Rome is in danger," wrote the ambassador of Ferdinand I. on July 3rd," but in spite of this the Pope fears nothing; he is waiting for the answer which Strozzi is to bring back from France." It then transpired that Alba had offered peace on the basis of the conditions considered in the previous November, but the Pope declared that he could settle nothing without Henry II.1 The people of Rome longed for the speedy return of Strozzi. On July 19th the 2000 Swiss whose coming had been announced some time previously by the nuncio Raverta, arrived in Rome; they were fine soldiers, though badly armed. The Pope welcomed them as angels sent by God for his liberation, and invested their leaders with gold chains and knightly rank. 2 He sent them, strengthened by Italian troops, to the relief of the sorely pressed Paliano. The expedition ended on July 27th in the utter defeat of the Papal troops.3

On July 30th, almost at the same time as this terrible news,

1 See the *report of Delfino of July 3, 11, and 17, 1557 (Secret State Archives, Vienna).

2Cf. PLON, Cellini, 394 seq.

3 See the Spanish *account in the State Archives, Naples, C. Farnes the *report of Delfino of July 24, 1557 (Secret State Archives, Vienna) and the *Avviso di Roma of July 24, 1557 (Vatican Library); BROWN, VI., 2, n. 969, 972, 976, 978; MASSARELLI, 312; ANDREA, 273; NORES, 201; CABRERA, III., 139. The statement contained in Cabrera, and accepted by Ranke, that all the standards of the allies were lost in the encounter, with the exception of two, is erroneous; five were saved, and one was torn in pieces by the ensign to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy (see LÜTOLF, Schweizergarde, 58, and FELLER, Ritter Melchior Lussy, I., Stans, 1906, 1; cf. also WYMANN, Aktenstücke aus dem Römerkriege von 1557: Schweizer Geschichtsfreund, LXIV. (1909, 277 seqq.) It is an exaggeration to say as does BROSCH (Mitteil. des Österr. Inst., XXV. 485) that the Swiss auxiliaries amounted to 4,000 men. NAVAGERO-ALBÈRI (p. 401) says distinctly "quattro milla Svizzeri in voce et forse in pagamento ma non più di due milla in essere." *Cola Coleine (Chigi Library) also gives 2,000; Bernardino Pia says in a report to Cardinal Gonzaga, dated Rome, July 30, 1557, that the "rotta" of the Papal troops

QUARREL OF CARAFA AND HIS BROTHER. 163

Strozzi returned to Rome; he brought a much more favourable report than anyone in the Curia had dared to hope. Henry II. was prepared to hold out on the Pope's side, and the latter was to decide how long Guise was to remain in Italy.1

Paul IV., like Carafa, now again placed all his hopes in the French. The Duke of Paliano, who had always hated the whole war, thought otherwise. He spoke more decidedly than ever in favour of peace, and fearlessly blamed even the Pope, and much more so the dangerous policy of his brother. He had a violent scene with the latter at the beginning of August, at the vigna of the Carafa in Trastevere, concerning the provisioning of Paliano. Strozzi was present when this took place. The Duke, who was enraged at the double-dealing of the Cardinal, accused him of being the cause of all their misfortunes, because he thought only of himself. When the old Pope died, he would still remain a Cardinal, but what was to become of him, and all the other members of the family? The excitement of both of them kept on increasing. Monsignor," cried the Duke, " you are deceiving the Pope, and the King of France and his ministers. You are ruining the world, devastating Italy, destroying our family and especially myself, for to me you have done the worst of all possible things, you have robbed me of my only son. Hitherto I have restrained myself, but I can do so no longer. I shall tell the Pope everything and show him the sort of person you really are." Carlo answered him furiously, "You need not imagine that my Cardinal's hat will cause me to show you any consideration; I shall throw it off, and expose you as the stupid brute that you are." The Duke then stepped back in order to draw his sword, whereupon the Cardinal, casting his hat on the ground, was about to seize his brother by the throat, when Strozzi succeeded in separating them. The Duke of Paliano then went away, bursting with rage, and crying out: "This traitor was born

on July 27 has ensued "più tosto per imperitia et delli capitani et de soldati che d' altro" (Gonzaga Archives, Mantua). P. Segmüller is preparing a special work at Einsiedeln concerning the battle of Paliano.

1 See ANCEL, Sienne, 85; Nonciat., I., cvii.

for the ruin of the world!" The Cardinal begged Strozzi to hurry after him, to prevent the Pope hearing of the occurrence. Strozzi succeeded in calming the infuriated Duke, so that only a very mild account of the whole scene was communicated to Paul IV. "One sees," writes the Florentine ambassador, "how the truth is kept from the Holy Father.”’1

As Henry II. had expressly ordered Guise to comply with all the Pope's requests, he was forced to pay attention to the latter's cry for help. As soon, however, as the French army was set in motion, Alba left the Abruzzi and advancing through the valley of the Sacco, marched on Rome for the second time. It therefore appeared as if a decisive battle was to be fought near the Eternal City, where a painful scarcity of provisions was already beginning to make itself felt.2 Then, like a flash of lightning from a clear sky, the news arrived on August 23rd of a great victory which the Spaniards had won against the French on August 10th at St. Quentin. Next morning a courier from Guise announced that he had received orders to take his troops back to France as soon as possible. The principal counsellors of the Pope, Cardinal Carafa, the Duke of

1 Cf. the report of Navagero of August 3, 1557, in BROWN, VI., 2, n. 980 and the letter of Gianfigliazzi of August 18 in ANCEL, Disgrâce, 20, n. 5.

""

2 According to an *Avviso di Roma of February 13, 1557, the imports of provisions were even then so limited, that orders were issued that no married man, and no one with a household of his own, was to take meals in an osteria, as otherwise those who had nowhere else to go for their food would suffer. Paul IV. said at the time to the Romans who were complaining: cose incredibili (Cod. Urb. 1038, p. 194). An *Avviso of August 7 speaks of the fear of a gran carestia," for which reason the Pope should have corn brought in : Si ragiona che si caccierano di questa città le cortegiane, il poveri et gli giudei et ogni altro sorte di bocche inutili." An *Avviso of August 21 announces : Qua si patisce d'ogni sorte de viver ne si puo comprar cosa alcuna senza bolettino et è andato il bando che tutte le genti inutili scombrino. . . et si ragiona di cacciar ancora una parte delle famiglie de cardinali" (Loc. cit., p. 253, 257. Vatican Library).

ALBA AT THE GATES OF ROME.

165

Paliano and Strozzi had met for a conference in the night between August 23rd and 24th, which lasted until four o'clock in the morning. Then the Duke and Strozzi hastened to Guise; they only succeeded, however, in getting from him a promise that the French army, under the command of the Duc d'Aumale, should remain from ten to twelve days longer, in order to give the Pope time to conclude peace with Alba.1

At that time it seemed as though very little would be required to plunge Rome once more into the horrors she had suffered in the fatal year of 1527. On August 25th Alba had advanced as far as La Colonna, situated on one of the last spurs of the Alban hills. During the following night 3000 Spaniards started for the Porta Maggiore, taking with them ladders in order to scale the walls near the gate. When they approached the city, however, they found Rome all lit up, and heard the cries of command and the beating of drums. They were prepared for an attack inside the city, for a spy had given warning to Carafa; thereupon Alba resolved to return to La Colonna, and afterwards marched on Paliano.2

It is very much open to question, however, whether Alba refrained from the attack solely on account of Carafa's preparedness for defence, especially as there was all the more likelihood of success from the fact that the Romans were very

1

1 Cf. BROWN, VI., 2, n. 999; ANCEL, Sienne, 87-88; Nonciat., I., cviii.; MALAGUZZI, La battaglia di S. Quintino, Modena, 1890; ROMIER, Jacques d'Albon de St. André (1909). According to a letter of the Cardinal of Lorraine of August 21 (see Revue des quest. hist., XXXII., 477), Henry II. was willing to leave a portion of the troops for the protection of the Pope.

2 Besides MASSARELLI, 313, see NAVAGERO-ALBÈRI, 398 seq.; Carafa in DURUY, 390; ANDREA, 306 seq. and NORES, 336; cf. the *Avviso of August 28, 1557 (Vatican Library). *Il sig. duca d'Alba, writes Delfino on August 28, 1557, to Ferdinand I., "si è molto avicinato con le genti sue a questa città et se l'altra notte buona diligentia non ci aiutava questa città rimaneva in preda degl' inimici " (Secret State Archives, Vienna). According to Cola Coleine, *Diario (Chigi Library) the Imperialists advanced as far as Acqua Bulicante.

tired of the war and longed for peace at any price. It is much more probable that Philip II.'s generalissimo was also kept back by religious1 and political reasons from inflicting on the capital of Christendom the terrible fate of being sacked and pillaged, which in those days was always the consequence of a victory by force of arms. As Charles V. had done thirty years before, so now would Philip II. draw down upon himself the hatred of the whole Catholic world. The restrained manner in which Alba had hitherto conducted the war-his own soldiers complained that they were led into the field against smoke or a mist-agrees very well with the supposition that the Viceroy merely wished to show the Pope, by a demonstration of his strength, how completely he held him in his power.2

3

However difficult it was for such a self-assured man as Paul IV., who was so unshakably convinced of his right and of God's protection, to enter upon peace negotiations, he was forced to do so, as he stood almost defenceless before a well-armed and powerful enemy. The war, indeed, was voluntary, as Navagero wrote, but the peace was enforced.5 It was due, above all, to the skilful mediation of Venice, that an agreement was reached in a comparatively short time. On September

1 Cf. NAVAGERO-ALBÈRI, 407. According to this well-informed authority, Cardinal Juan Alvarez de Toledo, Alba's uncle, is said to have pointed out to his nephew the bad end to which all those came who had taken part in the Sack of 1527.

2 That was the opinion of Navagero; see SAMM, Une question italienne au XVIe siècle, 258; DURUY, 239; Cf. Arch. stor. Napolit., XXXV., 561, 566.

3 Cf. his remarks at the end of July in BROWN, VI., 2, n. 963, 972; see also ALBÈRI, 390, and MANAREUS, 125. Concerning the scene with Cardinal Ghislieri see, in Appendix No. 40, the *Avviso of September 4, 1557.

4 According to MASSARELLI, 314, the withdrawal of the Gascons from Rome began on September 4, which caused Paul IV. the greatest excitement; see the report of the Este of September 7, 1557, in the Annales de S. Louis, IX., 251.

5 NAVAGERO-ALBÈRI, 400. Concerning the peace negotiations cf. SAMM, Question 262 seq.; DURUY, 241, 390 seq.; RIESS, 271 seq., 463 seq.