we would not permit any other power to acquire or occupy it, we would not bind ourselves not to do so, as circumstances

cision, even if it receive any countenance from the language of President Monroe (which it does not), cannot be sustained by any reasoning drawn from the law of nations.

"The Government of the United States is not entitled to affirm as a universal proposition, with reference to a number of independent States for whose conduct it assumes no responsibility, that its interests are necessarily concerned in whatever may befall those States simply because they are situated in the Western Hemisphere. It may well be that the interests of the United States are affected by something that happens to Chili or to Peru, and that that circumstance may give them the right of interference; but such a contingency may equally happen in the case of China or Japan, and the right of interference is not more extensive or more assured in the one case than in the other."

Lord Salisbury's instructions to Sir Julian Pauncefote, from which the above is quoted, were practically in reply to the instructions of Mr. Olney, then Secretary of State, to Mr. Bayard, our Minister in London, July 20, 1895 (Foreign Relations, 1895, Part 1, page 545; pp. 558, 560), in which the following occurred:

"The people of the United States have learned in the school of experience to what extent the relations of states to each other depend not upon sentiment nor principle, but upon selfish interest. They will not soon forget that, in their hour of distress, all their anxieties and burdens were aggravated by the possibility of demonstrations against their national life on the part of powers with whom they had long maintained the most harmonious relations. They have yet in mind that France seized upon the apparent opportunity of our civil war to set up a monarchy in the adjoining state of Mexico. They realize that had France and Great Britain held important South American possessions to work from and to benefit, the temptation to destroy the predominance of the Great Republic in this hemisphere by furthering its dismemberment might have been irresistible. From that grave peril they have been saved in the past and may be saved again in the future through the operation of the sure but silent force of the doctrine proclaimed by President Monroe. To abandon it, on the other hand, disregarding both the logic of the situation and the facts of our past experience, would be to renounce a policy which has proved both an easy defense against foreign aggression and a prolific source of internal progress and prosperity.

"There is, then, a doctrine of American public law, well founded in principle and abundantly sanctioned by precedent, which entitles and requires the United States to treat as an injury to itself the forcible assumption by an European power of political control over an American state. The application of the doctrine to the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela remains to be made and presents no real difficulty. Though the dispute relates to a boundary line, yet, as it is between states, it necessarily imports political control to be lost by one

might render it advisable, or even necessary, for us to take such action.2

See dispatch of Secretary of | acquire Cuba, December 1, 1852, State Everett in regard to pro-and referred to in note 1 to § 52, posed mutual disavowal of Eng- page 104–5.

land, France and United States to

party and gained by the other. The political control at stake, too, is of no mean importance, but concerns a domain of great extent-the British claim, it will be remembered, apparently expanded in two years some 33,000 square miles-and, if it also directly involve the command of the mouth of the Orinoco, is of immense consequence in connection with the whole river navigation of the interior of South America. It has been intimated, indeed, that in respect of these South American possessions Great Britain is herself an American state like any other, so that a controversy between her and Venezuela is to be settled between themselves as if it were between Venezuela and Brazil or between Venezuela and Colombia, and does not call for or justify United States intervention. If this view be tenable at all, the logical sequence is plain.

"Great Britain as a South American State is to be entirely differentiated from Great Britain generally, and if the boundary cannot be settled otherwise than by force, British Guiana, with her own independent resources and not those of the British Empire, should be left to settle the matter with Venezuela-an arrangement which very possibly Venezuela might not object to. But the proposition that an European power with an American dependency is, for the purpose of the Monroe Doctrine, to be classed not as an European but as an American state, will not admit of serious discussion. If it were to be adopted, the Monroe Doctrine would be too valueless to be worth asserting. Not only would every European power now having a South American colony be enabled to extend its possessions on this continent indefinitely, but any other European power might also do the same by first taking pains to procure a fraction of South American soil by voluntary cession.

"The declaration of the Monroe message-that existing colonies or dependencies of an European power would not be interfered with by the United States-means colonies or dependencies then existing, with their limits as then existing. So it has been invariably construed, aud so it must continue to be construed unless it is to be deprived of all vital force. Great Britain cannot be deemed a South American state within the purview of the Monroe Doctrine, nor, if she is appropriating Venezuelan territory, is it material that she does so by advancing the frontier of an old colony instead of by the planting of a new colony. The difference is matter of form and not of substance, and the doctrine, if pertinent in the one case, must be in the other also. It is not admitted, however, and therefore cannot be assumed, that Great Britain is in fact usurping dominion over Venezuelan territory. While Venezuela charges such usurpation, Great Britain denies it, and the United States, until the merits are authoritatively ascertained, can take sides with

56. Louis Napoleon, Mexico, and the Monroe Doctrine. -In 1862, the Emperor Louis Napoleon attempted to take neither. But while this is so- -while the United States may not, under existing circumstances at least, take upon itself to say which of the two parties is right and which wrong-it is certainly within its right to demand that the truth shall be ascertained. Being entitled to resent and resist any sequestration of Venezuelan soil by Great Britain, it is necessarily entitled to know whether such sequestration has occurred or is now going on. Otherwise, if the United States is without the right to know and have it determined whether there is or is not British aggression upon Venezuelan territory, its right to protest against or repel such aggression may be dismissed from consideration."

The result of the Venezuela controversy was an adjustment between Venezuela and Great Britain referring the boundary dispute to an arbitration tribunal, which definitely defined the boundary line, giving a part of the disputed territory to Venezuela and a part to Great Britain; in a large measure the claims advanced by Venezuela and supported by the United States were justified, for, although, a larger amount of territory as to area was awarded to Great Britain, both sides of the mouth of the Orinoco River were included in the territory awarded to Venezuela, thus establishing one of the principal points contended for by Venezuela.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND RECENT ACQUISITIONS.

During the last three years the question has been raised, principally by those opposed to the acquisition of additional territory, that it is impossible for the United States to acquire territory in the Eastern Hemisphere, and also to maintain its traditional policy as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine in regard to affairs of the Western Hemisphere.

The author considers that the acquisition of the Philippines and the Monroe Doctrine have absolutely no bearing upon each other. The message of President Monroe in which his doctrine was enunciated, declared that it was against the policy of the United States to interfere with the disputes of European powers in regard to European matters. At that time the European powers were not interested in Asiatic matters. Since that time, while the relations of the United States in regard to European matters, and the policy of non-intervention there with may not have changed, and while it might be impossible to change that policy, and to intervene in European affairs, without altogether abandoning, or to a great extent jeopardizing, our right to maintain the Monroe Doctrine, our relations with Asiatic countries are so entirely different that the Monroe Doctrine has absolutely no application thereto. The countries on the eastern side of the Pacific Ocean are nearer neighbors to America than they are to Europe, not only as to distance but also as to commerce. In a recent publication the Pacific Ocean has been described as a great American lake. (See Josiah Strong's Expansion, N. Y., 1900.) The United States have a perfect right to protect their interests in the Eastern Hemisphere, to establish footholds therein,

advantage of the then weak and disturbed condition of Mexico to establish an Empire in America under French auspices

or to acquire territory in payment of indemnity, otherwise uncollectible, without in any way either renouncing the Monroe Doctrine or interjecting itself into the affairs of Europe; the mere fact that European nations have acquired or attempted to acquire Asiatic territory, or to exercise control over Asiatic governments, does not necessarily transform Asiatic affairs into European affairs. The enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine never disclaimed the right which the United States always has had, and always will have, of exercising its sovereign rights wherever and whenever other sovereign powers can exercise similar rights of sovereignty.

SOME OPINIONS OF PUBLICISTS.

It is impossible to collate all the authorities upon the Monroe Doctrine. A few only will be referred to. John W. Foster, as expressed in his Century of American Diplomacy, has already been referred to; Professor Theodore Dwight Woolsey and his son, Professor Theodore Salisbury Woolsey, have expressed some doubt as to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine so far as the right to intervene merely because the territory is in the western hemisphere, although they sustain that right whenever such intervention is prejudicial to our material interests. Their views are expressed in section 48, Introduction to the Study of International Law by Theodore Dwight Woolsey (6th edition, revised by Theodore Salisbury Woolsey, N. Y., 1891), and in the chapter devoted to that subject in Theodore S. Woolsey's America's Foreign Policy (N. Y., 1898).

Doctor Francis Wharton devotes sections 56a to 61a, pages 268 to 416 of volume I. to a consideration of the Monroe Doctrine under the title, "III. Intervention of European sovereigns in the affairs of this continent disapproved. Monroe Doctrine."

He refers to the original enunciation of the doctrine in sections 56a and 57; in the following sections he refers to subsequent applications of the doctrine in regard to Yucatan, Mexico, Peru, Cuba, Hayti, San Domingo and the Danish West Indies.

There are numerous extracts from opinions of the Presidents, dispatches and notes of Secretaries of State, and of the replies from foreign offices of their governments in regard to the Monroe Doctrine and its application.

In regard to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, he says on page 288: "The Clayton-Bulwer treaty is the only exception to the rule that the Government of the United States will decline to enter into combinations or alliances with European powers for the settlement of questions connected with the United States." See also bibliography of Monroe Doctrine contained in Gilman's Life of James Monroe, American Statesmen Series.

On the other hand, some of the eminent French authorities on international law have declared that the Monroe Doctrine cannot be consid

and protection; in 1865, however, after our civil war was over, and we had time to devote, and military forces with

ered in any light as a principle of international law, but that it is the mere expression of opinion of an American statesman. In this respect Alphonse Rivier says (Droit des Gens, Paris, 1896, pp. 404-5, Vol. 1):

§ 88. LA Doctrine de MonrOE.—“La politique d'intervention de la Sainte-Alliance a provoqué une déclaration importante du cinquième président des États-Unis, James Monroe, dans son message présidentiel due 2 Septembre, 1823.

“D'après cette déclaration, les États-Unis d'Amérique ne s'ingéreront pas dans les affaires des nations européennes qui ont des colonies en A mérique; mais ils ne toléreront pas non plus que les États nouveaux, reconnus par eux comme indépendants, soient en butte aux attaques d'États européennes, et ils respousseront toute immixtion de l'Europe sur le continent américain. C'est là ce qu'on désigne communément sous le nom de doctrine de Monroe.

"Le message contient une autre déclaration, motivée par les revendications ou prétentions de la Russie dans le Nord de l'Amérique. 'Les continents américains, d'après l'état de liberté et d'indepéndance qu'ils se sont acquis et dans lequel ils se sont maintenus, ne peuvent être considérées à l'avenir comme susceptibles d'ètre colonisés par aucune puissance européenne.' Ceci veut dire que le sol de l'Amérique n'est plus sans maître, qu'une occupation nouvelle par un État d'Europe n'y est donc pas concevable.

"La doctrine de Monroe est une maxime ou règle de conduite, qui n'avait, dans l'origine, d'autre valeur que celle d'une opinion ou d'une résolution personelle de son auteur responsable, énoncée en quelque sorte ex cathedra. Les successeurs de James Monroe y sont restés fidèles. John Quincy Adams, président à son tour, l'a proclamée derechef à propos du congrès de Panama (1826), et les républiques de l'Amérique espagnole ont déclaré l'adopter au congrès de Lima (1865). Mais elle n'a jamais fait l'objet d'une convention, à laquelle des États non américains auraient consenti. Il va sans dire qu'elle ne saurait avoir aucune sorte de force obligatoire pour l'Europe. Son principe ne fait point partie des principes du droit des gens. La prétention émise plus d'une fois par les États-Unis de l'imposer plus ou moins aux États européens, est dénuée de tout fondement juridique.

"D'autre part, cette maxime n'implique pas, ainsi qu'on l'a cru parfois, une intention des États-Unis de se désintéresser de la politique générale de la Société des nations, et il n'est point inutile de constater que tout en écartant jalousement toute immixtion européenne sur les continents américains, ils s'arrogent eux-mêmes le droit d'y intervenir partout et à tout propos, si bien qu'aujourd'hui ce qu'ils appellent la doctrine de Monroe est en réalité l'affirmation d'une pretention permanente des Etats-Unis d'intervenir dans les affaires de tous les autres États d' Amérique."

Calvo devotes sections 147-167, pp. 284-300 of the first volume of his International Law (fifth edition, Paris, 1896) to a history of the Mon.