ception of the nature of a sentence. On the basis of this conception we will briefly examine the real import of ellipsis and its value as a means of interpretation. The usual definitions of sentence have of old been founded on a logical point of view, and if they are meant to be based on grammatical or more accurately on morphological characteristics, yet the logical criterion has always played a part. The abovementioned definitions of BECKER and DIONYSIOS THRAX are typical representatives of this conception of the essence of a sentence. Still in our days grammarians and philosophers endeavour to determine the conception of a sentence from the same point of view. Thus STOUT1 says: The sentence is a unit of speech because it is the expression of a unit of thought. This unit of thought as distinguished from its expressive sign is a judgment.» SIGWART maintains: »Der Satz ist der sprachliche Ausdruck des Urtheils», and SWEET holds: »A sentence is a word or a group of words capable of expressing a complete thought or meaning.> As to these kinds of definition we refer to the criticism to which they have been subjected by WUNDT1. PAUL seems to be the first who has endeavoured to define the sentence from the point of view of its psycho-genesis. But, according to WUNDT, he has given a wrong description of the psychological process in the formation of sentences when he says: > Der Satz ist der sprachliche Ausdruck, das Symbol dafür, dass sich die Verbindung mehrerer Vorstellungen oder Vorstellungsgruppen in der Seele des Sprechenden vollzogen hat, und das Mittel dazu, die nämliche Verbindung der nämlichen Vorstellungen in der Seele des Hörenden zu erzeugen.» This definition, WUNDT says, is applicable to »jede beliebige, rein mechanische Vorstellungsassociation», e. g. the enumeration of the twelve signs of the zodiac. It may be added that it is also applicable to any part of a sentence, consisting of at least two morphems, e. g. the murder of Cæsar, for it neglects determining the kind of psychical picture that a sentence is meant to express. 6 Also WUNDT wants to base the definition of sentence on a 1 Cf. Mind, vol. xvi, 1891, p. 192. 2 Cf. SIGWART, Logik, Freiburg, 1893, i., 25. Cf. SWEET, A New English Grammar, Oxford, 1892, p. 155. 4 Cf. WUNDT, op. cit., p. 222 sqq. Cf. PAUL, Principien, etc., Halle, 1898, p. 110. 6 Cf. WUNDT, op. cit., p. 230 sqq. psychological foundation. He, too, tries to indicate the psychogenetic character of a sentence, but he does it in a different way. >Ein Satz», he says1, »ist der sprachliche Ausdruck für die willkürliche Gliederung einer Gesammtvorstellung in ihre in logische Beziehungen zu einander gesetzten Bestandtheile. The essential point in this definition is that sentence is the linguistic expression for the resolution of what WUNDT has called the »Gesammtvorstellung 2» into its elements. This part of the definition has met with DELBRÜCKS approbation, although the latter adds, dass sich unter den einwortigen Sätzen, deren Vorhandensein natürlich niemand leugnet, einige Typen finden, die von Anfang an ungegliedert gewesen sind». GOMPERZ, too, looks upon sentence as a >>Zerlegung einer Gesammtvorstellung», consequently as an analytical process. It is maintained by WUNDT that the »Gesammtvorstellung is formed only in the very moment it finds expression in words. Moreover, he maintains that the elements of it which are not expressed in words when forming the sentence, do not generally stand out clearly in our consciousness: »es mangelt ihnen eben jene die Vorstellung momentan in den Blickpunkt des Bewusstseins hebende Kraft, welche dem gesprochenen Wort zukommt. Das unausgesprochene bleibt so meist in dem unbestimmten, simultanen Zusammenhang der Gesammtvorstellung eingeschlossen, ohne sich deutlicher aus dieser abzuheben». Therefore it is, that in sentences where the 'Gesammtvorstellung' has been imperfectly resolv ed into its elements, it is impossible to decide with certainty by which morphems the unexpressed elements would have been represented if the thought had been more accurately split up. From this it follows that the more incomplete the process of resolution has been, the more vague will be the meaning of the sentence, and the more mental effort will be required on the part of the 1 Cf. WUNDT, op. cit., p. 240. 2 As to the meaning attributed by Wundt to this term, see his Völkerpsy. chologie i., Die Sprache ii., p. 243 sqq. In the present treatise 'Gesammtvorstel lung', (F. représentation totale) has been rendered by 'total representation', or simply by 'thought', and G. 'Zerlegung' ('Gliederung'), 'zerlegen', have been rendered by 'resolution', 'resolve (into elements)', 'split up'. p. 141. Cf. B. DELBRÜCK, Grundfragen der Sprachforschung, Strassburg, 1901, 4 Cf. M. GOMPERZ, Zur Psychologie der logischen Grundthatsachen, Leipzig und Wien, 1897, p. 43. 3 Cf. WUNDT, op. cit., p. 242. hearer (reader) to understand, i. e. to reconstruct the thought which the sentence is meant to express. Thus, if the formation of a sentence is an analytical process, on the other hand, its understanding is of synthetic nature. The latter process is described by GOMPERZ1 in the following way: »>im Hörer ruft jedes dieser Worte (i. e. the words of a sentence) eine entsprechende Einzelvorstellung hervor, er combiniert diese aufeinanderfolgenden Einzelvorstellungen zu einer gleichzeitigen Gesammtvorstellung, welche der des Sprechers wesentlich congruent ist». This faculty of forming a total representation from the elements of a sentence is a psychological fundamental law. It is, GOMPERZ says, together with the corresponding analytical process (i. e. the formation of sentences) »die wahre und eigentliche Urtheils function». When the analytical process has been incomplete, the hearer (reader) is forced to draw from context, localization, surroundings, and attendant circumstances the necessary materials for the synthesis, i. e. the comprehension. This phenomenon is generally described as supplementation ('Ergänzung'). The essential and most important feature of a sentence is thus, according to WUNDT, analysis or resolution of the thought it embodies. But if this be the very essence of a sentence, it follows that morphems such as Thieves!, Fire!, Murder! are not sentences. In these it is only the predominating element of the thought that has found expression as a representative of the whole. WUNDT calls them equivalents of sentences because, like they lat ter, they are expressive of a total representation, but are lacking in the analytical criterion. In contradistinction to these he puts sentences which offer a resolution of the thought, but not a complete one. To such he must no doubt reckon expressions as Well I never!, One, Brighton, single!, the Virgilian Quos ego —!, etc. For our purpose, however, it is quite immaterial, whether or not the definition of sentence should be made so as to embrace also sentence-equivalents. What we here lay particular stress upon is the point that the normal sentence represents a resolution of a thought into its elements, that there are sentences in which it is incomplete, and others in which it is complete, and that the unexpressed elements do not make themselves salient in consciousness. It is on the basis of this view that we will now examine the real import of ellipsis and with what justification this term is applied to various kinds of sentences. 1 Cf. GOMPERZ, op. cit., p. 43. In taking a cursory survey of the principal kinds of sentences termed elliptical, we can divide them into the following categories. The sentence-equivalents will for the sake of convenience be considered as sentences with imperfect resolution of the thought they represent, although, strictly speaking, they offer no resolution at all. 1. Sentences offering an imperfect resolution, which may be presumed to represent only incomplete application of the modes of resolving thoughts into their elements, as used in the several languages. 2. Sentences offering an imperfect resolution, which presumably are survivals of primeval types of sentences. 3. Sentences offering a resolution which, comparatively speaking, is complete, but not following the common type. To the first category we may, as a rule, assign the case when the outward discourse is a more or less true reflection of the inward discourse (la parole intérieure' [EGGER]). The free, unrestrained manner of thinking is generally discursive, i. e. it operates with the help of language. In other words, we usually think by means of morphems, although we, sometimes, also may think without them. But it is by no means all the elements which constitute a thought that attain to distinct consciousness. This is only the case with the principal elements. The formal elements which in speech or writing indicate the relation between the chief points in a thought, do not stand out clearly in our consciousness. This may even be the case with whole sentences which would serve as connecting links. In short, a complete resolution of the thoughts is not presented by discursive thinking'. » Alle Sprechthätigkeit besteht in der Bildung von Sätzen», says PAUL. Now, it is no rare occurrence for this abrupt, pregnant form of thinking to be revealed in the outward discourse in a more or less unmodified state. When this is the case, sentences with incomplete resolution spring into existence. Reflections of the inward discourse are chiefly met with in emotional speech. The overwhelming emotion does not leave time for a complete resolution of the thought. For examples, we can apply PAUL words: »Hierher gehören Ausdrücke der Verwunderung oder Entrüstung oder des Bedauerns, die nur den Gegenstand angeben, über den man sich verwundert oder entrüs 1 Cf. G. CEDERSCHIÖLD, Om Svenskan som Skriftspråk Lund, 1902, p. 50 sqq. 2 Cf. PAUL, op. cit., p. 110. 3 Cf. Ibid., p. 299. tet oder den man bedauert. Das Prädikat wird dabei hauptsächlich durch den Gefühlston angedeutet. Vgl. Subjektsnominative wie dieser Kerl, diese Fülle, der Unglückliche etc.» Here belong also expressions such as: Well, I never!, Of all the unjust things!, Horse, a horse, a kingdom for a horse! (Sh.), Lat. Quos ego -! The same mode of expression is also frequently conditioned by the economic principle that so often operates in language, e. g. A glass of bitter!, One, Brighton, single! And if we turn to Dickens's 'Pickwick Papers', we shall find it used for comic effect. The adventurous vagabond Mr. Jingle does not take the trouble fully to resolve his thoughts, when pronouncing them. It is the inward discourse that is reflected in his speech, as for instance in the following passage (Pickwick, i. 12). » Heads, heads, take care of your heads», cried the loquacious stranger, as they came out under the low archway, which in those days formed the entrance of the coach-yard. »Terrible place dangerous work other day five children mother tall lady, eating sandwiches crash forgot the arch knock look round mother's head off sandwich in her hand to put it in - head of a family off shocking, shocking. Looking at Whitehall, Sir, - fine place little window head off there, eh, Sir?» children no mouth somebody else's In these and similar examples we are obviously in the presence of an incomplete resolution of the thought meant to be expressed. But it is impossible to know which morphems have been omitted, as the unexpressed elements of thought do not make themselves salient in our consciousness. There is no reason to assume that they are survivals of primeval types of sentences, except when we are concerned with sentence-equivalents in exclamative function or with types that perhaps should be interpreted as attributive sentences. On the contrary, we may fairly assume that, if the thought had been more fully expressed, it would have been resolved into its elements according to the principles which prevail in the several languages. This is at any rate obvious in cases when the morphem is of such a form as to suggest a relic of a fuller expression, e. g. Well, I never!, Of all the unjust things!, Lat. Quos ego -! Incomplete resolution of the kind here illustrated is often called ellipsis. Sometimes, however, it is designated as brachylogy; but it is not possible to determine the principles on which these expressions are employed. Furthermore, the term aposiope 'The examples are quoted from KRUEGER, Die Auslassung oder Ellipse in Herrig's Archiv vols. cvii (1901), cviii (1902). |