thus amicably settled a question which for a quarter of a century has threatened from time to time to plunge at least three countries into war.2

2 See reference to Lord Salis- | bury's letter in footnote 1 to § 52, pages 107-8.

tion for their expenses had to be made by Congress. When the special message was sent to the Senate nominating Richardson C. Anderson and John Sergeant as envoys to the Congress, a resolution was at once offered as follows: "Resolved, That it is not expedient at this time for the United States to send any ministers to the Congress of American nations assembled at Panama."

While this resolution was pending in the Senate, the following resolution was introduced in the House: "Resolved, That in the opinion of this House, it is expedient to appropriate the funds necessary to enable the President of the United States to send ministers to the Congress at Panama.”

The appropriation finally passed Congress, and commissioners were appointed; on account of the delay, however, our representatives did not actually participate in the meeting. The Congress met at Panama, but without accomplishing any actual results; it adjourned to meet at Tacubaya the following year, but no adjourned meeting was held, and as Professor Snow says in concluding his chapter on this episode, “Thus ended the first attempt to form an alliance of American states. The Monroe Doctrine was forgotten for the time; and the Spanish-Americans were left to work out their destiny in their own way, and to acquire by long training in the school of experience the capacity for self-government which they lacked at that time."

The details of the entire history of the Panama Congress are very interesting, and, according to a note in Professor Snow's article (page 312) the following documents contain a complete history of the conference. "The documents and details of the Panama Congress are given in full in the 4th volume (Historical Appendix) of the proceedings of the International American Conference. See also: Lyman's Diplomacy of the United States, II., 467; American Review and Whig Journal, January, 1846; A. W. Young: American Statesman, 352; Am. State Pap. VI., 834-910; Benton's Debates, VIII.; Benton's View, I.; Webster's Works, III., 178; Niles's Register."

OTHER CONGRESSES OF AMERICAN REPUBLICS.

There have been a number of American congresses since the attempt to hold one in 1825-26.

Professor Snow refers to them as follows: (1) The Congress of Lima, 1847; (2) the Continental Treaty of 1856, which to some extent showed "a spirit of hostility to the United States," resulting from the Walker expeditions into Central America; (3) the Congress of Lima, 1864; (4) proposed Congress of Panama, 1881; (5) the proposed Congress at Washington, 1882; the International American Conference, 1890.

§ 55. Spain, Cuba, and the Monroe Doctrine.-In 1852, when we had reason to suspect that Spain contemplated a

TRANS-ISTHMIAN COMMUNICATIONS AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

The Monroe Doctrine has always been asserted by the United States in regard to the right of transit over the Isthmus of Panama and through the territory of Nicaragua, and in fact generally as to any trans-Isthmian communication.

Reference to this will be found in Professor Snow's book, page 326, in Lindley Miller Keasbey's Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe Doctrine, ex-Secretary of State John W. Foster's Century of American Diplomacy, and Tucker's Monroe Doctrine.

In connection with trans-Isthmian communication, however, so far as Great Britain is concerned, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 is considered by some as a modification of the Monroe Doctrine; but although that treaty created a joint protectorate between this country and Great Britain as to a trans-Isthmian canal, under certain then expected conditions which up to this time have never materialized, it did not weaken the right of the United States to prevent the extension of British dominion in Central America, as was evidenced by the firm position which was asserted and maintained in regard thereto by Mr. Webster.

Particular reference in this respect is made to Mr. Keasby's chapter "the Central American Imbroglio," in which he says that the Monroe Doctrine was asserted with the result that Great Britain was obliged to withdraw from her protectorate over the Mosquito Coast. See also the history of Central American Complications with Great Britain in Government Document, 1856, Central American Affairs and the Enlistment Question.

RELATIONS WITH CUBA.

The relations of the United States and Cuba have always been more or less affected by the Monroe Doctrine. In 1852 France and England suggested that those powers and the United States should enter into a joint disavowal of ever intending to acquire the Island of Cuba; this the United States refused to do. On the contrary, those powers were informed that events might necessitate the acquisition of Cuba by the United States, but whether that were so or not, under no circumstances would this country permit any other country to take possession of that island.

On December 1, 1852, Secretary of State Edward Everett, wrote identic notes to Great Britain and France, in which he expressed the position of the United States as follows (1 Wharton's Digest, § 60):

"The United States, on the other hand, would, by the proposed convention, disable themselves from making an acquisition which might take place without any disturbance of existing foreign relations and in the natural order of things. The Island of Cuba lies at our doors. It commands the approach to the Gulf of Mexico, which washes the shores of five of our States. It bars the entrance of that great river which

transfer of Cuba to some other power, we gave notice at once that no such transfer would be permitted. On the

§ 55.

1 For an extended history of the foreign relations of the United States affecting Cuba, see: Cuba

and International Relations, by James Morton Callahan, John Hopkins Press, 1899.

drains half the North American continent, and with its tributaries forms the largest system of internal water communication in the world. It keeps watch at the doorway of our intercourse with California by the Isthmus route. If an island like Cuba, belonging to the Spanish Crown, guarded the entrance of the Thames and the Seine, and the United States should propose a convention like this to France and England, those powers would assuredly feel that the disability assumed by ourselves was far less serious than that which we asked them to assume. The opinions of American statesmen, at different times and under varying circumstances, have differed as to the desirableness of the acquisition of Cuba by the United States. Territorially and commercially it would in our hands be an extremely valuable possession. Under certain contingencies it might be almost essential to our safety. Still for domestic reasons, on which in a communication of this kind it might not be proper to dwell, the President thinks that the incorporation of the island into the Union at the present time, although effected with the consent of Spain, would be a hazardous measure; and he would consider its acquisition by force, except in a just war with Spain, should an event so greatly to be deprecated take place, as a disgrace to the civilization of the age." (Mr. Everett, Sec. of State, to Mr. Crampton, Dec. 1, 1852, MSS. Notes Gr. Brit. See Mr. Everett and the Cuban Question, by Mr. Trescot, 9 South, Quar. Rev., new series, April, 1854, 429. For Mr. Everett's views in full, see 1 Wharton's Digest, § 72). Mr. Everett, on December 3, 1852, wrote again to Mr. Crampton as follows:

"To enter into a compact with European powers to the effect that the United States, as well as the other contracting powers, would disclaim all intention, now or hereafter, to obtain possession of Cuba, would be inconsistent with the principles, the policy, and the traditions of the United States." 1 Wharton's Digest, § 60. (Mr. Everett, Sec. of State, to Mr. Crampton, Dec. 3, 1852, MSS. Notes, Gr. Brit.; see also 1 Wharton's Digest, § 72.)

See also the authorities cited in section 60 of Wharton's Digest under the head of Intervention in Cuba, including extract from President Filmore's third annual message in 1852.

As to the present relations of Cuba and the United States and the effect of the Monroe Doctrine thereon, see §§ 106 et seq., chap. III, post.

MEXICAN INTERVENTION.

One of the most notable instances of the application of the Monroe Doctrine was in 1861-1865 during which period Louis Napoleon attempted to establish a monarchy in Mexico under French protection.

other hand, however, when France and England asked us to unite with them in a mutual declaration that all of the

England, Spain and France had claims against Mexico amounting, possibly, to a million dollars, but the French bankers held bonds which had been issued to the amount of fifteen millions, although, comparatively, only a trifling sum had been advanced upon them.

Mexico refused to pay the debt, and in 1861 the three Powers signed a convention by which they agreed to exercise coercive measure to enforce the payment of their debts. Article 2 of the convention was as follows:

"Art. II. The high contracting parties engage not to seek for themselves, in the employment of the coercive measures contemplated by the present Convention, any acquisition of territory, nor any special advantage, and not to exercise in the internal affairs of Mexico any influence of a nature to prejudice the right of the Mexican nation to choose and to constitute freely the form of its government."

The War of the Rebellion was raging at that time, but even in its crippled condition, the Government of the United States remained unchanged in its adherence to the Monroe Doctrine; "From the moment" as stated by Tucker, "when intervention seemed probable, explanations were demanded of France, and the assurance was given that her sole purpose was the enforcement of the claims of the subjects of the Emperor. During the entire period of the French occupation of Mexico, the Government of the United States recognized only the Government of Juarez, and after the termination of the Civil War in the United States the Government at Washington was more pronounced than ever in warning the Government of France of the consequences likely to follow the prolonged stay of the French troops in Mexico."

This attitude of the United States was necessitated by the attempt on the part of France to establish an empire with a monarchical form of government in Mexico; in fact, the placing of Maximilian upon the throne was not for the purpose of obtaining the payment of a debt to France, but for the purpose of establishing in America an ally of France.

England and Spain withdrew from the attempt to destroy republican institutions in Mexico, and thus left the matter entirely in the hands of France.

The final result of the opposition asserted by the Government of the United States, as communicated by Secretary Seward to the French Government, was that France withdrew from Mexico; on the 5th of April, 1866, it was announced that the French troops would evacuate Mexico, and in a little less than a year from that date they all departed. While this matter was entirely settled through diplomatic correspondence, there is no doubt that the fact that General Sheridan, whose reputation as a military commander was as well known and respected in France as it was in the United States, was at the head of an army of veterans of the Civil War, encamped in the vicinity of Mexico; although there is nothing in the records of the War Department or the State Department to connect the exact causes of his location with the French

uniting powers disclaimed any intention of ever acquiring that island, we promptly declined, declaring that although

troops in Mexico, that location might have proved to be very fortunate for the United States, had it become necessary to use our military forces in order to enforce our rights under the Monroe Doctrine.

In speaking of the results of the Mexican episode, Sir Edward S. Creasy, an eminent English authority on international law, says at page 122: The United States (occupied by their own Civil War, which was then raging) did not actually send troops to oppose the French in Mexico, but they steadily refused to recognize Maximilian, or any government except a republican government in Mexico, and the language of their statesmen exhibited the fullest development of the Monroe Doctrine."

VENEZUELA BOUNDARY DISPUTE WITH GREAT BRITAIN.

The most notable instance of the enforcement of the principles enunciated by President Monroe was in 1895 and 1896, when President Cleveland asserted that "the Monroe Doctrine finds its recognition in those principles of international law which are based upon the theory that every nation shall have its rights protected and its just claims enforced." This sentence was contained in his message transmitted to Congress on December 17, 1895, after Lord Salisbury had declared in a dispatch to the British Ambassador, and which had been left with the Secretary of State, that the Monroe Doctrine did not embody any principle of international law founded upon the general consent of nations. The exact words of Lord Salisbury will be found in his dispatch dated November 26, 1895, commencing at page 563, part I. of the Foreign Relations' Report, 1895. In the course of his dispatch he declared that he would not be understood as expressing any acceptance of the doctrine on the part of Her Majesty's Government; in fact, he said:

"It must always be mentiored with respect, on account of the distinguished statesman to whom it is due, and the great nation who have generally adopted it. But international law is founded on the general consent of nations; and no statesman, however eminent, and no nation, however powerful, are competent to insert into the code of international law a novel principle which was never recognized before, and which has not since been accepted by the Government of any other country. The United States have a right, like any other nation, to interpose in any controversy by which their own interests are affected; and they are the judge whether those interests are touched, and in what measure they should be sustained. But their rights are in no way strengthened or extended by the fact that the controversy affects some territory which is called American. Mr. Olney quotes the case of the recent Chilean war, in which the United States declined to join with France and England in an effort to bring hostilities to a close, on account of the Monroe Doctrine. The United States were entirely in their right in declining to join in an attempt at pacification if they thought fit; but Mr. Olney's principle that American questions are for American de