called for all documents, data, etc., on the official files relating to the resignation of Admiral Brownson and the appointment of Surgeon Stokes to command the Relief. As Admiral Brownson had resigned and could not longer. put on the official files any statement of his side of the discussion, it was manifestly improper for the department to send to Congress a letter from Surgeon General Rixey, dated January 22,— the day before the material was sent to the house. Dr. Rixey's letter of January 22 is another step in the same direction; for he begins it with the surprising statement that “ Admiral Brownson's written representations in regard to the hospital ship have just been brought to my attention," etc. In view of the previous conduct of the case, it passes understanding that Admiral Brownson's official memorandum of November 18 should have escaped Dr. Rixey's vigilance for more than two months.

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The record as sent to the House is incomplete in several points of interest. Secretary Bonaparte's decision that a hospital ship, when commissioned during time of peace, should be commanded by a medical officer, was in the form of an endorsement, dated December 12, 1906, on the report and recommendations of the Joint Army and Navy Medical Board of February 17, 1906. The matter sent to the House includes nothing between December 12, 1906, and November 6, 1907. On this latter date, Dr. Rixey, in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, asks for the commissioning of the Relief under the command of a medical officer. And in this letter to the Secretary occurs the following interesting paragraph, which, it seems to us, should lead the House to ask for further information. Dr. Rixey, says:

"All the necessary arrangements for the commissioning of this ship have been considered by this Bureau in advance, and her stores are either on board or at the Navy Yard, Mare Island, in readiness to be placed on board at short notice."

Again, Admiral Brownson, in his memorandum, says: "The experience gained with naval auxiliaries on board. of which divided authority existed is fully set forth in the enclosed report from the Senior Squadron Commander of the Asiatic fleet, and has a direct bearing on the present point at issue."

Fairness would seem to demand that this report of the Senior Squadron Commander should have been sent to the House; but it was not sent.

As to the merits of the discussion, we imagine that Admiral Brownson's statement of reasons for opposing command of a hospital ship by a medical officer will appear sound and conclusive both to members of Congress and to the general public. His discussion of the mishaps which attended the navigation of the Iris and Nanshan, with civilian masters and crews, brings out clearly the irrepressible conflict between control by any naval officer whatsoever and the presence of a civilian sailing master subject to the shipping laws of the United States, which are at entire variance with the navy regulations. His application of the navy regulations and the navigation laws to the situation which would exist on board a hospital ship manned as recommended by Surgeon General Rixey, makes clear the inevitable difficulties and confusion that would result from such a constitution of things.

But aside from questions of law and the navy regulations as they apply to this matter, Admiral Brownson's contention is powerfully supported by the endorsement of Rear Admiral George A. Converse on the report of the Medical Board. Admiral Converse, as chief of the Bureau of Navigation, opposed the recommendations of the Joint Medical Board, and in his endorsements he summarized the most vital objection to the scheme now advised, in the following words:

"Finally, the military and other professional insight afforded the persons on board hospital ships, of the fleet operations, plans, bases, in time of peace and particularly so in time of war, might be used to our great injury and result most unfortunately for the success of our forces were such opportunities to gain military information made available to persons not of the naval service and not subject to its discipline, as would be the case were the personnel of hospital ships composed of civilians."

reliable. For a considerable number of years, Russia was the world's terror,- a great overgrown shaggy giant, prowling about the northern parts of Europe and Asia, infinite in number, and likely to descend upon an unwary universe and do the most astonishing things to it. We Americans varied our wonder at the latent power of Russia, with occasional scares over what Germany was on the point of doing to South America and the Monroe Doctrine.

Japan is now the bugbear. Since her great victories over Russia, we have discovered that the Japanese are a proud and fiery and warlike people, and we readily credit both the people and the government with the disposition to spend their last cent in sweeping in everything that adjoins them. As comparatively few of the present generation in this country have had any personal knowledge of a great war and what it means to the finances of a country, we find it easy to believe that Japan, with the huge foreign debt that she brought out of her victories. over Russia, is even now on the verge of a struggle with the richest nation in the world. Having beaten Russia, she must naturally feel that she can "lick all creation" and must therefore be itching to undertake the task at the earliest possible moment. Out of this unfounded credulity grow such rumors as the recent one that Japan had sent a torpedo flotilla toward the strait of Magellan for the purpose of sinking our battleship fleet in that desolate region and thereby disabling us, so that the Mikado's big ships might gobble the Philippines, and deal a fatal blow to our interests in the Far East. The Japanese have a great talent for keeping things quiet when they don't want them to be known at large; but it would be difficult, if not impossible, for even Japan to detach any formidable portion of her fleet for a voyage of ten thousand miles across the Pacific, with the colliers and supply ships that must inevitably accompany such an expedition, without the fact being known immediately. Whatever other virtues they may have, Japanese torpedo boats cannot fly from Yokohama to the Horn; and the prosaic requirements of coal and food absolutely negative the possibility of such a wily expedition as has been rumored. The recent statement of the Japanese Minister of Marine in regard to the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet may be accepted as altogether conclusive.

FOREIGN NAVAL CORRESPONDENCE (Special Correspondence of THE Navy)

THE STRATEGY OF THE NORTH SEA

LONDON, January 4, 1908.

What is daily discussed in the journals as "the German menace" has brought about realization of the importance of guarding the North Sea shores of England and Scotland. Further than this, this important maritime frontier between the British Isles and the German Empire has developed into such wonderful strategic importance, as a result of the increasing development of the German navy, that the three neighboring naval powers of Great Britain, Germany, and France have been compelled by political considerations to seriously consider the realignment of old naval bases and the establishment of new strategic points.

The situation has become so important that every move on the chess-board of the North Sea is being closely observed and thoughtfully studied by the chancelleries and admiralties of Europe. England has well-developed naval bases and dockyards along the north shores of the English Channel in Portsmouth and Devonport, near Plymouth, but is singularly lacking in these important adjuncts along the North Sea coast north of Dover and Sheerness. The Admiralty cannot get away from the fact that between Dover and the north of Scotland there is only one dock capable of accommodating the Dreadnought, and this is Stephenson's dock at Hepburn-on-Tyne.

Across the North Sea from Hull lies Hamburg, only three hundred and seventy miles distant, on the River Elbe. North of Hamburg, at the eastern entrance to the Kiel Canal, which the German Reichstag has decided to widen and deepen at enormous expense, lies the increasingly important naval base of Kiel; and the other end of the Kiel Canal empties into the mouth of the Elbe not far from the new German naval base of Cuxhaven, which is to be developed into an important North Sea base for the German navy. Before the completion of the Kiel Canal, the naval interest of Germany centered along the shores of the Baltic. Since the cutting of that waterway, Germany has a short-cut to the North Sea. France and England are coming to a fuller appreciation of the significance of the decision to develop greatly the strength of the German Navy and of the Kaiser's insistence upon the enlargement of the Kiel waterway so as to afford ready means for the transfer of the imperial navy from the

Baltic to the North Sea. Corollary to all this, Germany has decided to make Emden, near Bremerhaven, a firstclass torpedo flotilla base for her navy. It is already a secondary station, but in the future it will be the chief North Sea torpedo base. Cuxhaven is being made into the chief German base for the North Sea,-or, rather, the Germans are doing there what the British Admiralty might have done in the River Humber, near Hull. The resources of Kiel as an arsenal are being greatly increased and the port is to be provided with new docks, so that by 1909 it will be equipped for use as one of the principal bases for the German fleet.

France, too, should be "shaping" her naval policy more with regard to possibilities of a war with Germany than with England. There are some indications that our French neighbors are preparing to resist the colossal development of the navy of the trans-Rhenish Empire and to prevent the German fleet reaching the ocean through the Channel. This new shaping of French naval policy is adding to the importance of Cherbourg, because Brest is too far from the region of possible hostilities in the North Sea. A considerable scheme is in hand for improving the base at Cherbourg, comprising the construction of another basin, the creation of a new outer harbor, and various dockyard improvements.

What is the answer of the British Government? A great new naval base at Rosyth, on the shores of the North Sea, and the redistribution of the fleet so as to bring thirty-two battleships, sixteen armored cruisers, and fifty-four torpedo-boat destroyers, all fully manned, within easy striking distance of this important strategic region. Formal announcement of the decision of the Admiralty to proceed vigorously with the development of the new naval base at Rosyth, coupled with the statement that bids were about to be issued for the project, was made first by Lord Tweedmouth, the First Lord of the Admiralty, in a speech at a luncheon given him at Duns, Berwickshire, when he was presented with the honorary fellowship diploma of the Educational Institute of Scotland.

It was reported by one paper that, in replying to the toast "The Imperial Forces," he said that contracts had been taken for the construction of accommodation at Rosyth for 112 warships. This report was incorrect, and Lord Tweedmouth sent a correct version to the paper, and repeated this version in a speech at Chelmsford early in December, as follows:

"They were now about issuing tenders for a new naval base in the Forth. There had been a long exploration of the Forth, and deep borings had been sunk to find out what the soil at the bottom of the Forth was like, and to

see how far they would have to go before they got a sound foundation. The naval basin would cover fifty-six acres, and would have a depth of thirty-six feet at all tides. They would have accommodation at the quays for twentytwo warships, and that number could be doubled by banking them two and two if it became necessary. There would also be a big dock that would take in the largest battleship of modern days. This would cost a great deal of money, and it would take ten years to complete, but it would be a most useful addition to the naval equipment of the country."

Lord Tweedmouth then admitted that from Portsmouth and Dover, right up the east coast of England and round the north of Scotland, there is no admiralty dock that will hold one of the big new battleships until they reach the Clyde; at Portsmouth and Devonport there were admiralty docks that would accommodate them; and in the Clyde, Severn, and Mersey, as well as at Belfast, there were private docks large enough for the Dreadnought; but that, on what he described as "this most attackable coast," there was neither a private nor a government dock that would dock that ship, except one private dock on the Tyne.

This authoritative announcement by the First Sea Lord is of great importance generally. With the redistribution of the fleet it makes clear to all the world that the Admiralty has recognized the changed conditions of sea power, particularly with regard to the North Sea. Discussing the situation and Lord Tweedmouth's announcement, one of our service contemporaries says:

"If it were necessary to add any argument in favor of the establishment of a naval base at Rosyth to those already advanced, the fact of the changes contemplated at Heligoland would be of sufficient weight. But the fact is that the redistribution and enlargement of the Royal Navy and facilities for concentration in home waters have rendered the ordinary accommodation for peace purposes quite insufficient. The decision to add a fourth port to those of Portsmouth, Chatham, and Devonport was made in 1903, nearly five years ago, by Lord Selborne. It cannot be said that the Admiralty is in a hurry. The present idea is that the work should spread over a period of ten years. Never since the Norman Conquest, not even in the struggle with the Dutch, have we been forced to look for danger across the sea north of the Thames until now. But nothing has been done to secure our position therein. In 1898 Lord Goschen appointed a Committee to consider the whole question, its report having been presented to Parliament in 1902. It unanimously selected the Firth of Forth as the most advantageous strategic center for naval defense in the North Sea. Later on a site for a base was obtained at Rosyth. Both Mr. Balfour and Lord Selborne thus endorsed the policy of Lord Goschen. Last April, Mr. Robertson gave rise to hopes that the talking stage was at an end, and a 'fourth home.

port' of the rank of Devonport, Portsmouth, and Chatham was to be created at once. Lord Tweedmouth now tells us that the Government has at last made up its mind. That is to say, nine years after the question was first raised, there is not a single facility for a fleet in war time between the Thames and the Clyde."

Rosyth stands in a little curved bay of the Firth of Forth, a few miles below Dunfermline and some two miles above the large bridge that spans the estuary. It is on the north shore of Perthshire, well protected by its position and the islands of the Forth, almost opposite Hopetoun, the seat of the Marquis of Linlithgow, while ancient Scottish homes like Dundas and Binns look down on its bay. In addition to the great basin of fifty-six acres,

Advocates of Dover for the North Sea base assert that Rosyth is isolated from the other naval bases and farther from the German coast by over one hundred miles than Dover. However, Lord Tweedmouth thinks the new base has been chosen at the right place, because the Forth has splendid railway communication, food and water supply, and is close to the Leith and Granton shipbuilding facilities. In an emergency the best shipwrights and engineers could, it is claimed, be readily procured from the Clyde.

Since the announcement of the government's intentions was made by Lord Tweedmouth, there have been several indications that the Admiralty will push the scheme with increased activity. Colonel Exham, Superintendent Engineer of the Naval Works Department, is engaged completing preliminaries in connection with the Rosyth project. He has two engineers of the staff of his department associated with him and several others are to be transferred from Devonport to Rosyth. While there is complaint about the period of ten years announced by Lord Tweedmouth for the work, it is understood this delay is due to the decision to pay for the work out of current revenue, instead of from a government loan.

210 miles_

•HOLLAND,

BELGIUM

Rosyth will have a dock of sufficient size for the biggest modern fighting ships. There will also be a lock eight hundred and fifty feet long, giving access to the large basin. This lock will be accessible at all stages of tide and will lead to the southwest corner of the basin with a depth of thirty-six feet. The basin or dock will be nearly square, the east quay sixteen hundred and twenty feet, the north quay fifteen hundred feet, the west quay twelve hundred feet, and the south quay one thousand feet. The southwest corner of this otherwise rectangular basin is to be cut off by a diagonal quay six hundred feet long, connecting the south and west sides of the dock. The total length of the quays will be about six thousand feet.

Dover was not at all pleased with the decision to make Rosyth a naval base, and the "Dover Express" contends that in comparing Rosyth with Dover it presents every disadvantage that can be imagined, pointing out that Rosyth is difficult of access, and that it would be difficult, in wartime, to get out of with an enemy at its entrance.

BRITISH-BRAZILIAN WARSHIPS

BERLIN, December 30, 1907.

Considerable excitement has been caused in naval circles here by a persistent rumor in regard to British naval expansion. Previous forecasts of the forthcoming British naval program have stated that only one or two battleships are contemplated, together with three or four light cruisers of an improved Edgar type and about six destroyers. But a bolt from the blue has effectually disturbed the complaisance with which the German Navy League regarded this unambitious increase in British sea-power. Your correspondent has learned from an authentic source that a strong belief has arisen that the two 21,000-ton battleships now building at Elswick and Barrow-inFurness, ostensibly for Brazil, are really intended to eventually fly the White Ensign, a supposition borne out by several significant facts. These two vessels are to be armed with four 13.5-inch guns apiece, eight of which are in process of manufacture by Armstrong, Whitworth & Co., and it is well known that the British Admiralty has regarded this large-calibre weapon with considerable favor for some time past. Moreover, it appears somewhat improbable that a minor naval power such as Brazil actually intends to saddle herself with such leviathans, in view of the fact that her present naval forces are wholly adequate to protect her interests against any probable

aggressor. An additional element of probability is added to the theory by the recollection of Great Britain's purchase from Chili of the Triumph and Swiftsure battleships in December, 1903. The only real negative argument is contained in the report that reciprocating engines will be installed in the two big ships, this being at variance with the British Admiralty's determination to continue the sole use of turbines in large craft at least. But it is quite possible that turbines are actually contemplated for the two battleships in question.

Up to the present this rumor has only circulated amongst a limited number of the best-informed naval authorities in Berlin, who entertain but little doubt of its accuracy. On the face of it the supposition is by no means fantastic, but Great Britain's method of thus using South American States as catspaws evokes much indignation here. One result of the affair will doubtless be a renewal of the Navy League agitation for even more extensive building plans than those just authorized by the Reichstag. Count Reventlow, the eminent authority on naval matters and a prominent member of the League, is understood to be preparing a digest of the matter, to be laid before a special meeting of the League, with a view to urging upon the Government the necessity of more battleships as an offset against this latest move by England.

GERMANY'S STRONG NAVAL PROGRAM

BERLIN, January 1, 1908. There has been no stage of international politics when the Imperial German government has not regarded proposals for mutual disarmament as Utopian. While other nations may have been misled by the visionary projects of "apostles of peace", the Berlin government, under the strong guidance of the Kaiser, has never for a moment entertained seriously the belief that the Hague Conference of 1907 would accomplish the sheathing of the sword. Germany was as willing as any other power to ameliorate the horrors of war and to establish rules limiting the scope of questions to be settled by other than peaceful means; but our people are scientific and practical, and believe thoroughly in the doctrine that preparation for war, in the fullest sense, is the best guarantee for peace.

Across the Channel there is much talk about the "German menace" and about the new German program being a "sad blow for lovers of peace". The attitude of the German government is inspired simply by a desire to feel secure. Berlin does not desire to menace the peace of the world, but wishes to be fully prepared whenever the

conflict comes. Everywhere except in France there is great naval development. Whatever the complaint of the Briton about the failure of his Admiralty to maintain the so-called two-power standard, it is an unmistakable fact that the British navy, with one Dreadnought in commission, three others completing, and another trio being laid down, is increasing its strength by leaps and bounds. The development of the German navy and the strengthening of the North Sea bases is no more a menace to Great Britain than the concentration of the British fighting strength in home waters, especially around the North Sea coasts, is to our country. If Germany is progressing to the point where she may aim a strong blow toward Great Britain, it may also be said that Great Britain is already prepared to strike quickly at Germany.

German relations with Great Britain have improved. The two governments were never on more friendly terms. The rapid growth of the German navy is not so much a menace to the British Empire as it is to the continued predominance of the superiority of the British navy. The British two-power standard is threatened, and the question for the two governments to settle is whether German economics and finances can stand the development of the greater German navy better than those of Great Britain can stand the strain of trying to continue the two-power standard.

The Naval Program before the Reichstag has been received favorably by all parties except the Social Democrats. It shows that the German Navy Act of 1900, providing for a permanent building program, is to be radically changed. The draft of the new clause is intended to take the place of the permanent building clause in the 1900 Act, has been sanctioned by the Bundesrath, and will undoubtedly be approved by the Reichstag. A memorandum attached to the Estimates, which give the revised Expenditure Table for 1908-17, shows that the Law of 1900 has been changed in only one particular,— and that a very important one, containing the essence of the new project, the reduction of the life of all armored ships from twenty-five to twenty years, counting from the date on which was voted the first installment on which the initial credit for the building of the substitute ship is endorsed.

The decision of the Imperial authorities to accept the principle that armored ships are obsolete at the age of twenty years is important. It is held that when the ships to be "replaced" are really withdrawn, they are actually thirty years old, counting from the period of payment of first installments to the actual completion of