brought in that court under the first section. Mexican National Rail-
road Co. v. Davidson, 201.

2. Although section 3186 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin may have
enlarged the ordinary equitable action to quiet title and remove a
cloud, the Circuit Court of the United States, sitting in that District,
may take jurisdiction of a bill properly brought under its provisions.
Bardon v. Land and River Improvement Company, 327.

3. A person in possession, claiming under a tax deed, under which he had
obtained title, may institute such a suit. Ib.

4. The jurisdiction of a suit so instituted is not affected by the provision
in section 1197 of the Revised Statutes of Wisconsin of 1878 confer-
ring for three years a right of action by the grantee in a tax deed
against the owner to bar him and his grantees from claiming the land,
nor by the provisions of § 22, c. 138, of the Revised Statutes of 1858.
Ib.

JURY.

Under the act of May 2, 1890, c. 182, providing a temporary government
for the Territory of Oklahoma, the provisions of the statutes of Arkan-
sas, that if either party shall desire a panel, the court shall cause the
names of 24 competent jurors, written upon separate slips of paper, to
be placed in a box to be kept for that purpose, from which the names
of 18 shall be drawn and entered on a list in the order in which they
are drawn and numbered, and that each party shall be furnished with
a copy of that list, from which each may strike the names of three
jurors, and return the list so struck to the judge, who shall strike from
the original list the names so stricken from the copies, and the first
twelve names remaining in the original list shall constitute the jury,
are mandatory, and no rule or custom of the court can override them.
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Railway Co. v. Shane, 348.

LIMITATION, STATUTE OF.
See TAX SALE, 2.

LOCAL LAW.

Wisconsin. See JURISDICTION, C, 2, 3, 4;

TAX SALE.

LONGEVITY PAY.

In computing the time of service which entitles an officer in the army to
longevity pay, service in a volunteer regiment is not service "in the
army of the United States" within the meaning of the 15th section
of the act of July 5, 1838, c. 162, 5 Stat. 256. United States v. Sweeny,
281.

MINERAL LAND.

1. When the course of a mineral vein is across a claim, instead of in the
direction of its length, the side lines of the location of the claim

become, in law, the end lines, and the end lines become the side lines.
Last Chance Mining Co. v. Tyler Mining Co., 683.

2. In an action, brought under the provisions of Rev. Stat. §§ 2324, 2325,
by an adverse claimant to a part of a mineral claim as located, the
plaintiff alleged a priority of location, and rested his right to recover
upon it. The defendant answered, but subsequently and before judg-
ment withdrew his answer, and amended his application for a patent
so as to exclude the tract in controversy. At the trial the defendant
did not appear, but the plaintiff introduced evidence, oral and docu-
mentary. The court made a finding of fact that the tract in contro-
versy had already been located by the plaintiff as a part of his mining
claim when the defendant located his claim upon it, and that, conse-
quently, it was not subject to location by the defendant. Upon that
finding it was adjudged that, by reason of the laws and premises, the
plaintiff was the owner of the disputed tract, that he was entitled to
the possession of it, and that he recover possession of it from the
defendant. Held, (1) That it appeared by the record that the court
had in that case passed upon and determined the question of priority
of location, and upon such determination had given judgment in favor
of the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant's withdrawal of his answer
did not operate to take the complaint out of the case, or the allega-
tions of fact contained in it, or to prevent a judicial determination of
those facts; (3) that the abandonment of his claim by the defendant
did not take the jurisdiction for the settlement of the question out of
the hands of the court, or restore it to the Land Department; (4) that
the judgment of the court was in all respects regular; was conclusive
as to the particular ground in controversy; and was binding by way
of estoppel as to every fact necessarily determined by it, including the
question of priority of location. Ib.

3. In view of the conclusions reached, it is not necessary to consider what
extra-territorial rights (if any) exist when a vein enters at an end
line, and passes out at a side line.

Ib.

NATIONAL BANK.

A note whose payment is guaranteed by a national bank is a liability of
the bank which is required by law (Rev. Stat. § 5211) to be shown in
the report to the Comptroller of the Currency. Cochran and Sayre v.
United States, 286.

See INDICTMENT.

NEW TRIAL.

Ambiguous or too forcible expressions in a charge may be explained or
qualified by other parts of it, and if the charge does not, as a whole,
work injustice to the party objecting, the use of such expressions will
not be cause for granting a new trial. Baltimore & Potomac Railroad
Co. v. Mackey, 72.

PATENT FOR INVENTION.

1. The provision in Rev. Stat. § 4887 respecting a "patent granted for an invention which has been previously patented in a foreign country" refers to foreign patents granted previously to the issue of letters patent for the same invention by the United States, and not to foreign patents granted previously to the application for the American letters. Bate Refrigerating Company v. Sulzberger, 1.

2. When such foreign letters issue before the United States letters issue, the American patent is so limited as to expire at the same time with the foreign patent having the shortest term, but in no case is it to be in force more than seventeen years. Ib.

3. One who buys patented articles of manufacture from one authorized to sell them becomes possessed of an absolute property in such articles, unrestricted in time or place. Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Company, 659.

4. Whether a patentee may protect himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a question before the court and upon which it expresses no opinion. Ib.

5. The complainants were assignees, for the State of Massachusetts, of certain letters patent granted to one Welch, for an improvement in wardrobe bedsteads. The Welch Folding Bed Company owned the patent rights for the State of Michigan. The defendants purchased a carload of said beds from the Welch Folding Bed Company, at Grand Rapids, Michigan, for the purpose of selling them in Massachusetts, and afterwards sold them there and were still engaged in selling such beds in Boston. Held, that the defendants having purchased the patented articles in Michigan from the assignee of the patent for the territory included in that State, had a right to sell them anywhere within the United States, including Massachusetts, where the patent rights had been assigned to another assignee. Ib.

6. The previous cases bearing on this point considered and reviewed. Ib.

POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT.

In March, 1878, P. contracted to carry the mails three times a week for four years on route 36,107, commencing July 1, 1878, and entered on the performance of his contract. On the 5th day of the following December, in consequence of false and fraudulent sworn statements made by him concerning the number of horses and men that would be required to expedite the service by reducing the time, a large additional compensation was allowed him by the Postmaster General for that purpose. On the 13th of the same December he sublet his contract to S. with the consent of the Department, and the service was from that time performed by S. Further increased allowances, based on like fraudulent statements by P., were made in January and July, 1879, and assented to by P. and S. The amount so fraudulently received during the term of service was $99,556.20. The govern

ment sued P. and S. to recover back that sum. In the first count the above facts were set forth and it was alleged that the false statements were designed to mislead and did mislead the Post Office Department. A second count was for money had and received. A third count set forth the same facts and averred that the money had been paid in mistake of fact, and had been received contrary to the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 3961. No process was served upon P., and he did not appear. S. appeared and demurred, and the demurrer was sustained. Each was cited in the writ of error, and service acknowledged by the attorney for both. Held, (1) That the statements regarding the "horses and men" required for the expedited service came within the statement as to "stock and carriers" required therefor, as provided in Rev. Stat. § 3961; (2) that P. and S. were bound by these statements and were estopped from asserting that it was not intended thereby to bring the contract within the statute; (3) that the demurrer admitted the fact that the increase had been allowed on the basis of the false representation; (4) that the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to the third count; (5) that the defendants having each participated in the transaction, were properly sued jointly; (6) that the demurrer should have been overruled. United States v. Piatt and Salisbury, 113.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 10, 11, 12, 13.

PRACTICE.

1. The plaintiff's declaration claimed $10,000. He obtained a judgment in the trial court for $8000. The appellate court affirmed this judgment, and ordered that he recover "as in his declaration claimed." Held, that these words did not have the effect of increasing the sum actually recovered in the special term, and that the inaccuracy was not sufficient ground for reversal. Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 72. 2. A request made to the court by each party to instruct the jury to render a verdict in his favor, is not equivalent to the submission of the case to the court without the intervention of a jury, within the intent of Rev. Stat. §§ 649, 700. Beuttell v. Magone, 154.

3. When each party asks the court to instruct a verdict in his favor, it is equivalent to a request for a finding of facts, and if the court directs the jury to find a verdict for one of them, both are concluded on the finding of facts. Ib.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 20;

JURISDICTION, B, 1;

REMOVAL OF CAUSES;
WRIT OF ERROR, 2.

PREFERENCES.

See CORPORATION.

PUBLIC LAND.

1. In view of the treaties between the United States and the Osage Indians, and the laws affecting their lands, enacted prior to December 15, 1880,

VOL. CLVII-46

it must be held that the lands which were, by the act of that date, 21 Stat. 311, directed to be opened for entry under the homestead laws, were lands within the abandoned Fort Dodge military reservation, subject to disposition under general laws relating to "other public lands," and not lands of an exceptional class, that were affected with a trust established for the benefit of Indians by treaty. Frost v. Wenie, 46.

2. The Commissioner of the General Land Office may direct the proper local land officer to hear and pass upon charges of fraud in the final proof of a preemption claim upon which the requisite cash entry has been paid, and has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the local land officer in respect thereof; and the Secretary of the Interior has jurisdiction to review such judgment of the Commissioner, and to order such an entry, shown to be fraudulent, to be cancelled. Orchard v. Alexander, 372.

See MINERAL LAND.

RAILROAD.

1. Knowledge of a defect in a car brake cannot be imputed to the employé charged with keeping it in order, when he has had no opportunity to see it. Baltimore & Potomac Railroad Co. v. Mackey, 72.

2. A railroad company, receiving the cars of other companies to be hauled in its trains, is bound to inspect such cars before putting them in its trains, and is responsible to its employés for injuries inflicted upon them in consequence of defects in such cars which might have been discovered by a reasonable inspection before admitting them to a train. Ib.

3. In an action by an executor of a deceased person against a railroad company to recover damages for the killing of the intestate, an employé of the company, brought under the act of February 17, 1885, c. 126, 23 Stat. 307, which provides that "the damages recovered in such action shall not be appropriated to the payment of the debts or liabilities of such deceased person, but shall inure to the benefit of his or her family, and be distributed, according to the provisions of the statute of distributions," it is not error to charge the jury that in estimating damages they may take into consideration the age of the deceased, his health and strength, his capacity to earn money as disclosed by the evidence, his family, who they are and what they consist of, and from all the facts and all the circumstances make up their minds how much the family would probably lose by his death. lb. 4. A bridge carpenter, employed by a railroad company, who is injured through the negligence of employés of the company while assisting in loading lumber, taken from an old bridge, on a car for transportation over the road, is an employé of the company within the meaning of § 93, c. 23, of the General Statutes of Kansas which makes a railroad company in that State liable to its employés for damage done them