others operated with it; provided the blow really contributed either mediately or immediately to the death in a degree sufficient for the law's notice." (2 Bishop's Criminal Law (New), par. 637.) Moreover, the instruction made it clear to the jurors that they could not convict appellant of homicide by reason of any shot fired after apparent danger had passed unless they found that such subsequent shot killed the deceased. As a part of the instruction complained of the court specifically charged the jury that if they found "that the shot or shots which killed deceased . . . were fired by defendant . . . after all apparent danger which would justify a reasonable man in further resistance had passed, then and in that event the defendant would not be justified under the law of self-defense.' (Italics ours.)

Finally, it is urged that the court erred in refusing to give an instruction requested by appellant. It seems that a witness for the prosecution testified that some time previous to the trial defendant had threatened that if he, the witness, should testify against defendant on the trial "he [the witness] would eat dust." Defendant voluntarily took the stand in his own behalf and denied that he had made any such threat. This was as far as his testimony went. He did not testify to any fact which constituted a constituent element of the charge in issue the killing of Antior.

The requested instruction was as follows: "You are instructed that the defendant in a criminal action need not take the witness-stand to testify in his own behalf, and his failure to take the stand should not influence you against him. When a defendant does take the stand he has a right to testify about any portion of his case, and no prejudice should be raised in the jurors' minds against him because he does not testify about all instances concerning his case. When a defendant takes the stand his testimony is not to be distrusted merely because he is the defendant; on the contrary, his testimony is to be weighed by you in the same light as the testimony of any other witness in the case." (Italics ours.)

The instruction was properly refused. It may be that under the circumstances it would have been error had the court refused a requested instruction to the effect that where a defendant in a criminal action testifies only to a collateral matter a matter not directly related to any fact which

is a constituent part of the crime with which he is charged -no inference unfavorable to him can be drawn from his failure to testify to such matters as are directly connected with the charge in issue. But that was not the instruction requested. If the court had given the instruction as requested its effect would have been to charge the jury that when a defendant takes the stand and testifies concerning "any portion of his case" (such is the language of the requested instruction), no prejudice should be raised against him because he does not testify to all the facts of his case. Such an instruction is too broad. It is not a correct statement of the law. Had it been given it would have been tantamount to a charge that the defendant in a criminal action can tell half of the story touching the merits of the case and then stop short by omitting to explain incriminating circumstances and events in which he participated and concerning which he is fully informed, without subjecting his silence to the inferences to be naturally drawn from it. Such is not the law. [6] A prisoner who takes the stand in his own behalf waives his constitutional privilege of silence; and if he testifies to the merits of the charge but withholds testimony of other facts which form a part of the charge against him and of which he is informed, he must expect to incur the discredit which the jury would naturally visit upon the ordinary witness pursuing a like course. (State v. Harrington, 12 Nev. 125; State v. Ulsemer, 24 Wash. 657 [64 Pac. 800]; State v. Tatman, 59 Iowa, 471 [13 N. W. 632]; Diggs v. United States, 220 Fed. 545 [136 C. C. A. 147], where an elaborate discussion of the authorities may be found; affirmed, 242 U. S. 470, 493, 494 [Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168, L. R. A. 1917F, 502, 61 L. Ed. 442, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 192].)

[7] Moreover, the concluding part of the requested instruction, that which says that the testimony of the defendant in a criminal action "is to be weighed by you in the same light as the testimony of any other witness in the ease," justified the refusal of the whole instruction.

any instruction at all as to the credibility of any witness, or the weight to be given to his testimony, is violative of section 19 of article VI of the constitution, which provides that 'judges shall not charge jurors with respect to matters of fact.' (People v. Van Ewan, 111 Cal. 149

[43 Pac. 521].) Such instructions should not be given, and it is always proper to refuse them. (People v. Winters, 125 Cal. 329, 330 [57 Pac. 1067]; People v. Ross, 134 Cal. 258 [66 Pac. 229]. See People v. Hiltel, 131 Cal. 580 [63 Pac. 919].) [8] It has been repeatedly held that if any part of a single instruction should not have been given the action of the trial court in rejecting the whole will be affirmed. (People v. Davis, 64 Cal. 440 [1 Pac. 889].)

The judgment and order are affirmed.

Works, J., and Craig, J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on July 3, 1923, and then rendered the following opinion thereon:

THE COURT.-In denying the petition for rehearing, although this point is not urged in the petition, we do not wish to be understood as approving that portion of the opinion dealing with the last instruction set forth in the opinion with reference to the defendant's testimony. It is unnecessary to determine in this case whether the defendant was entitled to an instruction that "When a defendant does take the stand he has a right to testify about any portion of his case, and no prejudice should be raised in the jurors' minds against him because he does not testify about all instances concerning his case." The instruction was properly refused because it infringes upon the province of the jury in the last clause reading as follows: "When a defendant takes the stand his testimony is not to be dis. trusted merely because he is the defendant; on the contrary, his testimony is to be weighed by you in the same light as the testimony of any other witness in the case." (People v. Winters, 125 Cal. 325, 330 [57 Pac. 1067], and other cases cited in the concluding paragraph of the opinion of the district court of appeal. See, also, 8 Cal. Jur., sec. 394, p. 365, and cases cited.)

[Crim. No. 963. Second Appellate District, Division Two.-May 4,

1923.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. SAMUEL HANSEN, Appellant.

[1] CRIMINAL LAW-FORGERY OF DEED-PROOF OF OWNERSHIP.-In a prosecution for forgery of a deed, where the prosecution does not rely upon the presumption of the continuance of title in the complaining witness, but such witness testifies that he had not alienated it, it is not error to permit proof of ownership by the county records instead of by the original deeds.

[2] ID. OTHER OFFENSES-GUILTY KNOWLEDGE-INTENT TO DEFRAUD -EVIDENCE.-In a prosecution for forgery of a deed, proof that defendant made, executed, and delivered a forged deed to a different piece of real property purporting to be from a named nonresident, and the acknowledgment to which was also represented as being before a notary public who is shown to have been fictitious, is admissible to prove guilty knowledge and intent to defraud.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County. R. Y. Williams, Judge. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Cooper, Collings & Shreve for Appellant.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, for Respondent.

CRAIG, J.-This is an appeal from a judgment and an order denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The defendant was charged with the crime of forgery by an information containing two counts. The first count alleges that the defendant did make, utter, forge, and counterfeit a deed dated September 18, 1919, to a certain piece of land in Orange County, with intent to defraud one T. R. Kinmounth. By the second count the same charge is made except that the deed said to have been forged is dated October 15, 1919.

1. Admissibility of evidence of other crimes in prosecution for forgery, notes, 9 Ann. Cas. 456; Ann. Cas. 1912C, 91; 62 L. R. A. 224, 249, 289, 319, 324; 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 754.

On the trial T. R. Kinmounth was called as a witness and testified that he was the owner of the property described in the deeds set up in the information, having received title. thereto from the estate of one Murphy in 1890, and that he had paid all taxes ever since that date; that he was a nonresident of California and had not been in this state for more than thirty years; that he had never signed a deed of this property to Samuel Hansen and did not know the latter; that he was a married man, although both of the deeds recited the fact that he was single. It was shown that the purported deeds as set out in the information from Kinmounth to Hansen appeared to be acknowledged before a notary public named Cora E. Moore; that they were recorded in the office of the county recorder of Orange County, and this fact was established by the introduction of the records. It was further proved that there never had been such a notary public as C. E. Moore holding a license from the state of California for Orange County; that after said deeds were recorded the defendant conveyed the property to one McDuffie.

[1] On behalf of the defendant several witnesses testified that a person named Kinmounth had exccuted deeds of the land in question to the defendant. It is claimed by appellant that the court erred in permitting proof of ownership by the county records without a foundation, and that the best and only competent evidence would have been the original deeds. To support this contention we are referred to People v. Strassman, 112 Cal. 687 [45 Pac. 3]. In that case a record title was shown in the complaining witness but there was no evidence to prove that between the date thereof and the filing of the information title had not passed to someone else. The intervening period was about a year. The court there held that the presumption of the continuance of title in the person in whom it was shown to exist by the record at the date of recordation must give way to the presumption of innocence. In the instant case the prosecution has not relied upon the presumption of the continuance of title in Kinmounth since the record shows that he acquired the same. Kinmounth himself testified that he had not alienated it. This evidence was competent. (Sec. 1951, Code Civ. Proc.)