that the evidence did not trace the paper to Earnshaw so distinctly as to the other defendant; but if the Court should be of opinion that it was an offence, they might think the evidence strong enough to induce them to call upon him to show cause. Mr. Justice Bayley asked whether the paper was written after Earnshaw's attendance in court? Mr. Scarlett said he believed that was the fact. The paper was dated the 1st of last month. It was sworn to that Mr. Earnshaw, on being asked whether he was the author, gave an indirect answer, saying it could not be traced to him, and that he had neither directly nor indirectly circulated it. One of the papers appeared, however, to be in his hand-writing. The learned counsel was then about to read the paper. The Lord Chief Justice.-The paper, I presume, imports to contain the opinions of a medical person? Mr. Justice Bayley. And is an affirmation of what could only be received as evidence under the sanction of an oath? Mr. Justice Best.-And is such evidence as had been previously rejected? Mr. Scarlett assented. The Lord Chief Justice.-It is clear that nothing ought to be delivered to a jury, and that no communication whatever ought to be made to them except upon oath. Mr. Justice Best.-It appears likewise to have been delivered secretly. Mr. Scarlett.-Yes; the coroner was himself unacquainted with it. Mr. Justice Bayley. It has certainly the appearance of an attempt to pervert the course of justice. If the coroner had allowed the paper to go to the jury, and they had received it in an open manner, he would have acted very improperly. Mr. Scarlett observed, whether the facts stated in the paper were true or not, that they were no evidence. There was even one still greater irregularity, the writer having combined with his own opinions certain alleged declarations of the deceased, which were clearly inadmissible evidence, even if stated upon oath. The Lord Chief Justice.-The circumstance upon which I found my opinion at present is, the communication of matter to the jury, the party so communicating not being upon his oath. I do not think, however, that enough is stated to implicate Earnshaw, but you may take a rule as it respects Taylor. HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY, NOV. 4. The Ship Prins Frederick. This was the case of the Prins Frederick, a Dutch 74, (but at the time of the salvage en flute), laden with a valuable cargo and on her voyage from Batavia. Being in great distress off the western coast of England she made signals for assistance, which was promptly afforded, and in consequence of which she was at length worked into Plymouth harbour. On the part of the salvors, the usual warrant was granted by this court, under date of of the 25th of October last, and served while the captain was below by the proper officer; but on his deputy's attempting to take possession of the ship with the customary forms, the Dutch captain assailed him with the most insulting language and ungentlemanly behaviour; he threatened to throw him overboard if he did not quit the ship immediately, after having otherwise put him in fear of some personal danger and punishment in the event of attempting to execute his orders. The officer was, in consequence, obliged to leave them unexecuted. Dr. Lushington, on behalf of the salvors, moved the court for a warrant of attachment as against the person of the captain, (the former one extending to the ship and cargo.) He contended that every possible consideration had been shown for the situation of this person and the character of his government. Immediate information had been transmitted to the ambassador from the king of the Netherlands in London, as well as to his consul resident at Plymouth. The conduct of the captain, under these circumstances, was a manifest contempt of court; and the learned counsel maintained, that the course he had proposed in submitting his motion, was the only one that ought to be pursued in this case. Sir William Scott asked if any appearance had been given on behalf either of the ambassador or of the consul? The king's advocate replied in the negative. He was aware that, therefore, it was only by the indulgence of the court that he could make any observation on the case before it; but he suggested, that it was one of great nicety, seeing that the foreign officer's instructions could not, most probably, contemplate the occurrence of the events in question. Dr. Arnold had also, conjointly with his majesty's advocate, been consulted by the consul on this occasion, and hoped that proceedings would be suspended. The captain was, in some degree, intrusted with the honour of the national flag under which he was sailing; and it might be fairly presumed, was more anxious for the preservation of its rights than the observance of his duties. He trusted that time might be allowed, in order that he might communicate with his government. Dr. Lushington insisted that this was the case of a ship which had sought, and been assisted by, the aid of British vessels, by whom she had been brought within British territory and under the undoubted jurisdiction of his Britannic majesty. How, then, could it be urged, that this was a case of any peculiar nicety; or that it could be necessary for this officer to make any reference to his own government? His conduct had been clearly most reprehensible, and was clearly within the reach of this court. But he wholly objected to the precedent of this officer's being allowed to ask for instructions from a foreign government. Was this court to wait such delays in a case like this? Suppose the vessel had been an American or a Russian, was this the way in which this country was to run the risk (he would not put it otherwise than conditionally) of having its authority invaded? Sir William Scott asked what further time the other party meant to apply for, before the warrant of attachment should be granted? It was intimated that a fortnight or three weeks would be sufficient. Sir William Scott wished to know, whether the ship, in case of the suspension, would remain certainly in her port, and whether there was any intention of proceeding? The King's Advocate had no means of answering positively; but the ship being a complete wreck, he presumed the court had every means of protecting itself whatever it might decide upon. Sir William Scott said, the court felt a desire to act with the greatest delicacy towards foreign states on occasions of this sort, and certainly not the less so in regard to the state in question. This was described as a ship of war, but her present situation was that of a merchant vessel, clearly; and the other vessels which had applied for this warrant were as clearly entitled to remuneration for salvage-service. There might be reasons on the part of the foreign minister here for the delay, which he was inclined to respect; but the British claimant must be protected. If he were given to understand that this ship would not be removed, however, he could not object to the warrant's being deferred for a short time; and this he desired might be signified to the minister, who represented his government in this country, accompanied with an intimation that such removal must on no account take place. The court, in conclusion, observed, that it should grant the warrant of attachment, unless the assurance of her continuing in port were speedily given him, which might be done by the proper parties, when so enabled, out of court, without waiting for the next court-day. KING'S BENCH, NOV. 8. Criminal Informations. The Lord Chief Justice, who was engaged in going through the bar a second time upon motions for new trials, observing that Mr. Hunt had been some time in court, with a bundle of papers at his side, inquired through one of the officers whether he intended to submit any motion; and on finding the affirmative, called upon him, and stated that the court were now ready. Mr. Hunt rose, and said he had a motion to make, and it respected the magistrates at Manchester. Lord Chief Justice.-Well, what is the nature of it? Mr. Hunt. My lord, I mean to move for a criminal information against them. Lord Chief Justice. That is not competent for you to do. A criminal information must be moved at the suit of the king; and such a motion can only be made by some gentleman at the bar. Mr. Hunt. I have looked into - all the books, and I cannot find any instance in which the court has interfered to stop a prosecution of this kind. Lord Chief Justice.-I believe there is no precedent of the court allowing any but a gentleman at the bar to conduct a proceeding of this nature. Mr. Pollock we are ready to hear you. Mr. Pollock, however, had no sooner finished his motion, than Mr. Hunt again offered himself to the attention of the court, and begged to know whether their lordships would be pleased to advise him how he ought to proceed. Lord Chief Justice-No, we do not sit here for that purpose. Mr. Hunt (interrupting his lordship, who with some difficulty was able to add, that if he had sustained any personal wrong, he might bring a civil action) replied, he had been often told that courts of justice were open to all. He had strong reasons for making this a public proceeding, and he had neither money nor inclination to employ professional lawyers in the management of it. Lord Chief Justice.-All this court does is to prevent you from moving for a criminal information. Mr. Justice Bayley.-It may be as well to state on this occasion the reasons of the rule by which the court is now guided. It would be most improper, in the first place, that the time of the court should be occupied unnecessarily, or in the consideration of topics irrelevant to those points over which alone it exercises its jurisdiction, or to which it can, beneficially to the purposes of justice, advert. The time of this court belongs to the public. Mr. Hunt (again interrupting). -I am one of that public. Mr. Justice Bayley.-You are, Sir, and are to be informed, that the king sometimes acts in this court by his own law-officers and sometimes by other professional gentlemen. Every criminal prosecution is carried on in his name; and for a long series of years a practice has prevailed, that none but gentlemen at the bar, whose education fits them for the conduct of such proceedings and who know by that education and from their experience what points ought to be urged and what topics may be brought forward without incurring blame, shall carry on the prosecution in court. It might otherwise happen, without any evil motive, but purely from honest ignorance on the part of an accuser, that the most injurious prejudices might be excited. It would, indeed, be a great hardship on a prisoner, charged perhaps with an offence affecting his life, that a prosecutor, merely because he knew not what it was proper to state and what it was necessary to omit, should bring forward matters with which a jury had nothing to do; but which, being brought forward, might produce an effect upon their minds which it would be impossible for the judge afterwards to remove or to control. The same observation must apply to cases of misdemeanors, and he knew of no solid distinction that could be made between what was to be addressed to a jury and what to that court, in cases at suit of the crown. There is no no precedent of a criminal prosecution originating in this court except at the instance of officers of the crown, or of persons who in some respects stand in the character of public officers-I mean, of course, gentlemen at the bar. To abandon this rule of proceeding would be to destroy the distinction between civil and criminal cases. By the former, every individual may seek a remedy for personal wrong sustained; but the object of criminal proceedings is not private redress but public justice; and it is therefore impossible for us to accede to that course which you are desirous of pursuing. Mr. Hunt.-May I be permitted to offer a few observations on what has fallen from the learned judge? Lord Chief Justice.-No, Sir, you cannot. Have you any instances of an individual not at the bar, being allowed by this court to do what you are contending for? Mr. Hunt.-There is no precedent from the earliest institution of trial by jury to the contrary. Lord Chief Justice.-You have not answered my question. Mr. Hunt.-I wish to refer the court to a case which came on before lord Ellenborough, a short time before your lordship was appointed lord chief justice of England. Mr. Justice Bayley. It was determined recently in the case of Milne, in the negative. Mr. Hunt.-I allude to a different case, that of the king, on the prosecution of Pitt, against the right hon. William Huskisson and others. Mr. Justice Bayley.-1 recol lect that lord Ellenborough did suffer Mr. Pitt to be heard, and that I afterwards spoke privately to that noble and learned lord, for whom I always felt the greatest respect, but to whom I communicated my opinion that he was wrong on that occasion. His lordship acquiesced in the reasons I stated, and declared his conviction that the proceeding was incorrect, and that the mischief of such a precedent, if it was allowed to be drawn into one, could not easily be calcu lated. • Mr. Gurney.-His lordship afterwards declared in court, that he was satisfied he had acted wrong. Mr. Hunt.-If this be law, it is useless for me to contend any further. Lord Chief Justice.-You are bound to submit to the authority of the court. Mr. Hunt. This is the first instance of a prosecution being so impeded. Lord Chief Justice.-There is scarcely any instance of a prosecution attempted to be thus com menced. Mr. Justice Holroyd.—I think it is clear that there is no precedent to justify an application on the part of the crown brought forward in the present manner. The object of all criminal prosecutions is public justice; and the court would act most improperly in allowing an individual to convert himself, at his own pleasure, into a counsel for the crown. Mr. Justice Best.-It is only where an individual can make himself party to a cause, that he |