As regards the national status of the subjects of the subjugated State, doctrine and practice agree that such enemy subjects as are domiciled on the annexed territory and remain there after annexation become ipso facto by the subjugation1 subjects of the subjugator. But the national status of such enemy subjects as are domiciled abroad and do not return, and further of such as leave the country before the annexation or immediately afterwards, is matter of dispute. Some writers maintain that these individuals do in spite of their absence become subjects of the subjugator, others emphatically deny it. Whereas the practice of the United States of America seems to be in conformity with the latter opinion, the practice of Prussia in 1866 was in conformity with the former. Thus in the case of Count PlatenHallermund, a Cabinet Minister of King George V. of Hanover, who left Hanover with his King before the annexation in 1866 and was in 1868 prosecuted for high treason before the Supreme Prussian Court at Berlin, this Court decided that the accused had become a Prussian subject through the annexation of Hanover.3 I believe that a distinction must be made between those individuals who leave the country before, and those who leave it after annexation. The former are not under the sway of the subjugator at the time of annexation, and, since the personal supremacy of their home State terminates with the latter's extinction through annexation, they would seem to be outside the sovereignty of the subjugator. But those individuals who leave the country after 1 The case is similar to that of Zachariae and Neumann, who cession; see above, § 219. * See Halleck, II. p. 476. * See Halleck, II. p. 476, on the one hand, and on the other Rivier, II. p. 436. Valuable opinions of deny that Count Platen was a Prussian subject, are printed in the Deutsche Strafrechts-Zeitung, 1868, pp. 304-320. Veto of third Powers. annexation leave it at a time when they have become subjects of the new Sovereign, and they therefore remain such subjects even after they have left the country, for there is no rule of the Law of Nations in existence which obliges a subjugator to grant the privilege of emigration to the inhabitants of the conquered territory. Different from the fact that enemy subjects become through annexation subjects of the subjugator is the question what position they acquire within the subjugating State. This question is one of Municipal, and not of International Law. The subjugator can, if he likes, allow them to emigrate and to renounce their newly acquired citizenship, and the Municipal Law of the subjugating State can put them in any position it likes, can in especial grant or refuse them the same rights as those which its citizens by birth enjoy. § 241. Although subjugation is an original mode of acquiring territory and no third Power has as a rule a right of intervention, the conqueror has not in fact an unlimited possibility of annexation of the territory of the vanquished State. When the balance of power is endangered or when other vital interests are at stake, third Powers can and will intervene, and history records many instances of such interventions. But it must be emphasised that the validity of the title of the subjugator does not depend upon recognition on the part of other Powers. And a mere protest of a third Power is of no legal weight either. 1 Both Westlake and Halleck state that the inhabitants must have a free option to stay or leave the country, but there is no rule of International Law which imposes the duty upon a subjugator to grant this option. XVI Grotius, II. c. 4-Vattel, I. §§ 140-151-Hall, § 36-Westlake, I. pp. 92-94-Lawrence, § 99-Phillimore, I. §§ 251-261-Twiss, I. 129-Taylor, §§ 218-219-Walker, § 13-Wheaton, § 164Bluntschli, § 290-Hartmann, § 61-Heffter, § 12-Holtzendorff in Holtzendorff, II. p. 255-Ullmann, § 81-Bonfils, No. 534— Despagnet, No. 390-Pradier-Fodéré, II. Nos. 820-829-Rivier, I. pp. 182-184-Calvo, I. §§ 264-265-Fiore, II. Nos. 850-851Martens, I. § 90-G. F. Martens, §§ 70-71-Bynkershoek, "Quaestiones juris publici," IV. c. 12-Heimburger, "Der Erwerb der Gebietshoheit" (1888) pp. 140-155. tion of § 242. Since the existence of a science of the Concep Law of Nations there has always been opposition to Prescripprescription as a mode of acquiring territory. Grotius tion. rejected the usucaption of the Roman Law, yet adopted the same law's immemorial prescription1 for the Law of Nations. But whereas a good many writers 2 still defend that standpoint, others 3 reject prescription altogether. Again, others 4 Again, others go beyond Grotius and his followers and do not require possession from time immemorial, but teach that an undisturbed continuous possession can under certain conditions produce a title for the possessor, if the possession has lasted for some length of time. This opinion would indeed seem to be correct, because it recognises theoretically what actually goes on in practice. There is no doubt that in the practice of the members of the Family of Nations a State is considered to be the lawful owner even of those parts of its territory of which originally it took 1 See Grotius, II. c. 4, §§ 1, 7, 9. 2 See, for instance, Heffter, § 12; Martens, § 90. 3G. F. Martens, § 71; Klüber, §§ 6 and 125; Holtzendorff, II. p. 255; Ullmann, § 81. 4 Vattel, II. § 147; Wheaton, § 165; Phillimore, I. § 259; Hall, $36; Bluntschli, § 290; PradierFodéré, II. No. 825; Bonfils, No. 534, and many others. Prescription how effected. possession wrongfully and unlawfully, provided only the possessor has been in undisturbed possession for such a length of time as is necessary to create the general conviction among the members of the Family of Nations that the present condition of things is in conformity with international order. Such prescription cannot be compared with the usucaption of Roman Law because the latter required bona-fide possession, whereas the Law of Nations recognises prescription both in cases where the State is in bonafide possession and in cases where it is not. The basis of prescription in International Law is nothing else than general recognition of a fact, however unlawful in its origin, on the part of the members of the Family of Nations. And prescription in International Law may therefore be defined as the acquisition of sovereignty over a territory through continuous and undisturbed exercise of sovereignty over it during such a period as is necessary to create under the influence of historical development the general conviction that the present condition of things is in conformity with international order. Thus, prescription in International Law has the same rational basis as prescription in Municipal Law-namely, the creation of stability of order. 243. From the conception of prescription, as above defined, it becomes apparent that no general rule can be laid down as regards the length of time and other circumstances which are necessary to create a title by prescription. Everything depends upon the merits of the individual case. As long as 1 This is pointed out with great lucidity by Heimburger, pp. 151155; he rejects, however, prescription as a mode of acquiring territory, maintaining that there is a customary rule of International Law in existence according to which recognition can make good originally wrongful possession. other Powers keep up protests and claims, neither is the actual exercise of sovereignty undisturbed, nor is there the required general conviction that the present condition of things is in conformity with international order. But after such protests and claims, if any, cease to be repeated, the actual possession ceases to be disturbed, and thus under certain circumstances matters may gradually ripen into that condition which is in conformity with international order. The question, at what time and under what circumstances such a condition of things arises, is not one of law but of fact. The question, for instance, whether Prussia, Austria, and Russia have now a good title by prescription to hold their respective formerly Polish territories, although the three partitions of Poland were wrongful and unlawful acts, must, I doubt not, be answered in the affirmative. For all the members of the Family of Nations have now silently acquiesced in the present condition of things, although as late as 1846 Great Britain and France protested against the annexation of the Republic of Cracow on the part of Austria. In spite of the fact that the Polish nation has not yet given up its hope of seeing a Polish State re-established on the former Polish territory, the general conviction among the members of the Family of Nations is that the present condition of things is in conformity with international order. When, to give another example, a State which originally held an island mala fide under the title by occupation, knowing well that this land had already been occupied by another State, has succeeded in keeping up its possession undisturbed for so long a time that the former possessor has ceased to protest and has silently dropped the claim, the conviction will be prevalent among the members of the Family of |