A government that is not fully sovereign has no right to extend its territorial possessions, and conversely one that plainly departed from the legitimate scope of a writer upon international law.

"Sec. 116. To illustrate these statements: Whether the United States may acquire new territory by gift, purchase, or cession from another country, must be determined by the Constitution, and the powers of the general government erected by that organic law. The Constitution itself is silent upon this particular topic; yet the power has been exercised several times: in the purchase of Louisiana and of Florida, the annexation of Texas, and the cession of California and New Mexico. The people have acquiesced, although Jefferson thought it needed a constitutional amendment to ratify his act in acquiring Louisiana. But whether the United States may transfer any of its territory, so as to cede away its paramount dominion therein, is an entirely different question, which has never, thus far in our history, been raised or discussed. "Sec. 117. By Grotius and the earlier writers upon public law kingdoms were divided into patrimonial or proprietary and usufructuary. The patrimonial, as it were, belonged to the monarch as a kind of private domain which he might alienate or dispose of at will. The usufructuary included all others, in which the rulers were looked upon as the representatives of a body politic behind them, and not as themselves constituting the state. Whatever might have been true in earlier times, it is certain that there is no such patrimonial kingdom or nation at the present day in Europe, and of course not in America.

"The general proposition of the international law, therefore, is, that by its proper, constituted authorities, whatever they may be,—king, president, legislature, people,—a nation may alienate to, or acquire from, another nation, territory or other things which are the objects of property. It is, moreover, of the last importance to remember that a nation which allows its ruler, either in his own person or through his minister, to enter into negotiations respecting the alienation of property with other nations, must be held to have consented to the act of the ruler; unless, indeed, it can be clearly proved that the other contracting party was aware at the time that the ruler in so doing was transgressing the fundamental laws of his state."" Pomeroy's International Law, edited by Theodore S. Woolsey, pp. 132–134.

GENERAL HALLECK'S VIEWS.

"Sec. 6. Right of a State to own property. A state being regarded in public law as a body politic, or distinct moral being, naturally sovereign and independent, it is considered as capable of the same rights, duties and obligations, with respect to other States, as individuals with respect to other individuals. Among the most important of these natural rights is that of acquiring, possessing, and enjoying property. And this right applies not only to property of the State, as exclusive of other States, but to such property as exclusive of individuals. But international law generally considers only the former kind of property, or in

cannot extend them does not possess the full measure of sovereignty. It is subject, by some limitation, to some other ternational domain. When, however, we consider the rights of conquest and cession, the rights of maritime capture and of capture on land, it becomes necessary to consider the interior or municipal rights of property in the State, and to distinguish between the absolute and paramount rights of the State, in respect to property considered in its interior relations under municipal laws, rather than its exterior relations under international laws. As a general rule, the property of a State, of whatsoever description, is marked by the same characteristics relatively to other States, as the property of individuals, relatively to other individuals; that is to say, 'it is exclusive of foreign interference, and susceptible of free disposition.'

"Sec. 7. Modes of acquisition. A State may acquire property or domain in various ways: its title may be acquired originally by mere occupancy and confirmed by the presumption arising from the lapse of time; or by discovery and lawful possession; or by conquest, confirmed by treaty or tacit consent; or by grants, cession, purchase, or exchange; in fine, by any of the recognized modes by which private property is acquired by individuals. It is not our object to enter into any general discussion of these several modes of acquisition, any further than may be necessary to distinguish the character of certain rights of property which are the peculiar objects of international jurisprudence.

"Sec. 8. Right of disposition of territory. A sovereign State has the same absolute right to dispose of its territorial or other public property as it has to acquire such property, but it depends upon its own municipal constitution and laws how, and by what department of its government, the disposition shall be made. This is sometimes a question of peculiar interest to foreign States, who may acquire such property by purchase, exchange, cession, conquest, and treaties of confirmation and especially where such acquisitions are made from States continually subject to revolutions and fluctuations in the character of its government and in the powers of its rulers. The act of a government de facto, a government which is submitted by the great body of the people, and recognized by other States, is binding as the act of the State; and it is not necessary for others to examine into the origin, nature, and limits of that authority. If it is an authority de facto, and sufficient for the purpose, others will not inquire how that authority was obtained.

"Sec. 9. Authority to make a valid transfer. Nevertheless, in order to make such transfer valid, the authority, whether de facto or de jure, must be competent to bind the State. Hence the necessity of examining into and ascertaining the powers of the rulers, as the municipal constitutions of different States throw many difficulties in the way of alienations of their public property, and particularly of their territory. Especially, in modern times, the consent of the governed, express or implied, is necessary, before the transfer of their allegiance can regularly take place. But formerly, what Grotius calls patrimonial kingdoms were considered in the light of absolute property of particular families, who,

power, which must be superior to it in that respect; when any government is in that condition owing to any cause whathaving received the blind submission of their subjects, sold and bartered them away, like any other property which they possessed. And such transfers of sovereignty included, not only the right of eminent domain and the absolute property of the sovereign or State, but all private lands, and the property, and services of the subjects, who were transferred with the soil, in the same manner as a slaveholder may transfer his slaves and all they possess, together with the title to his plantation.

"Sec. 10. Patrimonial kingdoms. There are numerous examples of such treaties of sale. In 1301, Theodoric, Landgrave of Thuringia, sold the Marquisate of Lusatia to Burchard, Archbishop of Magdeburg, for 600 marks of silver-'in super cum ministerialibus vassalis et mancipiis, et aliis hominibus, cujuscumque conditionis in jam dicta terra commorantibus,' etc. In the same manner, in 1311, Dantzic, Derschovia and Swiecae were sold by the Margrave of Brandenburg to the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, for 10,000 marks. In 1333, the city and territory of Mechlin, was transferred for one hundred thousand reals of gold, by a treaty of sale between its Sovereign and the Earl of Flanders, the fealty being reserved. About the same time the city and county of Lucques were sold by John of Luxemburg to Philip of Valois, for 180,000 florins; and a few years after, the sovereignty of Frankenstein was sold by the Duke of Silesia, for 2,000 marks, to the King of Bohemia. The sovereignty which the Popes so long held over Avignon was purchased by Clement VI., for 80,000 florins, from Jane, Queen of Naples and Countess of Provence. Alaska was purchased from Russia by the United States, by treaty of March 13, 1867.

"Sec. 11. Inhabitants of such kingdoms. The practice also extended to the mortgaging of sovereignties, and the sales of reversionary interests in kingdoms. Thus, Robert, Duke of Normandy, in order to raise money to engage in the first crusade, mortgaged his duchy for 666 lbs. weight of silver to his brother William, and transferred the possession before his departure for the Holy Land. In 1479, Louis XI. bought the right of the house of Penthièvre, the next male heir in reversion, to Brittany. And fifteen years later Charles VIII. purchased, for an annual pension of 4,300 ducats, an estate of 5,000 in lands in France or Italy, and the disposition of the Morea (when conquered), of Paleologus, the nephew of Constantine, the last Christian Emperor, his right to the whole Empire of Constantinople. The act of sale being drawn up by two notaries, and ratified, Charles assumed the robes, and ornaments of the imperial dignity, and made no scruples in claiming the imperial rights vested in him by virtue of this purchase.

"Sec. 12. Modern Transfers. It was also the custom to dispose of sovereignties and dominions by deeds of gift, and by bequests. The Emperor Lewis V. created the dauphin Humbert king, with the full privilege of disposing of his sovereignty at will, during life, or at his death. In 1343, Humbert ceded his dominions to Philip of Valois, by solemn deed of gift. By similar deeds, and upon a like principle, the

ever, it must acknowledge that it lacks complete sovereignty, Emperor Henry VI. conferred upon Richard I. the kingdom of Arles, and the Emperor Baldwin gave to the Duke of Burgundy the kingdom of Thessalonia. By bequests, not only were whole sovereignties dis posed of, but the orders of succession were frequently changed. Thus Charles II., King of Sicily and Count of Provence, changed by will the order of succession to the county, and the claims of Charles VIII. to the throne of Naples were founded upon the adoption of Louis of Anjou, by Jane, Queen of Naples, 1380, which was evidenced to all Europe by a solemn and public deed. In 1544 the English Parliament declared the succession to the Crown, but omitted to make any arrangement in the case of failure of issue of the children of Henry VIII. The King, by his will, named the descendants of his sister Mary, Duchess of Suffolk, as heirs in case of such failure." Halleck's International Law, third London edition, vol. 1, 1893, pp. 153–157.

PROFESSOR LAWRENCE'S VIEWS ON TITLE BY CESSION.

Among the titles it is possible to obtain through the transfer of territories already in the possession of civilized states, the most important is title by cession.

"Cession is the formal handing over by agreement of territorial possessions from one state to another. The agreement is embodied in a treaty which usually contains stipulations as to the transfer along with the ceded district of a proportionate share of the public debt of the ceding state. Moreover, questions connected with the rights of citizenship of its inhabitants and rights over the state domains within it are usually settled in the treaty; but no general rule can be laid down as to these matters. The stipulations respecting them will vary with the circumstances of each case.

"Since cession is the usual method whereby changes are effected in the distribution of territory among states which are subjects of International Law, it follows that cessions may take place in consequence of transactions of various kinds. Of these we will consider first Sale. It is not very frequent; but cases of it are to be found even in modern times, as when in 1867 the United States purchased Russian America for $7,200,000. The next ground of cession is Gift. Free gifts of territory are not altogether unknown, though as a rule the intercourse of states is not conducted on principles of lavish generosity. Yet a government that desired for special purposes to retain another's good-will has been known to make a gift of territory by treaty of cession. Thus in 1762, France ceded to Spain the colony of Louisiana, in order to indemnify her for the loss of Florida, which had been transferred to England by the Treaty of Paris; and in 1850 Great Britain ceded to the United States a portion of the Horseshoe Reef in Lake Erie, in order that the government of Washington might erect a lighthouse thereon. But in matters of transfer of territory the gift is far more often forced than free. A state beaten in a war is sometimes obliged to make over a province or a colony to the victor as one of the conditions of peace. In

and that it cannot rank among the great and independent powers of the world."

Such is the condition of every State of this Union. No one of them is completely sovereign, because the people have either delegated certain elements of sovereignty to the Central Government, viewing it from a federal standpoint, or viewing it from a national standpoint, they have vested the Central Government with certain elements of sovereignty to the exclusion of the States. One of the elements of sovereignty which the States do not possess is this right of acquisition of additional territory. No one of them can extend its borders without the consent of the Central Government.3

Not having surrendered any of its fully sovereign powers, as to the matters wholly within its own domain, the United States therefore possesses, in common with every other sovereign power, this right of acquisition of territory which, in the light of international law as we are now viewing it, includes the right to acquire, and to exercise sovereignty

deed, most cessions are the results of warfare and come under the head of forced gifts. One of the most recent instances is to be found in the cession of Alsace and part of Lorraine by France to Germany. This was done by the Treaty of Frankfort of 1871, and was one of the results of the defeat and downfall of France in the war of that and the preceding year. The last ground of cession we will mention is Exchange. It was common enough in times when territories were cut and carved in order to make provision for the scions of ruling families, but the growth of the principle that populations should have a voice in the settlement of their political destiny has made it comparatively rare. We can, however, find one instance in recent European history. By the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 Roumania ceded to Russia that portion of Bessarabia given to it at Russia's expense in the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and received in exchange the Dobroutcha, which was taken from Turkey." Lawrence's Principles of International Law, section 97, pp. 156-157.

See also Woolsey's Int. Law, § 53, p. 62; Hall's Int. Law, § 7, p. 45; Glenn's Int. Law, § 37, p. 49; Phillimore's Int. Law, vol. 1, §§ 268-270, and 275; Calvo's Int. Law, vol. 1,§§ 291-299.

2" Semi-Sovereign States do not possess all the essential rights of sovereignty, and therefore, can be regarded as subjects of international law only indirectly, or at least in a subordinate degree." Halleck's Int. Law (Baker's 3d English Edition), § 17, p. 74, Vol. I.

See Hall's Int. Law, p. 31; Woolsey's Int. Law, p. 35; Glenn's Int. Law, § 9, p. 17, and see citations collected in footnote, Glenn, p. 17.

8 U. S. Const. Art. I., § 10 and see § 19 of this volume, ante.