. The U.S.S. Iris was, in 1901, making passage from Cebu to Tacloban in the Philippine Islands, and ran ashore on Sikijor Island. A board appointed to investigate the grounding found it due to the ship's over-running the patent log, westerly current and leeway. thick weather. and poor judgment in setting the course. The Board also found that the naval officer in command 'Did not take all precautions to assure himself of the proper navigation of the ship, but owing to the anomalous position of a naval officer on board the Iris with a merchant crew and officers, subject to the orders of the master, and owing to the duties and responsibilities, and authority given the master by the United States laws for the Merchant service, the board is of the opinion that no further action should be taken in the case of but that Master

should be discharged.'

"Owing to the fact that there was divided authority on board the Iris, the Commander-in-Chief and the Department approved the finding of the Board. In this connection it may be stated that the naval officer was an officer of experience and unquestioned professional ability.

[The Case of the "Nanshan"]

"The case of the Nanshan was as follows: The Nanshan was at anchor in the harbor of Hong Kong; the Second Officer during the evening became intoxicated and noisy. The naval officer in command sent word to the master for him to pipe down. This the 2nd officer not only declined. but failed, to do. After several warnings, the naval officer directed the master to put the 2nd officer in irons. This the master declined to do, stating that his crew and officers were shipped under the Navigation Laws, which prohibited such action on his part while the vessel was in port. The naval officer then asked the master what he would do were he in actual command of the vessel without a naval officer on board. The master replied that he would send for the harbor police. The naval officer then directed him to request the Harbor Police to take charge of the 2nd officer. The Harbor Police declined to interfere, as the Nanshan was a government vessel under the command of a naval officer. At this juncture the 2nd officer retired to his room, locked the door, and threatened to shoot anybody who tried to force an entrance. After firing four shots through the door, the naval officer took

the law into his own hands, broke down the door and disarmed the 2nd officer.

"It will be noted from the foregoing that a situation. existed on board the Nanshan which no one was legally competent to cope with.

"Owing to the legal complications involved, the only action taken was to discharge the 2nd officer the following day in the Harbor of Hong Kong.

[The Essential Principles of Ship Administration] "If a hospital ship were merely a floating hospital, as the Surgeon General states in his endorsement, and the ship were securely moored and not called upon to move from point to point, it would perhaps be well not to have any sea line officers on board. It would appear, however, that in addition to the navigation of the vessel and ship administration connected therewith, the discipline of the crew has been entirely lost sight of. Both the law and the Navy Regulations state that officers of the line exercise military command. On board a hospital ship when in commission for sea service and cruising in company with a fleet, there will always be a certain number of enlisted men of the Navy, Marine Corps, and, perhaps, of the Army, who are convalescent, many of them practically well and nearly ready for duty.

"The temptation for these men to commit infractions of discipline will be various on board a hospital ship. and in addition to the ordinary infractions they will be liable to get into difficulties with the merchant crew of the vessel; the latter (if the vessel is manned in accordance with the recommendation of the Surgeon General) are amenable only to the navigation laws of the United States. The Bureau fails to see how there can be any complete control over the discipline of the personnel on board a hospital ship when part of such personnel is amenable only to one set of laws, the other to the Navy Regulations; the officer in command being an officer who by law is forbidden the right of exercising military command except in his own. corps, the master of the ship being a civilian with no legal right to control men in the Navy.

[The Cardinal Points of Military Command] "Officers intrusted with the command of United States vessels, whatever their rank, must, while properly in such command have full command, authority, and precedence over all officers and persons of whatever rank, serving in such vessels. The efficiency of every military organization requires of the commanding authority, besides the general duties of command and direction, the additional duties of organization, police, and inspection; all these appertain to and go with the command. The officer in command of a vessel is not authorized to delegate his power, except for the carrying out of the details of the general duties to be performed by his authority. The command is his and he can neither delegate the duties of it to another nor avoid its burdens, nor escape its official responsibilities which cannot be assumed by or fall upon any other person.

[Citations of the Statute Law]

"By the force of naval law, and regulations made in conformity therewith, the above principles are established